

CHAPTER 5 DIASPORA SPACE, ETHNOGRAPHIC SPACE — WRITING HISTORY BETWEEN THE LINES

A Postscript

This book began with a discussion of a specter with complicated implications for how Black Germans were read and responded to by Germans during the first half of the twentieth century. But in many ways, the chapters presented thus far might be said to be “haunted” by their own ever-so-benign specter of sorts. Then again, perhaps *specter* is far too hyperbolic a term for the phenomenon to which I refer. Perhaps it is better characterized as an insistent, underlying subtext, a nagging assumption or question that cannot be ignored. Although this study has placed the history of Black Germans and the narratives of the lives of two individual members of this group firmly in the context of the history of the Third Reich and the politics of race, gender, and sexuality in early-twentieth-century Germany, the question remains as to how we are to read the history of this community in relation to the similar histories of other Black populations. Indeed, for many, the material presented in this study would pose a different, as yet unanswered question of what links, parallels, and comparisons might be drawn between Afro-German histories of racism, resistance and struggle, and affirmation and identification and those of Black communities in other cultural contexts. Might there be points of similarity and commonality among different Black cultures that connect their historical and cultural trajectories? Might we not view these links as points of comparison that offer us a deeper understanding of the social and political status of Black people more generally?

This closing chapter will respond to this subtext of suggestive and

provocative questions about the links and commonalities among different Black communities. Examining the relations between Black communities transnationally and the ways in which these connections can be utilized constructively toward important cultural, political, material, discursive, and analytic ends is at the core of a growing and complex literature on the African diaspora. Yet scholarship theorizing Black community and cultural formations often relies on a discourse of diasporic relation in which similarity and commonality are privileged. In the pages that follow, I hope to complicate and, perhaps more ambitiously, contribute to a rethinking of how the relations of the African diaspora might be conceived more productively. This chapter grows out of a desire to understand the diaspora as a formation that is not solely or even primarily about relations of unity and similarity, but more often and quite profoundly about the dynamics of *difference*. It illuminates these dynamics by thinking about the question of translation among different Black communities, and how difference and translation are themselves crucially constituent elements of the African diaspora. Hence, this final chapter offers a very future oriented end to this historical study of German Blacks in the early twentieth century by considering how this community might refigure the politics of the African diaspora in the twenty-first century.

In his 1994 article, "Diasporas," James Clifford poses the probing question, "What is at stake, politically and intellectually, in contemporary invocations of diaspora?"¹ This question holds continued relevance for current scholarship on Afro-diasporic communities and is central to understanding the links many Black scholars see as significant to an analysis of the transnational relations among Black communities. Reexamining Clifford's question gives us the opportunity to reflect critically on the extent to which the discourse of diaspora has become far more centered, particularly in the fields of Black studies, cultural studies, and African-American history, than it was at the time of the publication of Clifford's essay, just a few years ago. Taking Clifford's provocative query as a starting point is also intended to invite a reflection on whether our stakes in the concept of diaspora in studies of Black communities transnationally have changed as this term has become more centered. At the same time, this question directs our attention toward the less celebratory, less comfortable, more problematic elements of this discourse as well as their implications for our

attempts to make sense of the histories, cultural formations, and expressions of Black communities elsewhere.

This final chapter is less a conclusion than a postscript, looking simultaneously both backward and into the future. Linking the narratives of Hans Hauck and Fasia Jansen to scholarly and popular discourses and discussions of diaspora, this chapter explores how the ethnographic exchanges out of which these narratives emerged reflect complex tensions within the relations between Black communities. At the same time, it illustrates some of the exigencies of diasporic relation that make the concept of diaspora something more than an analytic tool—indeed, for many people, it is a practical and political necessity. This chapter explores these issues by way of a particularly rich set of ethnographic phenomena that characterized my exchanges with my Afro-German informants, phenomena that occurred at different times and in different forms in all of my interviews. A complex citational practice that my informants strategically invoked throughout our exchanges, the phenomenon I refer to as “intercultural address” raises fascinating questions about the implicit notions of similarity and relation often assumed between the histories and experiences of Black communities transnationally. The following pages reintroduce several passages from the preceding chapters. These quotations will be returned to the original interview contexts from which they were extracted and reread in relation to the ethnographic settings in which they occurred.

This chapter resituates Clifford’s original question, reading it through a very different lens and site of analysis. In so doing, the chapter takes as its starting point a related question, albeit one whose formulation differs from Clifford’s in important ways. Specifically, what do invocations of “diasporic relation” do for communities situated at what anthropologist Jacqueline Nassy Brown calls “the margins of diaspora?”² Although we may never comprehensively answer this question with any degree of satisfaction, reflecting momentarily on the term *diaspora*—both its more recent genealogy and some of the methodological and theoretical uses to which it has been put—might prove useful as an analytic framework for the study of Black communities, enabling us to begin imagining what such an answer might entail. Following this brief introduction, I offer a reading of some of my encounters with diasporic invocation taken from my work on

Black Germans. The first set of encounters are scholarly ones, the second very rich ethnographic ones. Each offers different insights into the work that diasporic invocation does and the entanglement of intercultural interpellation and interrogation therein. Each asks us in different ways to engage the stakes of the relationships between Black communities in ways that are at times uncomfortable, at times problematic, yet always insightful and instructive.

BORROWINGS, LINKS, AND (BE)LONGINGS

As numerous scholars have made clear, the foundational notion of *diaspora* is the forced dispersal or displacement of a people. A diverse array of social theorists have theorized diaspora in relation to this fundamental notion of dispersal and displacement from an originary homeland, building on the much-cited etymology of the term from the Greek *dia* (meaning “through”) and *speirein* (meaning “to sow” or “scatter”). The implicit and often explicit referent in these analyses is what is seen as the defining paradigm (what William Safran, following Weber, terms the “ideal type”) of diaspora—the Jewish diaspora.³ Diaspora traditionally has been associated with a historical event of migration or dispersal whose profound effects come to be inscribed in narratives of displacement. Equally central to this model of diaspora is the maintenance of either a concrete or imagined relationship to an originary homeland and the narratives cultivated and passed down within communities that construct an intergenerational continuity of relationship to such homelands across time and space. Yet, as both Clifford and sociologist Avtar Brah emphasize, the concept of diaspora is not limited to a historical experience. Rather, this idea functions as at once a theoretical concept, a complicated imagined space of relation, and a complex analytic discourse that “invites a kind of theorizing that is always embedded in particular maps and histories.”⁴ Brah suggests that we conceive of diasporas as “an ensemble of investigative technologies that historicize trajectories of different diasporas, and analyze their relationality across fields of social relations, subjectivity and identity.”⁵

Yet when considering the concept of diaspora specifically in relation to African-descended peoples, the question arises of what exactly constitutes the potentially beneficial diasporic connection among Black

peoples? Precisely this question has been one focus of the subtle and sophisticated analyses of Black British theorists of diaspora, most prominently Stuart Hall and Paul Gilroy.⁶ Many models of African diaspora emphasize the role of African origins, cultural heritage, and legacies, and these models continue to constitute a highly influential discourse both within the academy and beyond it. Both the historical event of migration and at times the residual effects of slavery as a defining moment of inequality whose effects continue to have salience in contemporary social interactions remain elements of these articulations of diaspora. Yet in the European context, Black British scholars such as Hall and Gilroy have theorized diaspora in the British context as multiple complicated processes of positioning in relation to a sense of belonging vis-à-vis the creation of psychic, symbolic, and material communities and “home(s)” in the sites of settlement.

In many ways, Gilroy’s conception of diasporic relation might be said to be the privileged model for understanding diaspora among contemporary theorists of Black European culture. Gilroy articulates this relation as a transnational link forged through the mutual perception of a shared, racialized condition and the cultural and political resources Black people use in their struggles against the various and varying forms of racial oppression with which they must contend in their respective contexts.⁷ Specifically, Gilroy argues that the ongoing “pursuit of emancipation, justice and citizenship internationally as well as within national frameworks” constitutes a transcultural and historical link between Black cultures.⁸ Moreover, an intricate process of borrowing and adaptation is key to Gilroy’s diaspora discourse. This dynamic cultural syncretism is central to the relations between Black cultures in the ways that communities such as Black Britain draw on the “raw materials” of Black communities elsewhere. As Gilroy writes in one of his most widely cited formulations,

Black Britain defines itself crucially as part of a diaspora. Its unique cultures draw inspiration from those developed by black populations elsewhere. In particular, the culture and politics of black America and the Caribbean have become raw materials for creative processes which redefine what it means to be black, adapting it to distinctively British experiences and meanings. Black culture is actively made and re-made.⁹

Through his emphasis on intercultural relations of borrowing, exchange, and adaptation within “settled” Black communities, Gilroy articulates a discourse of diaspora as a complex politics of location and belonging. As Brown asserts, Gilroy’s diaspora discourse thus moves beyond a fixation on the consequences of migration, displacement, and relation to originary homelands to focus on the types of raw materials (for example, popular cultural artifacts such as music, shared memories, or cultural narratives) on which Black populations draw in constituting their own cultures and communities.¹⁰ Here, Brown’s notion of “diasporic resources” proves particularly useful. In her 1998 article, “Black Liverpool, Black America, and the Gendering of Diasporic Space,” Brown engages the stakes of the discourse of Black America in Black British articulations of diaspora and offers an important intervention in the discussion of diasporic relation. Building on Gilroy’s notion of raw materials, Brown undertakes a sophisticated analysis of the cultural and political practices of Black Liverpudlians, focusing on their use of “the vast resources of what they construct as the Black world, yet within the political economy of what has been available to them.” She continues,

Diasporic resources may include not just cultural productions such as music, but also people and places, as well as iconography, ideas, and ideologies associated with them. . . . I use the term *diasporic resources*, then, to capture the sense that black Liverpudlians actively appropriate particular aspects of “black America” for particular reasons, to meet particular needs—but do so within limits, within and against power asymmetries, and with political consequences.¹¹

Emphasizing the African diaspora itself as less a concrete geographical trajectory than a set of relations constructed actively by communities for specific purposes, toward particular ends, Brown contends that “there is no actual space that one could call ‘the African diaspora,’ despite how commonly it is mapped onto particular locales.” Yet she argues that this fact points out the extent to which “social spaces are constructed in tandem with processes of racial formation.”¹² Moreover, the complex forms of desire and longing she understands as crucial to the relations between different Black communities are central to

her concept of diasporic resources. As we will see, these relations are anything but simple, universal, or egalitarian but rather emerge as the product of past and contemporary histories and hegemonies that require active and self-critical engagement.

DIASPORIC ASYMMETRIES

My interest in fleshing out the limits and tensions of diasporic relation arises out of my increasingly frequent confrontations with diaspora as *the* requisite approach or theoretical model through which one should (or perhaps must) understand all formations of Black community, regardless of historical, geographical, or cultural context. In trying to understand the relationship of the history of Black Germans to the histories of other Black communities, it becomes increasingly apparent that diaspora does not constitute a historical given or universally applicable analytic model for explaining the cultural and historical trajectories of all Black populations. Rather, we must engage this concept with an awareness and articulation of its limits in regard to those Black communities whose histories and genealogies do not necessarily or comfortably conform to dominant models. Indeed, it is worthwhile to recall Gilroy's reminder that diaspora often serves to paper over difficult fissures and gaps within the affiliations constructed between Black communities. As he remarks, "This powerful idea is frequently wheeled in when we need to appreciate the things that (potentially) connect us to each other rather than to think seriously about our divisions and the means to comprehend and overcome them, if indeed this is possible."¹³

Similarly, particularly for a Black community such as Afro-Germans, it is necessary to establish their specific relation to the concept of diaspora before assuming their inclusion within this model on an equal or universal status with other Black communities. Yet such specificity often proves elusive when theorizing the relation of particular Black communities to the African diaspora, as the following example attests. In her 1996 article, "Historical Revelations: The International Scope of African Germans Today and Beyond," Carol Aisha Blackshire-Belay writes:

It is true that the level of awareness of Africa and Africanness among African Germans has increased over the years since the

organization of various groups among them. This has also led to a development of consciousness about who they are in European society. Examination of German history and German contacts with African people in Africa, Germany, and in the Americas helps them to identify the obstacles that have historically stood in the way of progress for the African Germans and their situation in German society today. This enables them to understand the ways in which these obstacles have been overcome in places and to draw up a program of action to overcome obstacles where they continue to exist. Indeed consciousness of Africa is a necessary rallying point for the promotion of more fruitful and enduring interactions between continental and diasporic Africans.

The time has come for the African-German community to see itself as a community belonging to the African Diaspora—African-descended people dispersed throughout the world. While the African Germans may perceived [*sic*] themselves as a small, yet visible minority in a white majority society, they are, however, national minorities in the countries of their birth. This becomes much more important when it is considered together with the populations of the African continent, and only then does the balance change. Because as members of the African Diaspora we are all connected by heritage although separated by birth. This connectedness offers us a strength that we can draw from, indeed just as African Americans have discovered over time.¹⁴

Blackshire-Belay's comments place Afro-Germans in a perplexing and rather awkward space in the discourse of diaspora. On the one hand, Belay describes a reciprocal relation between Afro-Germans' growing awareness of their African history and heritage and the beneficial effects of this awareness in reinforcing their sense of themselves as Europeans. On the other hand, through the emphasis she places on the lessons that might be learned from a closer examination of Germany's historical encounters with Blacks at home and abroad, her comments seem to gesture toward a notion of raw materials or resources that is related to though less well developed than that articulated by Brown and Gilroy.

Yet at this point, Blackshire-Belay's arguments take a distinct turn in a different direction—one that privileges both Africa and African-

Americans in her configuration of the relations of the African diaspora. When she writes that “consciousness of Africa is a necessary rallying point for the promotion of more fruitful and enduring interactions between continental and diasporic Africans,” she elides the benefits of learning from the history of Black peoples’ struggles with an identification with Africa, at the same time making a curiously essential distinction between what she terms “continental” and “diasporic” Africans. In this way, she seems to invoke the identification with a culturally and nationally transcendent “Africa” as the necessary prerequisite to diasporic relation. Blackshire-Belay’s notion of the diaspora thus recenters Africa as a mythic point of origin and a unifying transnational social and politic adhesive between continental Africans and their irksome siblings, Afro-diasporics. This recentering of Africa harkens back to much earlier discourses of diaspora similarly anchored in sites of origin and notions of cultural heritage as powerful explanatory models for contemporary social and political configurations.

In this context, Blackshire-Belay offers her most strident invocation to diasporic identification, insisting that the Black German community’s identification with the African diaspora is long overdue. Here she defines *diaspora* quite simply as “African-descended people dispersed throughout the world,” where the diasporic relationship between Black communities is their “common heritage”—a connection on which, she emphasizes, Blacks can draw for strength. In many ways, Blackshire-Belay’s comments closely resemble the words of African-American feminist poet and activist Audre Lorde, who, in her 1990 foreword to *Showing Our Colors*, articulates a similar set of issues: “Members of the African Diaspora are connected by heritage although separated by birth. We can draw strength from that connectedness.”¹⁵ Yet unlike Blackshire-Belay, who defines a very specific relationship between Black Germans and Africans in her diaspora discourse, Lorde formulates this relationship as a question both open to interpretation and in need of interrogation. In her 1984 introduction to the original German publication of *Showing Our Colors*, *Farbe bekennen* (reprinted in the English edition), Lorde poses this question quite directly:

Who are they, these German women of the Diaspora? Beyond the details of our particular oppressions—although certainly not outside the reference of those details—where do our paths intersect

as women of color? And were do our paths diverge? Most important, what can we learn from our connected differences that will be useful to us both, Afro-German and Afro-American.¹⁶

In her foreword, Lorde refined this formulation to explicitly query the exact relationship to Africa of Afro-Asians, Afro-Europeans, and African-Americans.¹⁷ Lorde's persistent efforts to ponder these relations as questions are useful, for in so doing, she foregrounds what she terms the "connected differences" between different Black communities and cultures such that their moments of divergence become as salient as their similarities, overlaps, and commonalities.

Blackshire-Belay seems not to give credence to the deeply diasporic dialogue out of which both the term *Afro-German* and the movement itself emerged. As the authors of *Showing Our Colors* attest, the thoroughly diasporic, cross-cultural exchange between themselves and Lorde contributed substantially to their articulation of their identity as Afro-Germans.¹⁸ Indeed, in many, if not all, of the personal narratives published in this seminal volume, the reader is struck by Black German women's recurring stories of fateful visits made to Africa (or Black communities in the Americas or Britain) and the pivotal role ascribed to these encounters with Black communities abroad. These experiences are often not described in positive terms, though they almost always have substantial implications for the women's later lives. Nevertheless, while identification with Africa or Black communities elsewhere often serves as a starting point, such identifications must always be unpacked and deconstructed to unearth the layers of projection, desire, and longing that inevitably play a role in these complex relationships. Similarly, privileging Africa within the discourse of diaspora is equally in need of unpacking and deconstruction.

Yet beyond the tendency of an uncritical invocation of diasporic relation to diminish the critical capacity of diaspora by reducing this concept to a descriptive term of identification and similarity through racialization, Blackshire-Belay's comments also illustrate another perhaps more worrisome dimension of the discourse on the African diaspora that arises from an overemphasis on relations of similarity. Belay's quotation exemplifies this through the telling role ascribed to Black America in her articulation of diaspora. The frequent citation of Black America within scholarly discourse on the African diaspora as

an almost privileged site or referent in the trajectory of diasporic cultural, community, and identity formation, and the increasing use of the African-American context in articulating a politics of diasporic relation, may be read as a discourse that refers not so much to a relation of equity than of hegemony. Blackshire-Belay's less-than-satisfying articulation of transnational diasporic relation embodies this tension, since her reference to the African-American experience seems intended not simply to be relational but rather to be exemplary.

In her compelling critique of Gilroy's conception of the diasporic relationship between Black Britons and Black America, Brown argues that Gilroy's analysis is troubled by the extent to which his attempts to theorize transnational diasporic relationships leave unexamined the asymmetries of power that exist across and between different Black communities and the very different relationships to diaspora that arise as a result. Brown urges us in our engagement of notions of transnational Black diaspora to examine how American hegemonies in particular have contributed to an imbalance in the nature of the transatlantic exchanges that constitute the diaspora. She cautions that

diaspora may very well constitute an identity of passions; but these passions, and the means of pursuing them, may not be identical within particular communities. These points force the sober realization that, despite invitations to universal identification, not everyone partakes in the privileges of membership to the diasporic community with impunity.¹⁹

Brown's work highlights a tendency within the discourse of diaspora to assume a kind of equality between Black communities within the diaspora in ways that bracket, ignore, or erase the very different ways in which specific Black communities are situated within the geopolitical relations of power and hegemony. She encourages us to remember that the diaspora is also structured by power asymmetries inscribed both by different histories of racialization, colonization, and imperialism and the more recently accruing forms cultural capital some Black communities, particularly the African-American community, have come to command in the past quarter-century. Indeed, the desire to see such linkages as removed from or outside of these relations is one of the most potentially problematic dimensions of the dis-

course of diaspora. As Brown also points out, in the relations of the African diaspora, not all Black communities are equal. African-Americans and African-American feminists in particular must be especially mindful of this fact, because the manner in which both Black America and Africa are invoked within African-American discourses of diaspora is also often anything but equitable.

Following Brown, it is important to recognize that the relationships between different Black communities are structured no less by dynamics of power and hegemony than the relationships that came to constitute the diaspora itself. Here, the role of Black America must also be incorporated into any assessment of diasporic relation, less as a concrete history of struggle than as a way in which this history and the increasingly influential cultural capital of Black America travels to and often structures modes of articulation within other communities.²⁰

Yet when we set the history of the Black German community in relation to the more complex notions of diaspora discussed in this chapter, it is also important to reflect on the role of an undertheorized element of diasporic relation—namely, the role of memory. Highlighting the function of memory in the writing of history has been one of this text's primary goals. Similarly, the role of memory is an important element in the relations of diaspora and should not be overlooked in its analysis. The status of memory suggests a different process of cultural formation and highlights some important tensions of diasporic relation that must be engaged in any analysis of the Black German community's relation to the African diaspora.

In the German context, the absence of the forms of memory so central to many models of Black diasporic identity and community raises the question of what happens when a community lacks access to such memories, as has historically been the case for Afro-Germans. Until recently, few Afro-Germans had any connection to one another, for most members of this largely mixed-race population grew up as the only Blacks in their surroundings. With the exception of the current generation, most Black German children did not grow up with their Black parents, thus hindering almost any transmission and preservation of memory in a fundamental way. Despite the fact that points of contact and relation among early Black migrants to Germany did exist, the death or departure of these almost always male Black parents often meant that these nascent networks of relation were rarely, if ever,

sustained from one generation to the next. Hence, what marks much of this group is the lack of shared narratives of home, belonging, and community that sustain so many other Black communities and on which they draw as “resources” in numerous ways. As a result, Black Germans have never regarded a sense of relation and belonging among themselves or to other Black communities as self-evident. It has come to be negotiated only in the past two decades. Even current attempts to forge political and cultural connections and alliances with members of other Black communities both in Germany and abroad repeatedly falter on this issue, often coming into conflict at the moment when established histories of other Black communities are imposed on Afro-Germans, who are assumed to identify with histories of struggle (most often those of Africans, Caribbeans, or African-Americans) in which Afro-Germans are not seen as active participants. Their struggles often go overlooked, along with the histories and existence of Black Europeans altogether.

Paradoxically, although the preceding chapters have emphasized the importance of memory in reconstructing the history of this population and in understanding the complex and contradictory effects of National Socialism at the local level, this chapter is less about memory *per se* than about what happens in its absence. In other words, how does the discourse of diaspora play out in a Black diasporic community where memory is quite palpably absent? What must be emphasized here is the extent to which memory plays a central role in constituting forms of diasporic identity and community. The direct and inherited memories of diaspora define and sustain a sense of relation to real and imagined homelands in addition to a sense of relation among and between communities separated spatially in diaspora. As both remembrance and commemoration, this memory technology engages strategic forms of forgetting imposed institutionally from without as well as individually and collectively within specific communities. Memory provides the source of the defining tension of diaspora and diasporic identity: the dynamic play of originary and imaginary homes, and the complex networks of relation forged across national, spacial, and temporal boundaries.

In this way, Afro-Germans are, once again, positioned in a type of interstitial space—implicated and intertwined, though not fully encompassed by such a model of diaspora/diasporic relation. The

waves of forced or collective migration that mark other Black communities do not characterize the history of Black Germans. And yet the individual journeys (voluntary except for the children of the postwar occupations and the scattered number of slaves brought by individuals to Germany) that led to the formation of this community might nevertheless be seen in relation to an alternative model of diaspora, albeit in a specifically German manifestation has yet to find full articulation. The lack of recorded historical memories and the consequent difficulty of their public transmission and interpretation in turn further constrains the diasporic function of memory. Thus, the representation of Afro-Germans in larger historical narratives of nation, race, and place has only recently begun to occur, while this community's own work in establishing and claiming a "diasporic memory" still remains in its nascent stages.

DIFFERENCE, DIASPORA, AND DÉCALAGE

In an article that echoes a number of concerns similar to my own, Brent Edwards offers a brilliant intellectual history of the uses of diaspora as an analytic framework to do what he terms "a particular kind of epistemological work."²¹ Edwards's essay, "The Uses of Diaspora," carefully excavates the history of this term's emergence within Black scholarly discourse, drawing lines of continuity and distinction from the Pan-Africanist movement and Negritude, through contemporary Black British cultural studies, and forward toward the future implications of theorizing the diaspora in Black scholarship. What emerges from Edwards's genealogy is a nuanced conception of diaspora that foregrounds a notion of difference that is constituent to its formation and, at the same time, its most productive analytic potential. Edwards contends that the dynamics of difference he posits as diaspora's most salient feature and founding logic is one that can only be understood through an exploration of the necessary and inescapable moments of translation that accompany it. Translation, as both bridges and gaps of meaning produced in the interstices of converging differences within the diaspora, is indicative of necessary divergences, as well as points of linkage, contestation, and communication that construct any relation that might be articulated as diasporic. As Edwards contends:

If a discourse of diaspora articulates difference, then one must consider the status of that difference—not just linguistic difference but, more broadly, the trace or the residue, perhaps of what resists translation or what sometimes cannot help refusing translation across the boundaries of language, class, gender, sexuality, religion, the nation-state.²²

What is particularly useful about the concept of diaspora that emerges in Edwards's piece is a provocative notion of diaspora as *décalage* that he develops so masterfully in the final pages of the essay. Borrowing from Negritude poet Leopold Senghor, Edwards resignifies *décalage* to engage differences among and between Black communities as a necessary and inevitable negotiation of a kind of "gap" or "discrepancy" between them. Reading Senghor's invocation of *décalage* against the grain, Edwards deploys the term as an innovative model for reasserting the unevenness and diversity of the African diaspora. Edwards argues for an analytics of diaspora that accounts for and attends to difference by conceiving of this formation as always inherently involving complex moments of *décalage* that structure relations among communities in diaspora. He concludes:

[*D*]écalage is the kernel of precisely that which cannot be transferred or exchanged, the received biases that refuse to pass over when one crosses the water. It is a changing core of difference; it is the work of "differences within unity." . . . [*D*]écalage is proper to the structure of a diasporic "racial" formation, and its return in the form of *disarticulation*—the points of misunderstanding, bad faith, unhappy translation—must be considered a necessary haunting. . . . [P]aradoxically, it is exactly such a haunting gap or discrepancy that allows the African diaspora to "step" and "move" in various articulations.²³

The final sections of this chapter offer a series of readings of what Edwards might term moments of "diasporic *décalage*." These sections examine a rich selection of ethnographic encounters during which I came to engage such uneven and discrepant processes of translation, quite literally, "face-to-face." My focus is on the dynamics of a series of interpellative exchanges—specifically, moments when I and my Black

German interlocutors felt ourselves to be “hailed” and recognized in ways that we identified with, despite the fact that these references and citations were not always accurate translations of those identifications, nor necessarily ones that we shared. The aim of my analysis is to explore what kinds of insights might be gained from engaging otherwise unremarkable gaps in the translation of blackness within the diaspora, and how understanding these moments of translation as simultaneously also sites of interpellation might help to articulate not only the specificities of the diaspora and diasporic relations, but also racial and gendered formation, cultural identity, and the effects and implications of the nation in compelling and productive ways.

The phenomenon I refer to as “intercultural address” will serve as a revealing point of entry for exploring these dynamics. This term describes a series of eruptions/interruptions that I encountered repeatedly in the process of interviewing: as an African-American, I often became the object of “address,” directly and indirectly spoken or referred to—at times even becoming the topic of our conversation—by my Afro-German interview partners in their attempts to explain and describe their experiences as Black people in German society. These unexpected exchanges were moments when I became aware of gaps of translation and moments of interpellation between us, as well as how we actively produced Black identity in our dialogues. My informants repeatedly made strategic use of Black America to articulate their assumptions of our similarities and commonalities as Black people while always emphatically insisting on the specificity of our culturally distinct experiences of race in our respective societies. As we will see, in Fasia Jansen’s narrative, intercultural address most often took the form of cross-cultural queries that challenged me to situate myself in relation to the issues of race and identity that I unintentionally attempted to impose on her through my questioning. In Hans Hauck’s narrative, intercultural address was expressed through his use of repeated references to me and to the African-American context in a series of narrative comparisons and contrasts that reflect and refract important aspects of how the relations among diaspora Blacks are configured. In this way, intercultural address illuminates important tensions of diasporic relation through the ways in which it simultaneously contests and affirms the assumptions of similarity between Black communities that were negotiated discursively in our interviews.

As a way of contextualizing the articulations of intercultural address that follow, it seems both pertinent and necessary to include some degree of ethnographic detail (or “thickness”) in my analysis. I do this as a way of suggesting how each of my informants’ comments was situated within the larger interview and to fill in some of the contours of the ethnographic space of my encounters with Hauck and Jansen. Despite the fact that the oral histories I conducted were intended to produce alternative historical sources, engaging these interviews as an ethnographic space proves important not only to understand the eruptions of intercultural address that emerged therein but also as a self-conscious attempt to acknowledge the extent to which the space of the interview constitutes a complex and loaded terrain shaped by dynamic interpersonal negotiations that reflect many of the complicated processes of social and cultural formation unearthed in and through the narratives they produce.

**“SPÜRST DU DENN, DAT DU SCHWARZ BIST?”: FEELING
BLACK AND THE DIFFERENCE IT MIGHT MAKE**

My conversations with both Hans Hauck and Fasia Jansen took place in Germany in 1992. At the time, I was a graduate student living in Berlin, on a research fellowship working on my dissertation. It was the second of what would eventually be a six-year residence in Berlin, at a volatile time in this city and country’s more recent history. It was a crucial moment in postreunification Germany: between 1989 and 1992, Germany experienced a dramatic increase in racist and xenophobic violence. In April 1991, a twenty-eight-year-old Mozambican man was killed by a group of neo-Nazi youth who pushed him in front of a moving tram in the East German city of Dresden. In September of the same year, right-wing youth firebombed a residence for asylum seekers and assaulted Vietnamese and Mozambican residents in Hoyerswerde. According to the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesverfassungsschutz), 1992 marked the height of these violent attacks. In August 1992 seven nights of violence occurred in the East German port city of Rostock, while in November of that year three Turks were killed in an arson attack in the small town of Moelln.²⁴ In response, Germans staged a series of candlelight marches in Berlin, Munich, Hamburg, Bonn, and other

cities, with more than three million people voicing protests against the violence. My interviews with Hauck and Jansen occurred against this disturbing background of resurgent racist violence and resounding reminders of eras past.

As with all of my informants, my initial contact with both Hauck and Jansen was facilitated informally, through a third party and mutual acquaintance. I received their names from a woman journalist whose documentaries on the history of Blacks in Nazi Germany had been an important starting point for my research. My initial contact with both Hauck and Jansen followed what would probably be described as the most conventional rules of ethnographic or oral historical formality and etiquette—an initial contact letter followed by a phone call. I explained that I was interested in speaking to them as part of my dissertation research. As discussed in chapter 4, Jansen was a well-known activist living in a small industrial town in the Ruhr valley. Over the years, she had become a public figure of sorts and had developed a following among German trade unionists and in leftist, pacifist, and feminist circles, both within the region and in the Federal Republic more broadly, through her music and her dedicated work on these causes. Jansen agreed to speak to me after receiving my letter and on what I later learned was the enthusiastic recommendation of our mutual acquaintance. I conducted two interviews with Jansen over a two-day period; one of these was planned, while the other was a spontaneous follow-up interview that occurred a day later.

Our first interview took place in a political café near Jansen's home. The location was familiar to me not because I had ever visited it before but because I had been in countless cafés like it in other German cities. It was familiar as a result of my political biography and activist work with feminist and antiracist groups in Berlin and in the cities to which my colleagues and I had traveled as part of this work. It was a place one could find in almost any German city. The café was part of a larger *Projekt*, one of the countless publicly funded local political projects that at the time were subsidized by agencies of the German federal, state, and local governments. The café was attached to a larger set of rooms used for meetings and other activities of the different political groups and alliances that worked out of the center. The café served as an informal *Treffpunkt* (meeting place) for activists and community members affiliated with or affected by the project's work. Unfortu-

nately, Jansen and I never got around to discussing the specific nature of the work of this particular project—we were engrossed in her story from the moment I arrived.

Jansen had suggested that we meet at the end of her shift in the café and do the interview there. The café would be closed, and it was one of the few times she was available to speak to me. Jansen was a busy woman. She struck me as hectic on the phone, and I was intimidated by her assertiveness. I jumped at this small window of opportunity to speak with her and agreed to do the interview at the café, disregarding my own reservations about the potential noise and disruption of such a public place. As it turned out, the noise of café cleanup and the comings and goings of the project and café staffers were indeed quite distracting, but only to me—she was completely unfazed by it all. Until then, I had always conducted interviews in my informants' homes, a setting that I felt put them at ease and made them more comfortable speaking with a stranger. As I found out when I arrived at the café, location made no difference to Jansen, a gregarious, vivacious, witty, and outgoing woman who felt as much at home here as at her residence. It seemed somehow almost more appropriate to interview her here, since, as she later explained to me, she spent more time in such places and traveling between these and other sites of her activism than she did at home. In fact, in this semipublic place, only I felt awkward—an out-of-place young American academic at a site of working-class struggle, asking this fascinating woman to reveal her innermost reflections on her complicated life.

But Jansen put me very much at ease. She had an easy way, and her charming manner allowed us to quickly establish an warm and open rapport. In fact, Jansen caught me quite off guard when, shortly after we met, she went so far as to correct my use of the formal *Sie*, traditionally used in German by a younger person to address an elder or stranger. She insisted that I address her with the informal *du*. Yet it would be misleading to represent our exchange as a comfortable process of mutual and transparent comprehension, despite the warmth and honesty of our rapport. Indeed, in many ways, Jansen insisted quite strenuously on mutual respect as the basis of our dialogue, and in quite specific ways, she defined the terms and delineated the boundaries of our relationship in the interview. One example of this is the fact that at the beginning of our second interview (which took place in her

home), Jansen informed me that she preferred that we use the more formal *Sie*. I had never experienced such a reverse shift from informal back to the formal, and I immediately thought I had done something to offend her. But Jansen explained that in her experience, *Sie* conveyed a mutual respect that is quite often lost with the *du* form, even among good friends, and she recounted an instance with a close friend when such had been the case. In making this shift, Jansen established a particular form of formality between us. At the same time, it was also a gesture of control in that she effectively defined the terms of the level of intimacy and respect in our exchange.

Perhaps because of the fact that our rapport was so good, the seams and gaps in our communication became that much more visible, in ways that I found extremely revealing of the deeper texture of our dialogue. As we will see, this complex interaction can be read as a compelling commentary on the tensions within the relations of the African diaspora in ways that urge us to consider the extent to which such relations are actively constituted at multiple levels in our cross-cultural dialogues and thus can never be assumed as a simple fact of similarity, affinity, or commonality. Intercultural address is one important site where both the texture of this complex ethnographic space and the dynamics of cross-cultural diasporic relation were made manifest in provocative and compelling ways.

The following example of intercultural address in Jansen's testimony adds an interesting dimension to my earlier discussion of the status of Africa in the discourse of diaspora. In this excerpt, Jansen and I discuss our relationship to "Africa" as Black women of different Western societies. We negotiate a popular construction of blackness that attributes to us a nonexistent relationship to Africa, a place that is foreign to both of us, whose social and cultural backgrounds lie outside the African continent.

EXCERPT L

FJ: Later, [my sister] continued her studies in America. I don't know what happened then. We met again after the war.

TC: Mhm, after the war.

FJ: Yes, —

TC: Was that —

FJ: I met all my brothers and my siblings then.

TC: Here in Germany?

FJ: In Germany.

TC: How did that come about?

FJ: One of them is director of geo-, geology—he does research on rocks and stuff like that and had some contacts, business contacts, in Hamburg. And then he heard that I was there and absolutely wanted to meet me. It was a terrible shock when a man came toward me who looked exactly like me. Exactly! It was my face. Yes. And it was so incredibly wonderful for me. He wanted to take me back to Africa. But I grew up here, and that's very, very hard. You see, I had no yearning for Africa.

TC: Um-hmm. Um-hmm. And —

FJ: I don't know how it is for you, if you have a yearning for Africa?

TC: Not at all. [Laughter] I understand what you mean, because I'm American.

FJ: Right.

TC: That's it. Nothing else.

FJ: That's it.²⁵

In this passage, Jansen discusses one of her few encounters with her African siblings. In Jansen's comments, *Africa* represents our common heritage as Black women. However, in the German context in which we at the time both resided, *Africa* is constructed as implicitly opposed to Germanness, and as the place where all Blacks come from, belong, and/or should have some mythical longing to be. Both of us reject this construction of *Africa*. But what constitutes the “yearning” or “longing” (*Sehnsucht*) to which Jansen refers? Jansen's comments put an interesting spin on the issues of relation and affiliation to Africa suggested by Blackshire-Belay. Whereas Blackshire-Belay emphasizes the necessity for “diasporic Africans” such as Jansen to gain a greater appreciation of the significance of Africa and African culture in the development of their identities, communities, and social and political struggles, Jansen's remarks highlight the tenuous nature of external attempts to define what this relationship should be, how it should look, and/or the terms on which it is or should be based.

The importance Jansen attributes to her contact with her African brother certainly affirms some part of the significance Blackshire-Belay attributes to contact with her African heritage. Yet Jansen's reaction to her brother's assumption that she would necessarily feel a natural connection to or affiliation with Africa seems equally worthy of comment. Jansen's brother's insistence that she return with him posits Africa as a lost homeland of sorts and intrinsically assumes either a return or, at the very least, identification and affiliation. As in Blackshire-Belay's comments, Africa is again constituted as a mythic, transcendent signifier of diasporic relation, the site to/through which all routes lead as the link between Black peoples. But in fact, it is less a site—that is, location—than a symbol that signifies connection in Jansen's case, anchoring a relation of kinship that begins with blood and for her brother ends with return. Yet for Jansen, like many Afro-German members of her generation, kinship with her African relations and culture is substantiated not by presence but by absence. For her, there were no shared memories or rituals of connection and few if any resources on which to draw in establishing any links of culture or heritage. Diaspora itself constructs such a relation, and Africa is its wholly symbolic vehicle. In her reaction to her brother's suggestion, Jansen asserts the limits of such a notion of diasporic relation. Her response engages *Africa* not as a symbol but as a peopled place of cultures and histories, a place to which, she emphasizes, she has no concrete relation: "But I grew up here, and that's very, very hard. You see, I had no yearning for Africa." Although links of kinship and heritage are important, Jansen underlines that hers are in Germany, rather than in Africa.

At this point, Jansen's engagement of the limits of diasporic relation broadens when she transposes this thorny issue onto me by querying my understanding as an African-American of my relationship to Africa. Her question, "I don't know how it is for you, if you have a yearning for Africa?" addresses me as a Black woman who, like her, is also from a culture outside of Africa. Her query articulates a request for confirmation or rebuttal of her own sense of the limits of diasporic affinity/affiliation. Yet the effect of her question is to establish an ambivalent connection. By addressing me directly as a Black woman and querying whether I have a relationship to Africa similar to that which she has just recounted in the story about her brother, Jansen ini-

tiates a process of interpellation that hails and thus produces me as a Black woman, a hailing to which I respond with immediate affirmation. Not only do I feel (cited and) recognized through her addressing me, but I also identify quite palpably with the awkwardness of the diasporic relation in which she is situated by her brother. Addressing her question to me effectively enables her to enact within the interview the same dynamic she has just described between herself and her brother. By asking me as another “sister” to position myself on the topic of my sense of my relationship to Africa—a place of tremendous symbolic significance in the discursive geography of the African diaspora, yet a place to which I have no “real” substantive connection—her use of intercultural address puts me in the position of having to recognize the gap that exists between the two of us and a notion of diasporic relation that centers on Africa as a site of origin and an assumed identity arising out of this site. In the process, her query effectively forces me to perform the same kind of positioning she did in relation to her brother, thereby beautifully making her point.

Intercultural address both points to necessity of making this symbolic relation and concrete nonrelation explicit and makes clear the extent to which they remain present as an assumed underlying relation in need of clarification. The fact that she asks me so pointedly where I “stand” in this relation strikingly attests to the truth of this paradox. In the end, we negotiate in this passage our relation to the diaspora, comparing our respective conceptions of what it means to be Black and to not come from Africa—that is, have a European or American socialization. In our exchange, the classic subject-object relation of interviewer-interviewee or speaker-listener dissolves almost completely in the context of our common rejection of a preexisting relation to Africa by virtue of race. In our discursive negotiation of the limits of diasporic relation, *Africa* at once signifies and facilitates the existence of our relationship to one another as Black people and at the same time highlights the need to translate and specify such gaps in the diaspora rather than assume those relations, as well as their limits, on the basis of both commonality and, even more importantly, distinction.

The intercultural relations of diaspora are quite decidedly the ever-present (sometimes explicit, at other times implicit) subtext of my interviews, both in the content of my questioning and woven through the fabric of our interpersonal interaction. Furthermore, intercultural

address provides the vehicle through which this latent subtext repeatedly erupts into our interviews. A second and particularly evocative example of this from my interviews with Jansen is the following exchange, a sequence discussed briefly at the beginning of chapter 3.

EXCERPT M

TC: But what motivated you to do all this, all these political things and activities?

FJ: You shouldn't ask me about motivations and such things—you can't do that. It had to do with my being Black.

TC: What exactly?

FJ: All the things that I experienced must never again [be allowed to] happen. I've seen too much misery, and [I] throw all the strength that I have into [political work]. But you mustn't think that I always—that I wanted to run around and play the heroine for justice. Instead it was always, always whatever was there, "Listen, you have to come," like that, right? Always pushing for something, now I've got it—did you see, with the mills, get that through, he wants mills, all sorts of things, like that. And then in the women's initiatives, the ones that fought for their husbands' jobs. They always came and got me.

TC: Came and got you?

FJ: And that's why — or went there — and that's why I didn't need a psychologist. I was able to get rid of all the anger that I stored up, you know, all of it.

TC: But what —

FJ: I've brought people to tears, but I've also made them laugh, and the reverse. And then, finally, I ended up in the women's movement. Good. Now you ask the questions.

TC: [*Laughter*] May I?

FJ: You have to now. It costs too much money in tapes.

TC: Yes. The question about being Black. What exactly was it that, that connects your political work with your being Black? How did you express it, or what did it give you?

FJ: *You have to imagine, there was no Black movement here. I was all alone with this, and I myself never felt that I'm Black.*

The others have their problems [with it]. That was never my problem. [Laughter]

TC: *Uh-huh. You never felt this yourself?*

FJ: *Do you feel that you're Black?*

TC: *Yes!*

FJ: *How?*

TC: *Yes. Yes, I mean —*

FJ: *Yes, when you look at yourself.*

TC: *Well, you're right.*

FJ: *I said to the children, I say, "Imagine, I know that I don't have this racial problem with myself. If I have a problem with being Black, then it's your problem, or your parents' problem."²⁶*

The sequence of intercultural address in this excerpt is embedded in our discussion of Jansen's political work. I begin by asking Jansen to describe her motivations for her activism. Her reply is unequivocal: it has to do with being Black. She explains that her activism comes from a commitment never to allow what she experienced to happen again and that her political activism served as an outlet for her to work through many of her experiences. Later in the passage, I attempt to follow up on Jansen's original statement by asking for the exact nature of the connection between her blackness and her political activism. My intention was to obtain a more precise description of her personal understanding of this relationship. In response, Jansen initiates a subtle shift in our discussion, eliding the issue of blackness by referring to the absence of a Black movement in Germany ("You have to imagine, there was no Black movement here"). At first glance, Jansen's remarks seem almost to contradict her original statement that her political engagement was related to her being Black. A superficial reading of this passage might lead one to interpret Jansen's reply as a misunderstanding, where Jansen mistakenly interprets my question to refer to her engagement in a Black political movement. However, a closer reading of this passage offers a more plausible interpretation of her remarks.

Jansen emphasizes that she could not participate in a Black movement because no such movement existed in Germany. As a consequence, she had no opportunity to work through her experiences as a Black person in Germany with other Blacks in Germany. Here her

implicit reference seems to be the U.S. civil rights movement of the 1960s and '70s. Jansen's emphasis on the absence of a Black movement in Germany is a direct response to my question, despite the discursive shift with which she introduces the topic into our conversation. The lack of a Black movement plays a primary role in explaining the necessity for Jansen's political engagement because the situation forced her to come to terms with her blackness alone ("I was all alone with this [*Ich war doch ganz alleine auf so was*]").

In many ways, Jansen's comments in this passage echo both Gilroy and Brown's discussions of the diasporic resources and raw materials they describe as marshaled by Black communities transnationally and used in strategic ways in the cultural, community, and identity formation of populations such as Black Britons. Yet Jansen's comments also speak to her sense of the lack of availability of such resources to her in Germany at a key point in her life. Her awareness of and engagement with the struggles of Blacks and women elsewhere, which she articulates throughout her narrative, makes clear that she did in fact draw inspiration from them. Still, Jansen seems to mourn the extent to which, regardless of their tremendous value to her, these struggles remain models and resources that are foreign and thus applicable only by extrapolation. Here again, the work diaspora seems to do is ambivalent, affirming the significance of access to transnational cultural and political models and resources while at the same time highlighting the extent to which they can always only be partial in their ability to satisfy the particular tasks, longings, and desires of specific communities in their equally specific cultural contexts. The kinds of borrowing and adaptation so central to Gilroy's model of the syncretism of Black expressive cultures are certainly important. Nevertheless, his model may not sufficiently account for the situations of populations like Black Germans, whose very different historical trajectory and consequent marginality in the discourse of diaspora perhaps demand a different formulation.

Just after Jansen's reference to the absence of such resources for potential borrowing and adaptation, a more substantial shift occurs in our discussion via the phenomenon of intercultural address.

FJ: I myself never felt that I'm Black. The others have their problems [with it]. That was never my problem.

- TC: Uh-huh. You never felt this?
FJ: Do you feel that you're Black?
TC: Yes!
FJ: How?
TC: Yes. Yes, I mean . . .
FJ: Yes, when you look at yourself.
TC: Well, you're right.
FJ: I said to the children, I say, "Imagine, I know that I don't have this racial problem with myself. If I have a problem with being Black, then it's your problem, or your parents' problem."

In this sequence, our exchange moves away from the issue of the connection between Jansen's politics and her experience of blackness, beginning with her statement that she has never "felt" Black. As an African-American, I initially respond with skepticism to this remark. I am curious about why and how Jansen does not "feel" her blackness. Without reflecting on the implications of this statement, I implicitly attribute this phenomenon to Jansen's German cultural context. This assumption, along with my skepticism and curiosity, is expressed in my response to Jansen's statement, when I pose to her the question, "You never felt this?" My question effectively sets up an implicit relation of difference between the two of us—a difference between two Black women's understandings of the effects of blackness as more than "just" skin color. In response to this submerged level of my question, Jansen shifts the focus away from herself and directly addresses me, challenging me to reflect on the issue I have just directed at her. Jansen's counterquestion, "Do you feel that you're Black?" rejects the assumptions of difference underlying my question, for Jansen directly takes issue with the subtext of my question: if I must ask why she does not feel her blackness, then by implication I (unlike her) must indeed be able to feel this aspect of myself. What follows is a fascinating exchange during which Jansen reverses the roles of the ethnographic encounter to query me on Black identity and in the process foils my attempts to interpellate her as a Black woman. Yet this role reversal also reveals an equally compelling process in which she comes to interpellate me on this same issue.

My comments to Jansen are made in response to her earlier state-

ments that she grew up with little or no exposure to Black people and that she lacked either a movement or community of Blacks with whom to identify. I assume, based on these remarks, that her comments are indicative of a lack of identification with blackness. I want to understand her comments in this way because, as an African-American, I equate a lack of contact with Blacks to a lack of identification of blackness. Indeed, as an African-American, I have to acknowledge that my model of Black identity fixes identity to a domestic community with whom one shares concrete ties of culture, history, and socialization. I also assume that the absence of these things as Jansen describes them in our interview would make such an identification improbable for Jansen, and I conclude all too quickly that her comments in this sequence are a direct reflection of that lack.

But Jansen's query as to my own sense of feeling Black interpellates me to the extent that I feel called on to articulate this feeling as part of my identification as a Black woman. From the moment Jansen begins to describe her experience of blackness in this sequence, I feel hailed to situate myself in relation to what I want to understand as our shared identity as Black women. Unlike in the previous example (excerpt L), though, this time it is a hailing to which I respond with suspicion, somewhat defensively. Although I feel directly addressed and recognized as a Black woman by her comments, I am not quite comfortable with her particular citation (rendition) of the experience of blackness/Black identity. When I attempt to relate (translate) Jansen's articulation of her understanding of what it means to be Black to my understanding, this translation fails because I want to see her concept of blackness as identical to my own. I again confront an inevitable gap of translation—in this case, the gap between related notions of blackness and Black identity that may share similarities but are far from identical.

But more important than the rapidity with which I jump to these conclusions are the assumptions that underlie them with regard to the relationship between my construction of blackness as an African-American and Jansen's as an Afro-German. Equally significant is Jansen's response to my clumsy attempts to impose my own conception of blackness on her. The persistent skepticism I express, through my insistence on the fact that I, unlike her, can and do feel my blackness, functions as both an attempt to dispute the extent to which one can claim not to feel her race and an implicit attempt to impose an

African-American model of Black identity on our exchange by contrasting my feeling with her lack. Indeed, by disputing her claim not to feel blackness, I seem intent on either exposing her denial or convincing her to acquiesce to the veracity of my position. Yet Jansen's response exposes my motives as well as the limitations of my narrow understanding of the dynamics of racial formation. Jansen articulates a complex sensitivity to processes of racial subject formation: she alludes to the fact that blackness has never been intrinsically problematic for her but rather has constituted a problem in what it is understood to mean by others and in how both we and others act on and thus produce it. Her counterquestions and challenges in this way school me, provoking me to recognize the ways in which I take for granted that blackness is a physical or material experience and one on which I act like I have cornered the market.

Jansen's questions forced me to understand the real message of her initial comments: that race and racial difference are the products of social interaction and interpretation, and that those interactions occur not just in Germany between whites and blacks, and not only during the war, when race in Germany was an individual's defining feature. They also occur among Blacks from different social and national contexts in our contemporary transnational encounters. In many ways, our exchange undeniably reproduces important tensions that might be seen as inherent to any cross-cultural dialogue between Black people from different backgrounds. What is perhaps most instructive about our exchange is how the negotiation of our assumptions about our differences and similarities becomes manifest within the interview in ways that make them available to analysis and interpretation. Such analysis nevertheless brings us back to the question of whether these negotiations can or should be seen as a reflection or expression of relationships that might be termed diasporic, and if so, in what ways and toward what ends. The question of what work conceiving of such negotiations as diasporic does forces us to consider the extent to which the type of queries and contestations that characterized my exchange with Jansen are both necessary for and inherent to the relations between members of different Black communities and never in and of themselves either an explanation or an endpoint of such an analysis. The paradoxical open-endedness of the relations of diaspora is an issue to which Hauck's articulations of intercultural address also speak in equally compelling ways.

**“MAN BRAUCHT EIGENTLICH EINER SCHWARZEN
AMERIKANERIN NICHT ZU ERZÄHLEN”:
BLACK AMERICA, BLACK GERMANY, AND THE
“CROWDED SPACE” OF DIASPORA**

As with Jansen, my initial attempt to contact Hauck occurred in the form of a letter. I sent off my letter feeling confident that our mutual friend had alerted Hauck to the fact that I would be contacting him and hopeful that he would be receptive to my request for an interview. She had encouraged me to get in touch with him and assured me that he would respond positively. This was not a cold call, and I entered into our encounter optimistic, though anxious and experiencing the inevitable sense of terror and strangeness that accompanies the initial stages of ethnography and interviewing. The initial personal contact certainly marks one of the greatest moments of anxiety for ethnographers and oral historians, and in my interaction with Hauck, this was a phone call. Almost immediately on receiving my letter, however, Hauck phoned me in Berlin. I had feared both that he would turn down my request for an interview and perhaps worse, that if he granted me the opportunity to speak with him, my German would fail me in the midst of our conversation. Neither of these scenarios came to pass. But what did occur proved no less off-putting, albeit far more complex in ways that I see as emblematic of the tensions of diaspora among African-Americans and Black Germans that are the focus of my analysis in this chapter.

In our phone conversation, Hauck and I discussed the details of where and how the interview would transpire, and I offered to travel to his home to conduct it. We agreed on this, and it eventually proved a very comfortable setting for the interview. Yet toward the end of our conversation, Hauck posed a quite pointed question, one that I would come to see as characteristically direct and revealing regarding our future interactions. He began with an apology, explaining that he did not mean to offend me, but he needed to ask: “Are you Black? I mean, I know you’re American, but are you a Black American or a white American?” My letter had described my interest in understanding his experiences and my desire to have them accounted for within the larger narrative of German history and the history of National Socialism, and I had introduced myself as an American, a historian, and a Ph.D. candidate. His comments made me realize that I had neglected to say

that I was Black. I am still unsure about why I did not mention this in my letter, and was only made aware of the implications of this omission later—by Hauck himself.

Hauck's question pierced the anonymity of our phone exchange in ways that would become familiar to me in our interview and our many subsequent conversations. The directness of his question also characterized my conversations with all of my Black German interview partners. It was a direct invitation to me to situate myself in the same ways and with the same degree of specificity that I asked and implicitly assumed of them. When I replied to Hauck's query that yes, I was African-American, he responded that he had thought so and that that was good. He agreed to do the interview with me and later told me that had I been white, he would not have consented.

Hauck's comments disarmed and confounded me. I was perplexed by the idea that Hauck talked to me on the condition of my blackness and by the assumptions that this seemed to reveal. Was my blackness assumed as the basis of empathy? Solidarity? Identification? An essential commonality and capacity to understand his experiences? More important, I was far more daunted by my uncertainty that I could live up to any of the expectations that I imagined his remarks to imply. Similarity and identification seemed to me the implicit point of reference for his remarks, and I felt wholly inadequate to such expectations. Indeed, I found my reply and affirmation that I was an African-American to be the source of greater unclarity than clarity. For what that statement did not name was the fact that I am an African-American born in New York City and raised in the suburbs of Washington, D.C. It did not say that I am a middle-class African-American raised by parents from working-class families in one of the most class-stratified Black communities in the United States. My response did not indicate that I am a graduate of a Seven Sisters college and an Ivy League university or speak to the vast problems of translation and interpellation that African-Americans experience within our own communities, as well as our even more vexed problems in communicating these complexities in our dialogues with Black communities outside of the United States, particularly in Europe. My answer did not address the ways in which these tensions undergo constant negotiation, deferral, and displacement in each and every one of the relations that Black people refer to as diasporic, ways that sometimes get talked about but very

often do not. I did not address any of these issues, but Hauck did—perhaps not always as directly but nevertheless, all too explicitly.

The phenomenon of intercultural address is even more provocatively expressed in my interview with Hauck. The following exchange is a continuation of a passage cited in chapter 3 in which Hauck discusses the effects of his membership in the Hitler Youth and of his subsequent sterilization on his social interactions as a youth in Nazi Germany.

EXCERPT N

HH: Of course after my sterilization, it was clear that it was over for me with the [Hitler Youth], with the whole spirit of it, which I more or less understood at fifteen or sixteen—in contrast to the thirteen-year-old.

TC: I don't quite understand what you mean.

HH: In contrast to the thirteen-year-old, who enjoyed the whole the Hitler Youth game, the fifteen-year-old didn't anymore. He was able to think more about it, but he had to go along.

TC: "Had to"?

HH: Well, what should I have done? No one forced me. But the circumstances forced me. I had to. I was an apprentice with the railroad. Without being in the Hitler Youth, I wouldn't have been allowed to do that. We appeared at all sorts of different occasions in uniform, in Hitler Youth uniform.

TC: Did that make a difference in how you were treated? When you wore this uniform?

HH: Yes. No one saw any more that I didn't really belong.

TC: No one?

HH: No, no one. And those who did know said nothing. It wasn't at all like that. There were many who knew. [But] as far as I can remember, it never caused me any problems.

TC: With the uniform?

HH: With the uniform.

TC: *And without it? Would that then have —*

HH: *Without it, I wouldn't have been able to participate. One can't even imagine it anymore.*

TC: *Yes, I'm asking —*

HH: *I just find— Yes, well, your question alone expresses a lack of knowledge of the situation back then.*

TC: *Exactly.*

HH: *That's quite clear. I understand it, because one can't at all imagine it, especially not as an American. Though, as far as I'm concerned, America is certainly no heaven on earth. So actually, one doesn't have to tell a Black American in what way this difference [racial differentiation] was expressed—even though it's legally forbidden in America. For us this differentiation was compulsory by law. And in spite of this, not everyone did it. You certainly know many Americans who behave impartially toward you [deal with you without prejudice]. You also have others. You see, that's how it is. Even in a democracy like America, that's the case. How much more so in a dictatorship like Hitler's Germany.²⁷*

In this excerpt, I am intent on clarifying the specific role that the Hitler Youth uniform played for Hauck and make three consecutive attempts to pose this question in various formulations. As discussed at length in chapter 3, in this excerpt Hauck explains that the Hitler Youth served a protective function in his life that enabled him to participate in spheres of German life to which he would otherwise not have had access because of his African heritage. At this point, I intervene to make a first attempt at clarifying the role of the Hitler Youth uniform in this process. In response, Hauck replies that the uniform concealed his heritage. When I attempt a second, follow-up question, Hauck interrupts. Because of this interruption, my question remains unclear. Hauck nevertheless responds by offering his interpretation of what he assumes would have been my question. He concludes by commenting that his situation is difficult to imagine in the present. When I make a third attempt to obtain a clearer articulation of Hauck's interpretation of the significance of the Hitler Youth uniform, he again interrupts, expressing irritation with my query. In this case, he responds by remarking on what he sees as my inability to understand his situation as a result of my apparent lack of knowledge. What was previously seen as a general phenomenon is now specifically attributed to me. Confronted with this situation, I am left no alternative but to acknowledge the correctness of his assessment, for although I am

familiar with the historical context of these events, Hauck's experience therein is indeed something of which I am truly ignorant. My persistence in asking my question in this exchange results not only from curiosity and stubbornness but also from my belief that Hauck has not answered me. In this interchange, I seem to resist or be incapable of accepting Hauck's explanations. In fact, Hauck does respond to my questions but does so in a way that I could neither recognize nor acknowledge at the time.

Hauck's answers to my question are made from within his own frame of reference, which, because it is based on his Afro-German cultural context, is unfamiliar to me. Initially in our exchange, Hauck and I attempt to communicate from two distinct standpoints, as an African-American and an Afro-German. The misunderstanding that develops between us is one effect of this phenomenon. In essence, it is a problem of translation, specifically my desire to translate his experiences into the familiar terms of my own cultural context. Here intercultural address delineates the gap that exists between us—one that requires translation across the specificity of our respective cultural backgrounds. At the point where this misapprehension becomes manifest, Hauck makes an important shift in his narrative technique in an attempt to resolve this conflict. Hauck's statement, "Your question alone expresses a lack of knowledge of the situation back then," articulates his recognition of the limits of his previous narrative strategy in achieving the comprehension of his African-American interlocutor. When it becomes clear that his initial mode of presenting his experience is not effective, he switches to an alternative one that directly targets my frame of reference as an African-American: comparison. Here Hauck uses me and the African-American context as the point of reference for his comparison.

Hauck responds to my admission of difficulty in understanding his situation by reiterating his earlier statement that a lack of knowledge regarding his experiences is understandable as a general phenomenon. Unlike his statements in the previous sequence, he goes a step further in this instance to specifically address this phenomenon to me as an American: "I understand it, because one can't at all imagine it, especially not as an American." Hauck's remarks ascribe my inability to understand him to a gap that he urges me to bridge through reference to my own, more familiar cultural context. His comments can be seen

as a gesture of pardon, excusing my lack of knowledge as not necessarily my fault but rather a cultural phenomenon, related to the fact that my cultural context is the United States. By bringing the general “lack of knowledge” or ignorance (*Unkenntnis*) to which he refers earlier in relation to a specifically American lack of knowledge, Hauck seeks to explain the temporary disruption of our communication in the interchange that preceded it. But directly thereafter, he qualifies this pardon, moving from describing a phenomenon of unfamiliarity among Americans to remarking on the specific relation that I, as an African-American, am assumed to have to this issue: “So actually, one doesn’t have to tell a Black American in what way this difference was expressed.” The implication of his statement is that as an American, my unfamiliarity is understandable, but as a Black American, it is not acceptable. Hauck again uses comparison and juxtaposition to illustrate and clarify his situation, a clear statement of his assumptions of the applicability to his situation of my cultural knowledge as an African-American as a necessary tool for translating our differences.²⁸ His comments take the form of a truism, indicating his belief in the self-evidence of what he is saying. Two different forms of juxtaposition follow: a comparison and a contrast between the American and German contexts. In each case, Hauck uses either me or the African-American context to further specify the complexities of his situation as a German of African descent in the Third Reich as well as this experience’s similarities to and differences from my cultural context—that is, the dominant model of the “Black experience” in the so-called First World. Each is an attempt by Hauck to make the differences in our respective experiences and knowledge of blackness apparent and in the process, to facilitate my translation and comprehension of these differences.

Hauck’s use of intercultural comparison strategically names the gap that is emerging in our conversation while attempting to bridge this gap by invoking his own limited knowledge of the aspects of my cultural context that might enable me to understand his. Addressing me through this comparison at once invokes a relationship of similarity between our communities and demands attention to their distinctions. His comparison sets up a relation that vividly recalls Lorde’s articulation of the “connected differences” between Black communities situated in very different locations within the diaspora. Yet as Brown

reminds us, it is important to keep in mind that the distinctive ways that so-called marginal Black communities such as Afro-Germans are positioned in relation to Black America are not always equal, nor do these relationships stand in a neutral space outside of or immune to power and social hegemony. Thus, particularly with regard to Hauck's comments and his use of intercultural address, it is important to consider the question of what Hauck's invocation of Black America tells us about the relationships between Black communities in the diaspora if we conceive of these relations to be as much shaped and affected by structures of power and hegemony as any other social formation.

The following excerpt offers much insight into this question. In an earlier chapter, this passage ends with Hauck's return to work at the railroad and his statement that the Nuremberg Laws prohibited him from marriage. In the interview itself, though, his comments continue. The passage begins with Hauck's recollections of his sterilization. What begins as a straightforward recounting of those painful events takes an interesting turn as Hauck attempts to communicate its significance to me, his African-American interlocutor.

EXCERPT O

HH: After the judgment, they immediately loaded us up and took us to hospital. There we were operated on, and in ten days I was released. And there I stood, back on the job. They had been informed at the railroad. And they informed me too, I wasn't allowed to marry, I could marry no German girl. That was clear. It was part of the Nuremberg Laws. And the same people ask me today, "Hey, why didn't you marry?"

TC: And why didn't you marry?

HH: Whom could I have married?

TC: And after the war?

HH: Well, after the war, it was too late.

TC: Yeah?

HH: After the war, it was too late. When I returned from the POW camp, I was thirty years old. Certainly, a person can also get married at thirty. But I didn't want to any more. Before that, no girl would have taken me. Even if the girls

had wanted to, their parents wouldn't have allowed it. *I don't know if I have to explain to you — If you wanted to marry a white American man somewhere in a particular area, one doesn't have to ask you why you don't want to marry him. Maybe you do; maybe he does, too. But it's still impossible. And here, aside from that, it was forbidden. It wasn't even worth mentioning.*²⁹

In the final sequence of this excerpt, Hauck attempts to clarify his situation on the issue of marriage by means of comparison. “Addressing” me directly as a Black person via his conception of my African-American cultural background, the point of reference for his comparison is once again, me. He begins with a gesture of hesitation, remarking on the potential superfluousness of explanation: “I don't know if I have to explain to you.” This phrase appears initially to indicate a moment when Hauck seems about to defer to what he assumes to be my “obvious” cultural knowledge of such a situation by drawing on an example from my cultural context to which I am assumed to be able to relate. Using as his example his image of what it would be like for me in the United States if I decided to marry a white man, Hauck sets up a relation of similarity between us by drawing on the potential commonality of our experiences as Black people. His statement, “One doesn't have to ask you why,” introduces a second assumption of commonality between the Afro-German and African-American contexts. His references appear to negate any discrepancy in our understanding of the consequences of interracial marriage. Yet in this second instance, though, he is less hesitant. His statements in this last sequence appeal for intercultural reciprocity, urging me to draw on my own cultural knowledge as an African-American to answer the question I just posed.

The exchange in this excerpt offers a second example of the process of negotiating our respective experiences as Black people that transpired at a discursive level during our interview. In this passage, intercultural address takes the form of an attempt to establish both discursive and intercultural reciprocity through comparative references. But Hauck's use of comparison has a second dimension that does more than establish a dialogue of similarity, functioning at the same time as a gesture of distancing and respect, as an attempt to probe the bound-

aries of our communication and to explain the ways in which experiences of race and racialization exceed an simple discourse of similarity.

Directly following his allusion to interracial marriage in the United States, Hauck defines the limits of his comparison. He uses the relation of similarity that he established through his reference to the African-American context to explain the differences between the two situations. The statement, "And here, aside from that, it was forbidden," signifies an end of the similarities between Hauck's experience as an Afro-German and those of African-Americans. Despite the fact that as an African-American, I may recognize the similarities between Hauck's experiences and those of my cultural context, our experiences as Black people differ considerably. As he shifts from using comparison as a means of establishing similarity to using it as a marker of difference, intercultural address becomes a form of critical juxtaposition. His insistence on simultaneously alluding to both the differences and the similarities between his experiences and those of African-Americans is neither random nor contradictory, for he intends the similarities he emphasizes to reinforce my ability to translate the differences in our respective experiences of blackness. Like his comments in excerpt N, Hauck's use of comparison and juxtaposition provoke me to reflect critically on my African-American context, as his repeated references to me and my cultural context effectively interpellates me as an African-American woman, in the process implicating and drawing me into his narrative more directly. In both instances, I am continually forced to critically assess the relationship between our two communities and to acknowledge the significant differences between them.

Yet Hauck's use of comparison and juxtaposition must also be seen in relation to the existence of another kind of discursive gap in representing the situation of Afro-Germans. Here, comparison and juxtaposition function as modes of conveying an experience that lies in space left out by available modes of representing Blacks in Germany, as well as being largely overlooked in the discourse of diaspora. On the one hand, the hegemonic discourse of German identity remains a largely homogenous and homogenizing discourse of whiteness that often conflates Germanness with whiteness as a form of racial identity. On the other hand, the discourse on Blacks in contemporary Germany defines its Black residents primarily as immigrants and foreigners in German society—individuals most often seen as Third World eco-

nomic and political refugees in pursuit of the wealth and opportunity the First World promises. At the same time, representations of African-American culture as the dominant point of reference for First World Black populations permeate this discourse. At the level of visual representation, Black America—particularly through the proliferation of hip hop, house, funk, and R&B through music videos—has made African-American cultural styles and expressions a focal point of identification for Blacks in Germany. In addition, the African-American civil rights movement serves as a model for Black liberation struggles around the world. The dominance of these representations of African-American history and culture in Germany have come to define popular perceptions of Blacks in the First World. One effect of these representations is the perception of Afro-Germans (as well as all other Blacks in Germany) as either Third or First World Others.

Here I would elaborate on Wright's assertion that Black Germans are read primarily as Africans and thus constructed as "Others-from-Within from Without" by proposing that we also consider the status of the Black American as a construction that exerts significant and competing discursive, conceptual, and ideological power over how blackness is read in Germany. This "First World Other" figures prominently in the contemporary construction of blackness in Germany both because of the legacy of the post-World War II occupation and because of its circulation in popular culture. In the German context, the Black American represents a mobile figure of the Black whose status outside of the United States is frequently neither abject nor marginal. On the contrary, in Germany this figure is often privileged, exoticized, and commodified as a complex vector of cultural appropriation and interpellation. Understanding this additional dimension of the construction of blackness in Germany helps to explain why the discourses of Black and German identity that define *German* as white and *Black* as either African or African-American leave little, if any, discursive space for Black German articulations of self, space that might allow individuals such as Hauck to describe the experiences of Germans of African descent in ways that might not necessitate reference to Black America.

In both of the excerpts from his narrative cited in this chapter, Hauck's use of intercultural address renders his experience in relation to the constraints of these discourses of race and ethnicity for Blacks in

Germany. Moreover, these excerpts illustrate the way in which the articulation of an experience that overlaps supposedly distinct forms of identity necessitates not only a dialogical relation of similarity (or at the very least, direct or indirect “reference”) to these dominant discourses but also a differential and contestatory stance beyond them. The construction of alternative forms of identity such as Afro-German also involves direct engagement with the dominant forms of identity that bound and consequently circumscribe them. Hauck’s narrative practice, as well as the experiences he recounts, reflect the negotiation of these positions—between that which is sayable within or in relation to existing and/or available terms of Black and German identity and that which remains unsayable and therefore unsaid.

Intercultural address points to the discrepancies we encountered understanding our respective experiences of race in the diaspora; the insistent need for the translation of these differences; the modes of diasporic interpellation enacted in these exchanges; and the at times inequitable resources available to communities situated in very different spaces within the diaspora. The moments of intercultural address examined in this chapter illustrate some of the asymmetries within the diaspora and some of the ways in which communities such as Afro-Germans must consistently reckon with Black America and its hegemony as an “always already there” primary referent for the African diaspora through which they must speak in their attempts to articulate these experiences. For this reason, it is perhaps all the more important to interrogate the contradictory manner in which this ever-present referent shapes these articulations and mediates their relation to the diaspora. The question we must ask is what the use of Black America as a mode of articulation limits or prevents Hauck and individuals like him from saying at the same time that it enables him to speak.

In both Hauck’s and Jansen’s narratives, intercultural address can be seen as a challenge that encourages us to reflect on the status of Black America in relation to other Black populations involved in the process of articulating their experiences and constructing alternative forms of Black identity and community. Intercultural address asks us to take a closer look at the influence of representations of African-American culture in these constructions. Each of these exchanges raises the question of whether these intercultural negotiations can or

should be seen as a reflection or expression of relationships that might be termed diasporic, and if so, in what ways and toward what ends. And yet, although it presents itself as an obvious model for explaining the sense of relationship postulated through such cross-cultural querying and citation, the question remains whether we can or should understand such citational imperatives as “diasporic” or as an expression or consequence of a “diasporic relation”? Should the ways in which Afro-Germans draw on the African-American context be seen as their use of some of the few diasporic resources available to them as Black people lacking other indigenous narratives of belonging, community, and struggle—or, for that matter, access to the forms of collective or individual memory that sustain other Black communities? In other words, can or should such references to Black America be understood as necessary attempts to draw from elsewhere that which is lacking, though essential, to the constitution of very different notions of Black identity and community at “home”? Or might such references also have everything to do with Black America’s emergent cultural capital, which increasingly allows it an almost endless capacity to proliferate and travel to many different global locations and thus become an available referent? In Hauck’s case, as well as for many members of other Black European communities more generally, I believe that the latter is the case.

Although the concept of diaspora invites us to use it as an obvious model for explaining the sense of relationship postulated through such cross-cultural querying, in some ways, this invitation seems almost too seductive to be believed. One might ask whether part of the work diaspora does is to hold out a promise it cannot quite keep, the promise of transparent forms of relation and understanding based on links forged through shared histories of oppression and racialization. Indeed, the concept of the African diaspora seems sometimes to invite us to forget the subtle forms of interpellation and incumbent gaps of translation that are a crucial part of all transnational dialogues.

Edwards’s compelling articulation of *décalage* as a haunting gap and necessary discrepancy in the African diaspora, and his insistence that there will always be some remainder that continually resurfaces within the diaspora as points of misunderstanding, bad faith, and unhappy translation is a cogent reminder that both translation and translation gaps are inherent elements of all diasporic formations by

virtue of the ever-present diversity of Black culture and community. Their gaps in particular can neither be negated, resolved, nor erased. On the contrary, they are that which enables, rather than hinders, both community and communication.

Each of the discrepant moments of diasporic invocation presented in this chapter asks us to think about the stakes of diasporic relation and how those relations are structured as much through difference as through similarity, and enunciated through complex modes of translation and interpellation that are anything but transparent. Engaging the tensions of diasporic relation as processes of translation and interpellation helps to explain how the diaspora/diasporic links are produced both actively and strategically; how the discourse of diaspora circulates in uneven ways geographically, and within and between different communities; and how diaspora does indeed do interesting and important “epistemological work.” The processes and practices of citation, translation, and interpellation that I have examined here are extremely illuminating and instructive when engaged with an eye toward understanding how they reveal the necessary if not crucial forms of distinction and commonality that characterize all transnational dialogues. But what is most essential to the future of African diaspora studies is the project of making more explicit what exactly constitutes the links and relations between us and how they necessarily require translation. For those of us interested in reconstructing the histories out of which communities and identities emerge, the ways in which intercultural and transnational links, bonds, and affiliations between different communities are invoked and produced through nuanced articulations both by scholars and by individual members of these communities is a dimension of the study of the diaspora that should not be overlooked. Indeed, articulations like those explored here urge us to rethink the discourse of diaspora and the diasporic relations it references. We might more productively think of them as less a common trajectory of cultural formation or as a set of cultural and historical links that either precede or call into being particular community formations or identifications. Following Judith Butler, I would conceptualize the diaspora as space in which the relations, definitions, and identifications within and between communities come to materialize and to matter as “real” in ways that are strategically useful; these phenomena in turn “hail” and thus interpellate us in important political, symbolic, and

often quite material forms. Indeed, the links and relations of the diaspora are themselves enacted in and through such transnational exchanges in ways that are thoroughly strategic and deeply embedded in intricate social webs of power and hegemony. Hence, I propose that we think of the diaspora as less an answer or explanation than as itself a persistent question—in fact, the question posed at the beginning of this chapter. What work does diaspora do?

My conversations with Black Germans about their memories of their lives in the Third Reich forced me to contend with their often very different understandings of race and their status as raced social subjects, understandings that were not always compatible with my own. My status as an African-American often became the site of challenge, as the ground on which complex contestations of difference and not simply similarity were waged. It is important to continually keep in mind that, like the category of race itself, our relation as Black people to the diaspora is not something we all have or are born with. On the contrary, these relations are constructed through negotiations and contestations in specific ways that are not always or easily translated/translatable into our respective cultural contexts. Relations of diaspora forged on the basis of similar experiences of racialization are not transparent links between Black people; rather, these relations are the products of highly constructed processes of cultural reading and interpretations that shape, define, and often constrain our ability to understand the differences between our histories and cultures. Although our experiences of living blackness may in some ways be similar, it is also necessary to consider the differences between our cultures and histories and to recognize how their specificities have come to bear on the ways in which the effects of race are lived and read.