Introduction

For obvious and irrefutable reasons, anti-Judaism in the nineteenth century and particularly anti-Semitism after the 1870s have received considerable attention from historians of modern Germany. The long and shameful record of anti-Judaism and the origins of modern anti-Semitism have undeniable importance for the history of Germany and indeed of Europe. Yet the nineteenth century in Germany with its particular confessional divide, modern rationalizing culture, and secularizing social currents was arguably more a century of anti-Catholicism. It was anti-Catholicism in Germany in the nineteenth century that culminated in what contemporaries called the Kulturkampf (cultural struggle) of the 1870s, a campaign sponsored by liberals and prosecuted by the state intended to break the influence of the Roman Catholic Church and the religious, social, and political power of Catholicism. The attack on the church included a series of principally Prussian, discriminatory laws that made Roman Catholics feel understandably persecuted within a predominantly Protestant nation. The Society of Jesus (the Jesuits), along with the Franciscan, Dominican, and other religious orders, was expelled from the German Empire, the consequence of two decades of anti-Jesuit and antimonastic hysteria. The Prussian state imposed its own authority over the education and appointment of Catholic clergy. Other state legislation authorized the seizure of church property, the expulsion of recalcitrant priests, and the removal of the financial support of those members of the clergy who refused to align themselves with state policies. Roman Catholics within Germany immediately recognized that these measures were an attack not merely on the church but on the entire Catholic way of life. State authorities believed they had no choice but to call upon the army to put down spontaneous riots by Catholics rebelling all over Germany in protest against the closing of monasteries, the imprisonment of
priests, the arrest of bishops, and the confiscation of church property by the state. By the end of the decade over eighteen hundred Catholic priests had either been incarcerated or exiled, and Catholic church property worth some sixteen million marks had been taken over by the state.¹

With the founding of the German Empire in 1871, Jews in Germany, meanwhile, finally achieved complete emancipation. This, of course, did not always mean that Jews were free from discrimination, but it did mean that Jews enjoyed equal legal status in a state that protected its citizens from arbitrary authority and guaranteed the rule of law. With considerable success, German Jews now increasingly moved into respectable commercial, professional, and academic positions and established themselves in German society as attorneys, journalists, physicians, and academics in numbers clearly disproportionate to the size of the Jewish population within the empire. At the same time during the first decade of the empire, contemporary critics continuously complained about the social, cultural, and professional underachievement of the Catholic population. Catholics and the Catholic Church in Germany now also faced a barrage of discriminatory Kulturkampf legislation that seemed constantly to remind them that they were not welcome. In modern Germany, an *Ausnahmegesetz* (exceptional legislation outside normal civil-juridical procedure) that abrogated citizen rights and a state-sponsored domestic war were unleashed first against Roman Catholicism.

While majorities could be found in the Prussian parliament and in the Reichstag to pass discriminatory legislation against Roman Catholics, the emancipation of Germany’s Jews, who constituted less than 1 percent of the population and therefore were scarcely capable of defending themselves against opposition, was not revoked. The Kulturkampf, even when most of its legislation lapsed in the 1880s, left a long legacy among German Roman Catholics, the bitter feeling that they had been branded as pariahs and had, for the sake of survival, to establish a separate Catholic subculture within the population. Liberals, the purported champions of tolerance, freedom, and equal rights before the law and as such the leadership of those who had insisted on Jewish emancipation, were the greatest enemies of Catholicism in the nineteenth century and the most dedicated prosecutors of the anti-

Catholic attack. By the 1870s liberals in Germany conceived of the anti-Catholic campaign as nothing less than a war to save the new empire from its most powerful enemy within its own territorial borders.

This study explores why the hatred of Roman Catholicism and Catholics was of such paramount importance to liberals, the self-avowed heirs of the Enlightenment, proponents of a modern industrial society, and loyal defendants of the modern nation-state. It examines more specifically the peculiarities of the liberal anti-Catholic imagination and the forms of intolerance developed and practiced by liberals against priests, monks, nuns, and the Catholic population in Germany. The anti-Catholicism of the nineteenth century and the anti-Catholic legislation of the 1870s emerge under close examination not, as so often understood, as contradictions of liberal principles, attempts to preserve the autonomy of the secular state, or campaigns to ensure the Protestant identity of the nation. The intolerance of Catholics that culminated in the Kulturkampf and the attempt once and for all to break the power of Roman Catholic faith and the influence of the Roman Catholic Church were instead embedded in a more pervasive and complex array of imperatives and anxieties specific to liberal identity and the liberal program for political citizenship, economic development, moral order, and public and private life in modern Germany.

**German Catholicism and Liberalism in Historical Perspective**

From the 1960s to the late 1980s almost an entire generation of social historians of Germany trained their attention on the society, culture, and politics of the working class in the nineteenth century. Toward the end of the 1980s, as historians began to look for new approaches to understand modern society, attention shifted to an exploration of the politics and social-cultural world of the German Bürgertum. Meanwhile, the history of German Roman Catholics during the nineteenth century remained for the most part unexamined or confined to Kirchengeschichte, often narrow studies of the institution of the church itself, despite the fact that, demographically, Catholics constituted one-third of the social and cultural life of the empire. Though once neglected, the broader religious, social, and political dimensions of German Catholicism have been rediscovered. Wolfgang Schieder’s pathbreaking article on the Catholic revival in the Rhineland with the
Trier pilgrimage of 1844 and then Jonathan Sperber’s equally important book on the resurgence of popular Catholicism in the Rhineland and Westphalia in the second half of the century initiated a wave of interest in the subject. Since these works, the study of German Catholicism in its rich social, cultural, and political aspects has become a major field within the historical literature of modern Germany.

Now historians can look back with some justified satisfaction on almost a generation of exemplary scholarship on nineteenth-century German Catholicism: Thomas Mergel’s study of Catholic middle-class society in the Rhineland, Otto Weiss’s exhaustive study of the Redemptorists in Bavaria, Irmtraud Götz von Olenhusen’s work on Catholic women and study of the culture of clerical ultramontanism in Freiburg, Margaret Lavinia Anderson’s works on Catholic piety and political culture, and David Blackbourn’s articles on political Catholicism and especially his study of Marian apparitions are only a few notable examples. As the study of Catholicism in Germany has developed a substantial body of literature, historians of Catholicism have


Other major works representing the range of topics in the literature on Catholicism in nineteenth-century Germany include but are not limited to Wolfgang Altgeld, Katholizismus, Protestantismus, Judentum: Über religiöse begründete Gegensätze und nationalreligiöse Ideen in der Geschichte des deutschen Nationalismus (Mainz: Matthias Grünewald Verlag, 1992); Olaf Blaschke and Frank-Michael Kuhlemann, eds., Religion im Kaiserreich: Milieus—Mentalitäten—Krisen (Gütersloh: Chr. Kaiser, 1996); Werner K. Blessing, Staat und Kirche in der Gesellschaft: Institutionelle Autorität und mentaler Wandel in Bayern während des 19. Jahrhunderts (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1982); Ellen Lovell Evans, The German Center Party, 1870–1933: A Study in Political Catholicism (Carbondale: Southern Illinois Univer-
been able to take stock of some of their predominant conclusions in order to direct or redirect further research, an indication of both the vitality and significance of the field. Recently, Oded Heilbronner has argued that historians may have brought the study of Catholicism out of the ghetto of historiographical ostracization, but in doing so they have ironically also confined the nineteenth-century Catholic population to a social and cultural ghetto, one that was willfully circumspect and antimodern, at variance with the progressive, main currents of life in Germany.4 This current historical evaluation of nineteenth-century Catholicism is an echo of the attitudes of liberal contemporaries who, as

I shall show, continuously complained of the Catholic population’s Bildungsdefizit (educational deficit) and backwardness.

In comparison to the body of research now available on Catholicism, little careful and sustained research has been devoted to modern German Protestantism and Protestant piety. David Blackbourn’s complaint that “the subject of popular Protestantism in the nineteenth century still awaits its historian” remains for the most part unanswered. Yet if research on Protestantism lags behind research on Catholicism and for that matter Judaism in Germany, historians have recently begun to plow new terrain in the history of religion as they move beyond the traditional focus on one religious denomination, whether Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish. Though usually the religious populations have been studied separately, historians are abandoning older habits, crossing over confessional borders to examine the ways the different religious populations in Germany cohabited and reciprocally shaped religious, social, cultural, and nationalist attitudes and practices.

At the same time, antireligious attitudes, particularly the study of the other side of the Catholic revival in the nineteenth century, the dramatic and parallel resurgence of anticlericalism and anti-Catholicism, have remained largely unexamined despite their breadth and depth and their larger meaning for German society and culture. Those studies that have explored anti-Catholicism in the nineteenth century have predominantly confined themselves to the period of the Kulturkampf itself. Much of this historiography has concentrated on the national political dimensions of the church-state conflict. Studies focused on


6. This is one of the virtues among others of Smith, German Nationalism. See also the collection of essays in Helmut Walser Smith, ed., Protestants, Catholics, and Jews in Germany, 1800–1914 (Oxford: Berg, 2001), particularly Helmut Walser Smith and Chris Clark, “The Fate of Nathan,” 3–32.


Otto von Bismarck as first minister of Prussia and chancellor of the empire have argued that the Kulturkampf was part of a manipulative strategy to ally liberal members of the Prussian parliament and the Reichstag with the state and imperial governments. By offering the Catholics as a target for liberal hostility, the chancellor hoped to divert attention away from the demand for constitutional-political reform. Josef Becker’s work exemplifies much of this instrumental and top-down perspective, arguing that “the chancellor imagined himself a ‘political chess player,’ holding together the splintering inclinations of the liberal parties in the empire by means of a slogan appealing to wide circles, a sort of outcry against popery, in order to corrupt liberalism, the strongest parliamentary force, through the Kulturkampf and to divert it from its constitutional-political goals.”

Studies that, on the other hand, stress the role of liberal politicians have also for the most part studied the church-state conflict as an aspect of parliamentary politics. Gustav Schmidt, for example, argues that liberal parliamentarians saw the Kulturkampf as an opportunity to solidify their political program, to force the chancellor to depend on liberal support, and to break the political power of the clergy in order to ensure parliamentary majorities.

Other works even as they moved beyond parliamentary politics have retained the traditional focus on Bismarck at the center of the church-state conflict. Heinrich Bornkamm, for example, in his account of the ostensibly ideological origins of the conflict, concluded finally, “the Kulturkampf, despite all associated influences, was Bismarck’s per-


10. Gustav Schmidt, “Die Nationalliberalen—eine regierungsfähige Partei? Zur Problematik der inneren Reichsgründung, 1870–1878,” in Die deutschen Parteien vor 1918: Parteien und Gesellschaft im konstitutionellen Regierungssystem, ed. Gerhard A. Ritter (Cologne: Kiepenheuer und Witsch, 1973), 208–23. Dieter Langewiesche’s account of the Kulturkampf also argues that the campaign was in part an attempt to bind Bismarck to the liberals. Dieter Langewiesche, Liberalismus in Deutschland (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1988), 182. As Jonathan Sperber notes, these two explanations—one specifying the role of the state, the other the motivation of the liberals—are not mutually exclusive. Both could have promoted the church-state conflict in order to increase its influence over the other. Sperber, Popular Catholicism, 208.
Studies that opened up the deeply nationalist character of the Kulturkampf see it as primarily an attempt by Bismarck to "Germanize" the Catholic peripheral populations, particularly the Polish-speaking nationalist population in the east. Marjorie Lamberti argues Bismarck conceived of school reform under the Kulturkampf as a weapon to combat the political activity of the Catholic clergy in the Polish-speaking areas of Posen, Upper Silesia, and West Prussia. Studies of the Catholic Church and local and regional studies have more successfully moved beyond the focus on Bismarck at the center of the Kulturkampf. Christoph Weber’s wide-ranging institutional study of the church has taken the historiography of the Kulturkampf into the inner politics of the church hierarchy and the Vatican. Norbert Schloßmacher’s study of Düsseldorf, Karl Rohe’s study of the Ruhr area, and Ute Olliges-Wieczorek’s study of Münster are examples of works that examine the Kulturkampf at the level of local and regional politics and political organization. Together they have been able to demonstrate the distinctive politicizing effects of the Kulturkampf on municipal affairs and the Catholic Center Party. Meanwhile, in an especially rich local and regional study of Constance, Gert Zang and others broke new ground with a structural and socioeconomic analysis of liberalism and the Kulturkampf in the Grand Duchy of Baden prior to the church-state conflict in Prussia and the empire. With a sustained campaign against the Catholic Church and particular...
larly its charitable organizations, which liberals believed drained economic capital and encouraged moral dependence, Constance liberals launched a progressive program for social improvement, commercial development, and political autonomy. In a collection of essays important not only for the Kulturkampf but for the history of German liberalism, the campaign against the church takes on larger cultural-political life and social and economic dimensions that are often sorely lacking in narrow political interpretations of the church-state conflict.

Even this cursory review suggests the volume and range of work on the Kulturkampf. But even as historians have acknowledged the importance of this work, they have continued to regard the Kulturkampf as an underresearched topic and enduring riddle in the history of nineteenth-century Germany. The most recent account continues to point out that the Kulturkampf itself “remains among the least understood problems of modern German history.”

Parallel to the work on the Kulturkampf, there has been a persistent sense that many rich and interesting questions about the conflict have not been pursued. The best recent work on the anti-Catholic campaign has, therefore, opened up fresh perspectives, training attention on previously

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18. Examples that run parallel to the development of the historiography of nineteenth-century Germany: “The statement . . . that the Kulturkampf for historical research remains ‘the most perplexing chapter’ of Bismarckian domestic politics continues to be true.” Birke, “Funktion des bürgerlichen Kulturkampfverständnisses,” 257. “The central significance that the Kulturkampf had for the full, domestic development of Germany has not been at all understood to its full extent.” Gall, “Problematik des badischen Kulturkampfes,” 151. “Despite an abundance of sources that has been available for decades, research on the Kulturkampf . . . to this day has not yet attained a satisfactory result. A ‘definitive’ general account [‘abschließende’ Gesamtdarstellung] of this fundamental and significant political, diplomatic, and spiritual struggle is still missing.” Morsey, “Bismarck und der Kulturkampf,” 232. “The history of the Prussian-German Kulturkampf is one of those themes that still has not been thoroughly researched, placed in its larger historical context, and examined for its effects on the inner disposition of German Catholics in Wilhelmine Germany.” Idem, “Probleme der Kulturkampf-Forschung,” 217. More recently: The Kulturkampf “remains remarkably under-researched.” Blackbourn, “Progress and Piety,” 143. “The popular-cultural aspects of the Kulturkampf and the sometimes near-utopian aspirations invested in it by liberal activists are a neglected dimension in the literature.” Geoff Eley, “Notable Politics, the Crisis of German Liberalism, and the Electoral Transition of the 1890s,” in *In Search of a Liberal Germany: Studies in the History of Germany Liberalism from 1789 to the Present*, ed. Konrad H. Jarausch and Larry Eugene Jones (New York: Berg, 1990), 187–216, quotation at 194 n. 17.
unexamined social and cultural dimensions of anti-Catholicism and the anti-Catholic campaign. David Blackbourn broke new ground initially with an important article on the culture of anticlericalism that pitted liberal “progress” against Catholic “backwardness,” arguing that the Kulturkampf was more than an episode in church-state relations or Bismarckian political calculations. He broke ground again with his elegant exploration of the cultural meaning of apparitions of the Virgin Mary in the town of Marpingen under the repressive legislation and state coercion of the Kulturkampf. In a work that brings theories of nationalism to the social history and politics of religious conflict in imperial Germany, Helmut Walser Smith examines the Kulturkampf as an attempt to impose on the German population a high culture based on “enlightened Protestantism.” By doing so, he has developed an argument that consciously takes distance from the Kulturkampf understood primarily as a liberal or state-sponsored attack on the church. From a social-historical perspective, Ronald J. Ross’s study of the failure of state power to prosecute successfully the campaign against the church captures the popular dimensions and social depth of a conflict that had been largely passed over as shallow or unremarkable. Recently, Margaret Lavinia Anderson in her rich and important work on the democratic franchise in imperial Germany has stressed that the Kulturkampf cannot be understood with the politics left out. The Kulturkampf, however much it owed to the clash between radical anticlericalism and fervent ultramontanism, should not be separated from the anxiety that accompanied the introduction of Germany’s democratic suffrage. Arguing that the Kulturkampf was predominantly a political not a cultural struggle, Anderson, in fact, brings the historiographical perspectives on the Kulturkampf almost full circle by reasserting the primacy of politics.

Together these recent works demonstrate that histories of modern Germany that either dismiss the Kulturkampf as marginal or accept the Kulturkampf narrowly as an attack directed merely against the institution of the church, clericalism, and the Center Party and not more broadly as a campaign against Catholicism as a way of life are untenable. The Kulturkampf struck deep into the Catholic population,

21. Smith, German Nationalism.
22. Ross, Failure of Bismarck’s Kulturkampf.
both its piety and consciousness, so much so that Catholics in response formed a relatively closed subculture: Catholics read their own newspapers, borrowed books from their own libraries, shopped at their own cooperatives, joined their own associations, belonged to their own trade unions, lived in their part of town, subscribed to their own brand of nationalism, and clung to their own worldview. For all their considerable virtues, however, these works also remain bound to the traditional research on anti-Catholicism inasmuch as they examine anti-Catholicism and the campaign against the Catholic Church only after the founding of the empire. Studies focused on the period of the Kulturkampf itself, as important as that period was, enter the history of anti-Catholicism in the nineteenth century in medias res. While most accounts of the Kulturkampf give the impression that the anti-Catholic campaign arose spontaneously and suddenly at the beginning of the 1870s and therefore provide little sense of the wide and deep-running anti-Jesuit, antimonastic, and anti-Catholic hysteria prior to German unification, the groundwork that made the Kulturkampf possible was, in fact, prepared over a period of decades. In contrast to previous work, one of the aims here is to expand the chronological horizon of the Kulturkampf.\(^\text{24}\) The anti-Jesuit paranoia, rabid antimonasticism and anticlericalism, and fervent anti-Catholicism that explain the passion of the Kulturkampf developed along with the dramatic revival of popular Catholicism during the 1850s and 1860s. This book argues that grappling with the significance of the anti-Catholic campaign requires an exploration of anti-Catholicism in Germany after the Revolution of 1848 and, therefore, a vision trained on the period well before the inception of Kulturkampf legislation.

Moving the exploration of anticlericalism and anti-Catholicism back to the 1848 Revolution, 1850s, and 1860s opens up the opportunity to reevaluate the nature of German liberalism in the second half of the nineteenth century. By focusing on the liberal obsession with anti-Catholicism particularly in the years before the unification of Germany and the unleashing of the Kulturkampf, this work develops new perspectives on liberalism and liberals in Germany. Over the past three

\(^{24}\) Work on the period before the Kulturkampf is of limited usefulness: Adelheid Constabel, ed., *Die Vorgeschichte des Kulturkampfes: Quellen aus dem Deutschen Zentralarchiv* (Berlin: Rüttén und Loening, 1956), though valuable, is only a compilation of source material. Erich Schmidt, *Bismarcks Kampf mit dem politischen Katholizismus: Pius IX. und die Zeit der Rüstung 1848–1878* (Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1942), and Erich Schmidt-Volkmar, *Der Kulturkampf in Deutschland 1871–1890* (Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1962), by the same author, were written by a member of the SS and exhibit a tendency to accept without critical circumspection the judgment of Catholics as “enemies of the empire.”
decades, a considerable amount of work has been devoted to the study of the nature and development of liberalism in nineteenth-century Germany. Conceptually much of this can be traced back to a major historiographical debate that opened in the mid-1970s. In a seminal essay, Lothar Gall stressed the importance of the 1848 Revolution in the transformation of liberalism as a political movement. Gall posited that preindustrial German liberalism as a result of the revolution underwent a transition from a constitutional movement committed to a *bürgerliche Gesellschaft* or “classless society of burghers” that was dominated by a large if internally differentiated *Mittelstand* (shopkeepers, artisans, and independent farmers) to a bourgeois ideology that was devoted to economic development and free-market capitalism. As an ideology of bourgeois class interests committed to the preservation of the status quo, liberalism became increasingly vulnerable during the period before the founding of the empire since it was unable to secure support from newly emerging social forces like the labor movement in the 1860s. Provocatively, Gall went so far as to suggest that the character of liberalism had changed so fundamentally that it might not be possible to speak of liberalism at all in Germany after 1850. On this reading, the period coinciding with Germany’s industrialization appears as the beginning of the end


of liberalism; liberalism was not, after all, the ideological path breaker toward modern industrial society.

At the same time, in a thesis even more sharply formulated than Gall’s, Michael Gugel argued that in the middle of the century German liberalism lost its original progressive, emancipatory character and became an exclusive, *bürgerlich* class movement. Facing the social consequences of industrialization, namely, the rise of the working class and the demise of the petite bourgeoisie, liberals either rejected or at least reinterpreted their original goals in favor of a defense of their social status. According to Gugel, the liberal political strategy during the constitutional conflict that dominated Prussian political life from 1861 to 1866 is best understood not by the allure of Realpolitik ideology but as a recalculation of their socioeconomic interests. Recent local and regional studies of voluntary associations central to the Bürger as a social group have given further specificity and empirical ballast to Gall’s thesis. For example, Michael Wettengel’s study of the Rhein-Main area argues that the experience of the 1848 Revolution was, at least in the Duchy of Hesse, the Duchy of Nassau, and the Free City of Frankfurt, the decisive break point in the trajectory of liberalism. Here, according to Wettengel, liberals faced with the failure of the revolution and under the pressure of the reactionary decade of the 1850s jettisoned the idealism of the Vormärz and became hard-nosed realists as they constituted new and modern political parties.

Together Gall and Gugel unleashed a spirited debate concerning the course and fate of liberalism in the nineteenth century. Wolfgang J. Mommsen soon argued that both Gall and Gugel idealized the political and social program of preindustrial liberalism and, by limiting the character of early liberalism to a “constitutional movement,” masked or distorted liberal social and economic interests. Mommsen pro-

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posed that the crisis that changed liberalism into a socially conservative ideology came not in 1848–49 or even 1866–67 or 1878–79 but rather only later in the 1880s with the second thrust of industrial development, protective tariff policy, and the dramatic rise of the working class. Under the conditions of “high capitalism,” liberalism began its demise, the liberal movement disintegrated, and the classical liberal program lost its persuasive appeal. Meanwhile, in the first synthetic evaluation of German liberalism since Friedrich C. Sell’s comprehensive treatment of the theme in 1953, James J. Sheehan examined “the relationship between liberalism and German society” throughout the nineteenth century. In a study of liberal elites, changing social conditions, party politics, election returns, and city and regional contexts, Sheehan explored, as he argued, “the way in which the historical situation narrowed liberals’ choices and often precluded alternatives that might have enabled them to save themselves and their ideals.”

Sheehan described an early liberalism that was not simply dominated by the Honoratioren (notables) of the Bildungsbürgertum—intellectuals, civil servants, and the economic bourgeoisie—but also included a broadly based and socially diverse Mittelstand. Sheehan supported Gall’s argument to the extent that he showed that the social heterogeneity of liberalism in the prerevolutionary period as well as its ideals meant that it was not a class-based movement. Sheehan, however, argued that liberalism began its decline not with the 1848 Revolution but with the founding of the empire in the 1870s. Although liberalism was once a movement of political opposition, liberals now advocated Bismarck’s Kulturkampf, foreign policy, and social-economic programs; no longer a movement of the Mittelstand, liberalism alienated Catholics, workers, and ethnic minorities. Sheehan concluded, “By the 1890s,


31. Sheehan, German Liberalism, 3.
their dreams emptied by frustration, dissension, and defeat, the liberals receded to the fringes of political life.”32

As historians continued to debate the location of the “decisive” turning point in the course of German liberalism, the debate itself took a turn with a stimulating critique by David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley of dominant interpretations in current German historiography. They together exposed as a myth the established notion of a Sonderweg or unique course of German historical development and, as they did so, pushed the watershed for German liberalism even further back in the nineteenth century.33 The significance of the Sonderweg debate has been well rehearsed. As is well known, historians who advocate the Sonderweg thesis argue that an insufficient legacy of liberalism in general and the abortive Revolution of 1848 in particular meant that Germany in the second half of the nineteenth century failed to establish within society the liberal and democratic foundations that developed in other Western countries at that time. According to these historians, preindustrial elites retained their privileged positions within a political autocracy. At the same time, the liberal desire for political reform was silenced by the national unification they themselves had been unable to achieve; culturally and socially the bourgeoisie was feudalized and then distracted by a “social imperialist” policy of manipulation from above.34 Blackbourn and Eley contend that this interpretation of German deviant develop-

32. Ibid., 273. After his initial reply to Gall’s thesis, Mommsen seemed to agree with Sheehan that the period 1870 to 1890 was decisive in the transition of liberalism: “The period between about 1870 and 1890 must be seen as the final phase in the history of bourgeois liberalism, at any rate at the level of the state.” Wolfgang J. Mommsen, “Society and State in Europe in the Age of Liberalism, 1870–1890,” in Imperial Germany, 1867–1918: Politics, Culture, and Society in an Authoritarian State (London and New York: Arnold, 1995), 57–74. This essay was first published as “Gesellschaft und Staat im liberalen Zeitalter: Europa 1870–1890,” in Der autoritäre Nationalstaat: Verfassung, Gesellschaft und Kultur des deutschen Kaiserkreiches (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch, 1990), 86–108.


ment rested on a normative, ahistorical, and misconceived comparison with the French, English, and American experiences.

Just as important, Blackburn and Eley argue that the fixation of historians on the defeat of the 1848 Revolution has blinded them to the considerable accomplishments of German liberals in the nineteenth century. Despite the political failures of the 1848 Revolution, the compromise of constitutional reform, and the realignment with protective tariffs, German liberals nonetheless waged an economic, social, and cultural “silent revolution.” They achieved many of their most important objectives in the domain of civil society, particularly during the 1850s and 1860s, and successfully established the “hegemony of the bourgeoisie.” Only in the 1890s, according to Blackbourn and Eley, did the traditional solidarities of liberal Honoratiorenpolitik (politics of notables) finally give way to a new style of mass, nationalist politics.35 Faced with the more complex and fragmented array of political constituencies in the final decade of the century, the National Liberals, unlike the Conservatives and the Catholic Center Party, failed to create popular organizations that included workers, the peasantry, and the Mittelstand. The liberal parties ultimately proved, Blackbourn and Eley argue, unable to keep pace with the dramatic rise in voter turnout that favored the parties to the right.36

Historians have by now criticized the German Sonderweg from different theoretical, methodological, and empirical perspectives so successfully that the interpretation no longer dominates contemporary


35. Blackbourn and Eley also reevaluate the Sonderweg and posit the 1890s as a major shift in political alignments in, respectively, Blackbourn, Class, Religion, and Local Politics; Geoff Eley, Reshaping the German Right: Radical Nationalism and Political Change after Bismarck (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980); and idem, “Notable Politics.” See also the collection of essays in Richard J. Evans, Society and Politics in Wilhelmine Germany (London: Croom Helm, 1978).

36. Jonathan Sperber’s examination of elections throughout the imperial period substantiates Blackbourn’s and Eley’s identification of the 1890s as a decade of considerable movement between parties, marking a break from Bismarckian election patterns. At the same time he concludes in contrast to Blackbourn and Eley that voter turnout declined during the Reichstag elections of the 1890s. Jonathan Sperber, The Kaiser’s Voters: Electors and Elections in Imperial Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
German historiography. Even so, it continues to serve as a conceptual touchstone, often implicit, that historians use to order debate about fundamental aspects of nineteenth- and twentieth-century German society, politics, and culture, particularly the course of liberalism. In a comprehensive examination of liberalism as ambitious as Sheehan’s, Dieter Langewiesche focuses not on a special variant of German liberalism but on liberalism in Germany, a reorientation consciously recorded in the title of his book. In this work and in a string of subsequent essays, Langewiesche argues that liberalism in Germany can be understood only if every change is not equated with a deviation from its original goals. He emphasizes continuities within liberalism over the course of the century: early liberalism may have shifted from a utopian vision of a classless society of citizens to an increasingly bourgeois ideology at midcentury, but at the same time basic tenets, including optimism; an orientation to the future; and a commitment to progressive reform, most notably education, remained intact. In Langewiesche’s nuanced evaluation, liberalism was not characterized by a simple linear demise; despite failures beyond 1871 liberal ideas continued to pervade German society and influenced the prevailing political culture. Liberal parties helped lay the legal, social, and economic foundations of the nation-state and helped establish the infra-


38. For a general reappraisal of German liberals, see Elizabeth Fehrenbach, Verfassungsstaat und Nationsbildung 1815–1871 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1992); for liberal achievements, particularly the rule of law in civil society, see Michael John, Politics and the Law in Late Nineteenth-Century Germany: The Origins of the Civil Code (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); and for a regional study that challenges the traditional concept of “unpolitical” liberals, Rudy Koshar, Social Life, Local Politics, and Nazism: Marburg, 1880–1935 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986).

39. Langewiesche, Liberalismus in Deutschland.

structures necessary for modern life in the cities. In fact, politically left liberalism experienced a remarkable revival in the first years of the twentieth century before the collapse of the empire in 1918. Only during the Weimar years was liberalism discredited before, according to Langewiesche, it was finished off by the Nazi rise to power in 1933.

Similarly, Konrad H. Jarausch and Larry Eugene Jones have also revised the account of liberal development through the nineteenth century to the post-1945 period. Together they argue that the course of liberalism is not characterized by one decisive break; rather it exhibits an uneven pattern with “peaks of success” and “valleys of disappointment and failure” that do not coincide with previous evaluations. From the French Revolution through the Vormärz, liberal ideas, according to Jarausch and Jones, emerged in a network of voluntary progressive associations in German society. The Revolution of 1848 marked not the ultimate failure of liberalism but a temporary setback from which the liberal movement recovered by the end of the reactionary 1850s. The period from the beginning of the so-called New Era in 1858 to Bismarck’s “second founding” of the empire in 1878–79 witnessed not the compromise of liberals with the authoritarian state but the first triumph of liberalism during which liberals were able to launch much of the major legislation including the Kulturkampf of the new empire.

Bismarck’s break with the National Liberals at the end of the 1870s initiated, Jarausch and Jones argue, a period of fragmentation and decline that lasted until the 1890s. With the turn of the century came not liberal isolation and dissolution in the face of mass, nationalist organizations but a second wave of liberal achievements that culminated in 1919 with the founding of the Weimar Republic. During this period, the progressive parties revitalized themselves by reaching over class and religious lines to social democratic and Catholic constituencies. This period of success was followed by the chaotic course of social, political, and economic developments specific to the Weimar period that together devastated the social basis of the German liberal parties and finally provided the Nazi Party with its electoral triumph. Liberalism experienced a third wave of accomplishment in the postwar period with the establishment of liberal ideas and practices in the

social, economic, and political life of the Federal Republic of Germany. Ultimately, Jarausch and Jones argue that evaluating the course of liberalism requires standards that include not just the electoral performance of its parties but its social and cultural dimensions as well.

The debate concerning the fate of liberalism in Germany seems to have no immediate end in sight; recent research on liberalism at the local level promises to ensure that the debate will only continue. For example, in a study of Frankfurt am Main during the second empire Jan Palmowski evaluates liberals as they actually exercised power at the municipal level of government, the only level at which liberals across Germany had any real political power throughout the empire. He identifies the late 1860s and 1870s as the crucial watershed that witnessed the fundamental politicization of urban government: during this period, which included the founding of local liberal parties, politics took on the characteristics that lasted in their essentials well into the Weimar Republic. As urban liberal leaders pushed through major reforms, they proved themselves politically astute, innovative, and prepared when necessary to compromise—behavior, Palmowski argues, that indicates their vitality, proves their realism, and refutes the image of German “unpolitical” notables.

In short, historians of German liberalism have argued for a fundamental change in liberal ideology after midcentury while disagreeing as to precisely when this transition took place. In a series of often mutually contradictory accounts, they have located the “decisive” turning point(s) and period(s) of success and failure in virtually every decade from the Revolution of 1848 to the Weimar Republic. Most argue that change for either better or worse was due to one or more seminal events: the defeat of the Revolution of 1848, the years of repression in the conservative decade of reaction, capitalist economic prosperity, the constitutional conflict of the mid-1860s, the success of Bismarck’s “Blood and Iron,” the allure of Realpolitik, and Bismarck’s break with the National Liberals in 1878–79. Clearly all of these events had a major impact on liberals, liberal practice, and liberal theory in the second half of the nineteenth century. But we miss an important part of the development of liberalism as a political ideology, as a social vision, and as a self-identity as long as the issues and terms remain fixed on middle-class prosperity with the economic boom of the 1860s, the con-

42. Palmowski, Urban Liberalism.
stitutional battle, the success of the wars of unification, the split of the liberals with the “second founding” of the empire, and the fate of Honorationpolitik. As important as these factors were in themselves, liberalism in the second half of the century cannot be understood with reference alone to political and economic pressures.

If so, then Dagmar Herzog’s study of religious politics in prerevolutionary Baden, exploring liberalism from a decidedly different angle, opens up opportunities to reevaluate liberalism in Germany. Rooted in feminist theory and literary criticism, Herzog focuses on the discursive relationships that tied together and reshaped controversies over ecclesiastical authority, Jewish emancipation, and women’s rights. In reaction to Catholic conservatives’ intransigent policy regarding clerical celibacy and marriage between Protestants and Catholics, many liberals embraced the cause in general of religious dissenters and in particular the antiultramontane Deutschkatholiken (German Catholics). Support of the religious rights of Deutschkatholiken and opposition to Catholic hard-line orthodoxy, not commitment to universal equality, compelled liberals to accept Jewish emancipation. However, the terms in which liberals accepted Jewish emancipation contributed to the persistence of anti-Jewish prejudice. The liberal paradox is likewise evident in the attitudes of Deutschkatholiken toward women’s rights. The deutsch-katholisch attitude, like the mainstream liberal notion of gender equality, was undermined by an insistence on gender difference that excluded women from genuine emancipation. Not only salient political and economic themes, therefore, but also private matters of intimacy such as faith, marriage, and sex reshaped the liberal political agenda in prerevolutionary Baden. These arguments may together amount to a reorientation of the more traditional study of liberalism. Since they are, however, limited to the Vormärz and to Baden, it remains to be seen whether they apply generally to liberalism in Germany in the nineteenth century. Indeed, since Herzog focuses on Deutschkatholiken, a small minority among liberals in the duchy, it is not clear that her conclusions are representative of liberalism even in Baden in the Vormärz.

44. “Liberalism,” Herzog concludes, “was part of the problem.” Ibid., 82. See also 58.
45. Baden may also be an unlikely place for a case study of Deutschkatholiken. Most of the early deutschkatholisch congregations were located in Saxony, and the largest congregation was, in fact, located in Breslau in Prussia, where some one thousand people signed a
The perspective according to which modern liberal ideology masks a deep authoritarian strain that can be traced to the totalizing utopian project of the Enlightenment bears on anti-Catholicism in the nineteenth century and offers ways to rethink particularly the Kulturkampf. Ultimately, most historians have tried to account for the Kulturkampf by explaining it away: the Kulturkampf with its intolerance and state coercion, they argue, amounts to a mistake along the liberal trajectory of the nineteenth century. They dismiss the Kulturkampf as a betrayal of the ideal of universal rights, a moment of liberal absentmindedness or acquiescence to Bismarckian manipulation during which, in either case, liberals abandoned their cherished principles. Even on its own terms the explanation for the Kulturkampf as a liberal “accident” seems unsatisfactory on three counts. First, the liberal hatred of Catholics that culminated in the Kulturkampf was too deep, too intense, and too abiding to be simply a mistake. Second, accounting for the Kulturkampf as a misguided departure from the presumably normative course of liberalism forecloses further critical inquiry into the origins of the Kulturkampf and the nature of liberalism. Finally, as recent scholarship has emphasized, presupposing a normative course as against a deviant one for the development of German liberalism in the nineteenth century is ahistorical: liberal ideology was what it was in any given historical period, not what it should have been. The Kulturkampf was not due to the liberals’ insufficient commitment to their own creed. Nor was it the case that German liberals

declaration of membership at the congregation’s founding in early 1845 and over eight thousand belonged by 1847. Herzog also gives considerable space to Louise Dittmar, herself an exceptionally radical feminist for the time, and since she did not live in Baden and she did not publish her works there (she merely gave several addresses at the small Monday Club at the very end of the Vormärz in 1847), it is unlikely that Dittmar had a major impact on the formulation of Badenese prerevolutionary liberalism. Fundamental questions therefore remain regarding the formation of liberal identity and ideology in nineteenth-century Germany.

were endowed with an inadequate Enlightenment legacy. On the contrary, the German liberals who were *Kulturkämpfer* (culture warriors) against the Catholic Church and Catholicism were passionately dedicated to their ideals and incessantly referenced the Enlightenment for inspiration and orientation. From the perspectives of cultural studies, the issue is rather that intolerance, specifically anti-Catholic intolerance, was, I argue, integral to liberalism in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Understanding why this was so requires recognizing a specific cognitive process of identity formation that placed anti-Catholicism at the center of liberal ideology and practice in the second half of the century. After the defeat of the 1848 Revolution, when liberals faced oppression and ultimately worried about their own continued relevance in the conservative decade of reaction, they found themselves in a crisis of purpose and identity that required critical reevaluation, associational reorganization, and cultural-ideological reorientation. In the context of the dramatic Catholic missionary campaign and the revival of popular Catholicism taking place all over Germany, the liberal response was to develop new anticlerical and anti-Catholic rhetorical metaphors and practices that by means of differentiation and contrast proved powerful ways to define and assert the bourgeois claim to social hegemony. During the New Era after 1858, the liberals’ stigmatization of Jesuits, priests, monks, and Catholics as stupid, medieval, superstitious, feminine, and un-German helped orient their vision of German society toward modern rationalism, bourgeois individualism, high industrialization, free-market capitalism, the unified nation-state, and gender-specific public and private spheres. By examining the formation of liberal identity and the liberal prescription for German society after the defeat of the revolution and during the resurgence of popular Catholicism, this book identifies the moral, social, and cultural imperatives behind the Kulturkampf of the 1870s. The Kulturkampf emerges in this light not as an exception to liberal principles but as the culmination of liberal demands for a modern German political, economic, social, and sexual order. Anti-Catholic intolerance was not derivative but constitutive of liberalism; it was not an ancillary expression but, on the contrary, at the core of liberalism in Germany.

**Outline of the Argument**

Two conceptual precepts inform the course of this work. First, liberalism is understood here not simply as a political movement and set of
economic principles but more broadly, as Konrad Jarausch and Larry Eugene Jones have argued, as also a body of cultural attitudes and social practices. As culture, “liberalism existed as a powerful cluster of related ideas and principles that helped legitimate bourgeois claims to social and political hegemony.” At the center of this cluster was the idea of the individual free from any restriction to the development of personality. “Directed against the unholy trinity of feudalism, absolutism, and religious orthodoxy, this ideal posited the cultivation of human reason and the development of the human intellect as the highest goal of all cultural activity.” Different aspects of German liberalism—a belief in a bürgerlich social order, a constitutional though not necessarily parliamentary state, a historically grounded belief in civil and human rights, a belief in reform within rather than emancipation from the state, a belief in private property and rights—were all embraced by the idea of Bildung, the cultivation of the human intellect and spirit. For German liberals Bildung was the defining characteristic of men as individuals and as members of civil society. As one historian has argued, German liberals believed “only the Gebildete [cultivated man] was competent to participate ‘reasonably’ in public discourse, and only the Gebildete could become an ‘autonomous personality’—the highest credo in liberal thinking.” Living a liberal life, however, entailed more than simply the cultivation of intellect and independence. It was also, according to Dieter Langewiesche, a historically specific “style of thinking” characterized by an “affinity for the new, an orientation toward the future, a belief in progress toward more freedom, rights, and reason.” If liberalism was a culture of rationalism, individualism, independence, Bildung, and progress—the principles in general of liberal modernity—then this study examines liberalism as a historically specific cognitive style in nineteenth-century Germany, a psychological and rhetorical disposition that was, I argue, anti-Catholic.

Second, this study accepts the assumption that words and deeds can produce meanings and identities that transcend in often unexpected
and unwelcome ways the intentions of their original authors and actors. By tracing the management of images in anti-Catholic texts or mob attacks against Jesuits and monasteries, it is possible to trace liberals working through who they were and what they wanted the German nation to be morally, socially, economically, and culturally. It is also possible, however, to uncover within anti-Catholic discourse and practice the deep level of dysphoria that characterized German liberals’ cognitive relationship to Roman Catholics. The confrontation with the resurgence of popular Catholicism after 1848 betrayed complex anxieties among liberals about their capacity to establish a unified, rationalized, scientific, and industrial German nation. In the liberal imagination, the Catholic revival represented a new age of mass culture, political democratization, and women’s emancipation, an age seemingly hostile to independent character, Honoratiorenpolitik, and the rational public sphere. The specific terms of anti-Catholicism as an act of creative imagination shaped an identity that was, I argue, riddled with insecurities about the reemerging women’s movement; the rise of socialism; the masculine public persona; and, ultimately, the viability of liberalism itself. Liberal men made their own identity, but they did not make it just as they pleased.

These issues and arguments are addressed in thematic chapters organized roughly chronologically from the Catholic Church’s reaction to the 1848 Revolution through the dissolution (for all practical purposes) of the liberal and state campaign against the church at the end of the 1870s. Chapter 1 examines the ultramontane Catholic revival that was the context for unprecedented levels of liberal anti-Catholic hysteria. It traces the response of Catholic Church authorities to the chaos they believed had been unleashed by the liberal-sponsored 1848 Revolution against throne and altar, the pillars of social, political, and religious order. In the wake of the revolution, with a feverish crusade of missions and the development of new forms of piety, the Catholic Church dramatically reawakened and mobilized popular Catholicism. While I examine the role of the missions in the Catholic resurgence throughout Germany, the concentration is primarily on the Rhineland, a region that due to its heavily Catholic population has been the focus of previous research on the popular revival.51 I revisit this region using different source material in order to

revise previous conclusions about the conduct of the missionary campaign and its impact on popular Catholic culture. In contrast to Jonathan Sperber’s work on Rhineland-Westphalia, for example, I show that as the campaign continued into the late 1860s the number of missions did not abate but in fact increased, that the missions were better organized and more systematic than in the 1850s. More important, the church’s campaign appears not merely as a bulwark against religious indifference and political radicalism; with their dynamic sermons that pounded audiences with the threat of infernal damnation, hellfire, and brimstone, the missions were instruments of psychological and public terror, traumatizing their audiences and driving them back into the church. By moving beyond the biased reports of clergy, I also show, again in contrast to Sperber, that though the missions had a profound impact on religiosity, *alltäglich* (everyday) patterns of popular, rural culture remained resilient despite the church’s efforts to improve moral conduct.\(^{52}\)

Chapter 2 examines the impact of the Catholic missions on Protestants and Protestant religious authorities, a topic that has been passed over in the social and religious history of modern Germany. The missions were remarkable “intraconfessional zones” where the different religious populations mixed and reconfessionalized in unprecedented ways. Contrary to the largely unquestioned assumption by historians that the Protestant population was undergoing an unrelenting process of secularization throughout the century (not simply in Germany but across Europe), the evidence indicates that one of the unexpected results of the Catholic missionary campaign was the heavy attendance of Protestants and with it the reawakening of popular Protestant religiosity. At the same time, the response of the Protestant leadership to the Catholic missions and revival was the development of militant anti-Catholicism and anti-Jesuit hysteria in particular. Within this context the chapter explores with close readings of important liberal prescriptive texts how anti-Catholicism could be used to rehabilitate and reorient German liberalism after the shattering events of 1848 and 1849, in the following decade of state repression and during a new age of industrial development. The chapter finally examines the polarization of liberalism and Catholicism by the late 1860s and argues that the Kulturkampf was not simply the expression of traditional Protestant


\(^{52}\) Ibid., 56–63, 91–98.
anti-Catholicism but a more specifically liberal project for social and cultural reform.\textsuperscript{53}

Chapter 3 is a more focused examination of the culture of anticlericalism and anti-Catholicism, concentrating on the relationship between the meaning of antimonasticism and anticonvent hysteria and the liberal reconstruction of self and nation. Liberals like state authorities looked with alarm yet fascination on the dramatic increase in the number of male and female religious orders during the postrevolutionary period. As purported relics from the feudal period in an age that liberals believed, was supposed to be modern, progressive, and scientific, monasteries and monks across the German landscape served in the imagination as historical artifacts that could orient the middle class culturally in the direction of industrialization, capitalism, productive labor, and nation building. I also look for the production of identity and meaning in the proliferation in widely read liberal journals and newspapers of lurid stories about sexual atrocities in convents. These stories on the one hand serviced bourgeois demands for morbid and prurient entertainment. On the other hand, and more important, fantasies about sexual intrigue in convents and nuns secretly hidden away to rot in dungeons ultimately reveal the complex anxieties that haunted liberals in an age of militant ultramontanism and the authoritarian state. At the end of the 1860s, an attack against a Dominican residence in an industrial suburb of Berlin, a series of antimonastic rallies, and antimonastic petitions delivered to the Prussian parliament expressed by means of contrast liberal expectations for the modern nation-state. The more closely we examine the German liberal relationship to monasteries and more broadly clerics and Catholicism in the nineteenth century, the more we recognize that anti-Catholicism was a rich and elaborate ritual of identity.

Chapter 4 examines the links between anti-Catholicism, prescriptions for public conduct and private domesticity, misogyny, and the Kulturkampf in liberal discourse. For liberal men, the reemergence of the women’s movement in the mid-1860s, what contemporaries called the \textit{Frauenfrage} or “women’s question,” and the demand by women for access to the public were inextricably linked to mass Catholic resurgence. In public Catholics seemed to undermine the principle of separate spheres reserved, according to liberal social and sexual ideology, for feminine domesticity and public masculinity. In this light, the attack on Catholicism emerges as an attempt during a period of dra-

\textsuperscript{53} This contrasts with Smith, \textit{German Nationalism}, 17–49.
matic change to maintain the social and political status quo between men and women. Helmut Smith reminds readers in his study of nationalism and religious conflict that the Kulturkampf is perhaps best understood as a kaleidoscope changing shape with each shift of perspective.\textsuperscript{54} If Smith viewed the Kulturkampf as an episode in the process of German nation building, I turn the lens a notch farther and see a war incited by the women’s question, the question concerning the role of women in society and their access to public life, education, professional opportunities, and ultimately politics. Exploring the Kulturkampf as a Geschlechterkampf, a contest between men and women, for access to the public sphere allows for a dramatically different evaluation of the origins and meaning of liberal anti-Catholicism, one that moves beyond studies that have argued that the church-state conflict was at bottom a clash between the “modern” outlook of liberal nationalists and “backward” Catholics, an attempt to preserve the autonomy of the state, or a campaign to stem the tide of political Catholicism, though, to be sure, the Kulturkampf was in some measure all of these as well.

The final chapter examines two seminal debates during the Kulturkampf, one concerning the ideological background that defined the legal relationship between church and state and the second concerning the enactment of anti-Jesuit legislation meant to break finally the Catholic missionary campaign that had continued unabated since 1848. As leading liberal legal scholars engaged the Kirchenfrage, the question concerning relations between the church and the state, they established the theoretical principles that abrogated the authority of the Catholic Church in Prussia guaranteed in the constitution of 1850. They went so far as to argue that the imperatives of freedom and progress ultimately justified, if deemed necessary in the campaign against the political power of Catholicism, amending the constitution in order to rescind the citizen rights of the Catholic population. In the debate concerning the Jesuit law, the exceptional legislation closing the Society of Jesus and suspending the residence rights of German citizens, progressive and national liberals argued that they were pursuing a campaign based on their historical responsibility in the name of freedom, modern culture, and the preservation of the modern state. In their prosecution of Kulturkampf legislation, liberals imagined that civilization itself weighed in the balance and that duty, therefore, demanded of them no less than a war against the Catholic Church. Ultimately this book argues that the Kulturkampf, the culmination of

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., 19–20. A kaleidoscope as a metaphor for the Kulturkampf is original to Pflanze, \textit{Bismarck and the Development of Germany}, 2:179.
over twenty years of fervent liberal anti-Catholicism, should be understood not simply as an attack on the Catholic Church as most scholarship has argued but, rather, as a more complex (and, therefore, arguably more interesting) attempt during a period of dramatic pressures for change to preserve an entire moral, political, social, and sexual order. Anti-Catholicism, far from the marginal status to which it is usually consigned, emerges as a central theme in nineteenth-century German politics, society, and culture.

An identity that could manifest such religious disdain, social arrogance, and masculine bravado does not perhaps lend itself well to disinterested analysis. I have tried, nonetheless, to balance this work with an appreciation for the historical specificity of time and place. The period in Germany that this work examines was marked by political revolution, by profound social trauma, by blood shed in warfare for national unification in the form of the empire. This was an age of great surges forward in industry and the economy; the time of the breakthrough of the Industrial Revolution and free-market capitalism; and, despite setbacks and crises, a period of accelerated growth and booming prosperity. It might seem a paradox, but it was, I shall argue, surely no mere coincidence that during this period Catholicism and liberalism were the movements with the greatest vitality and momentum. Despite their incompatibility, the age belonged as much to the one as to the other. Anti-Catholic progressives like Rudolf Virchow and Hermann Schulze-Delitzsch and national liberals like Rudolf von Gneist and Heinrich von Sybel exhibited an irony consonant with their age. Though rabidly intolerant, they were not without redeeming virtues. They were principled, public men who believed in science, progress, and freedom; in the value of the individual and the rule of law; in service to humanity as well as the nation. They were idealists who shouldered together the burdens of remaking a world but shared no less the optimistic conviction despite personal sacrifice that it was worth doing and that it could be done for the better. They were, in short, visionaries of a modern age shaped by humanism and the Enlightenment, an age that could only be by definition, they believed, beyond and without Catholicism. They had apparently very little if any sense that their idealism was their limitation, that they were paradoxically as much bound to as repulsed by Catholicism. This is ultimately, therefore, a study of the problem of anti-Catholicism as a prescription for modernity.

55. For an eloquent statement concerning the current inclination to chastise German liberals and to sentimentalize the Catholic victims of the Kulturkampf, see Blackbourn, *Marpingen*, xxxiv.