Popular Cinema, National Cinema, and European Integration

Marc Silberman

German cinema in the 1990s is a story of structural changes responding to audiovisual diversification and to the global networking that has come to play a major role in the European Union. The infrastructural shifts in the movie industry and the discourse about the significance of national cinema(s) that has accompanied those shifts over the past ten years will concern me here. I propose to set out some of the parameters that have given rise to the complaints and hype surrounding developments in the past ten years and then to conclude with some speculative comments on the implications of the new media landscape in Germany and Europe.

In the two decades prior to 1990, cinema critics, historians, and funding agencies in both East and West Germany as well as the foreign audience for international films regarded German contributions as artistically sophisticated works representing the liberal and cosmopolitan spirit of postwar Germany, the products of a personal, subjective, and committed view of reality transformed into a meaningful social dialogue. Such a perspective assumed a selective view of what counted as quality in the cinema, a view shaped by considerations derived from or legitimated by “high culture” characteristics of authorial control, authenticity of voice, formal complexity, and the artist’s public role in mediating social critique. For example, the strict physical distinction within the East German Deutsche Film-Aktiengesellschaft (DEFA) studios between television production located in the Adlershof studios and feature film production in the Babelsberg studios mirrored the division between personnel and resources directed toward popular culture and art. Although the Babelsberg facility also produced “popular” fare such as children’s movies and topical comedies, these were considered to be finger exercises for younger directors either to prove their
mettle or to punish those who had pushed the ideological limits too far in developing material for more “serious” productions such as historical films, adaptations of literary texts, or dramas. The membership of several DEFA directors in the Academy of Arts of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) with their selected “Meisterschüler” might be seen as symptomatic for the status the cinema had achieved in the GDR as a legitimate artistic endeavor, a status bought at the price of political quiescence or marginalization that was sometimes apostrophized as poetic realism during the 1980s.

The New German Cinema in the Federal Republic had meanwhile established its reputation as the most successful European new wave of the 1970s through its orientation toward the Autorenfilm, a concept emphasizing the individual creativity and genius of the director who controls and is responsible for all aspects of the filmic work of art. The ongoing laments and eulogies for the artistically ambitious New German Cinema throughout the 1980s did not arise because the aging mavericks of the 1960s and 1970s stopped making films but because the funding and distribution market for their vision of film production was shrinking. Never commercially viable in West Germany (the box-office market share for these features vacillated between 4 and 10 percent annually into the 1980s), the mature New German Cinema, like its DEFA counterpart, was drawing ever closer to a kind of state-sponsored stagnation. At the same time, the commercially successful West German contributions of the 1980s—those that are rarely mentioned in film histories or by film critics and that are never exported—were dominated by television comics like Otto Waalkes, Loriot, Didi Hallervorden, and Gerhard Polt.

This was the situation, then, in 1990. While the DEFA studios had built a solid reputation for craftsmanship coupled with conservative aesthetic and political judgment, DEFA’s domestic audience had been eroded by competition from imported films, increasingly from the West, and from television programming received from both East and West German broadcasters. In West Germany the New German Cinema directors, who in any case had never constituted a unified movement, were drifting toward more commercial filmmaking, while others dropped out or emigrated and still others tried to establish a niche existence. Meanwhile the younger generation considered the New German Cinema by this point to be an extension of “Papas Kino.” The year 1990 reconfigured the playing field in a number of significant ways. Reunification suddenly pitted a large pool of talent from the East against colleagues in the West, who were all competing for state and
local subsidies as well as for public television cofinancing, including from the two new regional public television stations in the newly constituted eastern federal states. In addition, television deregulation opened the door to private broadcasters with an enormous appetite for new (cheap) talent and with great potential as a secondary market for feature films. Moreover, import/export strategies of the American majors adapted to the new European landscape with investments in multiplex cinemas and moves to protect their traditionally high share in the German market by investing in local production with distribution guarantees. Finally, the political agenda for European integration introduced new audiovisual policies and a new vision of European cultural identity.

The movie industry in the united Germany continued through the year 2000 to produce between sixty and seventy cinema features annually, but more than half of those launched sold too few tickets at the box office to amortize the production costs. The real news in the 1990s was the success of a series of comedies. These included the familiar television crossover products that had already established a following in the 1980s, as well as comedies aimed at the younger audience by a new generation of filmmakers. The absolute leader of the pack was Sönke Wortmann’s Der bewegte Mann, which gained a 30 percent market share when it opened in 1994 and went on to sell an unprecedented 6.5 million admissions in Germany during its commercial release. This was followed in 1995 by Detlev Buck’s Männerpension (3.5 million admissions), Michael Schaan and Udo Beissel’s Werner—Das muß kesseln (5 million admissions in 1995–96), and Wortmann’s Das Superweib (2.3 million admissions). The trend peaked in 1996–97, when the market share for domestic productions maintained itself at around 17 percent, the highest since the early 1980s, but the truly historic figures for the first quarter of 1997—a solid 31.5 percent of the market share—were attributable to the release of only three extremely popular comedies, Helmut Dietl’s Rossini, Thomas Jahn’s Knockin’ on Heaven’s Door, and Michael Schaak and Veit Vollmer’s animated feature Das kleine Arschloch. After that the trend receded, with only four comedies surpassing the watershed of 2 million tickets sold: Lola rennt by Tom Tykwer in 1998; two features in 1999, Asterix und Obelix gegen Caesar and the animated film Werner—Volles Rooää!!!!; and Sonnenallee by Leander Haussmann in 2000.

Although there was a constant stream of comedy successes during these ten years, with more features than ever breaking the symbolic barrier of 1 million admissions, the average German market share—
excluding that one unusual peak in 1997—ranged between a modest 8 and 13 percent. Indeed, more relevant is the fact that many of these comedies, like the artistically ambitious features of the New German Cinema, were produced originally as television films or at least with television co-financing. A major difference of this recent cinematic cheerfulness, however, is the synthesis of visual and structural aesthetics from film and television. Thus, one finds conventional television-type narratives using familiar recipes and genre resolutions with amusing twists but characterized by well-crafted cinematography and editing techniques derived from cinematic know-how.

While it has been clear in Germany since the early 1960s that statistically comedies have a better chance for domestic audience acceptance than any other genre, the reason for the abundance and extraordinary success of comedy fare in the 1990s would need a more multifaceted explanation. First and foremost, generational issues and shifts in youth culture have changed the cinema landscape. All statistics indicate that the cinema is overwhelmingly a young people’s medium. About 60 percent of the audience consists of viewers under thirty years old; 89 percent of the fourteen to nineteen year olds and 76 percent of the twenty to twenty-nine year olds go to the movies at least once a week in Germany, while those over thirty tend to stay at home and watch television. Television programming, especially among the private broadcasters, has played a major role in popularizing life-style issues around sexuality, gender role reversals, and romance. In addition, the (re-)discovery of movies as vehicles for stars has created a powerful synergy with television talk shows, sitcoms, soaps, and detective serials. Since private television is dependent on advertising revenues, the commercialization of the cinema based on audience expectations, formulaic plots, and stereotypical characters becomes more explicit and helps explain the copycat quality of this comedy boom. At the same time the movie industry itself is concerned that the comedy wave is only that, a temporary high that cannot be expected to strengthen the industry’s position on a long-term basis. As is usually the case with comedy, it is rarely exportable, so these domestic successes have not translated into international distribution. Possibly more significant is the fact that domestic audiences have been attracted back to the cinemas to watch German movies, and this may prove to be the foundation upon which in the years to come the German movie industry can build its audience with other genres as well.

Equally important in the equation for the future of the German movie industry are the attempts to establish a European framework for
the production, distribution, and exhibition of audiovisual material. European integration has made great strides forward on the practical, political, and economic levels in the past ten years, and despite the ongoing frictions between the various members of the European Union it is evident that they consider the general direction to be positive. These developments have implications for the European cultural agenda as well. In the last ten years the legal infrastructure and economic support mechanisms for the European movie industry have been established, but the actual product—the European film—has not yet made its appearance, unless we are speaking of the “Euro-puddings,” those multinational coproductions financed by the combined resources of several European state agencies and television networks and usually filmed in English in the hope that they will travel beyond the borders of European distribution. Such films are more properly referred to as international productions and have little or nothing to do with a European cultural identity, while the obstinately local productions, those small films that emerge precisely from the specificity of a community, seem to continue to define the very essence of European identity—its diversity and difference.

Given this state of affairs, it comes as no surprise that the discussion about moving images and culture became one of the major stumbling blocks for the renegotiation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) during the last months of 1993. The first GATT agreement in 1947 had included provisions for regular adjustments, and the eighth renegotiation (the so-called Uruguay Round), which began in 1986, provoked the crisis of 1993 when the United States argued that it was time finally to open the audiovisual market—as had already been agreed for other markets—to the unrestricted circulation of goods. If the European partners saw the American initiative as a thinly veiled economic ploy to dominate the media and communications market, their grandstanding in defense of national cultures was no less a disguise on the part of politicians, businesspeople, and intellectuals for their own commercial interests. Europe’s protection of its movie industry has historically been economic, relying on quota, contingency, or levy systems to shelter investment and employment. The cultural value of the industry’s products has been secondary and derivative of the commercial value. In other words, film content and aesthetics have rarely been proposed as a reason for protecting a national movie industry anywhere in Europe. Thus, although the rhetoric of “invasion” by (American-produced) mass culture commodities and the defense of a more authentic national culture echoes earlier controversies of the
1920s and 1930s, the impassioned argument that film and television are both crucial for cultural identity is a new one, and in this sense the GATT talks might be more properly regarded as a marker for the way cultural space will be negotiated in the global future, joining other controversial issues such as culinary traditions, linguistic autonomy, and intellectual property rights.

The discussion about cultural particularity in Europe is advancing, but the particularity is defended by policymakers and bureaucrats almost exclusively within the context of global economic players, that is, as a contest between Europe and America. For these purposes the polemical rhetoric simply assumes the existence of a unified cultural space called “Europe.” Rather than considering the marginalization of European tradition within a global context and the competing local and regional interests within Europe, such a position makes claims to cultural legitimacy and hegemony based on a European collective identity to be defended against an external threat. Germany, for instance, seen from Spain or Portugal, is a major exporter of television series and entertainment that competes to the detriment of domestic fare. Similarly, a global media giant like Bertelsmann, a holding company located in Germany, competes with other transnational concerns for market shares and market domination.

The putative opponent in this David and Goliath contest is Hollywood, seen as the industrial producer of profit-oriented mass culture commodities based on the lowest common denominator of audience appeal. The reality of the American movie industry with its differentiated products that include blockbusters, low-budget and independent features, and popular and art cinema in fact does not differ systemically from the European industry but rather differs in economies of scale. That American movies dominate European screens, on the other hand, is unarguable. In 1991, for example, a typical year for the entire decade, U.S. productions accounted for 81 percent of the screenings in European Union cinemas, 70 percent of the European box-office take, and 54 percent of all dramas and comedies broadcast on European television. But American filmmakers, many of them immigrants themselves, have perfected a cinematic imaginary with tropes, styles, genres, and characters that are familiar in many different cultures and can be translated into local contexts. This has fed the previously mentioned myth of a universalized Hollywood enemy and has led to the defense of European cinema with recourse to an aggregate idea of Europe made up of discrete national cultures.

Yet the very notion of national cinema is itself a precarious one, and
the developments in Germany during the 1990s reveal other, more fruitful ways of understanding how a variety of local cultures compete with a single transnational source of readily adaptable cultural tropes. First of all, it is questionable whether cinema is even the appropriate or logical ground on which to defend European cultural identity against Americanization. Today television is a more relevant site for visual culture, especially in view of the opportunities opened up by digitalization. Some 600 movies are produced each year in Europe, but fewer than 250 actually find their way through distribution and exhibition channels to the cinema screen.11 The remainder usually ends up on television. Meanwhile, technological advance and the convergence of broadcasting, computing, and telecommunications that occurred in the second half of the 1990s are transforming the entire media environment. With the decline of analogue communication the national systems of media regulation that seek to control content by means of quotas are rendered obsolete. In this highly technological, commodified culture industry that allows access on many different levels, competition is leading inexorably to consolidation and more conformity. The issue, however, as I already stated, is how cultural space will be negotiated. As a result of the controversy surrounding the latest round of GATT talks, it becomes clear that the very character of the public sphere is being contested: what does and does not deserve subsidy or legal protection? In other words, it may be more fruitful to compare apples with apples rather than apples with oranges. Thus, when a citizen in Germany chooses to watch on television a German-produced soap like *Gute Zeiten, schlechte Zeiten* or a detective series like *Polizeiruf 110, Tatort,* or *Derrick* over an American product of similar nature, it is a decision to engage with a specifically German social context whose referent and style obliterate identification to a “relatively” lesser degree.

Second, beyond the discourse of European culture and identity occasioned by the recent GATT controversy, there have been more practical efforts undertaken by the European Union, whose goals have been characterized in an official document as “to strengthen our companies’ competitiveness in order to use our cultural diversity and transform growth into jobs.”12 My hunch is that the latter, the employment goal, is the priority, if not from the perspective of the filmmakers and audiences then at least from that of the European bureaucrats and movie industry investors. Two main agencies were created, Eurimages and Media. Eurimages, established in 1989 by the Council of Europe, is the pan-European fund for multilateral coproductions. It funds pri-
marily full-length feature films but also documentaries, the exhibition sector, and marketing initiatives among the member states. Funding is dispersed to projects involving at least three producers from member states in the form of interest-free production loans, repayable from producers’ net receipts. The second complementary agency, Media, also established in 1989, is an umbrella program responsible for pre- and postproduction support of the European audiovisual industry. Its activities are divided into three areas: professional training, film development, and promotion and marketing, including support of local film festivals and prizes. The largest portion of Media’s annual budget (about two-thirds) goes to the activities in the third category, in particular to help “national” fiction from the five largest member states (Germany, Italy, Spain, France, and the United Kingdom) penetrate the regional television market. Both of these European agencies have developed programs oriented toward the audiovisual industry as a volatile international meeting place of art and commerce. Culture is regarded as a high-technology, high-investment marketplace with new employment opportunities for skilled labor.

Germany has conformed to the trends of the past decade in European funding and development. Both the film subsidy board (Filmförderungsanstalt)—created in the early 1970s in the Federal Republic to support the production of quality films in conjunction with public television cofinancing—and the various regional funding boards have been expanded and restructured since 1990. Especially the competitive bidding wars that arose between regional film funds, which were trying to attract national and European productions to their respective facilities, and the resulting fragmentation in production led in 1994 to the pooling of some subsidy programs and better coordination of regional resources. What becomes apparent here is the shift from criteria of quality to market-driven considerations of local and regional investment. The major impetus was the revision of the federal film subsidy law (Filmförderungsgesetz) in December 1992 that placed more emphasis on commercially promising (i.e., box office oriented) scripts but then made subsidy payouts dependent on a filmmaker’s willingness to use regional shooting locations and technical services.

A 1999 informational brochure of the Berlin-Brandenburg Film Board (established in 1994) touts, for example, its subsidy program for “sophisticated, artistic films as well as popular entertainment” and goes on to assure potential applicants that the board does more than support entertainment and culture: it is “also an important economic factor.” A similar brochure of the Filmstiftung Nordrhein-Westfalen
(established in 1991) stresses that it promotes economic and cultural objectives (in that order!) with the goal of creating jobs through great filmmaking. The new Filmakademie Baden-Württemberg, which opened in Ludwigsburg in 1991, conceives its program explicitly against the myth of the Autorenfilm director, training instead specialists for the modern entertainment industry who can be integrated “into the rationalized labor of media business.” In general, the discussions about film production and subsidy occur now within the framework of market returns, investment opportunities, and creating or maintaining employment, while the films or television productions themselves are commodities that enter the larger context of capital circulation. Thus, at the same time that the cinema is becoming more and more contextualized within a global media network that includes technological innovations, telecommunications, and tourist-oriented event culture, the regionalization of funding policies and actual filmmaking are becoming more and more important. This plays itself out with cities like Cologne, Stuttgart, and Karlsruhe now competing with traditional film studios in Munich, Berlin, or Hamburg, offering training facilities, audiovisual service industries, media and informational know-how, and so forth.

This leads back to the question of finance and economies of scale mentioned earlier. In the 1990s the average entertainment film in Germany cost 3–5 million Deutsche mark (DM) to produce. A big film, such as Dietl’s box-office success Schtonk, cost about 16 million DM in 1992, and Volker Schlöndorff’s sleeper Der Unhold was budgeted at an unheard of 27 million DM in 1996. Yet such films could expect to earn only about 4 million DM from the combined cinema exhibition, sale of television broadcasting rights, and video sales in Germany. Since comedy, in particular German humor, is basically nonexportable, that meant anything budgeted over 4 million DM had to be earned at the domestic box office. Both on the federal and European level, recommendations have been made to limit the number of productions and thereby to subsidize fewer large-scale productions that can really compete on an international scale to amortize production costs. Yet this overlooks, of course, the traditional diversity of functioning cinema markets, first and foremost in the United States but also in commercially competitive markets like those of Japan, India, and Hong Kong. These latter cases have demonstrated that it is possible to build an audience with both domestic and international appeal that can compete with Hollywood products. Moreover, the many small and marginally distributed films in all of these countries function as a form of
fertilizer for the major box-office successes, as well as for the wider media infrastructure.

There are two developments that can round out this overview. First, the growth of television programming in Germany during the decade of the 1990s represents possibly the single most important factor in the audiovisual market. Polls have indicated that at the end of the century German television audiences increasingly preferred domestic products to imports—either American or European. Hence, it is no surprise when statistics show that, on the one hand, the number of German films shown on television diminished by about half since 1992 (in particular, the number of reruns of older German films) but that, on the other hand, the number of new, made-for-television films increased, to the point where about two hundred are being produced per year in Germany and shown primarily during prime time. Even a cursory glance at the weekly television guides indicates an incredible number of program hours filled by movies, series, comedies, and thrillers. Like never before both the German audience and the television broadcasters are seeking young directors and screenplay writers and even older New German Cinema directors to fill this programming space. In fact, Germany leads Europe in the production and screening of domestic television productions, and many of these are regionally inflected, set in particular cities or geographical locales that reflect the regional broadcasting company of the federal broadcasting system.20

Meanwhile, Europe counted over 250 television broadcasters in 1996, of which two-thirds are privately owned, at least double the number in 1990. Here is probably where the future of any new German wave will have to gather its forces. Yet, as in the past, the greatest barrier will be the distribution system. Just as the New German Cinema was blocked from the domestic exhibition market of the 1970s because the distribution and cinema circuits in Germany were to a large extent in the hands of American corporations, today the box-office successes of the German cinema are backed and distributed by Buena Vista (Disney’s German affiliate), Warner, Columbia, United International, and Fox and are booked into cinema chains and multiplexes owned by multinationals. More importantly, private television broadcasters increasingly purchase packages of television programming from large transnational producers and distributors (e.g., Bertelsmann and Kirch Media) rather than individual products from independents or even small companies.

Second, a vital group of multicultural directors and actors emerged
in the last decade as another facet of regionalization in Germany, enriching and contributing to a local-bound sense of cultural distinctiveness and difference that stands in contrast to the more conventional comedies that otherwise dominated the German cinema. These vernacular filmmakers stake their claims on the search for a new identity, on the pleasure of cultural exchange that results from making films in Europe but not necessarily from Europe. Of course, identity cannot be constructed in a vacuum but rather is forged through the active demarcation of a self in relation to some Other. Arguably, this comparative and competitive spirit still valorizes German or European culture as the reference point in relation to which particularity is claimed, and similarly even the most local of these films enters a transnational space through the international festival circuits and publics they seek to address. Since reunification, the discussion of nation and national identity in Germany has revived in all areas of cultural and intellectual discourse. The challenge coming from the periphery in the cinema, from the multietnic filmmakers, is new because it aims neither at the American competition—the main “enemy” of European cinema—nor at the mainstream national cinemas—the object of traditional national new waves. The extent to which audiovisual culture and policies can accommodate such resistances on the path to political and economic unity will reveal how serious Germany and Europe actually are about linking pluralism, diversity, and democracy.

Notes

An earlier version of this essay was researched and presented in 1999 in Australia at the Sydney German Studies Symposium and appears under the title “European Cinema in the 90s: Whither Germany?” in Schreiben nach der Wende: Ein Jahrzehnt deutscher Literatur, 1989–1999, ed. Gerhard Fischer and David Roberts (Tübingen: Stauffenburg Verlag, 2001), 317–30. The version in this volume has been substantially revised and updated based on research conducted in January 2001.

1. Statistics for both Europe and Germany show a gradual increase in the number of films produced annually, in the number of admissions sold, and in the number of new cinemas (especially multiplex construction). The explanation can be found, however, in the dominance of American productions: Germany is the second largest export market for American box-office hits after Japan, and, from the American perspective, a healthy German movie industry is an asset, especially when the distribution channels are owned by the American majors. Although the traditional cinema venues maintain their vigor, their fare is an increasingly inter-
national commodity defined by American production values and professionalism and marketed by means of American distribution strategies, with the result that more and more spectators are seeing fewer and fewer movies.

2. These and the following figures have been gleaned from the yearly statistics reported in Carsten Pfaff, ed., *Filmstatistisches Taschenbuch* (Wiesbaden: Spitzenorganisation der Filmwirtschaft [SPIO], 1990–98), 1990ff.

3. It should be noted that in 1996–97 the Hollywood studios entered a phase of troubled commercial returns when the spiral of ever fewer but more expensive films began, a development that had some impact on the distribution of American block bookings in Germany and thus indirectly facilitated the temporary success of German releases.


5. These statistics reflect the numbers in 1999 as reported in *Kinobesucher in der MA* [Medienanalyse] (Düsseldorf: PR und Forschungsgesellschaft Werbung im Kino, 2000), 11. For a more general discussion of the cinema audience in the 1990s, see Caroline Beer, *Die Kinogänger: Eine Untersuchung des Kinopublikums in Deutschland* (Berlin: Vistas, 2000), esp. chap. 3.


13. Finney, *State of European Cinema*, 108–13. Eurimages’s official literature and reports scrupulously avoid the word “subsidy,” emphasizing their funding program as “repayable loans.” Some of the successful features supported with Eurimages funds have included *Breaking the Waves* (Lars von Trier); *Smilla’s Sense of Snow* (Bille August); *Antonia’s Line* (Marleen Gorris); *Mutters Courage* (Michael Verhoeven); and *Beyond the Clouds* (Michelangelo Antonioni and Wim Wenders). In 1996 more than $500 million of national and European Union public money was spent to support the production of European films (Finney, *State of European Cinema*, 114), but Eurimages’s own budget is so modest that its impact on the audiovisual sector can be judged as negligible (Theiler, “Why the European Union Failed,” n 37).

14. Media is an acronym for “mesures pour encourager le développement de l’industrie audiovisuelle” (measures to encourage the development of the audiovisual industry).


16. The sources here are informational brochures distributed at the Berlinale Film Festival in February 1999. The original German for the quotes are, respectively, “anspruchsvolle, künstlerische Filme genauso wie populäre Unterhaltung”; “auch ein bedeutender Wirtschaftsfaktor”; and “in den arbeitsteiligen Medienalltag.” It should be noted that most of this promotional material is printed in English as well as German; the regional film boards are increasingly seen as launch pads for marketing regional business facilities on an international level.


18. Amend, “Deutsche Filme im Fernsehen,” in *Der Bewegte Film*, ed. Amend and Bülow, 58, table 1. American television productions provide on the average about 25 percent of series and entertainment on German television but almost exclusively outside of prime-time slots (Johannes Kreile, “Stellung der Produzenten in Deutschland,” in *Der Bewegte Film*, ed. Amend and Bülow, 190).

19. One article cites an unnamed study that reports in 1997 Germany pro-
grammed 1,815 hours of made-in-Germany soaps, television dramas, and television movies, while the comparable numbers for England were 1,225 hours and for France 576 hours (Nikolaus von Festenberg, “Viele Jäger, arme Hasen,” Der Spiegel 48 [1998]: 244–46.)