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Thráinn Eggertsson

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I see Imperfect Institutions as an extension of my previous book, Economic Behavior and Institutions, which aimed at synthesizing emerging contributions to the new institutionalism in economics. The new book explores the implications for policy of new institutional economics, while reflecting on recent developments in the field as well as in my own thinking.

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