

Notes

Chapter I

1. CBS conducts surveys with the *New York Times*, ABC with the *Washington Post*, and NBC with the *Wall Street Journal*. In addition, CNN regularly commissions the Gallup Organization to conduct surveys.

2. The description that follows emphasizes differences between these two schools of thought and devotes less attention to the views of those who have taken intermediate positions or attempted to bridge the differences.

3. Bevin, speech to the House of Commons, November 1945, quoted in Bartlett 1955, 926. The liberal position on questions of international relations is effectively summarized and analyzed in Doyle 1986; 1997.

4. Locke argued that issues of security and foreign affairs properly are a function of the executive. Foreign policy requires a consistency that derives only from the vision of one person rather than from the diverse interests of the public (Locke 1988, 365–66).

5. These efforts stimulated the creation of a new field of inquiry—propaganda analysis—that subsequently engaged the interest of such leading social scientists as Harold Lasswell and Alexander L. George.

6. Woodrow Wilson, quoted in Carr 1941, 44. (Carr cites the R. S. Baker edition of Wilson’s papers, Baker, 1:259, as the source for this quotation, but I could not find it there.)

7. The role of liberals, Protestants, Irish-Americans, and public culture in the League of Nations debate has been examined in Helbich 1967–68; Lancaster 1967–68; Maxwell 1967–68; Levering 1991; and Tony Smith 2000.

8. Root was not unmindful of the realist thesis that the mass public’s passions and prejudices can complicate international negotiations and contribute to conflict. For example, he wrote in 1907 (nine years after the Spanish-American War), that “it sometimes happens that governments are driven into war against their will by the pressure of strong popular feeling . . . because a large part of the people in both countries maintain an uncompromising and belligerent attitude, insisting upon the supreme and utmost views of their own right in a way which, if it were to control national actions, would render peaceable settlement impossible” (Root 1907, 1). See also Root 1917.

9. An indication of Lippmann’s continuing influence is the fact that *Public Opinion* has remained in print. It was republished in a paperback edition

in 1965 and by 2002 was available in editions from three publishers. Evidence of his influence as a columnist emerged during the tensest days of the Cuban missile crisis. His *Washington Post* column on October 25, 1962, the fourth day of the public phase of the crisis, proposed a trade of U.S. missiles in Turkey for the Soviet missiles in Cuba. Although many in President Kennedy's ExComm opposed the trade, that proposal became a crucial part of the deliberations in the final stages of the crisis.

10. Although it is widely recognized that an unrepresentative sample led the *Literary Digest* astray in 1936, scholars and pollsters still debate the specific details of the debacle. See, for example, Squire 1988.

11. For an excellent history and analysis of survey research in the United States, see Jean Converse 1987.

12. From the transcript of Roosevelt's recording of the meeting. I am grateful to Steve Casey of the London School of Economics for providing this information in a private communication, March 21, 2002. Roosevelt's views on Gallup and, more generally, on the impact of public opinion on his wartime policies are carefully analyzed in Casey 2001.

13. Even before the U.S. entry into World War II, a majority of the public supported the Soviet Union rather than Germany. In 1938, the margin was 83 to 17 percent, and after the Nazi attack on its erstwhile ally the margin was 72 to 4 percent. In July 1941, Gallup asked whether respondents favored a peace in which Germany would keep "only territory won from Russia" and give up its other conquests; only 34 percent of respondents accepted that proposition (Gallup 1972, 128–29, 288, 296).

14. All of the following survey results are drawn from Gallup 1972, vol. 1.

Chapter 2

1. Had American officials responsible for conduct of the war in Vietnam paid serious attention to the Strategic Bombing Survey, they might have been less sanguine about the prospect of bombing North Vietnam into submission. According to one historian, the U.S. and British bombing campaigns against Germany were driven in part by "the public's affection for air power, the term usually given to strategic bombardment, and its fear of heavy casualties. The polls made this clear, survey after survey showing that the bomber was America's favorite weapon" (O'Neill 1993, 304).

2. This report is undated, but internal evidence indicates that the survey was conducted in September 1947.

3. Almond's use of the term *mood* differs from that of Frank Klingberg. Almond refers to short-term shifts of attention and preferences, whereas Klingberg has used the term to explain American foreign policy in terms of generation-long societal swings between introversion and extroversion. For the latter usage of the term, see Klingberg 1952, 1979, 1983; Holmes 1985.

4. In less than five years, Almond was backing away from his most pessimistic diagnoses; see Almond 1960.

5. Kennan's critical assessment of U.S. policy-making was also an important theme in the fourteen lectures that he delivered at the National War College between September 16, 1946, and December 18, 1947. The texts of these lectures may be found in Harlow and Maerz 1991.

6. Some of the more notable examples include Joseph Jones 1955 on the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan; Wohlstetter 1962 on Pearl Harbor; George 1955 and Paige 1968 on the decision to resist aggression in Korea; Neustadt 1970 on the Suez crisis and cancellation of the Skybolt missile program; Allison 1971 on the Cuban missile crisis; and George and Smoke 1974 on challenges to U.S. deterrence policy.

7. The exceptions include Cohen 1957; Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1963; and Cottam 1977.

Chapter 3

1. In addition to a large number of individual studies of the general public, a number of long-term projects on public opinion and foreign policy were initiated during this period. The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations undertook its first survey in 1974 and has conducted similar studies every four years through 2002. These findings have been summarized in Rielly 1975, 1979, 1983, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999; Bouton and Page 2002. Some of the data are also available at www.cfr.org. Steven Kull and his colleagues at the University of Maryland's Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) have been conducting surveys since 1993; the fullest summary of their findings appears in Kull and Destler 1999. PIPA also provides reports (available at www.pipa.org) on specific topics that include not only PIPA's data but also those from other surveys. Under the leadership of Andrew Kohut, the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press (formerly the Times Mirror Center for the People and the Press) has since 1993 conducted periodic surveys that have been published under such titles as "America's Place in the World" (see www.people-press.org).

The foreign policy views of opinion leaders have received greater attention since the 1970s. The Chicago Council surveys described earlier include a smaller sample of leaders in various institutions. Some of the PIPA and Pew studies also include leaders. The Foreign Policy Leadership Project, directed by Ole Holsti and James Rosenau, conducted six large-sample surveys of opinion leaders at four-year intervals beginning in 1976. For descriptions of the samples in these and other studies of leaders, see table 4.1.

2. Valuable book-length, post-Vietnam works that explore the nature, sources, trends, and other important aspects of public opinion include Levering 1978; Foster 1983; Deibel 1987; Wittkopf 1990; Mayer 1992; Page and Shapiro 1992; Price 1992; Zaller 1992; Murray 1996; Foyle 1999; Jacobs and Shapiro 2000. See also three excellent unpublished dissertations: Graham 1989; Brandes 1994; Isaacs 1994.

3. For additional evidence from this research program, see Page and Shapiro 1983, 1984, 1992; Page, Shapiro, and Dempsey 1987; Shapiro and Page 1988, 1994. A somewhat different assessment of stability and change in American public opinion appears in Mayer 1992.

4. For additional evidence about the rational public, the stability of policy preferences, and issue voting, see S. Bennett 1972; Free and Watts 1980; Graham 1988, 1989, 1994; Krosnick 1988a, 1988b, 1990, 1991; Russett 1990, 1993; Popkin 1991; Peffley and Hurwitz 1992; Marcus and Hanson 1993.

5. Other studies confirm the limited knowledge of public affairs despite

rising levels of education. In some cases, they even indicate that factual knowledge has declined during recent years. See Graham 1988; S. Bennett 1989; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Jennings 1996.

6. For a somewhat similar effort to categorize the American public in the post–Cold War era, see Kohut and Toth 1994. Using questions on the approval or disapproval of using force abroad for oil security and humanitarian assistance, they classified respondents as *interventionists* (approve the use of force for both purposes), *noninterventionists* (disapprove force for both), *oneworlders* (approve for humanitarian, disapprove for oil), and *U.S.-centrics* (approve for oil, disapprove for humanitarian).

7. Good starting points are Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1963; Rosenau 1963, 1974; B. Hughes 1978; Zaller 1992; Powlick and Katz 1998.

8. Not surprisingly, many of the existing studies have been conducted by historians. In addition to those cited in the following pages, see May 1959, 1964; Benson 1967–68; Small 1970; Levering 1978, 1989; E. Williams 1996.

9. The public differences between Defense Secretary Weinberger and Secretary of State Shultz, described in the opening pages of chapter 1, were also evident in private policy discussions.

10. Public opinion analysts have long focused on American attitudes toward the Soviet Union and Russia. See, for example, Walsh 1944; Levering 1976; Tom Smith 1983; Holsti 1991; Richman 1991.

11. A study by Russian, Chinese, and American scholars based on archival materials from Moscow confirms the hypothesis that Stalin knew of and in 1950 approved Kim Il Sung's plan to invade South Korea, although Stalin had earlier refused to give Kim the go-ahead for an invasion (Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue Litai 1993).

12. The thesis that Ronald Reagan won the 1980 election despite rather than because of his foreign policy positions is developed in Schneider 1983.

13. The *Los Angeles Times*, *Washington Post*, and Harris Organization also asked for appraisals of China in four surveys between 1983 and 2001, but because the response options differed from those offered by Gallup, these surveys are excluded from figure 3.3.

Chapter 4

1. For example, Barton 1974–75, 1980; Sussman 1976; Koopman, Snyder, and Jervis 1989, 1990; Chittick, Billingsley, and Travis 1990; Times Mirror Center 1993; Pew 1997. Despite the military's importance in foreign and defense policy, it is not included in the samples of some leadership surveys. Studies that focus on military leaders include Kinnard 1975; Russett and Hanson 1975; Holsti 1998, 2001; Davis 2001.

2. The occupations listed in table 4.1 are those specifically targeted by the sampling design. This list does not include other occupations or groups that may also be represented in the samples. For example, in the course of sampling among various occupational groups, the Times Mirror sample included substantial numbers of women. Thus, it should not be assumed that the Times Mirror data preclude analyses directed at possible gender-based differences. Similarly, the FPLP surveys include lawyers who may have been included as part of random samples of leaders drawn from general directo-

ries (*Who's Who in America*) or because they qualified for inclusion by other criteria, such as foreign policy experts who have published in major foreign affairs journals.

3. For a scathing critique of what the 1994 CCFR survey reveals about the American public, see A. Schlesinger 1995, 7: “The latest public opinion survey by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and the Gallup Organizations shows that, while Americans are still ready to endorse euphonious generalities in support of internationalism, there is a marked drop-off when it comes to committing not just words but money and lives.” Schlesinger is among several articulate liberals who criticized expansive definitions of American national interests two decades ago but are now strong proponents of a more active U.S. leadership role in such areas as Bosnia. *New York Times* columnist Anthony Lewis shared these views.

4. I am indebted to Ronald Hinckley for the 1812 example.

5. The question about using U.S. troops was also included in the 1974 CCFR survey, but the wording seems sufficiently different to raise questions about comparability with the four subsequent surveys. Hence, table 4.4 begins with data from the 1978 CCFR survey.

6. Steven Kull, private communication, October 2000.

7. Unfortunately, the “cooperation” question was dropped from the CCFR surveys of the public after 1974. In that survey, the gap in “very important” ratings between leaders and the public was 19 percent (86 percent to 67 percent).

A comparison of responses to the CCFR and FPLP surveys reveals that consistently higher proportions of leaders in the CCFR studies accorded arms control a “very important” rating. That gap may result largely from one significant difference in the CCFR and FPLP samples. The latter included military officers, an occupational group that has generally expressed somewhat less enthusiasm for arms control than most others, whereas descriptions of the CCFR samples indicate that they did not include military officers.

8. More extended discussion of public and leadership views on human rights and democracy promotion abroad as foreign policy goals may be found in Holsti 2000a, b.

9. The centrality of attitudes toward the Soviet Union in structuring foreign policy beliefs emerges from many studies, including those cited in chapter 3.

10. To take the intensity of attitudes into account, each response was transformed into a scale of 1.00 to –1.00: “agree strongly” (1.00) to “disagree strongly” (–1.00), or “very important” (1.00) to “not at all important” (–1.00). Scores were then summed to place each leader on the two scales.

11. A more extensive analysis that assesses the relationship of the MI/CI scheme to a broader set of issues appears in Holsti and Rosenau 1993.

12. For a critique of international relations theorists and their failure to predict the end of the Cold War, see Gaddis 1992–93. However, Gaddis could perhaps equally well have aimed his critique at students of comparative politics.

13. In the 1999 TISS survey, the item on the Equal Rights Amendment was replaced by one about encouraging mothers to stay at home rather than to work outside the home. As a result, agreement with six items was scored

as a “liberal” answer and agreement with the other six was scored as a “conservative” one.

14. As with the MI and CI scales, each response received a score between 1.00 and -1.00 , depending on the intensity of the attitude: “agree strongly” (1.00) to “disagree strongly” (-1.00). Responses to the twelve items were then summed to place each leader on the social and economic issues scales.

15. Ronald Hinckley has taken this classification scheme and expanded it into a two-by-two-by-two scheme by categorizing respondents according to their answers to three questions—whether the government should be more or less involved in economic, social, and value engineering. The resulting eight groups range from *libertarians* (who believe that the government is doing too many things in all three areas) to *statists* (who believe that the government should do more in all of them). The other six groups are: *conservatives*, *egalitarians*, *materialists*, *populists*, *moralists*, and *liberals*.

A very similar classification scheme using two dimensions to describe *liberals*, *conservatives*, *populists*, and *libertarians* appears in Janda, Berry, and Goldman 1994, 26. These authors plan to replace the term *populist* with *communitarian*.

Still another effort to classify respondents on domestic politics is described in *U.S. News and World Report* 1995. The seven groups are described as *populist traditionalists*, *stewards*, *liberal activists*, *dowagers*, *conservative activists*, *ethnic conservatives*, and *agnostics*.

For one of the earliest efforts of this kind, see Lowell 1923, 271–89, on “classification of dispositions.”

Chapter 5

1. See chapter 3, including table 3.1 and figure 3.2, for evidence of changing public attitudes toward the Soviet Union.

2. Responses to almost three hundred questions on the Persian Gulf War, many of which were asked several times, are reported and analyzed in Mueller 1994. Almost half of that book consists of tables reporting aggregate responses to these questions. However, neither the tables nor the text examines the demographic correlates of opinions on the war. Other studies that deal with public opinion during the Persian Gulf War include Idelson 1991; Kagay 1992; Renshon 1993; W. Bennett and Paletz 1994; Nacos 1994.

3. For effective summaries of the circumstances under which the “rally round the flag” phenomenon is likely to occur, see Brody and Shapiro 1989; Lian and Oneal 1993.

4. These measures received strong support in Congress. In each case, votes in support exceeded 70 percent, and in the cases of the Marshall Plan and NATO, the favorable votes ranged from 80 to 86 percent.

5. Foster 1983, 112. For evidence of partisan differences on foreign policy during the period immediately following Truman’s dismissal of MacArthur, see Belknap and Campbell 1951–52.

6. For the most detailed assessment of public support for the wars in Korea and Vietnam, see Mueller 1973. Verba et al. 1967 report that even after the Vietnam War became controversial, party identification was not an important determinant of attitudes on the war.

7. Gaubatz 1995 also found important intransitivities in public preferences regarding the various U.S. policy options for responding to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait: withdrawal, multilateral economic sanctions, unilateral military intervention, and multilateral military intervention.

8. Gallup special survey of leaders listed in *Who's Who in America*, May 22, 1955 (Gallup 1972, 1152).

9. The following paragraphs discuss only some highlights of similarities and differences between Democrats and Republicans who participated in the 1992 leadership survey. For tables that provide more detailed data, see Holsti and Rosenau 1994.

10. Drew 1978, 116–17. Many others regarded the views of the “Vietnam generation” as the best hope for this nation’s future. “What the country may have learned is that it should listen to its young. They never saw the cables. They read the handwriting on the wall. The Vietnam generation was ‘the best and the brightest,’ the term David Halberstam applies to the glittering Kennedyites who got us into the war in the first place” (McGrory 1975, 31).

11. An article on the African policy staff of the State Department described its leading members as follows: “The four are in the same age group—39–46—and they share a common experience of disillusionment with and then opposition to the Vietnam War. All remain highly skeptical about United States military involvement, direct and indirect, in areas where they feel the national interest is not obviously at stake” (Hovey 1978, A3; see also Roberts 1982).

12. See, for example, comments by Samuel P. Huntington (Hoffmann 1981, 3–27) and Representative Thomas Downey’s assertion that the “children of Vietnam are the adults of El Salvador” (Roberts 1983, D26).

13. The percentages in the text are recalculated from the data in Mandelbaum and Schneider 1979, table 1.

14. The data in this paragraph are drawn from Gallup surveys, January 24–26, February 12–14, and February 26–28, 1993 (G. Gallup Jr. 1993, 41, 43).

15. Sigmund Neumann has defined a political generation as all those who underwent essentially similar historical experiences during the crucial formative years between ages seventeen and twenty-five (1942, 235–36). The importance of this period in the life cycle is emphasized by many others; see, for example, Barber 1972.

16. In the six FPLP surveys, the correlations (ϕ) between generation and foreign policy orientation were consistently weak: .19, .09, .12, .08, .10, and .10.

17. In two-way analyses of variance, occupational differences were significant at the .001 level for all four of these questions. None of the differences across generations reached that level, although those for the United Nations question approached it.

18. For further evidence on this point, see Holsti and Rosenau 1984, 153–63.

19. Other relevant studies on gender include Tom Smith 1984; Zur and Morrison 1989; Rapaport, Stone, and Abramowitz 1990; E. Cook and Wilcox 1991; Bardes 1992; Gallagher 1992.

20. The data in this paragraph are drawn from Americans Talk Security

surveys 2, 3, and 6 (1988) and from Gallup polls in February, May, June, and July 1992 (G. Gallup Jr. 1993, 43, 116, 117, 127).

21. The correlations between gender and foreign policy orientations (ϕ) for the six surveys are .11, .06, .03, .08, .06, and .06.

22. Data on racial differences with respect to these issues were drawn from the following sources: South Africa (G. Gallup Jr. 1991, 133–34); Haiti (G. Gallup Jr. 1992, 32–33); Somalia (G. Gallup Jr. 1993, 175); and Bosnia (G. Gallup Jr. 1993, 41–42).

Chapter 6

1. The United States has taken the position that the captured members of the Taliban and al Qaeda who have been incarcerated at the Guantanamo Naval Base in Cuba are trained terrorists and thus are not entitled to protections accorded to prisoners of war under the Geneva Convention.

2. These increases, however, may have been the result of a switch from all in-person interviews in 1998 to some telephone interviews in 2002. Respondents in the two modes ranked the goals almost identically, but those in the telephone interviews were quicker to rate all goals as “very important.” I am indebted to Benjamin Page, Co-Director of the 2002 CCFR survey, for this information in a personal communication, September 2003.

Chapter 7

1. For other coauthored case studies that touch on manipulation of public opinion, see Jacobs and Shapiro 1994a, b, 1995, 1995–96, 1999, 2000.

2. For a study that links attitudes toward immigration to broader aspects of U.S. identity and nationalism, see Citrin et al. 1994.

3. This distinction between decision contexts is drawn from Hermann 1969.

4. If the executive views congressional moods as expressions of public opinion, it opens up another very large body of evidence on intervening variables between public opinion and foreign policy. For recent studies that explore these linkages on the Strategic Defense Initiative, weapons procurement, and sanctions on South Africa, see Lindsay 1990, 1991; Hill 1993. Other issues are considered in Ripley and Lindsay 1993.

5. The literature on these topics is enormous; see, for example, Bishop, Tuchfarber, and Oldendick 1978; Bishop, Oldendick, and Tuchfarber 1984; Kagay and Elder 1992. Graham 1989 presents a somewhat different view on the importance of identically worded questions.

6. The Nixon administration considered Gallup a friendly pollster and Harris an adversarial one. In an effort to gain some control over data released by these organizations, the White House took various measures, including awarding a contract to Harris (Jacobs and Shapiro 1995–96).