

## Figures

- 1.1. A general classification of goods
- 1.2. A framework for appropriation problems
- 1.3. A framework for provision problems
- 2.1. Components of action arenas
- 2.2. A framework for institutional analysis
- 2.3. Linking levels of analysis
- 3.1. Game with two players, two strategies
- 3.2. Prisoner's Dilemma
- 3.3. Arrow diagrams, general payoff possibilities
- 3.4. Appropriation externality
- 3.5. Assignment games
- 3.6. Provision games, intermediate value
- 3.7. Provision games, no intermediate value
- 3.8. Monitoring
- 3.9. The four cases of monitoring
- 3.10. Regime diagram, monitoring
- 4.1. Relationships between rules and games
- 4.2. Game according to rule configuration C1
- 4.3. Cases C1-1, C1-2, and C1-3
- 4.4. Case C1-4
- 4.5. Case C1-5
- 4.6. Game according to rule configuration C2
- 4.7. Game according to rule configuration C3
- 5.1. Table presented to subjects showing units produced and cash return from investments in Market 2
- 5.2. Theoretical predictions
- 5.3. Individual baseline experiments
- 5.4. The effect of increasing investment endowment
- 6.1. Round 1 decisions
- 8.1. Experimental design: institutions for facilitating gains in efficiency
- 8.2. Baseline versus imposed sanctioning
- 8.3. No communication with imposed sanctioning
- 8.4. Baseline versus imposed sanctioning

xvi      **Figures**

- 9.1. **Linear and extended measured reactions**
- 9.2. **Measured reactions**
- 9.3. **Measured reactions**
- 9.4. **Limited measured reactions**
- 9.5. **Measured reactions**
- 9.6. **Measured reactions**
- 9.7. **Measured reactions**
- 9.8. **Measured reactions**
- 9.9. **Measured reactions**
- 12.1. **Location of study sites in Almora district. Map of India reprinted by permission of Kluwer Academic Publishers.**
- 12.2. **Resource condition and attention to monitoring, sanctions, arbitration: six villages**
- 13.1. **Prisoner's Dilemma, the assurance problem, and the rule-ordered pumping game**
- 14.1. **A typology of CPRs**