

Preface

In 1987, the three principal authors of this book received the first of two National Science Foundation grants to study an institutional theory of common-pool resource (CPR) dilemmas. This research is the foundation for this book. All of us involved in the writing of this volume are deeply appreciative of the continued support of the National Science Foundation (Grant Nos.: SES 8619498 and SES 8921884). Additional support from the Resources and Technology Division, Economic Research Service, United States Department of Agriculture (Cooperative Agreement No. 43-3AEM-1-80078), is also appreciated.

Many of the chapters in this volume draw on papers that have been previously published. Early in the process of writing, we decided against doing the book as an edited series of papers. We wanted to ensure that the book had an internal coherence that is not possible when one simply brings together previously published papers. Thus, the resemblance between the prior publications and chapters in the book has become rather faint in some instances.

Any research team that has written many previous papers accrues an enormous indebtedness to many colleagues at their home institution as well as at other universities. In Bloomington, we are particularly appreciative of the extraordinary talents of Patty Dalecki, who has somehow kept track of a very complex and evolving manuscript under the condition that changes may come from any and all directions. Her skill as a production manager, editor, and layout artist will be apparent to all who read this book. Her cheerfulness and willingness to go through revision after revision after revision is something only those of us who have worked with her can recognize. In addition, Stanra King provided many hours of very helpful editing on the penultimate version of this book.

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