

CHAPTER 9

## The Hard Line and the Color Line

### *Race, Welfare, and the Roots of Get-Tough Reform*

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The Social Security Act of 1935 laid the groundwork for something poor families had never had in the United States: a federal entitlement to public aid.<sup>1</sup> Thirty-five years later, in the wake of legal victories in the 1960s, this entitlement began to bear fruit in the form of greater access and equity in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. By the 1990s, however, the political tides had turned. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) abolished the federal entitlement to aid. In its place, federal lawmakers created Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), a system of block grants that gave states more freedom to select among policy tools but also imposed a forceful mandate to promote work, reduce welfare usage, and change poor people's behaviors. Public officials in many states moved quickly, and with considerable public support, to implement tough new policies consistent with these federal TANF goals.

In this chapter, we analyze the racial underpinnings of welfare retrenchment in the crucial years of 1996 and 1997. For the public at large, and for state policymakers in particular, welfare reform raised new

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questions about the terms that should govern aid for low-income families. Some states used their new discretion to pursue relatively stringent and punitive program rules; others opted for a more moderate course. Some citizens supported the most restrictive new approaches to public aid; others resisted the call to “get tough” with recipients. Accordingly, our analysis proceeds on two levels. First, we ask how racial factors might help explain why some but not all states chose to impose restrictive welfare policies in the name of reform. Second, we ask how race and racial attitudes shaped public support for such policies.

In what follows, we use multivariate analysis to isolate the impact of race on state policy choices and citizen policy preferences under welfare reform. In doing so, we consider a variety of alternative explanations for state- and individual-level outcomes. Our findings affirm that “get tough” welfare reform has had complex political roots. No factor, however, eclipses the central importance of race. In the period immediately following federal legislation in 1996, the strictest welfare reforms were significantly more likely to be adopted in states where people of color made up a larger proportion of the welfare caseload. Public support for these tough new welfare measures arose from many sources. But support ran stronger among whites than blacks, and within the white population support was significantly enhanced by negative stereotypes of African Americans and Hispanics. The entwining of race and welfare provision has a long and troubled history in the United States. Regrettably, our contemporary experience suggests that the past remains prologue. Much is new in today’s welfare politics, but the “problem of the color line” remains.

Welfare Policy Making: A New Division of Labor

When the federal government abolished the AFDC program in 1996, it removed a framework of rules that had structured state-level administration of cash aid since the 1960s. The new block-grant system ended the federal guarantee of matching funds and allowed states to pursue a wider variety of policy innovations without seeking waivers from the federal government (on waivers, see Fording, this volume). Proponents touted the new TANF system as a “devolution revolution” that would liberate the states from stifling federal rules, allowing them to create more effective poverty policies. Such claims contain a grain of truth regarding shifts in the intergovernmental division of labor, but they also

mislead by implying that states were given a historically unprecedented degree of liberty.

In the American political system defined by federalism, localism, and a relatively weak and fragmented national government, state-level politics has always played a key role in shaping the amount and form of public aid for the poor (Trattner 1999; Noble 1997; Skocpol 1996). Beginning in 1911 with mothers' pensions, and later in the Aid to Dependent Children program, state administration and interstate variation were defining features of public aid for poor families (Gordon 1994). In the wake of legal activism in the 1960s, the federal government applied a broad set of national standards to administrators (Davis 1993; Melnick 1994). Interstate variation, however, remained a signal characteristic of the AFDC program that distinguished it from the national system of social insurance coverage in the United States (Peterson and Rom 1990).

With welfare reform in 1996, states gained more authority over eligibility rules and administrative procedures than they had enjoyed for three decades (Mettler 2000). At the same time, however, the federal law imposed a variety of new mandates that constrained state lawmakers and bureaucrats (Kincaid 1998). The new law, for example, set strict quotas on the percentage of adult recipients who must participate in "work-related activities" and defined these activities in a narrow manner that left states with little room to maneuver.<sup>2</sup> Likewise, the 1996 law prohibited states from spending TANF funds on nonworking individuals who receive assistance for more than two years or on individuals who receive aid for more than five years in a lifetime.

The system of public aid established in 1996 can be described as one in which the states enjoy increased discretion in choosing *means* so long as they toe the line in meeting federally prescribed *ends*. In principle, this system permits states to make benefits more accessible to poor families and to enable clients to pursue new opportunities. Indeed, a small number of states have emphasized enabling and opportunity-producing policies, and most states have passed at least some policies that fall into this category (Berlin 2000; Massing 2000). Momentum for welfare reform, however, was fueled by perceptions that AFDC was too permissive, and the federal legislation in 1996 reinforced this zeitgeist by creating outcome-based penalties for states that did not act quickly to enforce work and lower caseloads (Bryner 1998). The result is that policy innovation in the states has been skewed in a restrictive direction (Mettler 2000). Many states stuck close to the basic requirements set forth by the federal government. But among those that deviated, the vast majority "used their

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new authority to limit access to social provision and, most especially, to shift the balance in welfare policy design from rights to obligations, imposing burdensome sanctions on recipients” (Mettler 2000, 26).

Why were some states more likely than others to pursue a welfare strategy based on restrictive and punitive policy choices? In what ways, if at all, should race be singled out as a factor that drove state choices to get tough with welfare recipients? Answers to these questions should matter to anyone who evaluates welfare reform because they tell us something about how welfare devolution functions in practice. Reform rhetoric in the 1990s promised a race-neutral process of policy experimentation; attention to the history of American welfare provision suggests reasons for skepticism about this claim. What is needed is an empirically grounded account that locates race among the variety of forces that actually drove policy choices once states were given the freedom to pursue their own visions of reform.

To develop such an account, we begin by identifying the policy choices that best capture the 1990s movement against welfare “permissiveness.” We then develop and test a general model of policy choice at the state level. Finally, we turn to individual-level data to ascertain the sources of public support for get-tough reform. Drawing our state- and individual-level evidence together, we specify how and in which policy areas the roots of reform can be traced to the politics of race.

### Policy Choice in the States

In selecting policy choices for analysis, we emphasized two goals: covering the major domains of “get tough” welfare reform and identifying the policy choices that were most salient in public debate and widely considered in the states. Surveying scholarly books and articles, policy reports, legislative materials, and mass media, we found a consistent emphasis on four key areas in which lawmakers sought to end permissiveness.<sup>3</sup>

The first focused on imposing obligations in exchange for assistance, especially the obligation to work. Here, the central policy choice for states was whether to demand work from recipients earlier than the federal requirement of 24 months. The second goal for reformers was to end long-term program usage. In this area, state governments had to decide whether to adopt a lifetime eligibility cutoff shorter than the federal limit of 60 months. The third dimension of reform focused on social behavior, especially the reproductive behaviors of poor women. Here, the most

widely debated policy choice was whether to impose a family cap denying additional benefits to children conceived by recipients. Fourth, reformers called for penalties tough enough to force compliance with the new regime of program rules. Toward this end, states could choose a weak, moderate, or strong sanction policy to punish client infractions.

Accordingly, our study focuses on four types of policy choices. First, we analyze the factors that led states to adopt weak, moderate, or strong sanctions.<sup>4</sup> Sanction strength provides direct evidence of a state's willingness to restrict aid for families who are needy but deemed to be out of compliance with new program rules. In addition, states adopting stronger sanctions have experienced significantly larger declines in their welfare caseloads since 1996.<sup>5</sup> Our other three dependent variables are dichotomies that measure whether states adopted a work requirement stricter than the federal mandate of 24 months, a time limit shorter than the federal limit of 60 months, and a family cap denying benefits to children conceived by current recipients.<sup>6</sup> As a group, these program rules define the key terms of participation for citizens who seek aid under the TANF program; they also capture the most fundamental goals of 1990s welfare reform.

In analyzing these program rules, it is important to acknowledge that political forces, including race, may affect different policy choices in different ways. Family caps, time limits, and work requirements are widely viewed as complementary tools for combating "permissiveness," but each is tied to a distinct goal articulated by reformers: deterring child-birth among recipients, enforcing work obligations, and ending long-term dependency. In addition to variation across these three policy areas, we might also expect sanction policies to emerge from a distinctive set of political forces. Unlike the other policies, sanctions are broad punitive tools used to enforce a diversity of program rules that may have very different political constituencies. Because of this greater reach and ambiguity, sanction choices may be subject to a wider range of influences.

With these differences in mind, we pursue separate analyses of each of our four policy choices. These analyses make it possible to directly observe whether a particular political factor, such as race, relates to different dimensions of policy choice in different ways.<sup>7</sup>

### Welfare Policy Choices: What Factors Matter? What Role for Race?

Existing welfare scholarship suggests many reasons states may differ in their willingness to adopt stringent welfare policies. We begin by outlin-

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ing why one might expect a racial basis for state policy choice; we then turn a broader array of forces that seem likely to exert some influence. (See appendix A for all measures, sources, and descriptive statistics.)

*Racial Politics*

Welfare politics in the United States has always had deep roots in race relations. In debates over the Social Security Act of 1935, southern members of Congress managed to exclude domestic and agricultural workers from social insurance coverage, effectively channeling people of color into public assistance programs controlled at the state level (Lieberman, this volume). Many scholars argue that state administration of these programs continued to be shaped by race from the 1930s to the 1990s, and that programs associated with nonwhite clients are more likely to be saddled with popular hostility and punitive rules (Quadagno 1994).

State-level research on welfare spending and benefit levels provides mixed but suggestive evidence regarding racial effects on the financial dimensions of welfare provision (see chapters by Hero and Johnson, this volume). Larry Orr (1976), for example, found that after controlling for other relevant factors, AFDC benefits were systematically lower in states where black recipients made up a higher percentage of the caseload. In fact, Orr estimated that a state with an all-black caseload would offer AFDC recipients almost \$2,000 less per year than would a state with an all-white caseload. Similarly, Gerald Wright (1976) found that all else equal, states with smaller proportions of black residents and more progressive racial policies (as measured by civil rights laws) tended to offer higher AFDC benefits. Christopher Howard (1999) finds that states with larger black populations offered significantly lower AFDC benefits as recently as 1990.

All of this evidence suggests race may have played a key role in shaping the ways states set the terms of public relief after 1996. Most existing research focuses on African Americans as the group most likely to be targeted by antiwelfare sentiment and less generous welfare policies.<sup>8</sup> Some observers, however, have speculated that “as the country’s Hispanic population continues to grow, attitudes toward welfare and poverty may become as strongly associated with perceptions of Hispanics as they are now with perceptions of blacks” (Gilens 1999, 71). Consequently, we investigate two variants of our *racial disparity hypothesis*. The first predicts that tougher TANF policies will be adopted in states where African Americans made up a higher percentage of the AFDC caseload in 1996.

The second predicts that tougher TANF policies will be adopted in states where Latinos made up a higher percentage of the AFDC caseload in 1996.

### *Additional Forces Shaping Policy Choice*

The roots of policy choice may be traced in many directions. Thus, to offer a reasonable assessment of any single influence, such as racial effects, one must build an analysis that addresses other plausible explanations. To do so, we turn to a set of contrasting (but not mutually exclusive) images of welfare policy as (a) an arena for policy innovation, (b) a site of ideological conflict, (c) an outcome of electoral politics, (d) a mechanism of social control, and (e) a forum of moralistic problem-solving.<sup>9</sup>

Many observers have suggested that policy choice under welfare reform might be viewed as a form of problem solving driven by concern over high rates of counternormative behavior (Bryner 1998). Specifically, the *dependency hypothesis* predicts that states with higher caseload-to-population ratios under AFDC in 1996 will adopt more restrictive policies under the TANF system. The *reproductive behavior hypothesis* predicts that more restrictive TANF policies will be adopted by states in which a higher percentage of all 1996 births were to unmarried mothers.

Our next hypotheses suggest that TANF policy choices may reflect relatively durable differences between the welfare orientations of liberal and conservative states (Rom 1999, 357). To begin with, one might expect states that adopted a more liberal approach under the old AFDC system to continue pursuing a more liberal path after 1996; states that worked to keep their caseloads down under AFDC might simply deepen their efforts under TANF. In contrast to the dependency hypothesis, this *continuity hypothesis* predicts that states that had higher caseload-to-population ratios in 1996 will adopt less restrictive policies under the TANF system. Looking beyond these past practices, one might also expect policy choice to be shaped by the ideologies of current elected officials. Specifically, our *government ideology hypothesis* predicts that states with more liberal governments will adopt less restrictive TANF policies.

An alternative perspective on welfare politics suggests that TANF policy choices might reflect each state's general propensity toward policy innovation (Walker 1969, 1971; Gray 1973; Berry and Berry 1990; Skocpol et al. 1993; Soule and Zylan 1997; Lieberman and Shaw 2000). The TANF policies examined here share a get-tough quality, but within a con-

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strained area defined by the federal government, they also represent a form of policy innovation. Accordingly, our *policy innovation hypothesis* suggests that states with a stronger propensity toward welfare policy innovation (as indicated by earlier requests for AFDC waivers) will be more likely to adopt restrictive TANF policies.

It also seems plausible that TANF policy choices might reflect two important features of state electoral systems. To begin with, we might follow V. O. Key's (1949) classic argument that the policy process is more responsive to the needs of the disadvantaged when political parties are more evenly matched and, hence, forced to compete with one another for voters. Accordingly, our *interparty competition hypothesis* predicts that states with more evenly matched two-party systems will adopt less restrictive welfare policies. A second relevant electoral factor may be the degree to which low-income voters go to the polls. All else equal, stronger turnout among this group should push politicians to respond to the needs of the poor and working class (Piven and Cloward 1988; Hill, Leighley, and Hinton-Andersson 1995; Hicks and Swank 1992; Hill and Leighley 1992). Accordingly, our *lower-class mobilization hypothesis* predicts that states with higher turnout among low-income voters will adopt less restrictive welfare policies.

Scholars who analyze welfare systems as mechanisms of social control suggest a final perspective on TANF policy choices. In a well-known argument, Piven and Cloward (1993) contend that when hard economic times combine with civil unrest, relief is readily extended to mollify the poor and maintain legitimacy for the state. Under stronger economic conditions, access to public aid is restricted in order to push potential workers toward available jobs, thereby easing the pressures that tight labor markets exert on employers. Given the strong economy of the late 1990s and the relative scarcity of civil unrest, Piven and Cloward's argument suggests our *labor market hypothesis*: states with lower unemployment rates will adopt more restrictive TANF policies—especially in the area of work requirements.

Social control theory also suggests that TANF policy may reflect general orientations toward the use of formal mechanisms to enforce social order. Societies combat disorder through a mix of informal controls in families, neighborhoods, and communities and formal controls deployed by the state (Rose and Clear 1998). Greater reliance on institutional tools such as incarceration is generally viewed as an indicator of more political will to “crack down” on marginal groups (Hunter 1985; Jacobs and Helms 1996; Rose and Clear 1998). During the 1990s, this is precisely



what happened in the United States. State officials throughout the United States passed stiffer penalties for criminal behaviors, increased funding for prison construction and maintenance, and imposed tough new work requirements on prisoners (Parenti 1999; Lafer 1999). Between 1990 and 1996, incarceration rates soared throughout the nation (especially among the poor), but the rate of this increase varied considerably across the states (Lynch and Sabol 1997). Following the view that incarceration rates indicate state dispositions toward tough formal regulatory mechanisms, our *formal control hypothesis* predicts that states with larger increases in incarceration from 1990 to 1996 will make more restrictive TANF policy choices.

### Empirical Analysis of State-Level Data

To test these explanations of state policy choice, we conducted separate logit analyses for each of our four policies. The results, shown in table 9.1, suggest that the collection of hypotheses outlined in the preceding section have a significant amount of explanatory power. In each of the four policy domains, we find that stringent policy choices are systematically related to the state-level characteristics included in our model. Considering the four models as a group, we find that nine of our ten independent variables yield statistically significant results in at least one equation. In addition, the results in table 9.1 prove to be robust across a wide range of model specifications.<sup>10</sup>

Turning to our individual hypotheses, we see some striking patterns. In one policy area, work requirements, we find no racial effects at all. Instead, we find a tight cluster of determining factors related to our social control hypotheses. States with larger increases in incarceration from 1990 to 1996 were significantly more likely to adopt strict work requirements, as were states with tighter labor markets. By contrast, family caps and time limits—the two policies most closely related to program usage and reproduction—emerge here as outcomes directly tied to the racial makeup of recipients. All else equal, family caps and strict time limits were significantly more likely in only two kinds of states: those with a higher percentage of African Americans in their AFDC caseloads and those with higher percentages of Latinos in their AFDC caseloads.

Finally, in the results for sanction policy, we find a more complex set of relationships. Strict sanctions were significantly more likely to emerge in states with conservative governments, states with less vigorous party

TABLE 9.1. State Policy Choices under TANF

Dependent Variable	Strength of Sanctions		Stricter Work Requirements		Stricter Time Limits		Family Cap	
	Coeff.	SE	Coeff.	SE	Coeff.	SE	Coeff.	SE
Unmarried Birth Rate	.188*	.109	.040	.124	-.036	.108	-.090	.117
Caseload-to-Population Ratio	-1.319***	.447	.087	.367	-.274	.372	.016	.402
Government Ideology	-.055***	.019	-.022	.017	-.008	.018	-.015	.018
Interparty Competition	-5.441***	2.358	-6.17	2.315	-1.237	2.229	-.314	2.401
Low-Income Voter Turnout	-10.094	9.750	-2.975	10.447	-11.571	9.865	-12.453	10.150
Unemployment Rate	.333	.452	-1.048*	.571	.061	.501	-.854	.655
Change in Incarceration Rate	.010	.017	.051*	.028	.039	.029	-.035	.021
Percent Latino	-.019	.029	-.006	.034	.071**	.034	.087**	.043
Percent African-American	.039*	.018	-.017	.022	.049***	.021	.072***	.025
Welfare Innovation	-.202***	.073	-.078	.067	.070	.068	.023	.071
Intercept 1	-26.026	9.069	11.848	9.003	-2.454	8.200	9.199	8.203
Intercept 2	-22.521	8.788	—	—	—	—	—	—
Overall model	LR $\chi^2$ (10 df) = 39.75		LR $\chi^2$ (10 df) = 21.10		LR $\chi^2$ (10 df) = 19.23		LR $\chi^2$ (10 df) = 20.13	
	$p = .001$		$p = .020$		$p = .036$		$p = .028$	
	$N = 49$		$N = 49$		$N = 49$		$N = 49$	
	PRE = .46		PRE = .63		PRE = .30		PRE = .50	
Method of analysis	Ordered Logit		Binary Logit		Binary Logit		Binary Logit	

Note: The significance test for caseload-to-population ratio is two-tailed; significance tests for all other coefficients are one-tailed. PRE (proportional reduction in error) estimates are based on classification of concordant and discordant pairs. All analyses were performed in STATA 6.0.

\* $p < .05$  \*\* $p < .025$  \*\*\* $p < .01$

competition, states with higher unmarried birth rates, states that engaged in policy innovation by making earlier requests for AFDC waivers, and states that maintained smaller AFDC caseloads. But here again, we also see evidence of racial effects. All else equal, states with larger numbers of African Americans in their AFDC caseloads were significantly more likely to adopt stricter sanctions.

As expected, these results affirm that many forces shape state policy choice. Still, it is hard not to be struck by the prominence of race as an explanatory factor. Even after accounting for the effects of other state differences, the racial composition of welfare recipients is a significant predictor of state choices in three of our four policy domains. Racial effects appear in these models more often than do any other kinds of effects; and in two policy areas, racial effects constitute the only significant relationships.

How much impact does the racial composition of recipients have on state choices to implement strict welfare policies? One way to answer this question is to use an interpretive procedure developed by Gary King, Michael Tomz, and Jason Wittenberg (2000). After setting all other variables at their means, we can shift the value of each racial variable from one standard deviation below its mean to one standard deviation above its mean (for ease of style, we refer to these values as *low* and *high*). By calculating the probability of a policy outcome before and after this shift, we can estimate how changes in the racial makeup of recipients would alter the likelihood of a particular policy choice *under the assumption that no other state characteristic changed at all*.<sup>11</sup> Following this procedure, we find that as the black percentage of recipients rises from low to high, the probability of a hypothetically average state adopting strong sanctions increases from .05 to .27. A similar shift raises the probability of a state adopting strict time limits from .14 to .66. Most dramatically, it raises the probability of a family cap from .09 to .75. The estimated effects of having more Latinos on the rolls are similarly large, lifting the probability of strict time limits from .22 to .61 and boosting the probability of a family cap from .19 to .63.

Taken as a whole, then, this part of our analysis suggests that state actions in the wake of welfare devolution were driven by a variety of social and political forces. The racial makeup of the welfare target population mattered greatly, but its role varied considerably across policy domains. In the case of sanction policy, the racial composition of caseloads operated as one factor among many that shaped policy choice. In the case of work requirements, we find no evidence of racial effects at all.

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In two policy areas, family cap and time limits, racial factors have a large impact *and* appear to be the only factors systematically related to state policy choices. On balance, these results suggest that policy devolution created new openings for racial distortions in the shape of U.S. welfare policy. In addition, our findings underscore that the extent to which “race matters” for welfare policy choice depends on what kind of policy is under consideration. In the following section, we turn our attention from state legislatures to the public at large.

Race and Public Support for Welfare Reform

Public opinion rarely offers a sufficient explanation for shifts in welfare policy. Institutional arrangements, organized interests, skewed political participation, and a host of other forces all function to refract the popular will (Noble 1997). Equally important, mass support for a public policy is itself a political outcome that hinges, in part, on the ways elites, activists, and mass media frame the issues at hand (Zaller 1992; Gamson 1992). Still, it is hard to imagine that welfare reform in the 1990s could have been achieved without significant public support. The link between mass opinion and public policy varies across issue areas, but majority opinion is generally a good predictor of policy outcomes (Sharp 1999; Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson 1995; Wright, Erikson, and McIver 1987). In the welfare context, public sentiment tends to be strongly correlated with the ways welfare policies vary over time and across political locales (Wlezien 1995; Jacobs and Shapiro 1994; Wright, Erikson, and McIver 1987). Thus, to adequately assess the racial underpinnings of welfare reform, we must devote some attention to the distribution and nature of public support.

Advocates of conservative welfare reform contend that large majorities of the public support tough behavior-oriented welfare rules; this public support constitutes “the long-run explanation for the shift” toward conservatism in U.S. welfare politics; and the roots of this support do not lie in racial prejudice (Mead 2001, 202–8). Regarding the first of these claims, polls provide compelling evidence of broad public support for reform (Gilens 1999). To discern the meaning of this support, however, we consider it essential to note two points about public opinion on welfare reform.

First, the public as a whole is, in the main, *weakly informed* about what specific welfare policies do and how the 1996 reforms changed exist-

ing programs. Polls conducted in 1996, at the height of media coverage of reform, showed that a large majority of Americans supported the new legislation; but when probed, almost half of the public admitted they had not heard about it or did not know enough to have an opinion (Weaver 2000, 338). Thus, while a majority of the public thinks “welfare reform” sounds good, this majority is also unsure about what “welfare” and “reform” mean. Second, in addition to lacking information on welfare reform, the public is also *misinformed*. Research suggests that Americans overestimate the number of families on welfare, the proportion of the budget that goes to welfare, the level of benefits provided to families, and the percentage of recipients who stay on the rolls for long periods of time (Kuklinski and Quirk 2000). In substituting these stereotypes for facts, individuals also tend to exhibit overconfidence in the accuracy of their welfare knowledge and to resist correcting their beliefs when supplied with correct information (Kuklinski and Quirk 2000). Thus, calls to “give the people what they want” must, at the very least, take into account that the public might want different things if it were informed more fully and accurately.

With these points about the weak knowledge base of public support in hand, we can turn to our central concern: the relationship between public support and race. As a first step toward understanding this relationship, it is helpful to compare welfare attitudes among white and black Americans. In the United States, public opinion frequently varies along racial lines. Indeed, compared with other group differences, the racial gap has often loomed so large that some scholars have deemed it “the divide without peer” (Kinder and Sanders 1996). The racial divide, not surprisingly, is widest for policies that bear directly and explicitly on racial matters (Schuman et al. 1997). Nevertheless, the difference between black and white opinion on social welfare policy has tended to be substantial, and the roots of this gap have been traced in part to basic beliefs about the appropriate role of government in American society (Kinder and Winter 2001).

So, how did black and white Americans feel about welfare issues in 1996? The 1996 American National Election Study (ANES) provides a unique opportunity to address this question because it includes good measures of four relevant welfare attitudes: individuals’ feelings toward “people on welfare,” support for welfare spending, and support for time limits and family caps.<sup>12</sup> Assessing these measures as a group, we find consistent evidence of a racial gap. As measured by a 100-point “feeling thermometer,” black respondents held considerably warmer feelings toward welfare

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recipients than did their white counterparts (a black mean of 62.5 vs. a white mean of 49.5). Similarly, while only a 40 percent minority of whites wanted to maintain or increase current levels of welfare spending, almost a two-thirds majority of African Americans (65 percent) held this position. Turning to the family cap and time limit policies, we find that these reforms drew majority support from both black and white respondents but this support ran stronger among whites. African American support for the family cap stood at 58 percent in 1996, while white support stood at 70 percent. Sixty-four percent of black respondents favored time limits compared to 80 percent of white respondents.

To further clarify the racial divide, it is helpful to use multivariate analyses that control for factors that might obscure or exaggerate racial differences. To do so, we rescaled all four welfare attitudes so that their values ran from 0 to 1 and then ran parallel regression models that assessed racial effects alongside the effects of gender, age, education, income, and region (South).<sup>13</sup> The results yielded several interesting findings. First, in all four cases, black respondents emerged as significantly more liberal than whites in their response to welfare, even after controlling for other demographics. Second, relative to the differences associated with other demographics, the racial divide was comparatively large. It had the third largest effect on family cap support, the second largest effect on support for spending, and the largest effect of any demographic factor on both feelings toward welfare recipients and support for time limits. Third, comparing the racial divide across these four welfare attitudes, we find an increasing order of effects as we move from the family cap through feelings toward recipients, time limits, and (largest of all) welfare spending.

The racial divide on welfare policy is instructive. However, the impact of race on public preferences in 1996 may also be traced to the ways in which racial *attitudes* affected white policy preferences. Contrary to myth, white Americans tend to support most kinds of public aid targeted at poor people; what they tend to support less is “welfare,” a program label that has become synonymous with rewarding the *undeserving* poor (Weaver, Shapiro, and Jacobs 1995; Smith 1987a). Suspicions that “people on welfare” are lazy and socially irresponsible fuel a relatively targeted public desire to limit welfare spending and impose restrictive rules on welfare recipients (Gilens 1999, 174–203). To understand the roots of support for get-tough reform, then, we must ask why welfare recipients—virtually alone among the beneficiaries of public social programs—have been perceived in such a negative light.

Here, it is helpful to begin with V. O. Key's (1966, 2-3) famous dictum: "The voice of the people is but an echo. The output of an echo chamber bears an inevitable and invariable relation to the input. . . . Even the most discriminating popular judgment can reflect only ambiguity, uncertainty, or even foolishness if those are the qualities of the input into the echo chamber." What sort of information does the public typically receive regarding poor people and welfare recipients? Martin Gilens (this volume) finds that, from 1965 to 1992, media stories about poverty systematically overemphasized images of black people; moreover, the proportion of black images tended to rise in stories that portrayed the poor in an unsympathetic light and in periods of heavier welfare criticism. With this sort of "input into the echo chamber," it is hardly surprising to find that Americans tend to overestimate the proportion of poor people who are black (Gilens 1999). Moreover, as Avery and Peffley suggest (this volume), individuals who encounter media images of poor black people (as opposed to images of poor white people) tend to have more critical responses to welfare in general.

The critical link here is racial stereotyping. Despite dramatic changes in racial attitudes over the past forty years (Schuman et al. 1997), old stereotypes of black laziness and irresponsibility persist in American media and public perception (Entman and Rojecki 2000). Because Americans tend to believe that most welfare recipients are black, these stereotypes encourage the public to view welfare recipients as morally undeserving (Gilens 1999). The effect on public sentiment toward "welfare" is profound. Analyzing survey data from 1991, Gilens (1999, 96) finds that the perception that blacks are lazy is the second most powerful predictor of opposition to welfare spending. This antiblack stereotype is also the single largest influence on whether individuals believe that welfare recipients are an undeserving group—the most powerful predictor of opposition to welfare spending.

Based on these findings from earlier periods, there are good reasons to suspect that white racial attitudes may have helped fuel public support for tougher program rules in 1996.<sup>14</sup> Popular sentiment toward welfare, however, tends to be complex; its origins lie in a variety of nonracial considerations (Feldman and Zaller 1992; Sniderman and Piazza 1993). Accordingly, support for welfare reform among white Americans must be analyzed with an eye to how racial attitudes operate within the broader web of attitudes that shape public opinion. Our model begins with demographic measures that test whether support for reform was especially intense among particular subgroups of the white citizenry.

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Specifically, we include measures of each respondent's *Age, Education, Family Income, Sex, and Employment Status*.<sup>15</sup> (See appendix B for measures and descriptive statistics for all individual-level variables.)

To capture the partisan and ideological sources of white opinion, our model includes measures of *Liberal-Conservative Identification* and *Partisan Identification*. In addition, we employ three measures tapping values that figure prominently in welfare policy debates: a *Moralism* index based on support for "traditional" family arrangements, an *Individualism* measure indicating whether respondents believe government should stand back and let individuals get ahead on their own, and an *Egalitarianism* index based on questions that ask about the desirability of equal opportunity and whether equality should be pursued more or less vigorously. Finally, our last variable in this group indicates respondents' preferred approach to reducing crime: punishment versus provision of social services. All else equal, we expect support for family caps and time limits to run heaviest among conservatives, Republicans, strong moralists, strong individualists, weak egalitarians, and people who favor a more punitive approach to crime.

To assess how white racial attitudes affect support for time limits and family caps, we employ separate measures of prejudice toward Hispanics and African Americans. The "prejudice scale" used here is designed to capture both the cognitive and affective components of negative group attitudes.<sup>16</sup> The scale is based on three measures of group stereotyping and one measure of group-based antipathy. The stereotype items indicate the difference between white respondents' ratings of white and black people, or white and Hispanic people, on traits of intelligence, laziness, and trustworthiness. The affective measure is a standard feeling thermometer score indicating how "warm" or "cool" white respondents feel toward black people of Hispanic people. Rather than pit these cognitive and affective elements of group prejudice against one another in a multivariate analysis, we use a single prejudice scale based on a factor score generated by all four items.

Table 9.2 presents the results of our ordered logit analyses of support for time limit and family cap policies among white Americans. Because our black and Hispanic prejudice scales are highly correlated ( $r = .73$ ), we assess their effects in separate equations. Each of the four models shown in table 9.2 offers a significant amount of explanatory power, and each yields support for several of our specific hypotheses. The results for our demographic measures indicate that support for these two policies varied only slightly across social categories that might divide white Americans.



TABLE 9.2. Support for Time Limits and Family Caps among White Americans

Dependent Variable	Support for Family Caps		Support for Time Limits		Support for Family Caps		Support for Time Limits	
	Coeff.	SE	Coeff.	SE	Coeff.	SE	Coeff.	SE
Age	-.005	.004	-.014**	.004	-.004	.004	-.015***	.005
Education	-.017	.051	-.112**	.051	-.031	.052	-.090	.051
Family Income	.026*	.013	.026*	.014	.029*	.014	.016	.014
Woman	.381**	.150	.187	.150	.389***	.153	.163	.151
Unemployed	.061	.374	-.017	.371	.104	.381	-.059	.378
Liberal-Conservative ID	.178**	.073	.214***	.074	.144**	.074	.199***	.075
Partisan ID	.042	.045	.037	.045	.063	.046	.030	.046
Moralism	.035	.023	.018	.023	.040	.023	.022	.023
Individualism	.140***	.054	.115**	.055	.139***	.055	.121**	.056
Egalitarianism	-.060***	.024	-.049*	.025	-.066***	.025	-.049	.025
Punitive Crime Orientation	.165***	.043	.144***	.044	.156***	.044	.136***	.044
Antiblack Prejudice	.022***	.009	.027***	.010	—	—	—	—
Anti-Hispanic Prejudice	—	—	—	—	.027**	.009	.034***	.009
Intercept 1	1.121	1.002	-.025	1.047	1.176	1.001	.083	1.020
Intercept 2	1.957	1.003	.801	1.047	2.027	1.002	.919	1.020
Intercept 3	2.893	1.006	1.965	1.048	3.973	1.005	2.111	1.022
Overall model	LR $\chi^2$ (12 df) = 130.8		LR $\chi^2$ (12 df) = 128.9		LR $\chi^2$ (12 df) = 134.1		LR $\chi^2$ (12 df) = 125.8	
	$p = .001$		$p = .001$		$p = .001$		$p = .001$	
	$N = 751$		$N = 768$		$N = 733$		$N = 751$	
	PRE = .07		PRE = .07		PRE = .08		PRE = .07	
Method of analysis	Ordered Logit		Ordered Logit		Ordered Logit		Ordered Logit	

Note: Significance tests for demographic variables are two-tailed; significance tests for all other variables are one-tailed. PRE (proportional reduction in error) estimates are based on classification of concordant and discordant pairs. All analyses were performed in STATA 6.0.

\* $p < .05$  \*\* $p < .025$  \*\*\* $p < .01$

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Younger respondents were significantly more likely than older ones to support time limits, but this factor had no effect on support for the family cap. Higher education appears to depress support for time limits, but it has no discernible effect on opinion toward the family cap.<sup>17</sup> Women were significantly more likely than men to support the family cap, but no more likely to favor time limits. The effects of family income were a bit broader: wealthier white people were significantly more likely than their poorer counterparts to support family caps and (in one of the two equations) time limits. White Americans who were unemployed in 1996 held preferences for these policies that were indistinguishable from the rest of the white citizenry.

Turning to our attitudinal hypotheses, we find that support for get-tough program rules was in every case stronger among self-identified conservatives, but in no case did support vary significantly across categories of partisan identification. The results for our three value measures are equally clear cut. Strong moralists do not emerge here as a distinctive group. However, individualism and egalitarianism are consistently strong predictors of welfare policy preferences. All else equal, support for each policy was significantly higher among white people who held strong individualist values and/or weak commitments to egalitarian values. Finally, in both policy areas, we find that support for stringent reforms was significantly higher among white Americans who favored a more punitive approach to dealing with crime.

The results in table 9.2 provide consistent evidence of racial effects. Among white Americans, higher levels of antiblack prejudice were associated with significantly stronger support for both the family cap and time limits. Stronger anti-Hispanic prejudice had a parallel effect, producing a significant increase in support for each of the two policies. How much effect did prejudice have? Following the procedures employed earlier for our state-level results, we can use predicted probabilities to clarify the effects of group stereotypes on support for the new welfare policies. Holding all other variables constant at their means, we can estimate the effect that a change in racial prejudice would have on the probability that a white respondent would strongly support each policy. Shifting the antiblack stereotype measure from low to high, we find that the probability of strong support rises from .40 to .74 for the family cap and from .41 to .80 for time limits. An equal shift in the anti-Hispanic stereotype measure raises the probability of strong support from .40 to .78 for the family cap and from .40 to .84 for time limits. To put these probability changes in perspective, it is important to note that *in every model shown*

*in table 9.2, the effect of group prejudice is larger than any other single factor included in our analysis.*<sup>18</sup>

## Discussion

Perhaps the most central question raised by welfare reform in the 1990s was “On what terms should government offer aid to low-income families?” In this chapter, we have asked whether racial factors influenced the ways state governments and citizens answered this question. Our findings suggest a qualified but unequivocal answer of “yes.” We do not find racial effects in every policy area; and our results underscore that race was only one factor among many that drove public and governmental preferences for tough new policies. In the 1990s, as in earlier eras of welfare politics, racial dynamics played out alongside a variety of other forces that shape state action and public sentiment. Let us consider each of our four policies in turn.

In contrast to policies that deny benefits to particular classes of individuals (e.g., sanctions, family caps, and time limits), work requirements impose a directive and supervisory system of behavioral controls on adults who receive public assistance (Mead 1997). Many discussions of race and welfare politics emphasize antiblack stereotypes surrounding work effort (Gilens 1999). Yet, our state-level analysis of work enforcement policy provides the clearest example of a case in which it would be a mistake to speak of racial effects in global terms. Our results for work requirements show no relationship with the racial makeup of the rolls, but point instead to a tight cluster of predictors centered on the social control thesis. Consistent with the formal control hypothesis, states that took the toughest approaches to incarceration in the 1990s were significantly more likely to pursue strict work requirements under TANF. In addition, we find support for Piven and Cloward’s (1993) argument that when labor markets tighten, lawmakers will be more likely to use welfare policy to set the poor to work.

Sanction policy provides our best example of a case in which racial effects intersect with a variety of other forces to shape state policy choice. The imposition of strong sanctions was especially likely in states with large numbers of black welfare recipients. But strong sanctions were also significantly more likely in states with conservative governments, states with less vigorous party competition, states with higher unmarried birth rates, innovative states that made earlier requests for AFDC waivers, and

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states that maintained smaller AFDC caseloads. Why did so many different forces influence the passage of sanction policies? Here, we think it is possible to offer some reasonable speculation based on the fact that sanctions are not tied to a specific program goal. Punitive sanctions raise the stakes for clients who fail to comply with *any* of a variety of new welfare initiatives. As a result, sanctions may be attractive to proponents of very different reforms or to lawmakers who simply believe that threats are necessary to bring about change. This versatility may make sanction policy an ambiguous political object that is open to an especially broad array of political influences.

Our analyses of time limit and family cap policies focus our attention squarely on race as a central problem for welfare reform. In debates over welfare in the 1990s, the quintessential “welfare queen” was often portrayed as a black woman with a long-term addiction to the dole and a willingness to use childbirth as a way to prolong and increase her welfare check (Fraser and Gordon 1994; Lubiano 1992). Welfare reform raised the possibility of using new tools to combat these problems: time limits provided a way to cut off long-term recipients and the family cap offered a way to end benefit increases for childbirth. Based on evidence drawn from two levels of analysis, we conclude that race played a major role in shaping public and governmental responses to these policy options.

At the individual level, several important conclusions stand out. First, the traditional racial divide in welfare opinion persisted in 1996. Like other Americans, a majority of black people supported key elements of reform, but the level of this support was consistently weaker than what we find among white people. Relative to whites, African Americans in 1996 expressed significantly more positive feelings toward welfare recipients, more support for welfare spending, and less support for family caps and time limits. Second, our analysis of white support for family caps and time limits reveals relatively minor demographic divisions. The results suggest a broad base of support rather than concentrated support in particular subgroups. Third, we find that support for these reforms was driven by a variety of nonracial attitudes. The strongest support came from white people who identified themselves as conservative, embraced individualistic values, rejected egalitarian values, and preferred punitive approaches to crime. Fourth and finally, our results underscore the crucial role that racial and ethnic prejudice played in white support for get-tough welfare reform. Among white Americans, support for reform appears to have been fueled to a significant degree by prejudice against

*both* blacks and Hispanics. Such prejudice proved to be a significant influence on white support in all four of our models; and in every case, it emerged as the most powerful predictor of white support for get-tough reform.

In our state-level analysis, we find that adoption of family caps and strict time limits was unrelated to any factor other than the racial composition of the rolls. From this evidence, we can only conclude that the “devolution revolution” has created openings for new forms of racial inequality in the U.S. welfare system. For example, because states with more black recipients have adopted stricter policy regimes, black families are now more likely to participate under the most punitive program conditions. Such policy disparities not only can produce inequalities in the distribution of resources, they also subject citizens from different social groups to systematically different treatment at the hands of government. Thus, a black woman who conceives a child while receiving welfare is now less likely than a white woman to live in a state that offers additional aid for the child. Likewise, a black client who misses a meeting with a caseworker is now disproportionately likely to live in a state where this single infraction results in a termination of benefits for the full family. White clients committing this same infraction are more likely to live in states that respond in a more lenient fashion.<sup>19</sup>

To illustrate the importance of such disparities, it is worth considering a single policy in some detail. In the period after 1996, sanctions emerged as one of the most pivotal TANF measures. Among policy factors, they became the strongest predictor of state caseload decline (Rector and Youssef 1999). From 1997 through 1999, approximately 540,000 families lost their entire TANF check due to a full-family sanction, and these families tended to fare worse (socially and economically) than families that left for other reasons (Goldberg and Schott 2000). Our analysis of state policy choice in 1997 suggests that one might expect a racialized pattern of vulnerability to sanctions to emerge in the ensuing years. An analysis of 1999 caseload data confirms this prediction three years into the life of the TANF program.<sup>20</sup> Among TANF recipients in 1999, 63.7 percent of black families were participating under the threat of a full family sanction, while the same was true for only 53.7 percent of white families. If somehow one could have waved a magic wand of racial justice and made the black percentage equal to the white percentage (53.7 percent), the number of African American families at risk for full-family sanctions in 1999 would have been reduced by about 102,000 *families*.

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Not surprisingly, state-level studies from this period indicated that TANF exits due to sanctions (rather than income increases) were higher among black families than among white families (Lower-Basch 2000).

## Conclusion

For students of welfare politics, policy retrenchment in the 1990s offers unique opportunities for analysis. Citizens and legislators were confronted with fundamental questions about how and when government should extend aid to the poor. In a short span of time, the political process that set the terms of relief for poor families was replicated 50 times over in the states, each time under a slightly different configuration of political forces. Taking advantage of these circumstances, we have asked why some states were more likely than others to get tough on the poor by making restrictive policy choices. At the individual level, we have pursued a complementary analysis designed to illuminate the roots of public support for new welfare policies. Above all, our analysis confirms that, even in the midst of great policy change, race has remained a troubling and complicated political force in welfare politics.

Our individual-level analysis should give pause to those who celebrate welfare reform as a democratic expression of the popular will. In our view, it would be misleading and unwise to simply dismiss white support for welfare reform as an expression of racism. The sources of white support are diverse; and at any rate, ugly attitudinal correlates do not justify a suspension of democratic norms. But at the same time, we would not want to see too little made of the connection between racial prejudice and white support for welfare reform. White Americans' preferences for get-tough welfare rules cannot be adequately understood apart from their racial component. Racial prejudice is, in the aggregate, a significant part of what white support for welfare reform means. In this context, we believe that reflexive calls to "give the people what they want" should be subject to close scrutiny.

The same may be said of claims that welfare devolution will free states to act as rational "laboratories" of policy experimentation. From the era of mothers' pensions up to the welfare rights victories of the late 1960s, public aid for poor families was characterized by virtually "unregulated state discretion over eligibility conditions and the amounts of grants" (Rosenblatt 1982, 266; Patterson 1994). Historians have demonstrated that such discretion was used for a variety of social purposes. Pro-

gram rules (such as “suitable home” and “man in the house” clauses) were used to control women’s sexual and parental behaviors (Abramovitz 1988; Gordon 1994). They were also used to regulate the labor activities of the poor, absorbing them during slow economic times and forcing them to work when more hands were needed in the factories or fields (Piven and Cloward 1993). In addition, states tended to administer benefits in a racially biased manner, imposing tougher conditions for aid on people of color and using program rules to punish those who violated racially biased norms of social conduct (Bell 1965).

Thus, freedom from the federal tether in the first half of the twentieth century did not produce a detached posture of experimentation in state governments; it simply hitched welfare policy to social and political forces that operated at the state level. Today’s TANF system exists in a political and legal context that makes it unlikely that the worst of earlier practices could be replicated. Still, an analysis of state policy choices in the 1990s suggests nothing so much as that the past remains prologue. Today in the United States, welfare policy is rooted in a rapidly changing but still-too-familiar politics driven by race and ethnicity, gender and family relations, class and labor market conditions.

New TANF policies include a variety of rules that explicitly target women’s sexual and familial behaviors—measures designed to dissuade unmarried women from having sex, deter current recipients from bearing children, and promote two-parent family formation (Mink 1999). Likewise, work enforcement remains critical in the contemporary reform era, and it is being pursued most vigorously in states that have tighter labor markets and stronger tendencies toward incarceration. Finally, and most pointedly, our analysis underscores that race and ethnicity continue to be a major influences on the terms of relief state governments set for poor families.

Looking to the future, we are struck by recent evidence that caseloads in many states are becoming more skewed toward people of color (Schram, this volume). This development does not bode well for racial justice in the U.S. welfare system. At the same time that TANF rules are getting harsher, they are also becoming more detached from the lives of white Americans. People of color are disproportionately likely to remain in the tough new welfare system, and they are especially concentrated in states adopting the strictest policies. In addition, our findings suggest that a shifting of caseloads toward people of color may encourage a deepening of tough-minded reforms in the states. In the coming years, the American welfare system will continue to grapple with the problem of the

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color line. There are dangers here, but perhaps there are also opportunities to begin speaking with a louder voice about the corrosive effects of racial prejudice, the persistence of racial inequalities, and the ideals of racial justice.

APPENDIX A: STATE-LEVEL SOURCES AND MEASURES

*Government Ideology, 1996:* Ideological score for each state government in 1996. Range = 1.3 to 93.9, on a 0 to 100 scale, with higher values indicating a more liberal government. Mean = 39.8; standard deviation = 26.4. Source: Berry et al. 1998.

*Interparty Competition, 1996:* The difference of proportions for seats controlled by each major party (Democrat and Republican) in each state's lower and upper house. Range = .30 to .97, on a 0 to 1.0 scale, with higher values indicating greater party competition. Mean = .74; standard deviation = .18. Source: U.S. Department of Commerce 1998.

*Low-Income Voter Turnout, 1996:* The proportion of all individuals falling below the Census Bureau's poverty threshold who voted in the 1996 elections. Range = .34 to .62, with higher values indicating a higher proportion of low-income persons voting. Mean = .45; standard deviation = .06. Source: U.S. Department of Commerce 1996.

*Per Capita Welfare Caseload, 1996:* The average monthly number of AFDC recipients in each state as a percent of the total resident population as of July 1, 1996. Range = 1.9 to 8.2 with higher values indicating a higher per capita caseload. Mean = 3.96; standard deviation = 1.40. Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 1997.

*Percentage of Caseload African American, 1996:* The proportion of each state's AFDC caseload in 1996 that was classified by the government as African American. Range = .3 to 86.2, with higher values indicating that African Americans made up a higher proportion of the caseload. Mean = 32.07; standard deviation = 26.51. Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 1997.

*Percentage of Caseload Latina, 1996:* The proportion of each state's AFDC caseload in 1996 that was classified by the government as Hispanic. Range = 0 to 57.4, with higher values indicating that Latino/as made up a higher proportion of the caseload. Mean = 11.00; standard deviation = 14.73. Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 1997.

*Unemployment Rate, 1996:* Official unemployment rate for each state. Range = 3.1 to 8.1 with higher values indicating a higher percentage of the labor force was unemployed. Mean = 5.19; standard deviation = 1.13. Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics: Local Area Unemployment 1996.

*Unmarried Birth Rate, 1996:* Percentage of all births born to unmarried



- women. Range = 16.0 to 45.0, with higher values indicating that unmarried women accounted for a higher proportion of all births. Mean = 31.30; standard deviation = 5.69. Source: U.S. Department of Commerce 1998.
- Policy Innovation*: The year of each state's earliest AFDC waiver request. Range = 77 to 97, with higher values indicating a later starting date (97 indicates no waiver requests under the AFDC program through 1996). Mean = 87.5; standard deviation = 7.1. Source: Lieberman and Shaw 2000.
- Change in Incarceration Rate, 1990–96*: The percentage change in the state prison population from 1990 to 1996. Range = -4.2 percent to 164.5 percent, with higher values indicating larger increases in incarceration. Mean = 44.9; standard deviation = 25.0. Source: U.S. Department of Justice 2000.
- Sanction Policy by State, 1997*: Range = 1 to 3, where 1 is weak sanctions (delayed and not applied to the entire family's benefit), 2 is moderate sanctions (delayed but applied to the full family), and 3 is strong sanctions (full-family immediate sanctions). The frequency distribution is 31 percent (weak); 42 percent (moderate); and 27 percent (strong). Source: Burke and Gish 1998.
- Work Requirement by State, 1997*: Range = 0 to 1, where 0 is a policy equivalent to the federal 24-month requirement and 1 is less than 24 months. While 51 percent of the states adopted stricter work requirements, 49 percent did not. Source: American Public Welfare Association 1997.
- Time Limit by State, 1997*: Range = 0 to 1, on a 0 to 1 scale where 0 is a time limit that is the same as the federal five-year requirement and 1 is less than five years. While 41 percent of the states adopted stricter time limits, 59 percent did not. Source: American Public Welfare Association 1997.
- Family Cap by State, 1997*: Range = 0 to 1, on a 0 to 1 scale where 0 is no family cap is adopted and 1 is where the family cap is adopted. While 41 percent of the states adopted the family cap, 59 percent did not. Source: American Public Welfare Association 1997.

#### APPENDIX B: INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL MEASURES

- Based on White Respondents from the American National Election Study, 1996
- South*: Coded 1 for South and 0 for other regions, based on the state of interview (v960109).
- Age*: R's age in years at the time of the interview (v960605). Range = 18 to 93; mean = 48.1; standard deviation = 17.6.
- Education*: R's formal educational attainment (v960610). Range = 1 to 7; mean = 4.2; standard deviation = 1.7.

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- Family Income:* R's family income (v960701). Range = 1 to 24; mean = 15.6; standard deviation = 6.0
- Woman:* R's sex, coded 1 for women and 0 for men (v960066).
- Unemployed:* R's employment status, coded 1 for not working and not retired, 0 for all others (v960615).
- Liberal-Conservative ID:* R's liberal/conservative self-identification (v960368). Range = 1 to 7; mean = 4.4; standard deviation = 1.4.
- Party Identification:* Partisan self-identification, measured on a seven-point scale that ranges from Strong Democrat (0) to Strong Republican (6) (v960420). Range = 0 to 6; Mean = 2.9; SD = 2.1.
- Moralism:* Additive index based on R's responses to four traditional morality items (v961247, v961248, v961249, v91250). Range = 4 to 20; mean = 14.0; standard deviation = 3.2.
- Individualism:* R's commitment to individualism, based on a question that asks respondents to place themselves on a scale that runs from "Government should see to it that every person has a job and good standard of living" to "Government should just let each person get ahead on their own" (v960483). Range = 1 to 7; Mean = 4.6; SD = 1.6.
- Egalitarianism:* An additive index based on six items that ask about the desirability of equal opportunity and whether equality should be pursued more or less vigorously (v961229–v961234). A higher value indicates more egalitarian views. Range = 6 to 30; Mean = 19.7, SD = 3.5.
- Punitive Crime Orientation:* Whether R favors reducing crime by treating "social problems that cause crime, like bad schools, poverty and joblessness" or by "making sure criminals are caught, convicted, and punished" (v960519). Range = 1 to 7; mean = 4.5; standard deviation = 1.9.
- Anti-Hispanic Prejudice:* Factor score based on R's feeling thermometer score for Blacks and stereotype items regarding laziness, trustworthiness, and intelligence. Range = 0 to 100; mean = 51.2; standard deviation = 9.9.
- Antiblack Prejudice:* Factor score based on R's feeling thermometer score for Blacks and stereotype items regarding laziness, trustworthiness, and intelligence. Range = 0 to 100; mean = 54.2; standard deviation = 9.7.
- Family Cap Support:* "Some people have proposed that a woman on welfare who has another child not be given an increase in her welfare check. Do you favor or oppose this change in welfare policy? [Follow up] Do you favor/oppose this change strongly or not strongly?" (v961321, v961322). Range = 1 to 4; mean = 3.1; standard deviation = 1.1.
- Time Limit Support:* "Another proposal is to put a two year limit on how long someone can receive welfare benefits. Do you favor or oppose this two year limit? [Follow up] Do you favor/oppose the two year limit strongly or not strongly?" (v961323, v961324). Range = 1 to 4; mean = 3.3; standard deviation = 1.0.

NOTES

1. We would like to extend our thanks to Robert Albritton, Jim Baumohl, Nathan Dietz, Richard Fording, Heather Girvin, Gary Krueger, Claudia Kruvovoy, Julia Littell, Justine McNamara, Frances Fox Piven, Ellen Szabo, Greg Caldeira, and the anonymous reviewers for suggestions that helped us improve on earlier versions of this paper. We also thank Gary King, Michael Tomz, and Jason Wittenberg for technical help regarding their Clarify program and Robert Lieberman and Greg Shaw for sharing their data.

2. States were required to have 25 percent of the targeted caseload working 20 hours per week in 1997 and 50 percent of the caseload working 30 hours per week by the year 2002. Moreover, the law's definition of "work-related activities" limited education and training to no more than one year. Subsequent legislation restricted the number of recipients states could have in education and training programs to no more than 20 percent of clients counted in the work quota.

3. For elaboration, see Soss et al. 2001.

4. Our trichotomous measure is based on coding from an analysis by Rector and Youssef (1999). Sixteen states (Alaska, California, Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington) adopted weak sanctions that permit welfare agencies to sanction only the adult portion of the TANF check, except in unusual circumstances. Thus, recipients retain the bulk of their family's TANF benefits even if they fail to perform workfare or other required activities. Twenty-one states (Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, West Virginia) adopted moderate sanctions. Nineteen of these states imposed a progressive sequence of penalties, sanctioning the full TANF check only after longer periods of noncompliance or repeated performance infractions. Two adopted policies that sanction the full family check only under specific circumstances. Fourteen states (Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Mississippi, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming) adopted strong sanctions that eliminate aid for the full family at the first instance of noncompliance with a program requirement.

5. Examining caseload changes from January 1997 to June 1999, we find that states with stronger sanctions had significantly steeper declines ( $F = 7.745, p = .001$ ). On average, the TANF rolls dropped by 31 percent in states with weak sanctions, 41 percent in states with moderate sanctions, and 53 percent in states with strong sanctions. These results are consistent with those reported by Rector and Youssef (1999) for January 1997 to June 1998.

6. Our measures are based on a report published by the American Public Welfare Association (1997). Twenty-six states adopted a work requirement stricter than the federal requirement: Arkansas, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Idaho, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, North Carolina, North Dakota, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washing-

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ton, and Wisconsin. Twenty-one states adopted a time limit shorter than the federal requirement: Arkansas, Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Nebraska, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Virginia. Twenty-one states adopted a family cap: Arkansas, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, North Dakota, Nebraska, New Jersey, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.

7. In an earlier version of this analysis, we adopted a more cautious analytic approach that took no a priori position on whether state policy choices should be treated as separate dimensions of reform or merely as multiple indicators of a single outcome. For evidence that separate policy analyses offer advantages over an analysis that uses a general index of policy severity, see Soss et al. 2001.

8. Consistent with this emphasis, Gilens (1999) reports that when beliefs about black people are compared with beliefs about other ethnic minorities, negative stereotypes of African Americans are far stronger predictors of opposition to welfare.

9. For reasons of space, we present only brief statements of our nonracial hypotheses here. For full discussions of each, see Soss et al. 2001.

10. To test the robustness of our findings, we employed a number of alternative measures for our independent variables and introduced a variety of supplemental controls into our models. For descriptions of alternative specifications and their negligible effects on our results, see Soss et al. 2001.

11. For a more detailed discussion of our procedures and a presentation of first differences with confidence intervals for all significant variables in our models, see Soss et al. 2001.

12. The 1996 ANES did not ask respondents any questions about work requirements or sanction policies.

13. Full regression results are not shown here due to space constraints; interested readers may obtain them from the authors on request.

14. Our expectation here is bolstered, in part, by scholarship that extends Gilens's (1999) research to the mid-1990s. Analyzing stories from 1993 to 1998, Clawson and Trice (2000) find that the public encountered particularly intense media coverage of poverty and welfare issues, and, as in earlier periods, this coverage was marked by racial bias. The authors conclude that newsmagazines painted "a stereotypical and inaccurate picture of poverty." Images of the poor were disproportionately black; welfare recipients tended to be portrayed as undeserving; and black faces predominated in stories that adopted a negative tone or emphasized unsympathetic traits.

15. We also tested a measure for region (South versus non-South). This measure yielded no significant results and did not produce any nontrivial effects on the results reported in table 9.2.

16. Our use of the term *prejudice scale* should not be read as a strict application of Allport's (1954) definition of prejudice as "an antipathy based on a faulty and inflexible generalization." Specifically, our evidence does not indicate whether respondents who score high on this scale hold demonstrably false or inflexible beliefs. Moreover, as Glick and Fiske (2001, 279) have argued, the scope

of prejudice extends beyond pure antipathy (contemptuous prejudice) to ambivalent forms that combine “both hostile and subjectively favorable beliefs about outgroups” (envious prejudice or paternalistic prejudice). We use the term *prejudice* simply to denote a negative evaluative orientation toward a specific social group (and its members) that incorporates negative stereotypes and negative affect. More data would be needed to tell whether respondents’ beliefs are demonstrably faulty, resistant to new information, or devoid of positive sentiments.

17. The coefficient for education in the second time limit model falls just shy of statistical significance,  $p = .07$ .

18. For example, the significant coefficients in the first column of table 9.2 yield the following probability shifts for “strong white support for the family cap” (listed in ascending order of magnitude): Woman (.10), Family Income (.15), Individualism (.21), Punitive Crime Orientation (.24), Egalitarianism (.27), Anti-black Prejudice (.34).

19. For black-white comparisons based on 1997 data, see Soss et al. 2001.

20. The results for 1999 are based on the authors’ calculations using caseload data from the Administration for Children and Families and policy data from the State Policy Documentation Project. Results are available on request.