

CHAPTER 1

Conflict and Crisis

Concepts and Overview Findings on Earthquakes I

Concepts

Conflict designates one of the two domains of politics and society, along with **cooperation**: the focus in this volume is on the former concept.

Conflict is as old as the human experience—in the relations between individuals and within, between, and among families, clans, tribes, city-states, nation-states, and multi-national empires from the beginning of recorded history to the present. Among the many definitions of political conflict, the most precise and concise was framed by Gurr (1980: 1–2): “Conflict phenomena are the overt, coercive interactions of contending collectivities.” They are characterized by two or more parties engaged in mutually hostile actions and using coercion to injure or control their opponents. As such, conflict encompasses insurrection, revolution, and riot, as well as protracted conflict, crisis, and war.

International conflict is the segment of conflict that relates to disputes between or among independent members of the global system—that is, legally sovereign states—and among non-state actors, including economic, social, ethnic, political, and religious organizations, movements, and regimes. It comprises the widest possible

range of hostile behavior, from physical or verbal threat, through diplomatic, political, and/or economic boycott, to psychological warfare and violence, whether minor incidents, serious clashes, or full-scale war.

There are several spatial domains of international conflict. One is **protracted conflict** (PC) (e.g., the India-Pakistan PC since 1947). Another is **crisis**. Some **international crises** erupt within, others outside, a protracted conflict (e.g., the Kashmir crises in 1947–48, 1965–66, 1990, and 2001–2, which erupted in the context of a protracted conflict between the two most powerful South Asian states, and the India intervention in Sri Lanka crisis in 1987, which was independent from any ongoing protracted conflict). A third type of turmoil is **war**, which can occur between adversaries either within a protracted conflict (e.g., the India-Pakistan war over Bangladesh in 1971) or outside a protracted conflict setting (e.g., China-India border war in 1962).

Protracted Conflict

What distinguishes a **protracted conflict** from other types of international conflict? In the pioneering definition of Azar, Jureidini, and Mclaurin (1978: 50), PCs are

hostile interactions which extend over long periods of time with sporadic outbreaks of open warfare fluctuating in frequency and intensity. They are conflict situations in which the stakes are very high. . . . While they may exhibit some breakpoints during which there is a cessation of overt violence, they linger on in time and have no distinguishable point of termination. . . . Protracted conflicts, that is to say, are not specific events or even clusters of events at a point in time; they are processes.

One important change in this definition seems in order. Research has revealed that many protracted conflicts exhibit all the traits noted previously but that *periodic violence* is not a *necessary* condition. The most notable illustration is the East-West protracted conflict from 1945 to 1989, with antecedents dating to the 1917 Russian Revolution: there were no “sporadic outbreaks of open warfare” between the United States and the USSR, though U.S.-USSR proxy wars were widespread—in Ethiopia-Somalia (1964, 1977–78), the Arab-Israeli PC (1967, 1973), Angola (1975–76), and Afghanistan (1979–89). In other protracted conflicts, violence was persistent and intense, including long-war PCs between China and Japan from 1927 to 1945; the Axis powers and the Grand Alliance from 1939/41 to 1945; North and South Yemen, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia in the Yemen War from 1962 to 1967; the Vietnam War between North Vietnam and the United States and South Vietnam from 1964 to 1975; and the Iran-Iraq War from 1980 to 1988. The non-war and long-war conflicts were protracted in all other respects—extended hostile interaction, high stakes, spillover to many domains, and conflict processes over time. Thus “sporadic warfare” is not treated in this book as a defining condition of protracted conflict: the war condition in the original definition of protracted conflict is met by high probability of war or periodic or persistent violence.

Conceptually and empirically, the definition of protracted conflict is very similar—but *not identical*—to that of **enduring international rivalry** (EIR). According to Diehl and Goertz (2000: 19), rivalries are defined by “(1) spatial consistency, (2) time or duration, and (3) militarized competitiveness or conflict.” They went on to elaborate this definition:

“Rivalry” broadly refers to repeated, militarized conflict between two states: rivalry is a relationship in which

both sides deal with issues using the military tools of foreign policy. If such militarized relationships last long enough, the rivalry becomes “enduring.” Wars, crises, disputes, and conflict management all occur within the context of rivalry relationships. Sometimes issues are resolved early and the rivalry does not mature into the enduring phase. In other cases, early wars establish the tone, and repeated conflicts and wars keep the rivalry going. (Diehl and Goertz 2000: 222–23)

Moreover, “All the rivalries must have a beginning and an end” (231), but “beginning and end dates are . . . difficult to observe with exactitude” (236).

According to Maoz and Mor, the essence of an enduring international rivalry is “a *persistent, fundamental, and long-term* incompatibility of goals between two states. This incompatibility of goals manifests itself in the basic attitudes of the parties toward each other, as well as in recurring violent or potentially violent clashes over a long period of time.” To qualify as an EIR, a conflict must have four characteristics: an outstanding set of unresolved issues, strategic interdependence, psychological manifestations of enmity, and repeated militarized conflict (2002: 4–5).¹

What does one seek to discover about protracted conflicts? One goal is to identify the points of convergence and divergence among the array of PCs since the end of World War I. A second is to illuminate the conflict-crisis linkage, conceptually and empirically.

International Crisis

What is an **international crisis**? It refers to

- (1) **a change in type and/or an increase in intensity of disruptive interactions between two or more states, with a heightened probability of military hostilities;**² that, in turn,
- (2) **destabilizes their relationship and challenges the structure of an international system.**

The change in type or increase in intensity of disruptive interaction is triggered by an act or event: a threatening statement, oral or written; a political act—the severance of diplomatic relations; an economic act—a trade embargo; a non-violent military act—the movement of troops; an indirect violent act, that is, against an

ally or client state of one's adversary; or a direct military attack. An international crisis can also be initiated by an internal challenge to a regime, verbal or physical, or as a diversionary act to strengthen the position of those in power. It may also arise from a technological or geopolitical change in the environment that weakens a state's capacity to protect its vital interests.

Whatever the catalyst to a crisis, it generates a perception of threat on the part of the decision maker(s) of the target state (A)—or more than one state. If the target(s) does/do not respond, the incipient crisis is aborted; that is, it remains a "near crisis" (James 2002c). More often, state A does respond, with a hostile act or statement; and this response leads to more disruptive interactions between A and B, and possibly other states as well, accompanied by a heightened likelihood of violence. In short, an international crisis is characterized by higher than normal tension, turmoil, and disruption in interstate relations.

How does one recognize an **international military-security crisis**? The key indicators are *value threat, action demonstrating resolve, and overt hostility*. Some well-known cases illustrate the stark reality of a military-security crisis. Threatening statements and the mobilization of armed forces by the major European powers in the June–July 1914 crisis revealed Europe on the brink of war. The Western powers' decision in March 1948 to integrate their three zones of occupation in Germany, followed by the USSR's closure of land access to West Berlin and the United States' airlift, marked a watershed East-West crisis soon after the collapse of the World War II Grand Alliance of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the USSR. The emplacement of Soviet missiles in Cuba and the United States' quarantine of ships en route to the Caribbean indicated another, even more dangerous, superpower confrontation in the autumn of 1962. Moscow's threat of unilateral military intervention during the October–Yom Kippur War of 1973 and Washington's responsive alert of its strategic air forces worldwide generated a brief but intense crisis between the United States and the USSR. The discovery by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors of a substantial discrepancy between the amount of weapons-grade plutonium and the amount reported by North Korea to the IAEA set in motion the first North Korea Nuclear crisis in 1993–94. North Korea's admission, in October 2002, that it had resumed its nuclear

weapons program, frozen by the North Korea-U.S. Framework Agreement in October 1994, triggered a second North Korea Nuclear crisis. It appeared to have begun to de-escalate, almost three years later, in September 2005, with the signing of a joint statement/draft accord on guiding principles by all participants in the Six Party Talks on the North Korea nuclear issue; however, no further progress has been made, and crisis termination remains elusive (April 2008). The deployment of almost a million troops on the India-Pakistan border highlighted still another nuclear—and the fourth Kashmir—crisis in South Asia in 2001–2. However, these are only some of the most dramatic among 440 international crises from late 1918 to the end of 2002.

The term "international-interstate crisis" applies to any **military-security crisis** between or among legally sovereign members of the global system. It does not apply to *domestic upheavals that have potentially large-scale, but aborted, spillover effects on the global system or a subsystem*. Only if such a domestic crisis escalates to the point of generating, for one or more states, perceptions of basic value threat, time pressure and heightened probability of war, and, in turn, higher than normal disruptive interaction between two or more states does such a domestic situational change develop into an international crisis.

This evolutionary process from domestic to international crisis is dramatically evident in the struggle between the forces of centralization, led by Serbia, and the forces demanding self-determination, led by Croatia and Slovenia and later by Bosnia, in Yugoslavia's decade-long civil war during 1991–2001. At first, this conflict within Yugoslavia did not qualify as an international crisis. However, by the autumn of 1991, with the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia as independent states by European Economic Community (EEC) members, a domestic Yugoslavia crisis was transformed into foreign policy crises for, and an international crisis between, the two principal actors at that time, Serbia and Croatia. The post-Cold War international crisis attending the disintegration of Yugoslavia was accentuated in 1992 by the Serb attempt to frustrate the Bosnia-Herzegovina referendum in favor of independence, leading to civil war, a massive flight of refugees, and UN-EEC economic sanctions against Serbia and its ally, Montenegro, from 1992 to 1995. The Yugoslavia conflict generated another domestic and international crisis, over Kosovo in 1998–99, leading to a

massive, NATO-led military intervention against Serbia. The conflict spread to Montenegro in 2001 in a civil war that led to further external intervention by the EEC and the United States.

An earlier example of evolution from a domestic to a foreign policy crisis is Pakistan's internal upheaval over East Bengal's demand for independence in 1970, which generated the international Bangladesh crisis in 1971, with Pakistan, India, and newly created Bangladesh as the crisis actors. (An in-depth study of this crisis is found in chap. 10.)

An alternative conception of international crisis was developed by the **Correlates of War** (COW) Project in the 1980s, namely, a militarized interstate dispute (MID) and a militarized interstate crisis (MIC). The former was defined as a "set of interactions between or among states involving threats to use military force, displays of military force, or actual uses of military force. . . . these acts must be explicit, overt, non-accidental, and government sanctioned" (Gochman and Maoz 1984: 587). This "evolves into a **militarized interstate crisis** when a member of the interstate system on each side of the dispute indicates by its actions its willingness to go to war to defend its interests or to obtain its objectives." These are steps two and three along a four-step ladder of growing belligerence, beginning with an "interstate dispute" and culminating in an "interstate war" (Leng and Singer 1988: 159).

Foreign Policy Crisis

An international crisis begins as an external or foreign policy crisis for one or more states. The trigger to a **foreign policy crisis** is perceptual; that is, it derives from three interrelated **perceptions** that are generated by a hostile act, disruptive event, and/or environmental change. These are perceptions by a state's decision maker(s) of

- (1) higher than normal **threat to one or more basic values**,
- (2) **finite time for response**, and
- (3) **heightened probability of involvement in military hostilities (war)** before the threat is overcome.

Among the three defining conditions of an ICB-type foreign policy crisis—perception of value threat, time pressure, and probability of war—the most crucial is heightened ex-

pectation of war. Threat and time pressure may coexist without a hostile act, event, or environmental change being defined, or responded to, as an external crisis. Moreover, a higher than normal probability of war necessarily implies a perceived higher than normal threat to values, but the reverse does not always obtain. Thus perceived probability of war is the pivotal condition of a foreign policy crisis, with threat and time closely related.

In sum, a foreign policy crisis for a state/actor arises from the highest-level political decision makers' image of pressure(s) to cope with externally focused stress. It also serves as the precondition, and marks the beginning, of an international crisis.

To cite a high-profile early Cold War crisis, the object of an in-depth case study in chapter 9 of this volume: the Berlin Blockade international crisis began as a foreign policy crisis for the Soviet Union on 7 March 1948, when the three Western powers, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, at a conference in London to which the USSR had not been invited, decided to integrate their occupation zones in western Germany. Although not published until 7 June, this decision was known by Moscow immediately and triggered a crisis for the USSR. Perceiving a threat to its influence in Europe, the Soviet Union responded by blockading all Western land and water (but, significantly, not air) transportation to and from Berlin and by cutting off all electric current, coal, food, and other supplies to the Western powers-occupied West Berlin. That response, in turn, triggered a crisis for the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, which perceived the future of Germany and, with it, their influence in Europe to be at grave risk. The first of these disruptive acts triggered a foreign policy crisis for the USSR, state A; the second generated a foreign policy crisis for its adversaries, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, a coalition of states B, C, and D, thereby escalating the tension to a full-fledged international crisis.

The link between the two levels of crisis, *interstate* and *state*, *macro* and *micro*, can now be formulated precisely. An *international* crisis erupts when there is behavioral change by one or more states—in the Berlin Blockade case, states B, C, and D—leading to more hostile interaction. That change in behavior triggers a *foreign policy* crisis for state A, through its perception of threat. In short, *perception* and *behavior*, *state level* and *interstate/inter-actor level*, and *foreign policy crisis* and *international*

crisis are analytically intertwined. Thus the phenomenon of crisis occurs—and should be addressed—at the two levels of analysis.

Why do crises merit analysis? One reason is that crisis is among the most widely used verbal symbols of turmoil in the politics among nations; that is, **crisis** is a universal term for disruption and disorder in the global or regional arena. Another reason is that crisis is closely related to **conflict** and **war**, two other concepts that are essential to understanding world politics (on the relationships among conflict, crisis, and war, with illustrations, see Figure 3.1 and the accompanying discussion in chap. 3). There is a third reason: the link between **crisis** and **change**.

In this context, the definition of international crisis that guides our inquiry attempts to overcome shortcomings in earlier definitions. It incorporates *change* in **process** and **structure** and links them to **stability** and **equilibrium**, the four crucial elements of an **international system**. In international crises, change varies in *quantity* and *quality*. *Few* distortions in process or *few* challenges to the structure of a system denote *low* instability, whereas *many* changes indicate *high* instability. Moreover, *reversible* changes in process or challenges to structure indicate equilibrium, while *irreversible* changes identify disequilibrium.³

That, in turn, may or may not lead to system transformation, as illustrated by the Berlin Blockade crisis. The Four Power Agreement on 12 May 1949 left Germany divided; created the foundations for two new international actors, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR [DDR], East Germany); and changed the balance of power between the superpowers. It also altered the interaction pattern that had existed during the occupation of Germany by the Four Powers. Thus the ICB definition of international crisis facilitates the study of *change* in world politics, large and small.⁴

International crisis and **international conflict** are not synonymous, though they are closely related. Every crisis reflects a “state of conflict” between two or more adversaries, but not every conflict becomes a crisis. Moreover, the focus of a crisis is (usually) a single issue, a territorial dispute, economic boycott, alleged mistreatment of a minority group, threat to a political regime, and so forth. Even when an international crisis is very long it can be distinguished from a protracted conflict, as with the

Palestine Partition–Israel Independence crisis-war from 1947 to 1949, which was part of the unresolved Arab–Israel protracted conflict over many issues since 1947.

Earlier it was stated that a major reason for studying **crisis** is that it is closely linked to conflict and war, all of them crucial concepts and phenomena in world politics. More generally, as Glenn H. Snyder persuasively argued:

An international crisis is international politics in microcosm. . . . Such elements as power configurations, interests, values, risks, perceptions, degrees of resolve, bargaining, and decision making lie at the core of international politics; in a crisis they tend to leap out at the observer . . . and to be sharply focused on a single well-defined issue. . . . Thus a crisis is a concentrated distillation of most of the elements which make up the essence of politics in the international system. (1972: 217)

What does one wish to explain about this microcosm of international politics? The crisis puzzle incorporates a cluster of questions. Under what conditions is an interstate crisis most likely to erupt? Why do some crises escalate to war, such as entry into World War II in August–September 1939, the June–Six Day War in 1967, or the Iraq Regime crisis-war in 2002–3, while others do not, for example, the Berlin Blockade in 1948–49, Cuban Missiles in 1962, North Korea Nuclear I and II in 1993–94 and 2002–, and the India–Pakistan Nuclear crises in 1998 and 2001–2? What are the effects of stress on the ways in which decision makers cope with crisis? When are states likely to resort to violence in crisis management? What are the conditions in which a crisis is most likely to wind down? Why do some crises terminate in agreement, such as the Berlin Blockade crisis, while others do not, as in the Berlin Wall crisis of 1961? And what are the consequences of crises, both for the adversaries and the system(s) in which a crisis occurs, for example, a fundamental change in the Middle East balance of power following the June 1967 crisis-war?

Crisis Phases and Periods

Every international crisis can be analyzed in terms of four interrelated **phases**: onset, escalation, de-escalation, and impact. Here I confront three conceptual questions:

What do the phases mean? How do they differ from each other? What is the nature of their interrelationship?

Onset identifies the initial phase of an international crisis. This coincides with the **pre-crisis period** of a foreign policy crisis, in which the non-crisis norm of no (or low) perceived value threat by a state's decision makers gives way to low (or higher), that is, increasing, threat from an adversary and, with it, low (or higher), that is, increasing, stress. Onset/pre-crisis does not refer to *any* hostile interaction or threat perception, for conflict and stress are pervasive in the twentieth- and early twenty-first-century global system of fragmented authority and unequal distribution of power and resources. Rather, they are characterized by a change in the intensity of disruptive interaction between two or more states and of threat perception by at least one of them, for example, a statement by state A threatening to attack state B unless it complies with some demand by state A.

Operationally, onset is indicated by the **outbreak** of a crisis, that is, the eruption of higher than normal hostile interaction, compared to **non-outbreak**, namely, interaction that may be cooperative or, at most, hostile but minimally disruptive. The onset of an international crisis requires at least two adversaries, one or both of which perceive higher than normal value threat and respond in a manner that generates higher disruption. And the precipitating change is, generally, region and issue(s) specific, except for infrequent system-wide upheavals among states.

Escalation denotes much more intense disruption than onset and a qualitative increase in the likelihood of military hostilities.⁵ At the actor level, the counterpart to the escalation phase is the **crisis period** of a foreign policy crisis, in which perceptions of time pressure and heightened war likelihood are added to more acute threat perception. The escalation phase and crisis period mark peak distortion and maximal stress, respectively.⁶

Escalation may—but need not—be characterized by a change from **no violence** to **violence** as the primary technique of crisis management; that is, the entire crisis may be non-violent. However, if violence occurs in the onset phase, escalation will be indicated by a shift from **low-level** to **high-level** violence, namely, from minor clashes to serious clashes or war between the adversaries. Whether or not accompanied by violence, the process of escalation usually leads to irreversibility in the sense of consequences for the adversaries, as well as for one or more elements of

systemic change—in actors/regimes, power relations, alliance configuration, and rules of the game.⁷

De-escalation is the conceptual counterpart of escalation, that is, the “winding down” of a crisis, compared to the “spiral” process. At the macro level it is indicated by a reduction in hostile interactions leading to accommodation and crisis termination. At the state level, de-escalation is operationalized as a decline in perceived threat, time pressure, and war likelihood, in the direction of the non-crisis norm. As such, it denotes the **end-crisis period** and is characterized by decreasing stress for the decision maker(s).⁸ While the danger of crises “getting out of hand,” that is, escalating to war, has attracted much more attention from scholars and practitioners, the reduction of hostile, often violent, interactions to a non-crisis norm is a goal of many states, as well as regional and global organizations.

Like onset, escalation, and de-escalation, the term **impact** refers to a crisis phase. In time sequence, impact designates the phase following crisis termination, that is, its aftermath, the counterpart of **post-crisis** at the actor level of analysis. Moreover, following normal usage, it identifies the consequences of a crisis.

All crises have effects at one or more levels: for the adversaries, for their relationship, and for one or more international systems—the subsystem(s) of which they may be members; other subsystems; the dominant (major power) system; and, in the widest sense, the global system. As noted, impact is operationalized by the extent of change in both adversarial relations and the core elements of a system. The task—which will be undertaken in chapter 4—is to describe and explain the impact or “fallout” or legacy of crises.

The phases and periods of a crisis, along with the linkages at international and state levels, are presented in Figure 1.1.⁹

As evident from Figure 1.1, each **phase** of an international crisis has its counterpart at the state level, a **period** in a foreign policy crisis. The essential traits of the former are *interaction* and *distortion*, of the latter, *perception* and *stress*. In terms of sequence, phases and periods are inextricably linked in time; that is, escalation must be preceded by onset, the crisis period follows the pre-crisis period, and so forth. However, phase and period may diverge in another sense; that is, the corresponding phase and period do not necessarily begin or end at the identical time.




FIG. 1.1. PHASES AND PERIODS

Phase change, for example, from onset to escalation, occurs when at least one crisis actor experiences a change from pre-crisis to crisis period; but not all actors need undergo that perceptual change simultaneously. In fact, the evidence indicates that, in a large majority of international crises since the end of WW I, crisis actors made the “step-level” jump from pre-crisis to crisis period at different points in time, in response to different triggers to escalation. One illustration will suffice.

In the Cuban Missile crisis, the United States was the first actor to experience the jump from pre-crisis to crisis period: the United States’ crisis period and, with it, the escalation phase of the international crisis were triggered on 16 October 1962, when the CIA presented to President Kennedy photographic evidence of the presence of Soviet offensive missile sites in Cuba. However, the USSR (and Cuba) continued to perceive low threat, no or low time pressure, and no or low probability of war until six days later. The catalyst for their step-level change from pre-

crisis to crisis period was the official announcement of a U.S. quarantine against all ships en route to Cuba. The crisis period for both the United States and the USSR, and the escalation phase of the Cuban Missile crisis, came to an end with their agreement on 28 October; and, with it, the international crisis entered its de-escalation phase. However, Cuba, the third crisis actor, continued at the high stress level of the crisis period until 20 November, when it yielded to joint superpower and UN pressure and agreed to the removal of the Soviet IL-28 bombers from the island. With that act, the Cuban Missile crisis ended for all three actors—and for a fearful world; the de-escalation phase and the end-crisis period for all three participants gave way to a stable equilibrium between the two superpowers. A similar divergence in **period change** is also evident in several recent crises, such as the first Gulf crisis-war (1990–91) (see chap. 11), the first North Korea Nuclear crisis (1993–94), and the India-Pakistan Nuclear crisis (2001–2).

What one seeks to explain about each of the four phases and periods can be stated in dichotomous terms: for onset and pre-crisis, the eruption or non-eruption of a crisis and the perception or non-perception of higher than normal value threat; for escalation and crisis period, whether or not it leads to peak disruption and peak stress, often with military hostilities; for de-escalation and end-crisis period, whether or not it terminates in some form of voluntary agreement, formal, informal, or tacit; and for impact and post-crisis period, the reduction or increase in tension between the adversaries and change or no change—in state actors and/or their regimes, the balance of power, the alliance configuration, and the rules of behavior—in the relevant international system following crisis termination. In short, *one seeks to uncover the conditions in which an international crisis and, for a state, a foreign policy crisis is most likely to erupt (pre-crisis), to escalate (crisis), to wind down (end-crisis), and to effect change (post-crisis).*

Before turning to several crucial aspects of international crises—the *protracted conflict-crisis* linkage, the *crisis escalation to war* process, and the *severity and impact* of crises (chaps. 2–5)—the first set of findings on international crises (political earthquakes) will be presented, in the form of empirical overviews of protracted conflicts and international crises.

Overviews

ICB research has uncovered 32 protracted conflicts and 440 international crises (391 excluding intra-war crises) from the end of World War I to the end of 2002. Profiles of the 32 *protracted conflicts* will be presented in Overview I, along several dimensions: **duration, actors, geography, termination**, and the cluster of **unresolved conflicts**. Overview II will focus on the **frequency and duration** of *international crises*; **values** at risk; the **level of violence** and its **role in crisis management**; and the **substance, form, and legacy of outcome** of crises within protracted conflicts.

Overview I: Protracted Conflicts

The preeminent finding about protracted conflicts (Tables 1.1–1.5) is **diversity**.

DURATION

As evident in Table 1.1, only two PCs were *short*, that is, less than 10 years from the beginning of their first international crisis since the end of WW I to the end of the last crisis within the PC or its definitive termination, for example, Czechoslovakia-Germany, 7 years (see note c to Table 1.1). Seven conflicts fall in the *medium* category, 10–20 years: they range from Yugoslavia, 10 years, to China-Japan and Lithuania-Poland, each 18 years. There were five protracted conflicts of *long* duration, 21–30 years, including Chad-Libya, France-Germany, and Western Sahara. A majority of twentieth-century and early twenty-first century PCs, 18, were of *very long* duration. They range from Italy-Albania-Yugoslavia, 32 years (see note d to Table 1.1); through Costa Rica-Nicaragua, Indochina, Ethiopia-Somalia, Finland-Russia, India-Pakistan, and Arab-Israel; to East-West, 71 years, and Greece-Turkey, 82 years. Many of these are still unresolved (indicated by a + sign in Table 1.1 and an X sign in Table 1.3); and many have deep historical roots, as evident in Table 1.1.

The China-Vietnam conflict has persisted for about a millennium, with varying degrees of active hostility and continuing rivalry over the Spratly and Paracel islands in the South China Sea—amid signs of accommodation in 2005. The France-Germany conflict lasted for at least three—some historians suggest eight—centuries until 1945. The Yugoslavia conflict dates to a decisive military defeat of Serbia by the Ottoman Empire in 1389 and its occupation from 1459 to 1878. The Greece-Turkey PC can be traced to the Ottoman conquest of Greece in 1453. The roots of the Lithuania-Poland PC lie in their struggle for primacy in East Europe and over Vilna-Vilnius since the fifteenth century. The India-Pakistan PC is closely linked to the Hindu-Muslim civilizational conflict that has persisted for the last four centuries or longer. The Poland-Russia interstate conflict, reinforced by the historic rivalry between Roman Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy from at least the eleventh century CE, dates to the first partition of Poland in 1772. The Indonesia PC, with the Netherlands as its principal adversary, derived from the imposition of full-scale direct Dutch colonial rule over Java in 1816, though Holland was the preeminent foreign power in Indonesia long before, acting through its United East India Company,

which arrived in the archipelago at the end of the sixteenth century.

The Ecuador-Peru conflict over territory began when Ecuador received its independence from Spain in 1830. The Arab-Israel conflict began in inter-communal terms in 1881, with the return of Jews to the Land of Israel; in interstate terms (Arab states-Israel) in 1948; and in civilizational terms (Islam-Judaism) since the emergence of

Islam in the seventh century CE. Like Indonesia, the Indochina conflict had its roots in colonial rule—beginning with the French occupation of Saigon in 1858 and, in terms of what later became North Vietnam, the establishment of a French protectorate over Annam and Tonkin in 1883. The Western Sahara protracted conflict between Morocco and a nationalist movement, Polisario, can be traced to rule by Spain over this disputed territory

TABLE 1.1. Duration of Interstate Protracted Conflicts^a

	Protracted Conflict ^b	Historical Beginning of PC	Duration in Years ^c
Short (less than 10 years): 2 PCs	WW II		6
	Czechoslovakia/Germany		1/7
Medium (10–20 years): 7 PCs	Yugoslavia	1389: Ottoman defeat of Serbia	10
	Iraq Regime Change		10+
	Angola		13
	Rhodesia		15
	Yemen		17
	China/Japan	1895: Japanese acquisition of Taiwan	11/18
	Lithuania/Poland	Approx. 400 years	18
Long (21–30 years): 5 PCs	Chad/Libya	Early years of twentieth century	16/23
	China/Vietnam	Approx. 1,000 years	10/24+
	France/Germany	Approx. 800 years	16/25
	Iran/USSR		26
	Western Sahara	1884: Spain's colonial rule established	14/27+
Very Long (30+ years): 18 PCs	Italy/Albania/Yugoslavia		32 ^d
	Costa Rica/Nicaragua		37
	Indochina	1883: France's protectorate over Annam and Tonkin	37
	Iraq/Kuwait		41+
	Finland/Russia		42
	Ethiopia/Somalia	1897: Annexation of the Haud region	27/42+
	Iran/Iraq	Rivalry for primacy in the Persian Gulf	29/43+
	Korea		52+
	Afghanistan/Pakistan	1893: Durand Line	53+
	Indonesia	1816: Dutch colonial rule over Java established	54
	Taiwan Strait		48/54+
	India/Pakistan	Approx. 400 years	55+
	Arab/Israel	1881: Return of Jews to Land of Israel	49/55+
	Poland/Russia	1772: first partition of Poland	61
	Ecuador/Peru	1830: Ecuador's independence from Spain	60/63
	Honduras/Nicaragua		52/65+
	East/West		66/71
Greece/Turkey	1453: Ottoman conquest of Greece	67/82+	

^aFor the period late 1918–end 2002.

^bAll 17 PCs in the Protracted Conflict column that are in bold typeface refer to PCs that began before November 1918.

^cA + sign indicates that, as of the end of 2002, this protracted conflict continues. Where one number is specified for Duration in Years, duration is calculated from the beginning of the first international crisis within the PC to the end of the last international crisis in that PC. Where two numbers are specified in this column, the first refers to the number of years from the first to the last international crisis in the PC; the second number refers to the number of years from the first international crisis within the PC to the year in which a finite act occurs, setting in motion a discernible change from long-standing conflict to a non-conflict relationship between/among the PC adversaries. It may be the formal end of a long war, e.g., China/Japan, France/Germany, 1945; a formal agreement terminating the core dispute(s) in a PC, e.g., Ecuador/Peru 1998; a decisive act, e.g., the formal transfer of the Aozou Strip by Libya to Chad in 1994, in accord with the international Court of Justice's binding ruling that year in favor of Chad's claim to this long-disputed territory. Evidence of such finite acts is more conclusive that a protracted conflict has terminated. However, while tension may—and often does—continue after the end of the last crisis within a PC, and no finite act of conflict termination has occurred, there is no longer evidence of overt *international* conflict or violence. Thus, in those cases, one can infer interim termination of a PC. In some PCs *domestic* conflict continued after the last international crisis or may have preceded international conflict; e.g., the Angola PC witnessed a continuing struggle for power between the governing MPLA party and the opposition UNITA movement from the end of the last international crisis, 1988, until 2002, and conflict between them occurred long before Angola became an independent state in 1975. However, the protracted Angola *international* conflict ended in 1988.

^dAlbania and Yugoslavia (but not Italy) were adversarial actors in the Kosovo crisis of 1999, but that crisis was treated as part of the Yugoslavia PC, 1991–2001.

from 1884 to 1975. The conflict between Afghanistan and its southern neighbor, initially the British Indian Empire but, from 1947, Pakistan, can be traced to the Durand Line of 1893 that demarcated the border as a British imperial diktat; some would cite the Afghan wars earlier in the nineteenth century. The China-Japan conflict can be traced directly to the latter's annexation of Taiwan (Formosa) by war in 1894–95. The Ethiopia-Somalia PC dates to the former's 1897 annexation of the ill-defined Haud border region, which contained(s) a large nomadic Somali population; some say much earlier.

The Chad-Libya conflict can be identified with attempts by Libya's rulers since the early years of the twentieth century to extend their influence into French-controlled Chad—first, the Ottoman Empire; then Italy, the colonial power after 1911; and, after Libya's independence in 1951, the Sanussi monarchy; followed by Gadhafi since 1969. And the Iran-Iraq protracted conflict was rooted in the latter's persistent oppression of its Shiite majority since it was granted formal independence in 1932 by the United Kingdom, the League of Nations mandatory power since 1920; some point to much deeper roots—their long-standing rivalry for primacy in the oil-rich Gulf region, the enduring clash between Shiite Islam (Iran) and Sunni Islam (Iraq) since the seventh century CE, and even the rivalry between Persia and Mesopotamia in antiquity.

Viewed in terms of *polarity*, protracted conflicts began and ended in all of the structural eras since World War I—multipolarity, bipolarity, bipolarity, and unipolarity. As noted previously, at least 17 began before, most long before, the post-WW I multipolar era (1918–45). Almost half (14) of the 32 post-WW I PCs began during the *multipolar* period, from the Costa Rica-Nicaragua conflict in 1918 to the Czechoslovakia-Germany conflict in 1938–39 that was a turning point on the road to WW II. Eleven PCs emerged in the *bipolarity* era, from Indonesia in 1945 to Iraq-Kuwait in 1961 and the conflict between North and South Yemen in 1962. Only 5 PCs began in the *bipolarity* era (1963–89), from Rhodesia in 1965 to China-Vietnam in 1978. And 2 PCs arose in the *unipolar* era, Yugoslavia in 1991 and Iraq Regime Change the following year. There were four clusters, in terms of PC onset: 1918–21, the aftermath of WW I, 9 PCs, 5 of them in 1920; 1935–39, leading up to WW II, 4 conflicts; 1945–50, the aftermath of WW II, 6 PCs; and 1971–78, 4 conflicts.

ACTORS

The number of actors (states) within protracted conflicts varied greatly: as evident from Table 1.2, they ranged from 2 to 22. The largest PC cluster is 2 actors, in 8 protracted conflicts (e.g., Ecuador-Peru [Americas], Afghanistan-Pakistan [Asia], Lithuania-Poland [Europe], and Iran-Iraq [Middle East]). There were 3 actors in 7 PCs (e.g., Chad-Libya [Africa], Indonesia [Asia], and Greece-Turkey [multi-regional]). There were 11 actors in the Arab-Israel PC, 13 in the Iraq-Kuwait protracted conflict, 14 in the Yugoslavia PC, 17 in the East-West conflict, and 22 in the protracted conflict dominated by World War II.

GEOGRAPHY

No region has been immune to protracted international conflicts (Table 1.3). The *Americas* have experienced 3 PCs. There were 4 in the *Middle East*, 5 in *Africa*, 7 in *Asia*, and 7 in *Europe*. There were also 6 *multi-regional* conflicts. Thirteen of the 32 remained unresolved at the end of 2002. Only in Europe have all protracted conflicts ended, the most recent being Yugoslavia in 2001. At the other end of the regional turmoil spectrum, 3 of the 4 Middle East PCs continue: Arab-Israel 1947–, Iran-Iraq 1959–, and Iraq-Kuwait 1961–; and 1 of the 3 unresolved multi-regional PCs is located in, or on the edge of, this region—Greece-Turkey 1920–; all but Iraq-Kuwait have deep roots; and only the Iraq-Kuwait PC appears to be moving, slowly, toward termination, in the aftermath of the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein-Ba'athist regime in 2003 and the creation of a democratic regime in Iraq in 2005. The evidence from these indicators provides strong support to a widespread intuitive view of the Middle East as the most conflict-ridden region in the early twenty-first-century world.

The duration of protracted conflicts by region varies greatly: multi-regional, 6–82 years; Europe, 7–61; Asia, 18–55; Middle East, 17–55; Africa, 13–42; and Americas, 37–65. Moreover, protracted conflicts were not proportionally distributed among the regions in terms of duration: all 3 PCs in the Americas were very long, as were 5 of the 7 Asian PCs, 3 of 4 in the Middle East, and 3 of 6 multi-regional PCs. By contrast, only 3 of 7 PCs in Europe, and only 1 of 5 in Africa, were very long, the latter largely due to the late emergence, at the beginning of the

1960s, of an interstate system in Africa after more than a century of colonial rule. Finally, if duration is categorized as short (combining the short and medium cases) and long (combining the long and very long cases), most regions exhibited long PCs: all 3 in the Americas, 6 of 7 in Asia, 3 of 4 Middle East protracted conflicts, 4 of 6 multi-regional conflicts, and 3 of 5 in Africa. By contrast, there was a near-equal distribution in Europe, 4 long and 3 short.

Among the 19 protracted international conflicts that (seem to) have been resolved (see note c to Table 1.1 for the method of determining PC termination), one ended

in the late 1930s—Lithuania-Poland. A cluster of PC terminations can be traced directly to the end of World War II—China-Japan, Czechoslovakia-Germany, France-Germany, and the WW II protracted conflict itself—though tension and rivalry between China and Japan persist. One, Iran-USSR, ended early in the Cold War but at the same time signaled an important escalation of the Cold War between the U.S.-led and the USSR-led blocs. Two protracted conflicts ended in the 1950s: Italy-Albania-Yugoslavia, though two of the actors, Albania and Yugoslavia, continued in a state of conflict over Kosovo until the end of the NATO-Serbia war over Kosovo in

TABLE 1.2. Actors in Protracted Conflicts

Protracted Conflict	Number of State Actors	PC Actors
Afghanistan/Pakistan	2	Afghanistan, Pakistan
Angola	9	Angola, Belgium, Cuba, France, South Africa, US, USSR, Zaire, Zambia
Arab/Israel	11	Egypt, France, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, UK, US, USSR, Uganda
Chad/Libya	3	Chad, France, Libya
China/Japan	2 ^a	China, Japan
China/Vietnam	2 ^a	China (PRC), Vietnam
Costa Rica/Nicaragua	2	Costa Rica, Nicaragua
Czechoslovakia/Germany	5	Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, UK, USSR
East/West	17 ^b	Afghanistan, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, France, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Russia/USSR, Syria, Turkey, UK, US, West Germany
Ecuador/Peru	2	Ecuador, Peru
Ethiopia/Somalia	3	Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia
Finland/Russia	5	Finland, France, Russia, Sweden, UK
France/Germany	9	Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, UK, Yugoslavia
Greece/Turkey	3	Cyprus, Greece, Turkey
Honduras/Nicaragua	2	Honduras, Nicaragua
India/Pakistan	3	Bangladesh, India, Pakistan
Indochina	7	Cambodia, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Thailand, UK, US, Vietnam
Indonesia	3	Australia, Indonesia, Netherlands
Iran/Iraq	2	Iran, Iraq
Iran/USSR	4	Iran, UK, US, USSR
Iraq/Kuwait	13	Bahrain, Egypt, France, Iraq, Israel, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, UK, US
Iraq Regime Change	3	Iraq, UK, US
Italy/Albania/Yugoslavia	7	Albania, France, Greece, Italy, UK, US, Yugoslavia
Korea	5	China (PRC), North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan, US
Lithuania/Poland	2	Lithuania, Poland
Poland/Russia	4	Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland, Russia/USSR
Rhodesia	4	Botswana, Mozambique, Rhodesia, Zambia
Taiwan Strait	3 ^a	China/China (PRC), Taiwan, US
Western Sahara	5	Algeria, France, Mauritania, Morocco, Spain
World War II	22	Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Romania, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, UK, USSR
Yemen	6	Egypt, Jordan, North Yemen, Saudi Arabia, South Yemen, Yemen
Yugoslavia	14	Albania, Belgium, Bosnia, Canada, Croatia, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, UK, Yugoslavia

^aChina and China (PRC) are considered a single actor.

^bRussia and the USSR are considered a single actor.

TABLE 1.3. Protracted Conflicts by Region and Status

Region	Conflict	Status	
		Resolved ^a	Unresolved
Africa: 5 PCs	Angola	1988	
	Chad/Libya	1987/1994	
	Ethiopia/Somalia	—	X
	Rhodesia	1980	
	Western Sahara	—	X
Americas: 3 PCs	Costa Rica/Nicaragua	1955	
	Ecuador/Peru	1995/1998	
	Honduras/Nicaragua	—	X
Asia: 7 PCs	Afghanistan/Pakistan	—	X
	China/Japan	1938/1945	
	China/Vietnam	—	X
	India/Pakistan	—	X
	Indochina	1990	
	Indonesia	1999	
	Korea	—	X
Europe: 7 PCs	Czech./Germany	1939/1945	
	Finland/Russia	1961	
	France/Germany	1936/1945	
	Italy/Albania/Yugoslavia	1953	
	Lithuania/Poland	1938	
	Poland/Russia	1981	
	Yugoslavia	2001	
Middle East: 4 PCs	Arab/Israel	—	X
	Iran/Iraq	—	X
	Iraq/Kuwait	—	X
	Yemen	1979	
Multi-Region: 6 PCs	East/West	1984/1989	
	Greece/Turkey	—	X
	Iran/USSR	1946	
	Iraq Regime Change	—	X
	Taiwan Strait	—	X
	WW II	1945	

^aThe methodology used to determine the year a PC ended is the methodology used to determine Duration of Years in Table 1.1. Where one number is specified for Duration in Years in Table 1.1, duration is calculated from the beginning of the first international crisis within the PC to the end of the last international crisis in that PC. Where two numbers are specified in this column, the first refers to the number of years from the first to the last international crisis in the PC; the second number refers to the number of years from the first international crisis within the PC to the year in which a finite act occurs, setting in motion a discernible change from long-standing conflict to a non-conflict relationship between/among the PC adversaries. It may be the formal end of a long war, e.g., China/Japan, France/Germany, 1945; a formal agreement terminating the core dispute(s) in a PC, e.g., Ecuador/Peru 1998; a decisive act, e.g., the formal transfer of the Aozou Strip by Libya to Chad in 1994, in accord with the international Court of Justice's binding ruling that year in favor of Chad's claim to this long-disputed territory. Evidence of such finite acts is more conclusive that a protracted conflict has terminated. However, while tension may—and often does—continue after the end of the last crisis within a PC, and no finite act of conflict termination has occurred, there is no longer evidence of overt international conflict or violence. Thus, in those cases, one can infer interim termination of a PC. In some PCs domestic conflict continued after the last international crisis or may have preceded international conflict; e.g., the Angola PC witnesses a continuing struggle for power between the governing MPLA party and the opposition UNITA movement from the end of the last international crisis, 1988, until 2002, and conflict between them occurred long before Angola became an independent state in 1975. However, the protracted Angola international conflict ended in 1988.

1999 and 2008; and Costa Rica–Nicaragua. One overt conflict, Finland–Russia, ended at the beginning of the 1960s, and another, Yemen, at the end of the 1970s. The 1980s witnessed termination of 4 PCs—Rhodesia, Poland–Russia, Angola, and East–West. And 5 PCs, in four regions, were resolved after the Cold War ended—Chad–Libya (Africa), Ecuador–Peru (the Americas), Indochina and Indonesia (Asia), and Yugoslavia (Europe).

TERMINATION

Conflict *termination*, too, reveals diversity, as indicated in Table 1.4.

Five PCs ended in—most of them at the close of—the *multipolar* era (e.g., France–Germany). Four terminated during *bipolarity* (e.g., Finland–Russia 1961). Five ended in the *bipolycentric* era (e.g., Poland–Russia in 1981 and East–West in 1989). And 5 PCs have ended so far during the *unipolycentric* era (e.g., Ecuador–Peru in 1998). Given the brevity of the current unipolar structure, 13 years (to the end of 2002), compared to multipolarity (27 years), bipolarity (17 years), and bipolycentrism (27 years), the termination of 5 protracted conflicts in unipolycentrism is another indicator of an era of declining turmoil, along with the declining number of international crises (see Table 7.1 in chap. 7). However, as noted, 13 conflicts remain unresolved.

Another aspect of the termination of protracted conflicts exhibits diversity—the *onset-termination* time frame. Five PCs began and ended during *multipolarity*, 4 of them with the close of World War II (e.g., Czechoslovakia–Germany, 1938–45). Four began in *multipolarity* and ended in *bipolarity* (e.g., Finland–Russia, 1919–61). Seven other PCs began in one structural era and ended in another: East–West and Poland–Russia, from multipolarity to bipolycentrism; Ecuador–Peru, from multipolarity to unipolycentrism; Yemen, from bipolarity to bipolycentrism; Indonesia and Indochina, from bipolarity to unipolycentrism; and Chad–Libya, from bipolycentrism to unipolycentrism. The remaining 3 PCs began and ended in the same structural era—Rhodesia and Angola in *bipolycentrism* and Yugoslavia in *unipolycentrism*.

UNRESOLVED PCS

Slightly more than 40 percent of the protracted conflicts since late 1918 (13 of 32) are still *unresolved*. They are

present in all regions except *Europe: Asia*, 4 (e.g., India-Pakistan); *multi-regional*, 3 (e.g., Greece-Turkey); *Africa* (Ethiopia-Somalia) and the *Middle East* (Arab-Israel), 2 each; and the *Americas*, 1.

The *sources* of these unresolved conflicts, too, are diverse. Six can be traced directly to prior *colonial rule* over one or more of the PC adversaries: 2 in Africa—Ethiopia-

Somalia and Western Sahara; 2 in Asia—India-Pakistan and Afghanistan-Pakistan; and 2 in the Middle East—Arab-Israel and Iraq-Kuwait. Three derive from *long-standing historical conflicts*: 1 in Asia—China-Vietnam; 1 in the Middle East—Iraq-Iraq; and 1 multi-regional—Greece-Turkey. In 2 unresolved PCs the conflict took the form of *civil war*, with the participation of external major powers—Korea and Taiwan Strait.

TABLE 1.4. Protracted Conflicts by Polarity and Termination

Polarity at Termination	Protracted Conflict	Termination ^a
Multipolarity: 5 PCs	Lithuania/Poland	1938
	France/Germany	1936/1945
	China/Japan	1938/1945
	Czech./Germany	1945
	WW II	1945
Bipolarity: 4 PCs	Iran/USSR	1946
	Italy/Albania/Yugoslavia	1953
	Costa Rica/Nicaragua	1955
	Finland/Russia	1961
Bipolycentrism: 5 PCs	Yemen	1979
	Rhodesia	1980
	Poland/Russia	1981
	Angola	1988
	East/West	1984/1989
Unipolycentrism: 5 PCs	Indochina	1990
	Chad/Libya	1987/1994
	Ecuador/Peru	1995/1998
	Indonesia	1999
	Yugoslavia	2001
Unresolved: 13 PCs ^b	Greece/Turkey	—
	Honduras/Nicaragua	—
	India/Pakistan	—
	Arab/Israel	—
	Taiwan Strait	—
	Afghanistan/Pakistan	—
	Korea	—
	Iran/Iraq	—
	Ethiopia/Somalia	—
	Iraq/Kuwait	—
	Western Sahara	—
	China/Vietnam	—
	Iraq Regime	—

^aWhere one year is specified as the termination date, it refers to the year of the last international crisis within a PC. Where two years are specified, the second refers to the year when a finite act occurs, setting in motion a discernible change from long-standing conflict to a non-conflict relationship between/among the PC adversaries. It may be the formal end of a long war, e.g., China/Japan, France/Germany, 1945; a formal agreement terminating the core dispute(s) in a PC, e.g., Ecuador/Peru 1998; a decisive act, e.g., the formal transfer of the Aozou Strip by Libya to Chad in 1994, in accord with the International Court of Justice's binding ruling that year in favor of Chad's claim to this long-disputed territory. Evidence of such finite acts is more conclusive that a protracted conflict has terminated. However, while tension may—and often does—continue after the end of the last crisis within a PC, and no finite act of conflict termination has occurred, there is no longer evidence of overt hostile behavior, notably violence, between/among the PC adversaries. Thus, in those cases, one can infer *interim* termination of a PC.

^bThe sequence of unresolved PCs in this table is based upon the year-date of their first international crisis since the end of WW I.

Overview II: International Crises within and outside Protracted Conflicts

FREQUENCY AND DURATION

Crises within protracted conflicts comprise almost 60 percent (261) of the 440 international crises from late 1918 to the end of 2002 (Table 1.5). However, when intra-war crises (IWCs) are excluded, the gap, *overall*, narrows somewhat to 55 versus 45 percent of the 391 cases—215 PC crises and 176 non-PC crises.¹⁰ Moreover, there is very little difference in the average duration of PC and non-PC crises, 156 and 170 days. At the same time, the duration of international crises within PCs is characterized by great diversity. For example, crises during the Czechoslovakia-Germany PC persisted for a mere 32 crisis days, whereas the ongoing Arab-Israeli protracted conflict logged more than 3,500 crisis days (excluding IWCs) to the end of 2002; and the second Palestinian Intifada continues.

Among the *regions*, Africa and the Americas experienced many more non-PC than PC crises, Africa twice as many. In the other three regions it was the reverse: Asia had more than twice as many PC crises, and the Middle East had almost double the number of non-PC crises, one of many indicators of the high concentration of protracted conflicts in these two regions. As for their average duration, non-PC crises in Africa, the Americas, and the Middle East were longer than PC crises—slightly, double, and markedly, respectively; in Asia and Europe, PC crises were substantially and modestly longer, respectively.¹¹

VALUE THREAT

The findings on value threat in international crises are noteworthy. This dimension was explored in terms of seven values, in ascending order of importance: economic, (avoidance of) limited military damage, political

regime, influence, territory, (avoidance of) grave damage, and threat to existence.

The most frequent “highest value threatened” in international crises, *overall*, was *territory*—in 138 crises, that is, 35 percent of the 391 non-IWC cases.¹² *Regional* data reinforce the primacy of territorial threats: Africa, 37 percent; Americas, 36 percent; Asia, 41 percent; Europe, 28 percent; and the Middle East, 33 percent. There was almost no difference in the proportion of PC and non-PC territory threat crises in Africa and the Middle East, more PC territory threat crises in the Americas and Europe, and the reverse in Asia.

Drawing upon Tables 1.6a and 1.6b and additional ICB data, there are *illuminating findings on value threat* in international crises. These will now be presented.

TABLE 1.5. Frequency of International Crises within Protracted Conflicts

Protracted Conflict	Number of Crises	Number of Crises Excluding Intra-war Crises ^a
Afghanistan/Pakistan	3	3
Angola	11	11
Arab/Israel	26	25
Chad/Libya	8	8
China/Japan	5	5
China/Vietnam	4	4
Costa Rica/Nicaragua	3	3
Czechoslovakia/Germany	3	3
East/West	21	21
Ecuador/Peru	5	5
Ethiopia/Somalia	6	6
Finland/Russia	4	4
France/Germany	5	5
Greece/Turkey	11	9
Honduras/Nicaragua	6	6
India/Pakistan	14	14
Indochina	18	8
Indonesia	8	6
Iran/Iraq	7	3
Iran/USSR	4	4
Iraq/Kuwait	5	5
Iraq Regime	5	5
Italy/Albania/Yugoslavia	5	5
Korea	8	6
Lithuania/Poland	3	3
Poland/Russia	4	4
Rhodesia	11	11
Taiwan Strait	5	5
Western Sahara	10	10
World War II ^a	24	2
Yemen	6	3
Yugoslavia	3	3

^aAll but two of the 24 international crises within the WW II PC were IWCs and are therefore excluded from this table.

A. Overall

1. The two values most frequently identified as the “highest value threatened” were *territory*, 35 percent, and *political regime*, 26 percent, of the 391 non-intra-war crises from late 1918 to the end of 2002. There were three less frequently cited values: *influence* (11 percent), *avoidance of grave damage* (10 percent), and *existence* (8 percent).
2. In terms of PC and non-PC crises, the two most basic values, *existence* and (avoidance of) *grave damage*, stand apart: *existence* accounts for 11 percent (24 PC crises) of the former; 3 percent (5 non-PC crises) of the latter; and *avoidance of grave damage*, 15 percent (32 PC crises) and 4 percent (7 non-PC crises), respectively. These findings point to an *important substantive difference between a protracted and non-protracted conflict setting: the most basic values are much more likely to be perceived at risk when a state confronts intense hostility and uncertainty over an extended period of time, that is, within a protracted conflict.*

B. Regions

1. In *Africa*, the most frequent “highest value threatened” in international crises was *territory* (37 percent of the 111 Africa-based crises). This was followed by *political regime*, 27 percent. Together, they account for two-thirds of Africa’s crises.

TABLE 1.6a. Highest Value Threatened in Protracted Conflicts (PCs) and PC Crises Overall

Value Threatened	Number of PCs It Was the Highest Value Threatened	Number of PC Crises It Was the Highest Value Threatened ^a
6 Existence	16	23
5 Grave damage	6	32
4 Territorial	7	67
3 Influence	2	23
2 Political	1	51
1 Limited military damage	0	14
0 Economic threat	0	5
Total	32	215

^aValue threat refers to the highest value threatened in an international crisis. This is derived from actor-level coding for gravity of value threat, which identifies the most salient object of threat perceived by any of the actors in the international crisis. Where two or more values are indicated as under threat, by one of the crisis actors or by the adversaries taken together, the most severe is selected as highest value threatened. “Most severe” is based upon an ascending scale of severity among the following values: economic, limited military damage, political regime, territory, influence, grave damage, threat to existence.

TABLE 1.6b. Highest Value Threatened in PC Crises within Each Protracted Conflict

Protracted Conflict	Number of Crises Excluding IWCs	Highest Value Threatened ^a
Afghanistan/Pakistan	3	Territory (3)
Angola	11	Grave damage (5), political regime (3), limited military damage (2), influence (1)
Arab/Israel	25	Grave damage (9), influence (6), existence (3), political regime (3), territory (2), economic (1), limited military damage (1)
Chad/Libya	8	Political regime (4), territory (2), influence (2)
China/Japan	5	Influence (1), political regime (1), territory (3)
China/Vietnam	4	Territory (2), grave damage (1), influence (1)
Costa Rica/Nicaragua	3	Political regime (3)
Czechoslovakia/Germany	3	Grave damage (2), existence (1)
East/West	21	Political regime (13), influence (3), grave damage (2), territory (2), existence (1)
Ecuador/Peru	5	Territory (5)
Ethiopia/Somalia	6	Territory (5), grave damage (1)
Finland/Russia	4	Political regime (2), territory (2)
France/Germany	5	Political regime (3), economic (1), grave damage (1)
Greece/Turkey	9	Territory (4), grave damage (2), limited military damage (2), economic (1)
Honduras/Nicaragua	6	Territory (3), political regime (2), limited military damage (1)
India/Pakistan	14	Territory (8), existence (2), political regime (2), grave damage (1), influence (1)
Indochina	8	Limited military damage (1), political regime (5), grave damage (1), existence (1)
Indonesia	6	Existence (2), territory (2), political regime (1), influence (1)
Iran/Iraq	3	Territory (3)
Iran/USSR	4	Existence (1), territory (2), economic (1)
Iraq/Kuwait	5	Existence (3), territory (2)
Iraq Regime	5	Grave damage (2), existence (1), political regime (1), influence (1)
Italy/Albania/Yugoslavia	5	Territory (3), existence (1), influence (1)
Korea	6	Influence (4), grave damage (1), existence (1)
Lithuania/Poland	3	Territory (2), existence (1)
Poland/Russia	4	Influence (2), political regime (1), existence (1)
Rhodesia	11	Existence (1), political regime (1), territory (1), grave damage (1), political damage (1), limited military damage (6)
Taiwan Strait	5	Political regime (2), existence (1), grave damage (1), territory (1)
Western Sahara	10	Territory (7), political damage (2), limited military damage (1)
World War II	2 ^b	Existence (1), grave damage (1)
Yemen	3	Territory (2), political regime (1)
Yugoslavia	3	Existence (2), grave damage (1)
Total PC crises	215	

^aThe numbers in this column refer to the number of non-IWC crises within protracted conflicts in which the specified value was the highest value threatened.

^bAll but two of the 24 international crises within the WW II PC were IWCs and are therefore excluded from this table.

2. In the *Americas*, *territory* and *political regime* were even more prominent, accounting for 76 percent of that region's crises, 36 percent and 38 percent, respectively.
3. In *Asia*, these two values were predominant in nearly two-thirds of that region's crises, 41 percent and 20 percent, respectively.
4. In *Europe*, these two values were the "highest value threatened" in a slightly smaller total proportion—28 percent and 27 percent of that region's crises.
5. The *Middle East* exhibited the greatest regional diversity of value-threat crises: *territory* and *political regime* account for slightly more than one-half (52 percent) of that region's cases—33 percent and 19 percent, respectively.¹³

VIOLENCE

There is a widespread belief that crisis and violence are inextricably intertwined. However, this belief is not supported by the evidence. The findings on this variable, too, will be presented in several "cuts": *overall*; *by region*; and in terms of *PC-non-PC crisis clusters*, based upon the four violence categories—*war*, *serious clashes*, *minor clashes*, and *no violence*.

The most noteworthy *overall* finding about the *extent of violence* in crises is that there was *no violence* in 45 percent of all non-IWC international crises since the end of World War I. At the other extreme of the violence spectrum, war occurred in only 14 percent of the international crises. Moreover, low-intensity violence, that is, *no violence* and *minor clashes*, combined, is evident in 59 percent of all crises compared to high-intensity violence at 41 percent. In short, the *image of violence as an integral and pervasive component of international political earthquakes is emphatically disproved*.

This crucial finding is reinforced by the overall data on the *centrality of violence as a crisis management technique* (CMT) in protracted conflicts (Table 1.7).

Violence was not employed as the primary CMT in almost half of all international crises that occurred in the context of protracted conflicts since late 1918. However, when violence was used, it was central: decision makers viewed it as *preeminent* in the pursuit of their goals in 26 percent of the crises and *important* in 27 percent. Rarely (4 percent) was violence viewed as inconsequential. I turn now to the major regional findings.

The data on violence in *Africa*-based crises differ from

the overall findings in two significant respects. There was more frequent violence, generally—in 89 percent of its crises. However, the frequency of full-scale *war* (12 percent) was markedly smaller than the overall finding. This finding is likely the legacy of the relatively recent European colonial control of that continent. African crises disproportionately featured an ethnic component (44.1 percent compared to 34.3 percent overall), and ethnic crises are both more likely to be violent and less likely to escalate into full-scale war.

Very few crises in the *Americas*, too, escalated to *war*, 4 of 49 non-IWC cases (8 percent). The finding is even starker for PC crises—there was no incidence of full-scale war among these crises. The most frequent level of violence by far was *minor clashes*, about 50 percent. And there was no violence in roughly a quarter of the crises in this region. A likely explanation for this anomaly lies in the U.S. hegemony over this region that persisted throughout the period of investigation (and still persists today).

Crisis in *Asia* exhibit a much higher proportion of *serious clashes* than *war*, almost double (33-18 percent of all Asia-based crises). There was no violence in 20 percent of this region's cases. There was an almost identical proportion of high-intensity and low-intensity violence in these crises. And *minor clashes* occurred more frequently than war (29-18 percent). In sum, the evidence points to *Asia as a region of medium-intensity violence that frequently played a crucial role in crisis management*.

Europe, except for the last six years before the outbreak of WW II (1933–39), was much more akin to the *Americas* with respect to the violence dimension of international crises. There was no violence in 57 percent of its crises. Low-intensity violence vastly exceeded high-intensity violence (73-27 percent). *War and serious clashes* occurred with equal frequency (10 of 74 cases); but together they account for barely one-fourth of *Europe's* international crises, much less than overall, *Africa*, and *Asia* (38, 45, and 51 percent).

During the last half of the twentieth century and beyond, the dominant image of the *Middle East*, as noted, was a region of pervasive violence. The data on Middle East crises support this image, but not entirely. There was a high frequency of war, 16 of 71 crises; and serious clashes occurred in 14 others, that is, high-intensity violence in 30 of 71 crises, 42 percent of the total. Yet minor clashes were the most frequent level of crisis violence (30

TABLE 1.7. Violence in International Crises within Protracted Conflicts^a

Protracted Conflict	Number of Crises Excluding IWCs	Violence (VIOL) ^b	Severity of Violence as a CMT (SEVVIOSY) ^c	Centrality of Violence as a CMT (CENVIOSY) ^d
Afghanistan/Pakistan	3	Serious clashes (1), minor clashes (2)	Serious clashes (2), no violence as a CMT (1)	Preeminent (2), no violence as a CMT (1)
Angola	11	Full-scale war (1), serious clashes (7), minor clashes (2), no violence (1)	Full-scale war (1), serious clashes (7), no violence as a CMT (3)	Preeminent (3), important (5), no violence as a CMT (3)
Arab/Israel	25	Full-scale war (6), serious clashes (8), minor clashes (7), no violence (4)	Full-scale war (6), serious clashes (4), minor clashes (5), no violence as a CMT (10)	Preeminent (8), important (7), no violence as a CMT (10)
Chad/Libya	8	Full-scale war (4), serious clashes (1), minor clashes (1), no violence (2)	Full-scale war (4), serious clashes (1), minor clashes (1), no violence as a CMT (2)	Preeminent (4), important (1), minor (1), no violence as a CMT (2)
China/Japan	5	Full-scale war (2), serious clashes (2), minor clashes (1)	Full-scale war (2), serious clashes (2), minor clashes (1)	Preeminent (1), important (3), minor (1)
China/Vietnam	4	Full-scale war (1), serious clashes (3)	Serious clashes (4)	Preeminent (3), important (1)
Costa Rica/Nicaragua	3	Minor clashes (2), no violence (1)	Serious clashes (1), minor clashes (1), no violence as a CMT (1)	Important (2), no violence as a CMT (1)
Czechoslovakia/Germany East/West	3 21	No violence (3) Full-scale war (1), serious clashes (3), minor clashes (4), no violence (13)	No violence as a CMT (3) Full-scale war (1), serious clashes (4), no violence as a CMT (16)	No violence as a CMT (3) Preeminent (4), important (1), no violence as a CMT (16)
Ecuador/Peru	5	Serious clashes (2), minor clashes (2), no violence (1)	Serious clashes (2), minor clashes (1), no violence as a CMT (2)	Preeminent (1), important (2), no violence as a CMT (2)
Ethiopia/Somalia	6	Full-scale war (1), serious clashes (4), no violence (1)	Full-scale war (1), serious clashes (4), no violence as a CMT (1)	Preeminent (2), important (3), no violence as a CMT (1)
Finland/Russia	4	Full-scale war (1), serious clashes (1), no violence (2)	Full-scale war (1), serious clashes (1), no violence as a CMT (2)	Important (2), no violence as a CMT (2)
France/Germany	5	Minor clashes (1), no violence (4)	No violence as a CMT (5)	No violence as a CMT (5)
Greece/Turkey	9	Full-scale war (1), serious clashes (1), minor clashes (3), no violence (4)	Full-scale war (1), serious clashes (1), minor clashes (1), no violence as a CMT (6)	Important (2), minor (1), no violence as a CMT (6)
Honduras/Nicaragua	6	Minor clashes (5), no violence (1)	Minor clashes (3), no violence as a CMT (3)	Important (3), no violence as a CMT (3)
India/Pakistan	14	Minor clashes (4), full-scale war (4), serious clashes (3), no violence (3)	Full-scale war (4), minor clashes (1), serious clashes (4), no violence as a CMT (5)	Preeminent (5), important (4), no violence as a CMT (5)
Indochina	8	Full-scale war (1), serious clashes (1), minor clashes (4), no violence (2)	Full-scale war (1), serious clashes (1), minor clashes (4), no violence as a CMT (2)	Preeminent (3), important (2), minor (1), no violence as a CMT (2)
Indonesia	6	Full-scale war (1), serious clashes (2), minor clashes (2), no violence (1)	Serious clashes (3), minor clashes (2), no violence as a CMT (1)	Preeminent (2), important (3), no violence as a CMT (1)
Iran/Iraq	3	Full-scale war (1), minor clashes (1), no violence (1)	Full-scale war (1), no violence as a CMT (2)	Preeminent (1), no violence as a CMT (2)
Iran/USSR	4	Serious clashes (1), minor clashes (1), no violence (2)	Serious clashes (2), no violence as a CMT (2)	Important (1), minor (1), no violence as a CMT (2)
Iraq/Kuwait	5	Full-scale war (1), minor clashes (2), no violence (2)	Full-scale war (1), minor clashes (2), no violence as a CMT (2)	Preeminent (1), minor (2), no violence as a CMT (2)
Iraq Regime	5	Full-scale war (1), serious clashes (2), no violence (2)	Full-scale war (1), serious clashes (2), no violence as a CMT (2)	Preeminent (3), no violence as a CMT (2)

TABLE 1.7—Continued

Protracted Conflict	Number of Crises Excluding IWCs	Violence (VIOL) ^b	Severity of Violence as a CMT (SEVVIOSY) ^c	Centrality of Violence as a CMT (CENVIOSY) ^d
Italy/Albania/Yugoslavia	5	Full-scale war (2), no violence (3)	Full-scale war (2), no violence as a CMT (3)	Preeminent (1), important (1), no violence as a CMT (3)
Korea	6	Full-scale war (1), minor clashes (3), no violence (2)	Full-scale war (1), minor clashes (1), no violence as a CMT (4)	Preeminent (1), important (1), no violence as a CMT (4)
Lithuania/Poland	3	Full-scale war (1), no violence (2)	Full-scale war (1), no violence as a CMT (2)	Important (1), no violence as a CMT (2)
Poland/Russia	4	Full-scale war (1), no violence (3)	Full-scale war (1), no violence as a CMT (3)	Preeminent (1), no violence as a CMT (3)
Rhodesia	11	Serious clashes (8), minor clashes (2), no violence (1)	Serious clashes (6), minor clashes (1), no violence as a CMT (4)	Preeminent (3), important (3), minor (1), no violence as a CMT (4)
Taiwan Strait	5	Full-scale war (1), serious clashes (2), no violence (2)	Full-scale war (1), serious clashes (2), no violence as a CMT (2)	Preeminent (3), no violence as a CMT (2)
Western Sahara	10	Serious clashes (8), minor clashes (1), no violence (1)	Serious clashes (9), no violence as a CMT (1)	Preeminent (4), important (5), no violence as a CMT (1)
World War II ^e	2	Full-scale war (1), serious clashes (1)	Full-scale war (1), serious clashes (1)	Important (1), preeminent (1)
Yemen	3	Full-scale war (3)	Full-scale war (3)	Important (3)
Yugoslavia	3	Full-scale war (2), serious clashes (1)	Full-scale war (2), serious clashes (1)	Preeminent (2), important (1)

Note: CMT = crisis management technique.

^aIntra-war crises are excluded from this table.

^bThe *extent* of violence in an international crisis as a whole regardless of its use or non-use by a specific actor as a CMT.

^cThe *most severe* type of violence used by any crisis actor as its primary technique of crisis management. The discrepancy between the number of VIOL and SEVVIOSY/CENVIOSY cases within a protracted conflict, e.g., Arab/Israel (VIOL = 21, CENVIOSY = 15) is that, in many crises, violence (VIOL) occurs but none of the adversaries *selects* violence as a technique to achieve its goals (SEVVIOSY, CENVIOSY).

^dThe *relative importance* that decision makers attached to violence in order to achieve their goal(s) in a crisis.

^eAll but two of the 24 international crises within the WW II PC were IWCs and are therefore excluded from this table.

percent). Moreover, both levels of low-intensity violence account for larger proportions of Middle East crises than the two levels of high-intensity violence: minor clashes, 30 percent; no violence, 28 percent; war, 23 percent; and serious clashes, 19 percent. And there were many more cases with low-intensity violence (58 percent) than high-intensity violence (42 percent). In comparative terms, the *Middle East stands first in frequency of full-scale war* (23 percent). The other categories are *overall* (14 percent), *Africa* (8 percent), *Americas* (8 percent), *Asia* (19 percent), and *Europe* (14 percent).

In sum, *Africa-based crises exhibit a higher than average violence, in general, but much less full-scale war. There was less and less intense violence in the Americas than overall and in any other region. Asia-based crises emerge as the most violence prone. Europe is close to the Americas as the least violence prone, except for unparalleled resort to violence from 1939 to 1945. The Middle East belongs to the*

cluster of three third world regions, along with Africa and Asia, as the most violence-prone regions.

As indicated at the beginning of Overview II, there were more crises within than outside protracted conflicts since the end of WW I, 215-176, excluding intrawar crises. Overall, *war* occurred in nearly twice the proportion of *PC* crises than in *non-PC* crises—39 of 215 (18 percent), compared to 17 of 176 (10 percent). *Serious clashes* exhibit more similar proportions but still favor *PC* crises—29 and 23 percent, respectively. The counterpart to many more wars in *PC* crises is the greater frequency of *minor clashes* in *non-PC* crises, 70 of 176 versus 51 of 215, that is, 40-24 percent. In addition, there is a very slightly higher proportion of no violence cases among *PC* crises, 30-27 percent. Another clear indicator of the *greater propensity to violence among crises within protracted conflicts* is the comparison of high-intensity violence (war plus serious clashes) and low-intensity violence (minor

clashes plus no violence): high intensity—PC crises, 47 percent, non-PC crises, 33 percent; low intensity—PC crises, 53 percent, non-PC crises, 67 percent.

Among the *regions*, the evidence indicates *diversity*, with the following ranking for *proneness to violence in PC and non-PC crises*: Africa and Europe—strong evidence that high-intensity violence occurred much more frequently in PC crises; the Middle East, moderately higher frequency of high-intensity violence in PC crises; the Americas, mixed evidence; and Asia, no difference between PC and non-PC crises.

OUTCOME

The analysis of crisis outcome will focus on both the total population of international crises excluding IWCs (391) and a comparison of PC and non-PC crises—on the three aspects of the outcome dimension, *content*, *form*, and *impact*. As with the preceding variables, the findings will be presented at two levels of analysis—*overall* and by *region*, with *PC and non-PC crises* compared in each “cut” (the *polarity* findings will be reported in chap. 7). I begin with the *content* of outcome, which is classified as *definitive* or *ambiguous*. The former is defined as an outcome in which all actors perceive victory or defeat, that is, the achievement or non-achievement of basic goals in the context of a specific international crisis. The latter refers to an outcome in which one or more of the crisis actors perceives either stalemate or compromise at the termination point of an international crisis.

The *overall* data, on 391 international crises, reveal virtually no difference in the content of outcome: definitive, 49 percent, and ambiguous, 51 percent. However, there is a *marked difference in terms of conflict setting*: there were many more ambiguous outcomes in the 215 PC crises (55-45 percent) and many more definitive outcomes in the 176 non-PC crises (55-45 percent). The outcomes of international crises within protracted conflicts are described in Table 1.8.

Among the *regions*, *Africa* replicates the overall finding: definitive outcome, 50 percent, ambiguous, 50 percent. However, there was a pronounced difference in the PC/non-PC distribution, much larger than the overall finding reported previously: PC crises—definitive, 40 percent, ambiguous, 60 percent. The non-PC crises exhibited the reverse, though the gap was smaller—56-44 percent.

Crisis in the *Americas* stand apart, in this as in many

other respects. There were moderately more definitive than ambiguous outcomes—53-47 percent. Moreover, the definitive-ambiguous distribution was nearly identical for PC crises (9 and 10 crises, respectively, out of a total of 19) and similar for non-PC crises—57-43 percent. Perhaps this is to be explained by the low severity of almost all crises in the Americas, reducing the relevance of conflict setting for content of outcome.¹⁴

The outcomes of international earthquakes in *Asia* were strikingly different from the overall and Africa findings, though in the same direction: definitive, 38 percent; ambiguous, 62 percent; the PC/non-PC divide was equally sharp (41-59 percent), and the contrast was even greater for the non-PC crises (32-68 percent).

The overall distribution for *Europe* shows a slightly larger number of definitive outcomes—53-47 percent. There was a near-identical reversed distribution of PC crises—46-54 percent. Finally, there is a much larger difference for non-PC cases, definitive, 61 percent, and ambiguous, 39 percent, of 33 crises. Thus Europe most resembles Africa with regard to the content of crisis outcome.

The *Middle East* exhibits a similar pattern of content outcome: a near-identical overall distribution—definitive, 49 percent, ambiguous, 51 percent; more ambiguous outcomes in PC crises—53-47 percent; and a very large difference among non-PC crises—definitive, 58 percent, ambiguous, 42 percent.

In sum, *except for international crises in the Americas, all the regions exhibit a pronounced difference in outcomes between the PC and non-PC clusters: the former have more ambiguous outcomes, the latter more definitive outcomes*. The explanation, as postulated in the discussion of protracted conflicts and crises, is that a PC setting generates a perception among decision makers that a crisis is merely an episode in an ongoing conflict; that is, regardless of the substantive outcome of a crisis, the conflict is likely to persist. By contrast, crises outside a PC are not saddled with the cumulative distrust and hostility of a protracted conflict. Thus *crisis* termination, when the crisis occurs within a PC, does not mean *conflict* termination; hence the tendency to ambiguous rather than definitive outcomes in PC crises.

The *form of outcome* was examined in terms of “voluntary agreement,” combining the ICB categories *formal agreement*, *semi-formal agreement*, and *tacit understanding*; and “imposed agreement,” combining the categories

TABLE 1.8. Outcome of International Crises within Protracted Conflicts^a

Protracted Conflict	Number of Crises Excluding IWCs	Outcome: Content ^b	Outcome: Form ^c	Escalation/Reduction of Tension ^d
Afghanistan/Pakistan	3	Definitive (3)	Semi-formal agreement (2), unilateral act (1)	Escalation (1), reduction (2)
Angola	11	Ambiguous (9), definitive (2)	Formal agreement (3), semi-formal agreement (1), unilateral act (5), other (2)	Escalation (8), reduction (3)
Arab/Israel	25	Ambiguous (16), definitive (9)	Formal agreement (5), semi-formal agreement (2), tacit understanding (4), unilateral act (11), imposed agreement (1), other (2)	Escalation (16), reduction (9)
Chad/Libya	8	Ambiguous (6), definitive (2)	Formal agreement (1), semi-formal agreement (3), unilateral act (3), crisis faded (1)	Escalation (7), reduction (1)
China/Japan	5	Ambiguous (3), definitive (2)	Formal agreement (2), imposed agreement (1), unilateral act (2)	Escalation (5)
China/Vietnam	4	Ambiguous (4)	Unilateral act (2), crisis faded (2)	Escalation (2), reduction (2)
Costa Rica/Nicaragua	3	Definitive (3)	Formal agreement (1), semi-formal agreement (1), unilateral act (1)	Reduction (3)
Czechoslovakia/Germany	3	Definitive (3)	Unilateral act (2), imposed agreement (1)	Escalation (3)
East/West	21	Ambiguous (8), definitive (13)	Formal agreement (2), semi-formal agreement (1), tacit understanding (1), unilateral act (15), crisis faded (2)	Escalation (8), reduction (13)
Ecuador/Peru	5	Ambiguous (4), definitive (1)	Formal agreement (3), semi-formal agreement (2)	Escalation (1), reduction (4)
Ethiopia/Somalia	6	Ambiguous (4), definitive (2)	Formal agreement (3), unilateral act (1), other (1), crisis faded (1)	Escalation (4), reduction (2)
Finland/Russia	4	Ambiguous (3), definitive (1)	Formal agreement (2), semi-formal agreement (1), imposed agreement (1)	Escalation (1), reduction (3)
France/Germany	5	Ambiguous (4), definitive (1)	Formal agreement (1), unilateral act (3), other (1)	Escalation (4), reduction (1)
Greece/Turkey	9	Ambiguous (4), definitive (5)	Formal agreement (2), semi-formal agreement (2), unilateral act (5)	Escalation (4), reduction (4), less than 5 years since termination (1)
Honduras/Nicaragua	6	Ambiguous (4), definitive (2)	Formal agreement (2), semi-formal agreement (2), unilateral act (2)	Escalation (2), reduction (4)
India/Pakistan	14	Ambiguous (9), definitive (5)	Formal agreement (3), semi-formal agreement (1), tacit understanding (2), unilateral act (6), imposed agreement (2)	Escalation (6), reduction (6), less than 5 years since termination (2)
Indochina	8	Ambiguous (2), definitive (6)	Semi-formal agreement (2), tacit understanding (1), unilateral act (4), other (1)	Escalation (4), reduction (4)
Indonesia	6	Ambiguous (3), definitive (3)	Formal agreement (2), unilateral act (3), crisis faded (1)	Escalation (2), reduction (3), less than 5 years since termination (1)
Iran/Iraq	3	Ambiguous (2), definitive (1)	Semi-formal agreement (1), tacit understanding (1), unilateral act (1)	Escalation (2), reduction (1)

(continues)

TABLE 1.8—Continued

Protracted Conflict	Number of Crises Excluding IWCs	Outcome: Content ^b	Outcome: Form ^c	Escalation/Reduction of Tension ^d
Iran/USSR	4	Ambiguous (2), definitive (2)	Formal agreement (2), imposed agreement (1), unilateral act (1)	Escalation (1), reduction (3)
Iraq/Kuwait	5	Definitive (5)	Formal agreement (1), unilateral act (2), imposed agreement (1), crisis faded (1)	Escalation (3), reduction (2)
Iraq Regime	5	Ambiguous (2), definitive (3)	Formal agreement (1), unilateral act (2), imposed agreement (1), other (1)	Escalation (4), less than 5 years since termination (1)
Italy/Albania/Yugoslavia	5	Ambiguous (3), definitive (2)	Formal agreement (1), unilateral act (2), imposed agreement (2)	Escalation (2), reduction (3)
Korea	6	Ambiguous (5), definitive (1)	Formal agreement (2), semi-formal agreement (1), unilateral act (1), imposed agreement (1), crisis faded (1)	Escalation (2), reduction (2), less than 5 years since termination (2)
Lithuania/Poland	3	Ambiguous (2), definitive (1)	Formal agreement (1), unilateral act (2)	Reduction (3)
Poland/Russia	4	Ambiguous (2), definitive (2)	Formal agreement (1), tacit understanding (1), unilateral act (1), other (1)	Reduction (4)
Rhodesia	11	Ambiguous (6), definitive (5)	Formal agreement (1), unilateral act (6), other (4)	Escalation (10), reduction (1)
Taiwan Strait	5	Ambiguous (3), definitive (2)	Semi-formal agreement (1), tacit understanding (1), unilateral act (3)	Escalation (2), reduction (3)
Western Sahara	10	Ambiguous (3), definitive (7)	Semi-formal agreement (1), unilateral act (4), other (3), crisis faded (2)	Escalation (7), reduction (3)
World War II	2	Ambiguous (1), definitive (1)	Unilateral act (2)	Escalation (1), reduction (1)
Yemen	3	Ambiguous (3)	Formal agreement (3)	Escalation (2), reduction (1)
Yugoslavia	3	Ambiguous (2), definitive (1)	Formal agreement (3)	Escalation (2), less than 5 years since termination (1)

^aFor the period November 1918–end 2002. Intra-war crises (IWCs) are excluded from this table.

^bContent of outcome refers to actor perception of the outcome as definitive or ambiguous: ambiguous = perception of stalemate—no change in the situation, or compromise—partial achievement of goals; definitive = actor perception of victory or defeat in an international crisis, i.e., achievement or non-achievement of goals related to that crisis.

^cForm of outcome refers to the manner in which an international crisis ends: formal agreement = treaty, armistice, cease-fire; semi-formal agreement = exchange of letters, oral declarations; tacit understanding = mutual understanding by adversaries, unstated and unwritten; unilateral act by a crisis actor = severance or resumption of diplomatic relations, military intrusion into adversary's territory; imposed agreement; fading of crisis.

^dEscalation/reduction of tension refers to an occurrence/non-occurrence of another crisis between the same adversaries within 5 years of the termination of their crisis.

unilateral act and *imposed agreement*. Findings are presented overall and by region, with special attention to the PC and non-PC crisis clusters (the polarity findings will be reported in chap. 7).

There is little difference in the *overall* frequency of voluntary and imposed agreements, 40 and 46 percent, respectively, of the 391 crises; the other 14 percent relate to crises in the **form of outcome** categories, “other,” and “crisis faded.” The same observation applies to the distribution between PC crises and non-PC crises within the

entire data set—voluntary-imposed agreements within the PC cluster, 38-48 percent, and within the non-PC cluster, 42-44 percent.

In *Africa*, there were slightly more voluntary than imposed agreements—39-35 percent. Within the PC cluster, there was a significantly lower proportion of voluntary agreements, 28-54 percent. The non-PC crises exhibit many more voluntary agreements—47-30 percent. In the *Americas*, too, there were more voluntary agreements—51-44 percent. The gap was much larger

within the PC cluster—voluntary, 63 percent, imposed, 37 percent—and slightly smaller in the non-PC cluster but in the reverse direction, 43-50 percent. By contrast, imposed agreements were more frequent in *Asia*, both for the region as a whole, 49-41 percent, and even more so in the PC cluster, 54-37 percent. In *Europe*, too, there were many more imposed agreements; in fact, the gap is much larger than in *Asia*: overall, 57-35 percent; in the PC cluster, 52-39 percent; and in the non-PC cluster, 64-30 percent. The *Middle East*, too, exhibits greater frequency of imposed agreements: overall—52-38 percent; and in both the PC and non-PC clusters, especially the latter—51-41 percent and 54-33 percent.

In sum, *there are several noteworthy differences in the form of crisis outcome among the regions: Europe, overall, 57-35 percent; PC crises, 52-39 percent; and non-PC crises, 64-30 percent, all in favor of imposed agreements; Africa, the non-PC cluster, 47-30 percent, in favor of voluntary agreements; Americas, the PC cluster, twice as many voluntary agreements; Asia, more imposed agreements, 52-39 percent; and the Middle East, more imposed agreements in the non-PC cluster, 54-33 percent. In general, Africa and the Americas were more prone to voluntary agreements, while Asia, Europe, and the Middle East were more prone to imposed agreements.*

Turning to *escalation or reduction of tension*, that is, the recurrence or non-recurrence of a crisis between the same adversaries within five years, the *overall* data reveal a vast difference. Significantly more crisis outcomes led to *tension reduction* rather than *escalation* (52-38 percent). (The percentages for this variable do not sum to 100 because crises are not coded for outcome until five years elapse after their termination.) The overall finding was repli-

cated among non-PC crises (54-33 percent); and, while the trend to more frequent reduction of tension applied as well to PC crises, the gap was narrower (51-41 percent).

Among the *regions*, *Africa* exhibits a modest difference in the impact of crisis outcome overall: reduction, 46 percent, escalation, 50 percent; a huge difference for PC crises in *Africa*—reduction, 23 percent, escalation, 77 percent; and a large difference for non-PC crises but the reverse—reduction, 63 percent, escalation, 31 percent. In the *Americas*, the data indicate an overwhelming reduction of tension—overall and in both the PC and non-PC clusters, 86-14 percent, 79-21 percent, and 90-10 percent, respectively, further indication of the *Americas* as a relative “zone of peace.” The evidence in *Asia* crises is more mixed than in *Africa* or the *Americas*: a slightly larger frequency of reduced tension overall, 48-42 percent; an identical distribution among PC crises; and a pronounced tendency toward reduction of tension among the non-PC crises, 56-36 percent. In *Europe*, too, there was a very large majority of tension reduction cases, both overall (61-34 percent) and among non-PC crises (70-24 percent), though this trend was more modest among PC crises (54-41 percent). In the *Middle East*, the evidence is mixed: a moderately higher proportion of escalation cases overall, 52-45 percent, with sharply contrasting proportions among PC and non-PC crises, 61-35 percent and 33-67 percent, respectively.

In sum, *reduction of tension was pronounced in the overall data on crisis legacy and in several regions. This finding is conspicuous in the overall data, in the Americas, and in Europe. Moreover, all five regions experienced a substantially higher reduction of tension in non-PC than in PC crises.*