CHAPTER XXXVII

The Two Germanies (1949-61)

The obvious failure of the Control Council convinced the American and British authorities in 1947 that the time was ripe for the formation of a German government for Western Germany. There was no hope of associating the Russians with this plan. They talked only of a strongly centralized government, something the three Western powers, especially France, would not consider. Furthermore, the refusal of the countries influenced by the Soviet Union to have anything to do with the Marshall Plan ruled out the possibility of a uniform economic program for all Germany. An important step toward unity was taken by the formation of Bizonia, but that had been kept purposely unpolitical; now joint political institutions would have to be worked out. It became highly desirable to integrate the French zone with the other two. This was not easy because the French seemed adamant on a far looser federal structure for Germany than the U.S. and Britain wanted. The French also wanted to prevent the Germans from controlling the Ruhr. However, as time went on the French realized how difficult it would be to remain aloof from their partners, particularly when the U.S. pointed out that it would be impossible to have two Marshall Plan programs for Germany. Therefore, they accepted an invitation to meet with the Americans and British in London. This conference was opened on February 23, 1948, over the vehement protest of the Russians.

It looked at first as if the French were hopelessly far from the Anglo-American attitude, but they relented and compromised at various points. The Russian ending of the Control Council in March helped to convince the French, but discussions continued on into the summer. The French government finally approved a plan to invite the minister-presidents of the eleven Länder to call an assembly to draw up a constitution for a democratic federal republic with little guidance from the occupation authorities, who simply listed areas in which they wished to maintain
jurisdiction and who would have the right to approve the final document. France was promised that the Ruhr question could be reopened.

The next step was to get German agreement to this plan. This proved surprisingly difficult. The German officials were very reluctant to take steps which might consecrate the division of Germany. Thus they objected to the words "constitution" and "constititutional assembly" and felt that the assembly should not be elected by the people but rather by the Land parliaments, a less formal gesture. In July the Germans were not at all sure how the Berlin blockade was going to result, and were anxious not to antagonize the Soviets any further. General Clay made it clear that the decisions of the Western allies would have to be carried out, but compromised on language. Thus the word Grundgesetz ("basic law") was used, and the assembly was called the "parliamentary council." The minister-presidents then appointed one expert on constitutional law from each Land; they met at Chiemsee near Munich and drew up a preliminary draft, which became the basis for the eventual Bonn Constitution.

The minister-presidents then called on each Land parliament to elect members to the new council on the basis of population and also in proportion to party affiliations at the last election. The council was made up of sixty-five members, with twenty-seven from each of the two major parties (CDU and SPD). It met at Bonn on September 1, 1948, and elected as its president the CDU leader, Konrad Adenauer, who was to be the leading German political figure for the next years. Adenauer, then a man of 73, had a long political career behind him; in his native Cologne he had been lord mayor from 1917 to 1933 and again briefly after the war. A devout Catholic, he became leader and spokesman of the CDU in the British zone. The council struggled over the basic law during the winter and spring of 1949, finally agreeing on it in May. The three military governors approved it on May 12, when it became law.

The basic law was complemented by an occupation statute, which defined the areas in which the occupying powers would maintain jurisdiction. This document proved very difficult to write, and in fact the German basic law was drawn up with very little cooperation from the allies. In general the allies eventually reserved control only over matters immediately concerned with the occupation: the maintenance of troops in Germany, foreign policy, reparations, disarmament, etc. They protected themselves with the right to protest any law passed by the new government within a fixed period of days and with a statute for an international authority for the Ruhr. The occupation statute was proclaimed on September 15, 1949; the military governors were replaced by high commissioners; and the occupation of West Germany was technically
ended. Elections to the new Bundestag had been held on August 14; the body convened shortly afterward; and with the election of Theodor Heuss as president and Konrad Adenauer as chancellor, the new government began to operate.

The Bonn basic law, originally intended to be a short interim law until Germany became again united, emerged as a lengthy complete constitution. Its authors tried to avoid the pitfalls of the Weimar Constitution, but in many respects the two are similar. As did the Weimar, the Bonn document starts with a long detached enumeration of basic rights. It then analyzes the relation between the central government and the Länder. Although the republic is called a federal republic, the central government has very considerable powers, and the tendency since 1949 has been to develop them rather than the local powers. The legislative body consists of two houses. The lower, the Bundestag, is elected by universal direct suffrage. It is the basic lawmaking body. The upper, the Bundesrat, represents the states as in earlier German constitutions. The members are appointed and withdrawn by the governments of the Länder in rough proportion to population; it has a suspensive veto and certain emergency powers greater than its opposite number at Weimar. The president of the republic is not elected directly by the people but by a convention called for that purpose and composed of the members of the Bundestag and an equal number of delegates picked by the parliaments of the Länder. His term of office is five years, and he may be re-elected only once. His office is largely decorative; there is no provision analogous to the notorious Article 48 of Weimar. The chancellor is more powerful than under Weimar, as the president is less powerful. He is elected by the Bundestag on the nomination of the president. His position is more secure than in most parliamentary governments because the Bundestag can vote no confidence only if it simultaneously nominates a successor. This device was planned to eliminate the lengthy government crises that plagued Weimar. The ministers are directly responsible to the chancellor, who controls them almost as absolutely as Bismarck did. The basic law goes into much detail on such matters as finance, administration, and religion, and has at least one unique provision. Article 24 reads: "The Federation may, by legislation, transfer sovereign powers to international institutions." It is certainly true that the Bonn Republic has so far operated in a more stable fashion than the Weimar Republic. Whether this is a tribute to the constitution, the new party system, or the firm hand of the first chancellor, is a question; but at least no serious loopholes in the basic law have so far developed.

A few weeks after the election of Heuss and Adenauer the People's
Congress of the Soviet zone proclaimed in force the constitution that had been drawn up some time before for the German Democratic Republic. As it became clear that the Western powers were going to organize the Western zones, the Soviet occupiers picked a People's Congress, dominated by the SED, to draw up a constitution allegedly for all Germany. The constitution was held in abeyance for two years until the Federal Republic was proclaimed. Then the Eastern constitution was placed before the people of the Soviet zone for confirmation. However, so high a proportion of the population refrained from voting that the congress simply picked a number of its own members to become the People's Chamber, as the new parliament was to be called, and announced on October 7, 1949, that the new government was in force. In 1950 another election was held for the chamber, but this was a completely unfree one. The voters could elect only a list of candidates in which the SED had a considerable majority, while there was a token representation of CDU and liberals. This was like a Nazi plebiscite and achieved similar results.

The constitution has the appearance of liberalism and democracy. It is supposedly based on the Länder and is therefore federal in character, but this is only window dressing. Not only does much more power go to the central government than in the Bonn document, but the Länder themselves have virtually ceased to exist. Their local parliaments and governments have been abolished, and the Soviet zone has been divided into fourteen districts for administrative purposes. In many cases the borders of these districts are not the same as those of the former Länder, and it is clear that they are just local units formed to receive directives from the center.

The opposition parties are represented in the cabinet of the central government, but their function is really to support the measures of the SED rather than to provide a real opposition. The constitution can be amended by the People's Chamber itself, and since for obvious reasons the Chamber usually votes unanimously and is controlled by the dominant party, it is easy to see that the democratic quality of this constitution is delusive.

In fact, the German Democratic Republic is simply one more satellite state in the orbit of the Soviet Union. Its president, Wilhelm Pieck, an old-line Communist who died in 1960, and its premier, Otto Grotewohl, leader of the secession from the SPD, have been figureheads. The real authority lies in the Politbureau of the SED and its secretary-general, Walter Ulbricht, a dependable Communist who spent the Nazi years in Moscow and who presumably still receives his orders from there. East Germany was granted the right to conduct her own international affairs
as early as 1949, and the Soviet control commission disappeared from the scene in 1954; but the huge, newly built, and ugly Soviet embassy on Unter den Linden is an ever-present reminder of the source of power.

It is hard to find reliable information on East Germany, but there is no question that the standard of living has improved very markedly since the end of the war. It was, however, an illuminating experience to walk through the Brandenburg Gate from bustling West Berlin to the shadows of the East. The visitor was usually shown the Stalinallee (later to become the Frankfurterallée), a street of massive new apartments with attractive restaurants and shops along the sidewalk. However, if the visitor were to have walked a few feet along one of the intersections, he would have found terrible ruins and rubble of much worse appearance than in the West.

It was in connection with the building of Stalinallee that the most spectacular event in the history of East Germany occurred—the strikes and riots of June 17, 1953. A few days earlier the workers on the new apartments were informed that their daily production quotas were to be raised without any increase in wages as an example of socialist competition. The new situation rankled in the workers' minds, and on the sixteenth and seventeenth they broke into violence. They struck and marched in parades along Unter den Linden toward the Western sector. The workers were joined by other strikers and even by youth groups in Communist uniform. They sang songs, insulted the government, and pulled down Red flags. The local police and the armed force of the republic (Volkspolizei) were slow to retaliate, but eventually they did and the Russians lent support by sending tanks into the streets of Berlin. The revolt was put down, of course, although it simmered for days both in Berlin and other cities. However, it was at least an indication of true feelings. There have been no other such uprisings, but the event is not forgotten. One of the poignant sights in West Berlin is the wooden cross erected to the East Berliners who fell on June 17; perhaps even more poignant is the stone near the cross, erected in memory of the Russian officers and men who were shot because they refused to fire on the East Berliners on June 17.

In West Germany the spirit is far different. There the visitor is immediately impressed by what has been called the "miracle" of Germany, her economic recovery and amazing prosperity. A combination of the currency reform, Marshall Plan aid, the ability of the German economy to help fill the world's needs, and the general industrial efficiency of the Germans has wrought marvels. Moreover, it has not been done either by socialization or by the historic German emphasis on cartels. Bonn Germany is devoted to the economic philosophy of free enterprise. Constant pronouncements on this subject by Ludwig Erhard, minister of
economics made this abundantly clear. In fact, the great prosperity made it impossible for the SPD to achieve control of the government since there seemed no reason to change over to socialism.

Politically, Adenauer maintained a firm control over the government. Many insist that he exerted too much control and ruled Germany too paternalistically. German wits called the government a Demokratur (a pun implying “democratic dictatorship”). Certainly he was reluctant to step down, even after having promised to do so in the spring of 1959. There was fear that when age forced him to move from the scene, there would be no one trained to replace him. His vigor and ability were extraordinary and undoubtedly contributed to the stability of the Bonn Republic for as long as the Weimar Republic existed.

During his first four years in office Adenauer headed a coalition government of CDU and FDP, which was sometimes precarious since the FDP was not always easy to keep in line, especially in the matter of rearmament. Until his death in 1952 Kurt Schumacher was leader of the SPD opposition and one of the ablest political figures of Europe. The election of 1953 gave Adenauer’s party, the CDU, a clear, if small, majority, and he then became able to control the Bundestag in all major matters. The Communist party has remained negligible, and in spite of occasional fears none of the so-called neo-Nazi groups has been able to win any important percentage of votes.

Adenauer made himself best known in the field of foreign affairs. At first this meant relations with the former occupying powers, because by the occupation statute Germany was forbidden to conduct an independent foreign policy. From the first Adenauer showed himself to be completely oriented to the West. He did everything possible to maintain warm relations with the United States, and, more surprising, constantly indicated a desire to draw closer to France. He realized the seriousness to Germany of the cleavage with Russia, chose to align himself with the democratic powers, and recognized that the old disputes in Western Europe have to be forgotten if Europe was to play any important role in the future. In this attitude Adenauer was often opposed by Schumacher, whose overriding interest was in the reunification of Germany and who felt this might be best accomplished by offers of friendship toward the Soviet Union.

Among the gestures made by Germany toward the West was its membership in the Council of Europe, the European Payments Union, and the Organization for European Economic Co-operation. In April 1951 Germany joined France, Italy, and the three Benelux countries in signing the project for the European Coal and Steel Community to create an
international body to control these basic industries. This had the importance for Germany of ending the old statute on the Ruhr and of paving the way for future negotiations concerning the Saar.

With the outbreak of the war in Korea in the summer of 1950 the Western allies became even more conscious of building up defense forces against Communist aggression. They began to think of the large reservoir of manpower available in Germany and to change their ideas about the permanent disarmament of the Germans. As early as September 1950 the foreign ministers talked not of a German army but of German units integrated into a European army. In fact it was the French premier, René Pleven, who first made a definite proposal along these lines. During 1951 a number of conferences were held about the possibility of rearming Germany. Steadily the Germans were losing more and more of their disabilities. In March Adenauer took the additional title of minister of foreign affairs. In July Great Britain, the Commonwealth, and France ended the state of war between themselves and Germany; in October the United States followed suit.

At home Adenauer was not having an easy time on the matter of rearmament. Since 1945 the Germans had been taught that they would never have to fight again; their constitution provided for no armed forces; they were sick of war and its terrible results. In particular, the SPD was opposed to rearmament. However, the chancellor persisted in his policy since he felt it was the only way to achieve the complete sovereignty that Germany desired.

A further step toward sovereignty was taken on May 26, 1952, when the allies watered down their occupation rights still more and entered into a contractual status with Germany by which, short of an emergency to be decided by them, they would limit their rights to maintaining troops and to dealing for Germany with the Soviet Union. The next day the foreign ministers met Adenauer in Paris to sign the agreements for the European Defense Community. This would have constituted an automatically functioning defensive alliance by which an attack on one member would constitute an attack on all, with Germany as an equal partner in defense. All the signatory nations except France ratified the EDC. The French postponed action for a long time and put up a number of objections. Finally in the summer of 1954 the French national assembly definitely refused to ratify the agreements, and the EDC did not come into existence. There was still to be delay before Germans once again wore uniforms. When they did, it was under the auspices of NATO, to which Germany was admitted in May 1955.

The climax of an era in German history came on May 5, 1955, exactly ten years after the capitulation, when Germany received notice of
full sovereignty from the ambassadors of France and Great Britain. The United States had acted a few days before. Except for the right to maintain troops on German soil and the denial to Germany of the right to include Berlin in its territory, since that would endanger allied rights there, the German Federal Republic now became sovereign. Thanks to the threat from the East and the firm policy of Adenauer, Germany was free much sooner than anyone ten years before would have predicted.

Political life in West Germany since 1955 has been relatively placid. The Germans seem to have achieved for the first time an orderly two-party government far removed from the multiparty folly of the Weimar period. In 1956, in anticipation of the general elections of the following year, the Communist party was outlawed. A mark of the progress of democracy in Germany is the fact that in the 1957 election almost 90 per cent of the population voted. It gave an absolute majority once again to the CDU and thus to the pro-Western policy of Adenauer. Fears of a neo-Nazi revival were allayed by the fact that the strongest of the right-wing parties, the German Reich party, received only 1 per cent of the votes and some months later was declared unconstitutional by the highest court.

Probably the most serious rift in the smooth surface of the CDU arose during the presidential election of 1959. On July 1 the term of Dr. Theodor Heuss was to expire. Heuss had endeared himself to the population. Scholar, disciple, and biographer of Friedrich Naumann, a representative of liberal southwestern Germany, he had presided over the state with dignity and serenity. In 1954 he was re-elected without question, but the constitution forbids more than two terms for the president. In April 1959 the CDU offered the candidacy to succeed Heuss to Konrad Adenauer. This looked like a seemly end to the career of an old man who might not be able to stand up against the buffets of active political life much longer. Adenauer accepted the nomination, and his election appeared to be a foregone conclusion. There was speculation about the next chancellor, but it seemed clear that this position would go to Ludwig Erhard, minister of economics. However, in early June, while Erhard was on a visit to Washington, Adenauer addressed a letter to his party withdrawing his candidacy for president. He declared that since the renewed Soviet threat to Berlin had grown into crucial proportions at the Geneva Conference, which was going on at the time, he would be shirking his duty not to see it through. He concluded, "I cannot, therefore, assume the responsibility of leaving my post during so critical a time." The CDU delegation after some debate accepted Adenauer's decision and gave him a vote of confidence. Erhard swallowed his disappointment and pride and remained in his cabinet position.
To replace Adenauer, the CDU nominated Heinrich Luebke, who had been minister of food and agriculture since 1953. Luebke is a Westphalian, a veteran of World War I, and has devoted much of his life to farm problems. He was a member of the Prussian parliament for the Catholic Center party in the last years of the Weimar Republic, and had a respectable anti-Nazi record. The SPD nominated Carlo Schmid, who had been first vice-president of the Bundestag since its inception.

The special electoral assembly met in Berlin. This was a symbolic gesture to reassure the threatened Berliners and to show the world that West Germany claims Berlin as its own. It was greeted with some criticism abroad on the grounds that Berlin is not technically a part of the Federal Republic (though it has nonvoting representatives in the Bundestag and accepts Bonn legislation as binding) and cannot be, for the position of the West in Berlin depends on the fiction that the city is still under four-power control. At the election Luebke received a clear majority of all votes cast.

The SPD has found itself in an awkward position since 1949. The extraordinary and increasing prosperity of the country has robbed the socialists of their principal platform, the nationalization of industry. Things seem to be going so well that the German voter sees no need for a change. In fact, the SPD no longer favors a drastic change in economic organization. Its points of issue with the CDU have concerned mainly matters of foreign policy. During the life of Kurt Schumacher the SPD maintained a nationalist position. It insisted that the big issue was the reunification of Germany. It opposed Adenauer's policy of close adherence to the West, calling instead for a policy of neutralism in the hope that by not antagonizing the Soviet Union, there would be more chance to bring the two Germanies together. After Schumacher's death in 1952 his rather colorless successor, Erich Ollenhauer, modified this line considerably, especially as he had seen the election returns go against the SPD at the federal level. (In a number of the Länder there have been SPD majorities.) The most interesting SPD leader was Willy Brandt, the forceful and magnetic mayor of Berlin.

On the economic side, the second half of the 1950's saw a continuation of the enormous strides made in the first half. The recession of the period was little noticed in Germany, and unemployment remained at a low figure. In the basic heavy industries German production continued to soar over the 1938 figures. This was not completely true in the case of coal because other fuels have to a considerable extent replaced it in certain industries and in late 1959 several noneconomic collieries were shut down in Bochum. However, the government en-
visaged the relocation of other sorts of industry in the Ruhr to take up the slack of possible unemployment.

The German export trade is a particular pride of the Federal Republic. It has maintained a consistently favorable balance of trade, which is vital to Germany because owing to her large population and to the loss of agricultural territory in the east, she must import large quantities of foodstuffs. The label, "made in Germany," once more was seen throughout the world, and German industry was actively competing for the business of developing underdeveloped lands. For example, the firm of Krupp, almost completely restored to its former power, was able and willing to provide almost anything in the way of engineering that a foreign state might want, from the earliest blueprints to the finished vast project. It is astonishing that the country which only a few years earlier seemed damaged beyond repair was now offering to finance and construct for the rest of the world.

Germany has achieved her economic triumph with a free-enterprise system; but it is free enterprise tempered with a number of the aspects of the welfare state, to which the Germans have taken kindly since the time of Bismarck. Most of the workers are members of the one large union organization, the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund ("German Federation of Trade Unions"), which has replaced the three separate organizations of the Weimar period. Early in the occupation the principle of codetermination (Mitbestimmungsrecht) was adopted, by virtue of which the workers have a voice in policy decisions. In many large corporations one of the directors is chosen to represent the workers' interests. Whatever the cause, the fact is that there have been extremely few labor conflicts during the past decade.

In cultural and artistic matters Germany has made a respectable recovery from the abyss of 1945. She lost a large number of her artistic and intellectual leaders by emigration during the Nazi years. Undoubtedly also she lost in the war many of the young men who would be the leaders of today. It is remarkable, however, how quickly the Germans restored themselves to the forefront in the performing arts. The author can remember as early as October 1945 an announcement of the forthcoming performance of one of the German classic dramas in the courtyard of Heidelberg castle; performances of operas and symphony orchestras often in makeshift surroundings were among the few joys of the German people in the early period after the war. Since then many opera houses and concert halls have been restored or built anew, and the tourist has more to choose from than he has time for. For example, two grandsons of Richard Wagner took control of the Bay-
reuth festivals and produced performances of their grandfather’s music dramas with revolutionary and controversial settings. Among the younger German composers probably the best known in the United States is Carl Orff, whose works, especially his Carmina Burana, have been given numerous performances.

Germany has much to offer the visitor. Munich has been being steadily and tastefully rebuilt; Düsseldorf has become the show city of the West; and in Berlin the Kurfürstendamm gives the appearance of being one of the gayest and liveliest streets in the world (unless by daylight one notes that some of the neon signs are built on scaffoldings against old ruins).

Religious life has developed very actively and apparently with real depth of intensity. This is true of both Catholics and Protestants. As a result of the changed boundaries, the two groups are almost equal in number in the Federal Republic, with just a small Protestant majority. No doubt the religious fervor of the Germans has been whetted by the persecution which continues in the Soviet zone. Every persecution creates its heroes. In East Germany the best known hero was Dr. Otto Dibelius, who was both bishop of Berlin-Brandenburg and also chairman of the council of the synod of the whole German Protestant church. His sermons in his cathedral in Berlin (which is located in the Eastern sector) were constant exhortations to the people of East Germany to stand firmly by their Christian belief.

In view of the unspeakable ordeal which the Jewish people endured during the Nazi regime, it is encouraging to observe the efforts made by the Federal Republic to make reparation, in cases where reparation has been possible. The federal basic law specifically outlaws any attack based on religion or race, and all responsible German leaders can be quoted in the same vein. Any German Jew who suffered during the Nazi years or his heirs could apply for restitution for the goods taken from him. Thousands have done so, and restitution of about two billion dollars has been made out of funds collected by the German government as reparation taxes. Jews have been invited to return to Germany to settle and some thousands have done so, giving contemporary Germany a Jewish population of about thirty thousand. The government has built synagogues and centers for the Jews and tried to integrate them into the new society. On September 10, 1952, the Federal Republic signed at Luxembourg an agreement with the government of Israel. Germany agreed to pay Israel $822,000,000 by 1964. Much of this took the form of machinery, agricultural equipment, rolling stock, and shipping, without which the early years of Israel would have been much more difficult.

There is latent anti-Semitism in Germany as in most countries. How-
ever, in Germany it is a more frightening matter on account of the past. From time to time offenders have been tried and imprisoned. In the last days of 1959 and the beginning of 1960 a wave of anti-Semitism, taking the form of swastikas and abusive remarks painted on synagogues, swept Germany and other countries as well. The reply of the government was immediate. The president, chancellor, Bundestag, and various key groups all disavowed the actions in strong terms. Almost a hundred persons were arrested and many of them given prison terms. A good proportion of them were juvenile delinquents looking for publicity. The government remains watchful, but there seems no reason to expect significant anti-Semitism or neo-Nazism in the near future.

The most important and controversial aspect of German development in recent years has been in the realm of foreign affairs. Four major issues are involved: rearmament, the Saar question, reunification, and since 1958 the new Berlin crisis. The entrance of the Federal Republic into NATO in 1955 required the Germans to pool their armed forces into the general NATO military organization. It took a year for the government to push approval of military service through the Bundestag. The SPD led the opposition, insisting that Germany’s tragedies had arisen from militarism and that it was unwise to invite them again. It also insisted that military co-operation with the West would serve only to antagonize the Soviet Union and make reunification more difficult. Finally in July 1956 the bill was passed, originally calling for a force of one half million men by the end of 1957. In early 1957 General Hans Speidel was appointed commander in chief of army forces. Great care was taken to make sure that the new army would have democratic foundations and not be in danger of becoming the autocratic state within a state which it had been during the empire, the Weimar period, and the Nazi state. It was put clearly under civilian control, with Franz Joseph Strauss as minister of defense. Even with all these qualifications it was hard to get the organization in existence, and the estimates of manpower had to be lowered. It was expected that German ground forces would reach three hundred fifty thousand by the end of 1961. The Germans had been permitted at the end of the war to maintain a few small naval units for coastal defense and police purposes. The permitted number has been increased and more units have been added, none larger than a destroyer. In 1958 a new German air force came into existence, but it would not be an important force for some years.

The successful settlement of the Saar question was probably Adenauer’s greatest diplomatic triumph. After the war the Saar became a part of the French occupation zone. The French separated it from the rest of their zone, and it was clear that they intended to annex it to France
politically as well as economically. The economic union was established forthwith. As the years went on and Germany became stronger, while France was immersed in the weakness and confusion of the Fourth Republic, the Saar issue became an even greater source of discontent. The two governments agreed in 1955 that subject to the approval of the Saarlanders the area should remain under international control, technically under the Western European Union (successor to the ill-fated European Defense Community). However, at an election in late 1955 the population turned down this idea decisively. The following year the two governments undertook bilateral negotiations and reached a conclusion late in the year. The Saar became an integral part of the German Federal Republic at the beginning of 1957 with the status of a Land. It was to maintain its economic relationship with France for three years; however, in July 1959 these ties were broken, and the Saar became part of Germany. One of the remarkable features of international affairs in recent years has been the increasing warmth between France and Germany. This rapprochement was carefully cultivated by Adenauer and was strengthened after Charles De Gaulle became the dominant political figure in France. The two leaders met on a number of occasions in both countries and seemed to be making a strong effort to forget the unhappiness of the past.

It goes without saying that the most urgent problem in the minds of most Germans has been reunification. The separation of Germany into two hostile states, each operating under the aegis of one of two hostile world powers, struck them as unnatural and tragic. No German political figure could hope for any success in his career if he did not pay frequent lip service to the goal of reunifying East and West. Yet realistic Germans have realized that the problem is outside their control and simply a function of the far greater problem of the split between the Communist and non-Communist worlds. The Soviet Union has no intention of relinquishing its hold on Germany with its industrial wealth and potential for continuing the general unrest upon which Communism thrives. Similarly, the Western powers have no idea of letting powerful and rich West Germany drift into the Soviet orbit. As long as these attitudes continue, and there is no reason to expect their abatement, the division will persist. It would be fruitless here to rehearse the conferences, personal visits, and negotiations concerning the subject of the division of Germany. The Soviet Union and the Federal Republic have extended diplomatic recognition to each other, Adenauer made the pilgrimage to Moscow, and every conceivable combination of statesmen and diplomats has discussed the matter from every angle; but as the years have progressed, the division of Germany has become more and more an enduring
fact. If this is true for the German Democratic Republic, it is even more true for the areas "under Polish administration" east of the Oder-Neisse line. This territory has been almost cleared of German nationals, the names have been changed, and the Poles have done everything possible to Polonize the land and create a fait accompli.

A certain amount of "reunification" went on every day at a voluntary and extremely informal level. A week never passed since the war without the surreptitious crossing of several hundreds of Germans from the East to the West. This is almost impossible along the zonal frontier, where there are barbed wire fences, many sentries of the East German uniformed police, and cleared strips along the border. It was much easier in Berlin, where it is possible to pass from East to West in the subways because the inspections are sporadic and not always efficient. Thousands have made successful efforts to reach the West. There is no way of knowing how many have failed. It is true that some have returned to the East, but their number is very small compared to those who have stayed. Those who return are the ones who find that the West is not the paradise they had expected; the very fact that that is what they expected speaks volumes concerning the opinion held in the East about the West.

The emigration from East to West has varied in its quantity in proportion to the pressure toward communization of the East German government. In 1959 and 1960 this pressure became more intense. The original "land reform" in the Soviet zone resulted in turning the area from one of great estates into one of small holdings. No effort was made in the early years to collectivize agriculture. This was changed, and heavy pressure was exerted to force the individual farmers to enter collectives. Sometimes brutal measures were used by the Communists, with the result that the stream westwards increased though the Eastern government also toughened its measures to prevent the leakage.

Berlin has undergone an experience since the blockade almost unique in history. This enormous city, itself divided in two, stands as an island of freedom about a hundred miles within the Communist border, with precarious and easily severable communication with its friends to the West. The economic prosperity of Berlin has not paralleled that of the Federal Republic, mainly because of its remoteness. In fact, the Federal Republic has had to subsidize the former capital by various devices, including a tax on all postal revenues. The Berliners have striven with great energy to develop types of industry suitable to their location, especially light industry. The result has been very satisfying. Berlin has also sought to increase tourist revenues by developing its entertainment possibilities on both the serious and lighthearted levels. Foreigners have been interested in visiting this outpost of freedom with its gaiety and
fun. However, beneath the surface the Berliners continued to be apprehensive about their situation. For instance, it was noticeable that the population of Berlin was relatively older than that of the rest of Germany. Many young people, afraid of the future and conscious of the greater opportunity in the West, have left Berlin to make their careers. However, for years after the failure of the blockade it appeared that the Soviets had decided not to tamper with the Berlin settlement.

This period of relaxation ended on November 10, 1958, when Nikita Khrushchev demanded that an end be made to the four-power control of Berlin and indicated that the Soviet Union would yield its part of the occupation to the East German government. The implication was clear that the Russians consider West Berlin to be simply a part of Berlin and thus part of East Germany. It was further clear that once the Soviets had handed over their authority to the East Germans, they believed that the East Germans would have clear sovereignty in Berlin, could thus control access to the capital, and could then order Western forces and citizens out of the city.

The United States promptly replied that the status of Berlin had been drawn up by the four powers working together and that therefore no one of the four had any right to change that status without the consent of the other three.

On November 27, 1958, Khrushchev proposed that Berlin be made a demilitarized free city and announced that the Soviet government would transfer the control of access to Berlin to the East Germans by June 1, 1959, no matter what the Western powers might care to do about it. This seemed to give a six-month period of grace for the West to make up its mind to accept the inevitable.

Within the next few weeks the United States was joined by Great Britain, France, and the German Federal Republic, as well as by the NATO Council, in statements that the West refused to accept Russia's proposal and would defend its position in Berlin. President Eisenhower, Prime Minister Macmillan, and other leaders in speeches, radio broadcasts, and by all other available means confirmed their determination to maintain their position and rights in Berlin.

The early months of 1959 were filled with negotiations. The Russians offered a proposed peace treaty on Germany which would perpetuate the division, recognize the Eastern state, and consecrate the Oder-Neisse boundary. In reply, the West proposed a general conference on the German problem at the foreign minister level, with participation by the Germans. Khrushchev countered with the suggestion for a summit conference, an idea which won no support in Washington, for the American government felt that there should be some assurance of success be-
fore it would be worth while to risk failure at the summit. Prime Minister Macmillan made the journey to Moscow in March and even accepted a rebuff from his host, who left the capital while Macmillan was there. However, Khrushchev did promise the British leader that the six-month deadline did not apply and that the Russians would not take any precipitate action in late May. Before the end of March the four powers had agreed to hold a conference at the foreign minister level in Geneva, with the understanding that if there were a possibility of a successful issue, a summit conference would be held to make it final. Accordingly, the Geneva Conference met on May 11, 1959.

The conference remained in session sporadically until early August. At the outset both the Soviet delegation and the Western powers presented drafts of their proposed plans to solve the whole German problem. Needless to say, these plans were mutually unacceptable. At times the conference bogged down over trivia and reminded onlookers of the negotiations at Westphalia in the 1640's (e.g., the first meeting was delayed for hours by a dispute over where the representatives from the two parts of Germany should sit). Finally the American secretary of state, Christian Herter, decided that the conference had no future and by his departure brought it to a close. There were no tangible results. However, it is noteworthy that the deadline announced by the Soviets came and went without any action, and the situation in Berlin remained as it had for ten years. This fact itself was possibly an achievement.

In the autumn of 1959 Premier Khrushchev visited the United States and held several private conversations with President Eisenhower. The atmosphere seemed to be friendly, even jovial, and announcement was made of a summit conference to be held in May, 1960, and of a visit by Eisenhower to the Soviet Union shortly thereafter. Khrushchev denied that there had been any ultimatum about Berlin intended or that there was any deadline after which the Russians would take unilateral action. There seemed to be a relaxation in the cold war.

Events proved that the relaxation was only temporary, if indeed it existed at all. When the heads of state assembled in Paris for the summit conference, Khrushchev ended the meeting before it began on the issue of the capture of an American plane performing espionage duties over Russian territory. A few hours later he announced at a press conference that the Soviet Union was planning to make a separate peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic which would give the East German authorities control of the access to Berlin. However, shortly afterward in a speech in East Berlin he announced that the treaty would not be signed immediately but at some indefinite date in the future.
Thus the Berlin crisis persisted. It may persist for years. No one could possibly predict the next actions of the Soviet government, but the informed consensus seemed to be that Berlin and its anomalous situation was a convenient weapon for the Soviets to use whenever they wished to increase the tensions in a world already tense.

History never stands still. There is never a moment at which one can stand back and make a thorough appraisal of the development of a nation, certainly not a nation with so troubled a history as Germany's.