## Contents

Preface ix

**PART ONE. THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS**

**CHAPTER ONE. Purpose and Method**

1.1. Bringing Theory to Bear on Data 6
1.2. Bringing Data to Bear on Theory 7
1.3. A Possible Objection and a Rejoinder 9
1.4. Blueprint 10
1.5. Scylla and Charybdis 12
1.6. Coda 14

**CHAPTER TWO. Theories and Explanations**

2.1. The Realist Paradigm and Classical Deterrence Theory 21
2.2. Coda 37

**CHAPTER THREE. Perfect Deterrence Theory: An Overview**

3.1. Axioms and General Theoretical Characteristics 40
3.2. Explaining the Absence of War 44
3.3. Theoretical Propositions, Empirical Expectations, and Policy Implications 49
3.4. Coda 56

**PART TWO. EXPLAINING THE GREAT WAR**

**CHAPTER FOUR. Bismarck’s System**

4.1. The Tripartite Crisis Game 64
4.2. Outcomes and Preferences 67
4.3. Analysis 72
4.4. Explaining the Austro-German Alliance of 1879 87
4.5. Coda 89
CHAPTER FIVE. Vienna, Berlin, and the Blank Check

5.1. Background 91
5.2. The Tripartite Crisis Game Redux 96
5.3. Analysis 100
5.4. Coda 106

CHAPTER SIX. La Guerre Européenne

6.1. Asymmetric Escalation Game 113
6.2. Preferences 118
6.3. Some Caveats 120
6.4. Analysis 123
6.5. Discussion 128
6.6. Coda 143

CHAPTER SEVEN. Britain’s Strategic Dilemma

7.1. Modeling the Deterrence versus Restraint Dilemma 147
7.2. Preference Assumptions 148
7.3. Information and Utility Assumptions 151
7.4. Analysis 152
7.5. Explaining Britain’s Foreign Policy in 1914 158
7.6. Coda 166

PART THREE. ENGAME

CHAPTER EIGHT. Questions, Answers, Implications

8.1. Explanation 172
8.2. Theoretical Assessment 181
8.3. Implications and Final Thoughts 186

References 195
Index 209