Notes

INTRODUCTION

1. I consider the case of the Jewish diaspora and its links to Israel to be an archetypical rather than idiosyncratic one. This case provides a fully developed paradigm of relations between diaspora and homeland from preindependence, via attainment of statehood, to the period of postindependence state consolidation. Indeed, this case is often singled out by other diasporas as a model to be emulated and is frequently cited as such by both scholars and international actors alike. Other diasporic-homeland interactions may only partially match this paradigm. This, of course, does not indicate that they are qualitatively different but rather that they represent only part of the full range of the paradigmatic diaspora-homeland nexus.


CHAPTER ONE

An earlier version of this chapter was published with Martin Sherman in Nations and Nationalism (summer 1998). The first draft was presented at the Harvard-MIT MacArthur Seminar in March 1996. The authors wish to thank Juan J. Linz,
Myron Weiner, Zvi Gitelman, Aharon Klieman, and Michael Kochin for their helpful comments.


3. Such as present-day relations between Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh and independent Armenia.


5. Aviel Roshwald writes: “Because, in principle, civic nationalism is inclusive of all who choose to participate in the common political culture, regardless of their parentage or mother tongue, most authors associate it with liberal, tolerant values and respect for the rights of the individual.” Roshwald, Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall of Empires: Central Europe, Russia, and the Middle East, 1914–1923 (New York: Routledge, 2001), 5.


8. Whatever the details of such a model may turn out to be, it seems likely that the causal roots of a failure to create (impose) a national identity may be traced, albeit not exclusively, to inappropriate delineation of political boundaries in relation to political allegiances, while those of failures to maintain national identity may be attributed, at least partially, to the obsolescence or loss of relevance of some formerly unifying ideology.

9. Since Moldova declared its independence from the Soviet Union, the new country has faced secessionist claims by republics in southern and eastern Moldova, Gagauzia and Transnistria (which has a large Russian-speaking community). At the same time, some ethnic Moldovan elites pressed their case for a pan-Romanian nation and called for the reintegration of Moldova with Romania. The Gagauzi and Transnistrians feared that the pan-Romanianism would lead to a forced “romanization” and a quick union of Moldova and Romania. See Charles King, “Moldovan Identity and the Politics of Pan-Romanianism,” Slavic Review 53, no. 2 (1994): 358. The fighting between the Dniester Republic and the Moldovans claimed the lives of hundreds and led to the dispatch of Russian troops into action on the side of the Dniester Republic. Eventually, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) sent a representative mission that formulated a comprehensive proposal for cantonizing the region. On February 1, 1994, after political and military pressure from the Russian state, the Moldovan government

10. One observer has written that “if the Armenians do ultimately carve out an independent region in Azerbaijan for themselves . . . it will be largely a result of the efforts of zealous diaspora Armenians.” Financial Times, September 16, 1994.

11. British foreign secretary Lord Curzon criticized the action as “a thoroughly bad and vicious solution for which the world will pay a heavy penalty for hundred years to come.” Winston Churchill, however, argued that “the dis-entanglement of populations which took place between Greece and Turkey . . . was in many ways a success, and has produced friendly relations between Greece and Turkey ever since.” At the Nuremberg trials, population transfers were defined as war crimes. Cited in Alan Dowty, Closed Borders: The Contemporary Assault on Freedom of Movement (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 88, 97.


14. In their common struggle to depose an existing tyrannical regime, nationalist exiles may collaborate with ethnic secessionists. See Shain, Frontier of Loyalty.

15. An important and very complex question is to what extent ideological divisions and large differences in regime type eventually may lead to ethnic divisions. In the case of Korea, there are many indications that the physical division at the 38th parallel gradually created deep ideational disparities so that any future push toward unification must contend with the divergence in values adopted by both societies.


20. Roshwald, Ethnic Nationalism.

21. The Soviet model intended in theory, though failed in practice, to unite all ethnonational groups in the Soviet empire under the banner of socialist comradeship. In many respects Soviet policy seems to have been confused and self-contradictory. Thus, on the one hand it prohibited any other vision of its constituent republics and systematically attempted to obliterate traditional cultures and to erase the recorded histories and memories of its titular nations. See Khachig Tololyan, “National Self-determination and the Limits of Sovereignty: Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the Secession of Nagorno-Karabagh,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 1, no. 1 (1995): 98. At the same time, and in apparent contradiction to its own political ideology, the Soviet state fostered and cultivated the titular nationalities. Indeed, the Constitution of the Soviet Union also provided in the famous article 17
that “the right freely to secede from the USSR is reserved to every Union Republic.” Cited in Lee C. Buchheit, *Secession: The Legitimacy of Self Determination* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), 100.

22. The large Eritrean refugee diaspora (that resulted from Ethiopian ethno-focal imposition) became a major force in the war for Eritrean independence. This pre-state mobilization remained very important after independence especially when the diaspora became the lifeline in supporting their homeland during the Eritrean-Ethiopian war of 1998–2000. See Ethiopiai, “The Eritrian–Ethiopian Conflict,” in Astri Suhrke and Lela Garner Noble, eds., *Ethnic Conflict in International Relations* (New York: Praeger, 1977), 36–37.

23. Kedourie’s account of the Turkish experience illustrates the complexity involved in the creation of an ideofocal identity.

Legal and political equality—however formal and empty of substance—made it difficult, if not impossible, to justify the millet system, with its communal institutions which acted as a shield to protect its members from the demands, and the usually unwelcome attentions of the government. If equality was now the rule there was no need for special privileges and for institutions to secure these. Under the new dispensation millets became minorities since equality necessarily meant that one citizen, whatever his religion, was to count no more than another citizen. This is indeed the logic of democracy, but the logic becomes somewhat oppressive when majorities and minorities are immutable. The majority is thus perpetually dominant, and imposes its norms and views on the minority, while the minority has little or no interest in maintaining the body politic of which it is ostensibly a member. A minority in such circumstances remains as much outside the pays politique in a modern Rechtsstaat as the millet had been when the state followed the laws of Islam. The minority may have a few representatives in parliamentary assemblies. But such representatives cannot possibly sway, or prevail against, the overwhelming numbers who belong to the majority religion. Again, should they attempt to act as the representatives of a minority, their position becomes false and awkward, precisely because the polity is deemed to be nationally homogeneous, and to proscribe divisions based on religion. The recognized status of the millet is replaced by the insecurity and tension which the discrepancy between democratic rhetoric and political reality must generate.


24. In India, where secular nationalism (associated with the Congress Party) served for decades as the official doctrine of national identity, many consider the rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its connection with the Hindu nationalist group, Rashtria Swayamsewak Sangh (RSS) as the greatest threat to the supraethnic vision of the nation. Mita Menezes, “The Rise and Domination of Hindu Nationalism: The Future of India’s National Identity” (essay, Georgetown University, December 2002).


26. Sherman, for example, has developed a theoretical model, showing how the differences in the internal structures of regimes affect the harshness of their policy

27. Indigenous peoples include aboriginal—i.e., “the residents of a place from earliest known times”—or colonialist settlers. See Myron Werther, “Labor Migrations as Incipient Diasporas,” in Sheffer, ed., Modern Diasporas, 7.

28. Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947–1949 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). Israel provides an interesting duality of both ethnofocal and ideofocal traits. If “Jewishness” is considered an ethnically homogenous feature, then in this regard Israel is indeed an ethnofocal state. If, however, the more commonly perceived ethnic traits, such as ancestral origin, social and cultural norms or mother tongue, or even physiological features are considered, then the Jewish population of Israel may be perceived as a highly diverse ethnic community, united by the ideofocal principle of Zionism. In fact, some have argued that the ethnofocal component of the Jews in modern times is more the result of global animosity and of persecution by external groups than of any inherent sense of a common national identity.


30. Refugees forced out of their homeland frequently resist adaptation while awaiting their return. By contrast, economic migrants tend to try to adopt a new identity associated with the host country. However, with the passage of time, even the most dedicated exile communities begin to adopt immigrant-like characteristics such as in the case of the anti-Castro Cubans in the United States. Migrant communities are at times drawn into ethnonational existence abroad when they face difficulties in assimilating in their host societies or conversely when their full empowerment in the host country mobilizes them to intervene in the politics of the homeland. The reluctance to integrate may be also encouraged by religious obligations as in the case of certain orthodox followers of the Muslim faith. They cannot, in principle, integrate into a system that requires loyalty to a liberal democratic state.


39. Here I must distinguish between (1) an “irredentist” diaspora and (2) a “far-removed” diaspora. Though members of the first category reside outside the national state, they remain within the geographical confines of the homeland as defined by nationalists. In this sense they are not really a diaspora. Moreover, not all transborder communities consist of indigenous people, and, in fact, many are simply immigrants. Yet, even in the latter case, the sense of indigenousness may be developed and irredentist claims may ultimately form. For example, the Mexican-American population in the Southwest of the United States has been cited as a potential source of irredentist aspirations. See Morris Janowitz, *The Reconstruction of Patriotism: Education for Civic Consciousness* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 137.


47. The fear of American disunity has received new theoretical backing in Samuel Huntington’s recent thesis about the expanding dominance of “civilizations” in world affairs. Huntington has argued that the persistence of “kin-country” loyalties in the United States run much deeper than assimilationists are willing to admit, and has questioned whether the trend toward “the de-Westernization of the United States . . . means its de-Americanization in the democratic sense.” Samuel Huntington, “If Not Civilizations, What? Paradigms of the Post–Cold War,” *Foreign Affairs* 72 (1993), 189–90.

48. Shain, *Marketing the American Creed Abroad*.

49. Anatoly N. Yamskov, “Russian Diaspora: Political Implications,” memo. However, if settler populations evolve demographically into a large minority (or even a majority) and become well-blended in cultural-linguistic terms with the
indigenous group—so that many of its members no longer even speak the language of their respective nationalities—regional identity, and not ethnicity, may emerge as the new basis for the seceding areas. Such newly established sovereign entities now constitute a community with a distinct version of culture whose members do not perceive themselves as part of a diaspora, even though the new state maintains strong connections with the state from which they secede.

52. Tololyan, “National Self-determination,” 98.

CHAPTER TWO

An earlier version of this chapter was published with Martin Sherman in Nationalism and Ethnic Politics (winter 2001).

2. Gruen, Diaspora, 246.
7. I adopt this term and the attendant abbreviation (IEIS) not only for reasons of notational brevity but also for reasons of substance. It conveys well the notion that I focus on: money flows within a given ethnic group but between segments thereof residing in different states.
9. Alexander Kitroeff, “Continuity and Change in Contemporary Greek His-
notes to pages 37–41


22. This attention to detail in articulating the logical link between the specification of the concept of nation is not mere semantic gymnastics but an essential methodological clarification in a field where surrender to methodological sloth
has become almost a sanctified principle. Indeed because of the alleged “complexity” of the subject matter, scholars contend that matters relating to nationalism “def[y] exact definition . . . [and] have many facets which stand in the way of rigorous and complete analysis,” and argue that “the scientific form of inquiry may be inappropriate.” A. Philips, “European Nationalism in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries,” in R. Mitchison, ed., Roots of Nationalism (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1980), 1–4. Apart from the fact that this “unscientific” approach appears to have the ring of intellectual surrender, it leaves open the question of precisely what form of unscientific inquiry would in fact be appropriate. It is thus little wonder that Israel Zangwill deemed issues related to nationalism to be “one of those tropical jungles of thought in which [the dangerous and imprecise colloquialisms] of politics and journalism flourish.” Quoted in L. L. Snyder, The Meaning of Nationalism (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1954), 5.


24. The former embodies the idea of a nation characterized by monolithic (sociocultural) uniformity; the latter, the idea of a nation characterized by harmonious (sociocultural) diversity, bonded by a common political allegiance. See Lord Acton, “Nationality,” in Essays in Freedom and Power (Boston: Beacon, 1949), 183–85.

25. According to the former, the nation is seen as an organic division of humanity, decreed by some divine or natural edict, and the ties that bind the nation and determine the political allegiance of its members are objectively discernible attributes such as ethnoracial, cultural, or linguistic traits. According to the latter perception, the idea of nation denotes “a number of individuals who have signified their will as to the manner of their government.” This view, which emphasizes the exercise of human volition as a generating force of nations, is underscored in the works of Mazzini where the binding force of a nation “does not depend upon race or descent, but upon common thought and a common goal” See Hans Kohn, Prophets and Peoples: Studies in Nineteenth Century Nationalism (New York: Colliers, 1961), 89.


27. Although it is true that in many respects this division parallels that of the more familiar distinction between ethnic and civic nations, it does however deviate from it in two substantively important aspects. First, the ideofocal term is more inclusive than the civic one. For while the latter is almost universally associated with multiethnic-libertarian connotations, the former is intended to incorporate multiethnic-authoritarian contexts as well, in which the use of the term civic would be at best misleading if not entirely misplaced. By contrast, the term ideofocal focuses on the allegedly unifying ideal (such as Soviet communism) rather than the rights exercised by those allegedly unified by it. Second, and more important for the purposes of this study, while the ethnic/civic distinction focuses more on the end results
of political process (the kind of states and/or nations that reflect the *culmination* of a process of nation building), our terminology places greater emphasis on the *causal origins* of political process (the nature of the nuclei around which national collectivities coalesce and that seed the nation-building process). It is thus better suited for an analysis of effects on the causal determinants of national identities, induced by factors such as financial flows to and from home and host countries, which make up the central focus of this investigation.


34. Yossi Shain, *Marketing the American Creed Abroad: Diasporas in the U.S. and Their Homelands* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 113. According to some sources, up to half of the Hamas Islamic organization’s budget of about $40 million was financed by Palestinian diasporic sources in Europe and the United States. The money was collected via charitable organizations and religious institutions and was recognized in the United States as qualifying for tax exemptions. See Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, *The Hamas Wind: Violence and Coexistence* (Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronoth, 1999), 127 (in Hebrew).


36. For example, when in March 1998 the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) began its armed campaign against Milošević, the rebels appealed to their kin diasporas in the United States for financial support. As NATO bombing commenced and the misery of the Albanian population in the region intensified, Albanian-Americans united in a show of force and donated considerable sums of money to the guerrilla forces. Subsequently, hundreds of young Albanian-Americans, driven by sentiments of kindred allegiance, left the United States and enlisted to fight alongside their ethnic brethren in the ranks of the KLA (*International Herald Tribune*, April 13, 1999).


42. Khachig Tololyan writes, “No overview of the Diaspora’s influence on the NKR [Nagorno-Karabakh] conflict, whether directed or mediated through Armenia, can neglect the economic dimension. First, the two Armenian lobbies in Washington have been crucial in securing for Armenia over $1 billion since 1991 in U.S. aid. A small part of that would have gone to Armenia without such lobbying, but not most of it. That averages to about $86.5 million a year for a government whose budget sank to less than $200 million at its nadir (the 2003 budget was $574 million in expenditures and $493 million in revenues). In 2003, Armenia’s GDP was $2.7 billion. NKR’s was $62 million and growing at close to 20% a year. Estimates for remittances to Armenia from Armenians working abroad, primarily in Russia, are between $200 and $300 million in 2003. Analogous figures are not available for NKR, but likely to be in comparable proportions. Tourism by some 200,000 tourists (most Armenians, either post-1988 emigrants returning for a visit, many others members of the older diaspora) contributed an estimated $120 million to GDP. Philanthropic organizations like the Hayastan Fund, the AGBU, the United Armenian Fund and the Armenian Relief Society have also contributed millions, though here the figures are less reliable because much of the assistance came in the form of goods, from aging kidney dialysis machines to computers to clothes and medications. In these various ways, the old and new diasporas together contribute a significant percentage of Armenia’s and NKR’s GDP. These sums are of material significance. They raise morale and the will to resist a settlement of the Karabakh issue regarded as unfavorable. And that difference in morale has been a major factor throughout the conflict. Not surprisingly, Azerbaijan’s leadership has taken steps to promote the organization of its own dispersed emigrant populations into diasporas.” See “The Armenian Diaspora and the Karabagh Conflict, from 1988 to the Future,” in Hazel Smith and Paul Stares, eds., *Diasporas in Conflict: Peacemakers or Peace Wreckers?* (United Nations University Press, 2007), 122.


50. Schoenbaum, *United States*.


64. *Ha’aretz*, November 17, 1999.


69. See “The Role and Contributions of NGO’s that Educate for Judaism as Culture in the General School System of Israel and the Secular Arena” (draft paper by PANIM for Jewish Renaissance in Israel written by Uzi Arad and Meir Yoffe, January 2003).


CHAPTER THREE


2. Cited in Aryeh Gershoni, “The United States Jews and the Disengagement from Gaza” (paper, Tel Aviv University, October 1, 2005).


4. Naftali Rothenberg, “Jews in Israel and the United States: Diverging Identities,” in Ernest Krausz and Gitta Tulea, eds., Jewish Survival: The Identity Problem at the Close of the Twentieth Century (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1999), 166–67. See also Steven T. Rosenthal, Irreconcilable Differences? The Waning of the American Jewish Love Affair with Israel (Hanover, NH: Brandeis University Press, 2001). On August 17, 2004, Moshe Katzav, Israel’s president, wrote in the Jerusalem Post, “I cannot feel complacent when the majority of the Jewish people still does not reside here, and when the majority of the Jewish people abroad do not provide their children with Jewish education and are becoming detached from their Jewish roots. In Israel too there is a similar phenomenon: It is a fact that students who grow up here and have graduated from the public school system are not sufficiently knowledgeable about the basics of Judaism.”


6. Studies by Yochanan Peres and Epharim Yuchtman-Yaar present the following categories of Israeli Jews according to their self-definition: 10 percent haredim (ultra-Orthodox), 10 percent religious, 29 percent traditional, and 51 percent secular. These studies also reveal that 23 percent of the Jewish-Israeli public worship in synagogues on a daily basis, and 26 percent do not drive a car on the Jewish Sabbath. See Between Consent and Dissent: Democracy and Peace in the Israeli Mind (Jerusalem: The Israel Democracy Institute, 1998), 162–63. According to Asher Arian, “About a quarter of Israeli Jews are observant in an Orthodox sense or even beyond that, including 6 to 10 percent haredi, or ultra-Orthodox, [while] about 40 percent are determinedly secular.” See The Second Republic: Politics in Israel (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1998), 10.


10. Rabin was assassinated in November 1995 by Yigal Amir, a young Israeli religious nationalist student who was influenced by Rabinic authorities of his camp (in Israel and the United States) that articulated the view that by agreeing to relinquish segments of the Holy Land to Gentiles Rabin was deemed “rodef” and “moser,” two obscure Halachic precepts that made the prime minister liable to be killed. See Milton Viorst, *What Shall I Do with This People: Jews and the Fractious Politics of Judaism* (New York: Free Press, 2002), 239–42, and Martin Kramer, “The Middle East, Old and New,” *Daedalus* (spring 1997): 94.


15. This view is echoed in the work of Yair Sheleg, an Israel journalist on religious affairs who recently observed that “while the demographic, financial, and spiritual center of gravity of non-Orthodox movements is in the United States, Israel is the world center for almost every Orthodox group. See “The North American Impact on Israel Orthodoxy,” American Jewish Committee, New York, 1999, 6.

16. Alan Dershowitz put forward the “Jewish Question” for the twenty-first century as “Can we survive our success?” He writes, “The good news is the American Jews—as individuals—have never been more secure, more affluent, and less victimized by discrimination or anti-Semitism. The bad news is that American Jews—as a people—have never been in greater danger of disappearing through assimilation, intermarriage, and low birth rates.” See Alan M. Dershowitz, *The Vanishing American Jew: In Search of Jewish Identity for the Next Century* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1997), 1.

17. For the debate over the study of Jewish-American demography and the different interpretations of population surveys, see Bernard Wasserstein, “Post-Diaspora Jewry and Post-Zionist Israel” (paper presented at the International Conference on Diasporas: Transnational Identities and the Politics of the Homeland, University of California, Berkeley, November 12–13, 1999).


23. See Ori Z. Soltes, “Memory, Tradition, and Revival: Mapping and Identi-
fying the Political Structure of the Jewish Community Worldwide,” in “Occasional Papers on Jewish Civilization Israel and the Diaspora” (Program for Jewish Civilization, Georgetown University, summer 2005), 14.

24. The term is borrowed from Robert Wuthnow.


30. Two political scientists at Bar Ilan University argued recently that the notion of Israel being “the first flowering of our redemption”—a term used in the in the Prayer for the State and recited on Shabbat as part of the regular service—"is essentially a symbolic ritual messianism that does not impact on quotidian life and on general and political behavior patterns” of the “silent majority” of religious Zionists. And yet, this messianic approach is the most vocal among religious Zionist leaders and their radicalized followers. See Asher Cohen and Stuart Cohen, “Tarred with the Brush of Extremism: In the Public and Academic Discourse, All Religious Zionists Are Branded as Deviants—Despite the Facts,” Haaretz, November 30, 2005, 8.


33. As early as 1885, the blueprint of American Reform Judaism declared, “We consider ourselves no longer a nation, but a religious community, and, therefore, expect neither a return to Palestine . . . nor the restoration of the laws concerning the Jewish state.” See “Reform Judaism and Zionism: A Centenary Platform,” CCAR Journal (spring 1998): 10.

34. See statement by the Central Committee of American Rabbis, May 1999. For the opinions of the two leading shapers of the political ideology of the Reform movement on this issue, see Albert Vorspan and David Saperstein, Jewish Dimensions of Social Justice: Tough Moral Choices of Our Time (New York: UAHC Press, 1998), 137.


38. For the best book on the subject, see Charles S. Liebman and Eliezer Don-Yehiya, Civil Religion in Israel (Berkeley: University of California Press), 1983. For
an analysis of how the civil religion helped in creating Israel's perceived sense of “exceptionalism,” and the implications of this collective identity for the foundation of Israel's national security, see Gil Merom, “Israel’s National Security and the Myth of Exceptionalism,” Political Science Quarterly 114, no. 3 (fall 1999): 409–93.


42. Studies by Arye Ratner show that the main cleavage among Jews in Israel today is between the secular and the religious camps. These studies also indicate a growing affinity between religious Zionists and the haredi community. While religious Zionists are gradually adopting more conservative religious practices, the haredi camp is taking hard-line and ultranationalist positions on matters of peace and war with the Palestinians, and adopt the posture of religious Zionists in the settler community regarding the sanctity of the occupied territories. Altogether, Ratner points out, there is a growing tendency within the Israeli religious community to delegitimate Israel’s legal system in favor of religious dogmas in a process that endangers the Israeli Rechtsstaat. See Arye Dayan, “Goodbye Old Cleavage, Hello New One,” Ha'aretz (Hebrew), July 30, 2000, B 3.


47. Am Ve’olam: “Nation and World: Jewish Culture in a Changing World,” Recommendations of the Committee for Investigation into Judaic Studies in State Education. Israeli Ministry of Education 1994. Yosef Dan, a leading Israeli scholar of Judaic studies, has argued that the hostility of many Israelis toward religious politics has led them to abandon Judaism altogether, thereby downgrading the validity of Jewish pluralism and Jewish cultural aspects, and unintentionally legitimating the ultraorthodox religious hegemony. This process has contributed to the decline of Judaic scholarship inside Israel, while in the West, Judaic studies have flourished under the new creed of diversity and multiculturalism. Yosef Dan, “Empty Hands,” Free Judaism (Hebrew) 11–12 (October 1997): 9.

48. The platform stated, “Extortion and exploitation of the public treasury for religious purposes have to end. The ultra-Orthodox establishment is a threat to the orderly administration of a free society and to the individual freedom that characterizes a democratic state. Attempts to turn Israel into a state based on Halacha (Jewish religious law) endanger our future. We seek to separate state and religion, while preserving the country’s Zionist character.”


50. A 1993 study by the Louis Guttman Israel Institute of Applied Social
Research maintains that “Israeli society has a strong traditional bent, and, as far as religious practices are concerned there is a continuum from the ‘strictly observant’ to the ‘nonobserver.’” Shlomit Levy, Hanna Levinson, and Elihu Katz, “Beliefs, Observances, and Social Interactions among Israeli Jews,” the Louis Guttmann Israel Institute of Applied Social Research, Jerusalem, December 1993, 2. Arian writes that “in 1996, the overwhelming majority of Jews identified themselves as ‘Jewish’ and ‘Israeli.’ Respondents were given four identities to rank: Jewish, Israeli, their ethnic classification (Ashkenazi or Sephardi), or religion (observant or secular). . . . More than 40 percent of the respondents chose each of ‘Jewish’ and ‘Israeli’ as both first and second choice. Ethnic and religious observance identities were left far behind.” Asher Arian, The Second Republic: Politics in Israel, 7.


53. Moshe Shokeid has found a great degree of similarity between the synagogue practices of Mizrahim in Israel and the religious practices of Conservative American Jews. “Like the Mizrahim in Israel, Jewish-Americans developed a social infrastructure of a communal-family migratory base that unified and preserved the Jewish-American synagogue communities for many decades.” Moshe Shokeid and Shlomo Deshen, The Generation of Transition: Community and Change among North African Immigrants in Israel (Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi, 1999), 243–44 (translated by the author from Hebrew).


55. For an analysis of the media campaigns of the movements, see Michal Schwartzman, “The Media Campaign of the Reform and Conservative Movements in Israel” (paper, Tel Aviv University, 1997).


57. See the statement by Samuel H. Sislen, executive director of the Masorti Foundation for Conservative Judaism in Israel, in “Strengthening Israel, Strengthening Conservative Judaism,” Women’s League Outlook (fall 1999).

58. See Ellen Schnitser, “The Impact of American Liberal Jewish Identity in Israel: The Case Study of Russian Speaking Immigrants” (paper, Tel Aviv University, April 2003).

59. In November 1999, activists of the General Assembly of America’s Jewry met in Atlanta and moved to establish a single umbrella organization, the United Jewish Communities (UJC). In what was described by one Israeli journalist as “more than a bureaucratic upheaval,” the new body took aim at redirecting funds to bolster Jewish identity in a process that empowers U.S.-based local federations and gives them greater say over spending in Israel. The new body unified all Jewish communities across America—through a merger of the UJA, the United Israel Appeal (UIA), and the Council of Jewish Federations (CJF). See Nitzan Horowitz, “Historic Assembly to Be a Melting Pot, as U.S. Jewish Organizations Merge,”


63. With the rise of intermarriages among Jews in the United States, American Reform rabbis have eased the difficult process of Jewish conversion in order to enable tens of thousands of American gentiles to become Jewish. The Orthodox do not recognize these conversions and regard Reform and Conservative converts as non-Jews. J. J. Goldberg, Jewish Power: Inside the American Jewish Establishment (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1996), 338.

64. According to J. J. Goldberg, the Lubavitcher Rebbe “had built a powerful trans-Atlantic political machine to press his view on a reluctant Israeli Orthodox political establishment. They in turn, had pressured [Prime Minister] Shamir.” Jewish Power, 338.


66. While the vast majority of Israeli Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox (about 80 percent) reject the idea of a Palestinian state in the occupied territories, a large majority of “non-observant” (75 percent) or “somewhat-observant” (62 percent) Israeli Jews support such an outcome as part of a permanent agreement. These divisions resemble those within the diaspora. See Asher Arian, “Israeli Public Opinion on National Security,” Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies (JCSS) Memorandum no. 53, August 1999, 46.


68. For the statement see Shahar Ilan, “Progressive Jews: ‘What Synagogue Are We Not Going To?’” Ha’aretz (English), February 21, 1999, 6.

69. Cited in Rabbi G. Hirsch’s keynote address, published in the Electronic Newsletter of the World Union for Progressive Judaism, Special Convention Issue, March 11, 1999, 5. The writers were attacked vehemently by secular Israelis who argued that by endorsing Reform and Conservative Judaism and by calling on Israelis to join these movements, they were undermining the vision of a secular-humanistic Jewish-Israeli movement. For A. B. Yehoshua’s response to these charges, see Free Judaism (Hebrew) 14 (April 1999): 38.


71. Yossi Klein Halevi has articulated a vision of how Israel should develop a new, indigenous Judaism that builds on American diasporic innovation. See his essay “Jewish Identities in Post-Rabin Israel” (Institute on American Jewish Israeli Relations, Jerusalem, July 1998).

72. Cited in the periodical report of the Minister of Diaspora and Social Affairs, Jerusalem, February 20, 2000.

73. Cited in “Making Meaning: Participants’ Experience of Birthright Israel,” a publication of the Maurice and Marilyn Cohen Center for Modern Jewish Studies, Brandeis University, November 2000, 1.


76. Schoenbaum, *United States*, 64.


82. Sarna and Dalin, *Religion and State*, 262.


85. Paul Berman has written that “it was sometimes believed that Palestinian skin tone was darker than that of the Israeli Jews, as if in pigmental confirmation of the proposed new link between Palestinians and African-Americans.” Paul Berman, “The Other and Almost the Same,” *New Yorker*, February 28, 1994, 68.


90. By that time a web of over seventy pro-Israel political action committees had been established that channeled $4.7 million to pro-Israel candidates during the 1987–88 election cycle. See Eisenstat, “Loving Israel,” 93.
91. Aaron S. Klieman, Israel and the World after Forty Years (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1990), 178.
93. See “American Jewish Attitudes,” survey by Market Facts, 45, 55.
94. Goldberg, Jewish Power, 359.
96. During negotiations between Israel and Syria, haredi and religious Zionists protested against Prime Minister Ehud Barak’s intention to trade land for peace and chanted “traitor, go home!” while leaders of the Reform movement visited the Israeli Embassy and other consulates across America to show their support for the Israeli prime minister. See Caryle Murphy, “Reform Jewish Leaders Urge Support,” Washington Post, January 11, 2000; Shlomo Shamir, “Reform Jews Try Rallying for Peace,” Ha’aretz, January 10, 2000.
97. See “American Jewish Attitudes,” survey by Market Facts.
99. See David Landau, “The Voice of Post-Tolerance” (Kol Ha’ Post-Metinut), Ha’aretz (Hebrew), October 17, 1996.
100. See Janine Zacharia, “The Unofficial Ambassadors of the Jewish State,” Jerusalem Post, April 2, 2000, 1.
102. They advocate a balance between civil and religious life in Israel based on the idea that the “ways of the Torah are ways of pleasantness and all its pathways are peace.” See David Berger, “Reflections on the State of Religious Zionism,” Jewish Action 60, no. 1 (fall 1999): 12–15.
110. “A survey conducted by The Forward found that 75 per cent of American Jews felt more threatened than they did prior to September 11 and half of these


118. Mendelsohn, On Modern Jewish Politics, 144–45.

119. “The spiritual leader of the Religious-Zionist camp, former Askenazi Chief Rabbi Avraham Shapira, called on soldiers to disobey orders to evacuate Gaza, even at risk of death or imprisonment. However, Rabbi Shlomo Aviner, head of the large yeshiva in the Beit El settlement, argued that civil disobedience was legitimate, but that soldiers had to follow commanders’ orders, otherwise the Israeli army would collapse. Yet the rabbi of Beit El, Rabbi Zalman Melamed, joined with Shapira in objecting to the order for withdrawal, claiming that if Rabbi Kook was alive today he, too, would have called on the soldiers to object.” These quotes are part of an excellent analysis of Israeli debates about the Gaza withdrawal; see Meyrav Wurmser, “Color War: Two Flags and an Israeli Schism.” National Review Online, August 24, 2005, available at http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/wurmser200508240819.asp (accessed February 15, 2007).


121. See Yossi Shain, Marketing the American Creed Abroad: Diasporas in the U.S. and Their Homelands (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).


123. Israel’s victory in 1967 was taken by many evangelists as a confirmation of the accuracy of biblical prophecies and the nearness of Christ’s own reign. In the words of religious right leader Jerry Falwell, “The most dramatic evidence for His imminent return is the rebirth of the nation of Israel.” Christian Right leaders, similar to many Orthodox Jews inside and outside Israel, find modern political meaning in Israel’s conflict with Palestinians over the control of God’s territorial gift to Abraham, not only as a matter of contemporary political battle but in fact, in the words of Oklahoma senator James Inhofe, a born-again fundamentalist, as “a contest over whether the word of God is true.” For this analysis see Jeremy Mayer, “Christian Fundamentalists and Public Opinion toward the Middle East: Israel’s New Best Friends,” Social Science Quarterly 85, no. 3 (2004): 695–712.


CHAPTER FOUR

1. There are generally four types of conflict-resolution situations and related peace processes in which far-removed diasporas may play an important role: (1) State-to-state conflicts that deal primarily with resources or boundaries, where neither side is seeking to eliminate the other (Eritrea-Ethiopia or India-Pakistan); (2) State-to-state conflicts that have a distinct minority dimension (Armenia-Azerbaijan on Nagorno-Karabakh); (3) Intrastate conflicts, where a minority is seeking secession/irredentism (Sri Lanka–Tamils; United Kingdom–Northern Irish Catholics, India–Kashmiris/Sikhs); (4) Intrastate conflicts in which diasporas have the limited objective of regime change, without questioning the legitimacy of the state or its boundaries. Such conflicts involve political exiles, who by definition would expect to return home once the conflict ceases (exiles from Iraq prior to the downfall of Saddam Hussein, Iranian exiles, or anti-Castro Cubans in Miami). In all of these conflicts when sizable and organized diasporas are present, they are likely to exert influence on outcome and processes.

2. With the Armenian-American diaspora consisting of nearly one million people, and the Jewish-American diaspora numbering roughly six million, these two minority groups are acknowledged to be (alongside Cuban-Americans) the most effective at advocating their priorities in the U.S. political system. Armenia and Israel are the largest per capita recipients of U.S. foreign aid. The ways in which diaspora involvement in these cases influences the prospects for conflict perpetuation or conflict resolution are therefore of direct concern to the United States and other states that invest time and money in peacekeeping, diplomatic initiatives, and economic development in these regions. See Michal Dobbs, “Foreign Aid Shrinks but Not for All,” Washington Post, January 24, 2001, 1.

3. The role of diasporas most frequently cited in the news media is their financial role in sustaining a conflict by funding armed insurrectionist groups, terrorists, or government efforts to eradicate the latter. See Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” Policy Research Working Papers (World Bank, Washington, DC, May 2000).


5. We are not addressing the eventual outcome of peace diplomacy but rather the evolution of support and opposition within the process itself.


11. In the last decade we have witnessed a basic rethinking of the relationship between Israel and Jewish-Americans in terms of legitimacy, status, power, and identity—away from the context of Zionist vision of the gathering of the exiles toward partnership and normalization with the diaspora. See Yossi Beilin, *His Brother’s Keeper: Israel and Diaspora Jewry in the Twenty-first Century* (New York: Schocken Books, 2000).


16. Some stateless diasporas may play a critical role in the struggle for the creation of a new ethnocentric state in the traditional homeland. This has been the case with diasporic Sikhs who have led the struggle for an independent Khalistan in India, or the diasporic Tamils who are the core supporters of the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. Gabriel Sheffer has argued that, with the establishment of independent states in their claimed homelands, stateless diasporas are likely to shift their methods of activism from an aggressive posture, which often includes being a source for military recruits or terrorists, to more “innocuous exchanges” involving cash transfers, tourism, and other nonlethal activities that help consolidate their kin states. Gabriel Sheffer, “Ethno-National Diasporas and Security,” *Survival* 36, no. 1 (spring 1994): 64.


19. The address of Prime Minister Sharon to the Conference of Presidents was given February 20, 2003, in the Inbal Hotel in Jerusalem and is available at http://www.pm.gov.il/PMOEng/Archive/Speeches/2003/02/Speeches7098.htm (accessed February 15, 2007).

21. A leading scholar of the Armenian diaspora, H. Stephen Astourian, argues that on issues of national mythology, neither the homeland nor the diaspora communities are monolithic. “It is difficult to talk of the Armenian diaspora as a united entity . . . The ARF was rabidly opposed to any and all of the tentative peace deals. The Ramgavar Party had split into at least two groups. Those in Armenia opposed the final peace deal. Those in the United States were more ambiguous . . . The Hunchakian Party was also divided into three groups . . . Those in Armenia were in fact a dummy organization totally controlled by Ter-Petrossian. They supported the peace deals. The attitude of the other ones, who are in general of very little influence in Armenian life, is unclear . . . The Armenian Assembly . . . did not take a stance on that issue. Beyond these organizations, there was a group of diaspora Armenians under the influence of, or in agreement with, the views propounded in the columns of the Armenian International Magazine published in Glendale. They tended to support the peace deal in the name of realism, pragmatism, moderation, etc . . . These individuals [generally] consist of Armenians disaffected with the established organizations, some professionals, some half-assimilated Armenians, and some anti-ARF people.” Astourian, telephone interview by author, January 25, 2001.


27. In the latest war between Eritrea and Ethiopia, for instance, the Eritrean and Ethiopian diasporas in the United States together contributed hundreds of millions of dollars toward weapons purchases by their homeland countries. For more on this topic, see Jesse Driscoll, “The Economics of Insanity: Funding the Ethiopia-Eritrea War” (paper, Georgetown University, fall 2000), 6–7.


29. Daniel Byman, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, and David


31. The survey data provided by Machon Dachaf at a recent meeting at the Jewish Agency for Israel in Tel Aviv shows a deep sense of kinship and commitment expressed by Israeli Jews toward their diasporic kin. See Machon Dachaf, *Survey Data*, May 12, 2002 (survey presented at a special meeting, Jewish Agency for Israel, Tel Aviv, Israel, May 22, 2002).


34. For an elaborate discussion of the anti-Oslo campaign by American Jews, see Steve T. Rosenthal, *Irreconcilable Differences? The Waning of the American Jewish Love Affair with Israel* (Hanover, NH: Brandeis University Press, 2001), 129–33. After the Oslo Accords were signed, those American Jews who opposed the peace process joined with conservative Israeli Likud members to obstruct improved U.S. relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Over the objections of the Clinton administration and despite lobbying by Israeli diplomats, anti-Oslo Jewish groups were able to convince the U.S. Congress to enact the Middle East Peace Facilitation Act in such a way as to limit U.S. participation in the donor efforts. Diaspora activists exacerbated the sharp divide within Israel over the peace process, even to the point that U.S.-based ultra-Orthodox rabbis issued rulings that sanctioned Israeli soldiers’ insubordination and the defamation of Rabin as a traitor. One Brooklyn rabbi even announced that it would be “religiously permissible to kill Rabin.”


46. Indeed, war and peace are deeply influenced by historical images of hostility and friendliness among nations. As Kenneth Boulding observed, in conflict resolution the most critical images “are those which the nation has of itself and of those other bodies in the system which constitute its international environment . . . Whether transmitted orally and informally through the family or more formally through schooling and the written word, the national image is essentially a historical image—that is, an image which extends through time.” Kenneth Boulding, “National Images and International Systems,” in *Approaches to Peace: A Reader in Peace Studies*, ed. David P. Barash (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 46–47.

47. On the concept of an ethnonational group’s “chosen trauma” and its effects on conflict resolution, see Vamik Volkan, *Bloodlines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1997).


52. Inan Ozyildiz, Counselor, Turkish Embassy, interview by author, Washington, DC, November 4, 1999.


58. Tololyan and Beledian, interview.


64. Armenian Assembly of America, “Armenia This Week,” January 12, 2001.

65. The House leadership pulled the resolution only after then-president Clinton intervened with a letter to members of Congress.


CHAPTER FIVE


10. William Safran is correct in his observation that recent scholarship on (and the use of the appellation) diasporas, especially in the field of anthropology and cultural studies, often has produced a maze of vagueness and open definitions that emphasize difference and “otherness” and that stretch the concept to include “a varied assortment of social phenomena that have little to do with dispersions and homelands.” French scholar Stephane Dufoix characterizes this misuse as “oxy-moronic” diaspora studies. See William Safran, “Recent French Conceptualizations of Diaspora,” *Diapora* 12, no. 3 (winter 2003).
14. In the early 1990s the rallying call of protecting ethnic Russians in the “near abroad” had strong irredentist tones. Initially these voices were dominated by Russian right-wing nationalists and hard-core communist reactionaries. Yet public pronouncements regarding the centrality of the Russian diaspora are now part of the Russian mainstream and continue to alarm many policymakers in the West and in the former Soviet republic who consider “the seemingly virulent obsession with the fate of the Russians in adjoining states as a potentially destabilizing force.” See Robert A. Saunders, “A Marooned Diaspora: Ethnic Russians in the Near Abroad and Their Impact on Russia’s Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics,” in Koslowski, ed., *International Migration and the Globalization of Domestic Politics*, 183.
17. Smith, *Foreign Attachments*.
20. Although other countries of immigrants, like Germany and France, are becoming more susceptible to diasporic influences, the American case (and perhaps the Canadian) remains quite unique in its accessibility and incorporation of diasporic
voices. Even Germany, with its deeply rooted ethnonational conception of citizenship and a semicorporatist social contracting between the state and leading institutions that dominates domestic politics, has started to see the seeds of such involvement. Yet because of its institutional and ideological design, Germany restrains diasporic lobbying of its government. Thus, diasporas have little influence over German foreign policy even when they are cohesive in their demands and well organized. See Nedim Ogelman, Jeannette Money, and Philip Martin, “Immigrant Cohesion and Political Access in Influencing Host Country Foreign Policy: A Comparison of Turks in Germany and Cubans in the United States,” SAIS Review (2002).


27. Such a position was articulated by Israel’s prime minister Ariel Sharon in his address to a large gathering at the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee’s (AIPAC) 2001 annual meeting. Sharon announced that he considers himself “first and foremost as a Jew,” and that he sees himself as having been given a mandate to unify not only Israel but also “Jews worldwide.” He further declared that “the future of Israel is not just a matter for Israelis who live there. Israel belongs to the entire Jewish People.” Cited in Yossi Shain and Barry Bristman, “Diaspora, Kinship, and Loyalty: The Renewal of Jewish National Security,” International Affairs 78 (2002).

28. As one senior diaspora activist explained to the authors, “we are an organization that receives [many] million of dollars a year. We must continue to create issues to satisfy our donors and convince them of our importance.”


38. Doty, “Sovereignty and the Nation.”


42. While Doty apparently focuses on outside elements, her insight is applicable also to inside groups, i.e., diasporic communities. Furthermore, it should be noted that inside claims by diasporic elements are based only on an ethnic notion of membership; a civic notion, by definition, negates any claim of membership on the basis of kinship. Doty, “Sovereignty and the Nation.”


51. Jewish activists provided Israel’s foreign office with warnings, gradually increasing in volume and urgency, that Israel’s ties with the apartheid regime were fueling growing opposition to its interests, in the administration and Congress, and undermining Jewish relations with the African-American community. See Shain, *Marketing the American Creed Abroad*, 149–51.

52. Other than that, we are unaware of instances of diasporas in nondemocracies that are or were able to organize and exert influence on homelands’ policies. To the extent that they exist, they are not independent.

53. These, then, are the two reasons why most of the literature dealing with ethnic foreign policy lobbies is focused on the United States. This country is both the most influential nation in international relations, and its foreign policy decision making is highly permeable to societal pressures.

54. True, failed states are beyond the pale; there is no policy-making and therefore no opening for exerting influence. A failing state, on the other hand, is another matter.

55. During the Oslo Peace Process, when Israel’s economy was thriving, some
Israeli leaders rejected the need for diasporic assistance. Israel’s deputy foreign minister Yossi Beilin told diaspora Jewry to spend their money on Jewish education abroad since Israel would no longer want to be treated as a charity case. See Steven Rosenthal, *Irreconcilable Differences? The Waning of the American Jewish Love Affair with Israel* (Hanover, NH: Brandeis University Press, 2001), 175. It was at this juncture that American Jews started to redirect their financial assistance to Israel from state to civil and political-society causes. This trend was reversed beginning in 2001 when perception of acute Jewish insecurity inside and outside Israel galvanized the United Jewish Communities’ emergency campaign that quickly raised about $300 million “to help educate diaspora Jews about the [Middle East] crisis, keep them connected with Israel, and raise money to help Israel” (*Jerusalem Post*, June 27, 2002).

56. Aviel Roshwald, *Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall of Empires: Central Europe, Russia, and the Middle East, 1914–1923* (New York: Routledge, 2001), 110.


58. The diaspora was divided along class, religion, and political lines, and was influenced by the political and cultural pressures of the different surroundings in which Armenians lived. Unlike the Dashnaks, the diasporic bourgeoisie cooperated with Soviet Armenians in communal matters. See Razmik Panossian, “Between Ambivalence and Intrusion: Politics and Identity in Armenian-Diaspora Relations,” *Diaspora* 7 (1998): 155–58.

59. Panossian, “Between Ambivalence and Intrusion,” 159–60. The Soviets “portrayed the Armenian SSR as the homeland and exclusive source of national identity, where the nation was being conserved and advanced. . . . Soviet Armenia was presented as a concerned homeland providing cultural nourishment for the diaspora, so that the latter could preserve its weakening ‘Armenianness’ in foreign lands. . . . In this view, the earlier roles of donor and recipient were reversed. The homeland became the ‘aid’ provider, while the diaspora needed assistance for its national ‘survival.’”


61. Inspired by third world ideology and the international attention given to political terrorism in the Middle East and Europe, young Armenians in Lebanon established the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA). In numerous acts of terrorism against Turkish facilities and diplomats (as well as against Western targets allegedly associated with the “fascist regime in Turkey”), ASALA’s violence reenergized the Armenian cause in the international arena. The organization’s visibility posed a challenge to the Dashnak older leadership, and the diasporic party responded by establishing its own terrorist arm known as the Justice Commando for the Armenian Genocide. See Anat Kurz and Ariel Merari, *ASALA: Irrational Terror or Political Tool* (Boulder: Westview, 1985).


63. This point was made by Armenian diasporic expert Khachig Tololyan in a letter to the authors, October 4, 1999.

67. See the message from the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Armenian Assembly of America in the 1998 Annual Report.
68. Libaridian, *Challenge of Statehood*; Astourian, “From Ter-Petrosian to Kochman.”
69. A 1995 study of the World Bank shows that “in June 1994 the average wage in the state sector stood at about $2 a month—equivalent to one kilogram of meat—and $4 to $5 economy-wide; the average monthly pension was about $1.” Cited in Astourian, “From Ter-Petrosian to Kochman,” 8.
70. According to one estimate, diasporic financial transfers to Armenia from the West amount to $175 million annually, about 15 percent of the GDP for 1998. See Astourian, “From Ter-Petrosian to Kochman,” 41–42. Even though American foreign aid budget is dropping, the Armenian lobby has managed to increase aid to Armenia and has turned its homeland into the second largest recipient (after Israel) of aid per capita. Armenia receives about $120 million annually, despite plentiful evidence of corruption and a patchy record on democracy and human rights. See *Washington Post*, January 24, 2001.
73. Gerard Libaridian, an Armenian-American who served as a senior foreign policy adviser to President Ter-Petrossian, argues that the politicization of the genocide by the diaspora “had served, wittingly or unwittingly, to create the mentality and psychology that Turkey, through its non-recognition of the Genocide, is likely to repeat it, that Turkey is the eternal enemy. If Turkey is the eternal enemy, then Russia is the eternally necessary friend. And this then creates pressures on your policy of independence.” See American Forum, http://www.gomidas.org/forum/af2c (accessed February 15, 2007).
74. As Mehmet Ali Birand, a leading Turkish observer, has written: “What bothers the Armenians in the shops and markets is not whether Turkey will accept the Genocide allegations or not. They are more concerned with how to fill their stomachs and how to win their daily grind.” *Turkish Daily News*, February 2, 2001.
75. Beilin, *His Brother’s Keeper*, 72.
76. Freinkman, “Role of the Diaspora in Transition Economies.”
77. Sue Gunawardena, “From British Sikhs to British Panjabis: The Reconstruction of Diaspora Sikh Identity and Homeland Politics” (manuscript, 1999), 31.