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Dialectical versus Unequivocal
Israeli Historiography’s Treatment
of the Yishuv and Zionist Movement
Attitudes toward the Holocaust

In November 1994, I helped organize a conference called “Vision and Revision.” Its subject was to be “One Hundred Years of Zionist Historiography,” but in fact it focused on the stormy debate between Zionists and post-Zionists or Old and New Historians, a theme that pervaded Israel’s public and academic discourse at the time. The discussion revolved around a number of topics and issues, such as the birth of the Arab refugee question in the War of Independence and matters concerning the war itself.

Another key element of the controversy involved the attitude of the Yishuv (the Jewish community in prestate Israel) and the Zionist movement toward the Holocaust. There were several parts to the question: what was the goal of the Yishuv and the Zionist leadership—to save the Jews who were perishing in smoldering Europe or to save Zionism? What was more important to Zionism—to add a new cowshed at Kibbutz ‘Ein Harod and purchase another dunam of land in the Negev or Galilee or the desperate attempt to douse the European inferno with a cup of water? What, in those bleak times, motivated the head of the organized Yishuv, David Ben-Gurion: “Palestinocentrism,” and perhaps even loathing for diaspora Jewry, or the agonizing considerations of a leader in a period of crisis unprecedented in human history?

These questions were not confined to World War II and the destruction of European Jewry (1939–45) but extended back to the 1930s and forward to the postwar years. Historians now scrutinized the dilemmas with which the Zionist leadership had grappled in the 1930s such as the Zionist position on the “territorial question” posed by the Evian Conference: How should Zionism have responded to the possibility of Jewish immigration to the Dominican Republic rather than Palestine? Or there was the question of “selective aliyah” at the Nineteenth Zionist Congress in 1935: had the focus been on the plight of German Jewry or on the Yishuv’s development in the Land of Israel? This discussion sprang
up in the context of the attitude of German Zionists and the German HeHalutz movement after 1933: had they shown equal consideration for German Jewry as a whole or had the fate of the non-Zionist German Jews left them cold? The publication of Daniel Frankel’s doctoral thesis, which dealt with Zionist policy on German Jewry in the early period of the Third Reich, provoked fierce debate on the question.²

As regards the postwar years, the scholars focused on such questions as the immigration of uprooted Jews, particularly those in Germany’s displaced persons camps, to the Land of Israel: had they genuinely desired to move to Palestine or was this a consequence of Zionist manipulation? How had Israel’s leadership related to Holocaust survivors immigrating to the country during the War of Independence: had they viewed them as cannon fodder?

One dramatic, highly charged disagreement, for example, was sparked by the issue of the battle for Latrun, an episode that has largely come to symbolize the condescending, instrumentalist approach of this leadership, especially that of its first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, to Holocaust survivors who participated in the war.³

These issues and disputes surfaced in the early 1990s as a clear consequence of the upsurge in historical research on the subject. The first signs of scholarly interest had emerged in the 1970s with the publication of a handful of studies, mostly master’s theses. It was in the next decade, however, that the subject became a key research topic, with numerous studies written and published on various aspects of the Yishuv’s attitude toward the Holocaust.

The seminal study was Dina Porat’s An Entangled Leadership: The Yishuv and the Holocaust, 1942–1945,⁴ a reworked and expanded version of her Tel Aviv University doctoral thesis under the supervision of Daniel Carpi. The book caused a stir in the media, and some of the reviews were to figure in the polemic that erupted in the 1990s. An extensive essay in HaAretz’s high-exposure, Rosh HaShana issue in 1986 examined the difference of opinion between Dina Porat and a fellow historian, Yigal Elam.⁵ Porat stressed a crucial point: the Yishuv’s weakness and consequent sense of overriding helplessness. The Yishuv’s conduct and the position of its leadership, she said, “were to be understood” against the vast disparity between German might and the meager resources of a community beleaguered also by the British; this disparity engendered not only feelings of helplessness but, indeed, of despair.

Elam argued that the attitude toward the Holocaust had been “a Zionist fiasco ensuing directly from the ‘Palestonocentric’ conception,
which even the full-blown extermination in 1943 did not dent.” To demonstrate his point, he quoted a prominent Zionist leader, Yizhak Gruenbaum, who had served as chairman of the Yishuv’s United Rescue Committee, a body concerned with saving Europe’s Jews in World War II: “Zionism comes first. . . . Zionism [means] the precedence of the war of redemption over all other wars [i.e., the interests of Zionism take precedence over everything else].”

The crucial difference between Porat and Elam lay in their perceptions of the Yishuv during the Holocaust. Porat painted a picture of a small Yishuv with scant resources and ties, bewildered and filled with trepidation at the horrific reports emanating from conquered Europe. Elam depicted a totally different image, that of an imperious Yishuv sure in its knowledge of its goal: to defend the interests of Zionism—its own interests in effect.

Toward the end of the 1980s and in the early 1990s, a number of books on the subject appeared, based on PhD theses. These included works by Hava Eshkoli, Dalia Ofer, and myself. Further books—by Tuvia Friling, Raya Cohen, and Shaul Webber—appeared in the latter half of the 1990s. They dealt with major topics, such as the attitude to the Holocaust of key players in the Yishuv—the Jewish Agency leadership and governing Mapai Party and the pioneering youth movements (the “cream of the Yishuv”)—as well as with the place occupied by illegal immigration (Ha‘apala or ‘Aliya Bet) in Zionist policy at the time.

In addition to these works, dozens of articles were published in this period, shedding light on a range of subtopics related to these disturbing questions: the return of the Zionist emissaries from Europe in the first year of the war, the attitude of the religious Zionists toward the Holocaust, the Revisionist Movement’s criticism of the Yishuv leadership during the Holocaust, the internal Yishuv disagreements over the absorption of the Teheran Children (refugee children who were brought to Palestine via Teheran in 1943), and so on.

Another significant topic for scholars then—and since—concerns Ben-Gurion’s attitude toward the destruction of European Jewry. In 1987, the third volume of Shabtai Teveth’s biography of Ben-Gurion was published. Entitled HaKarka HaBo’er (The Burning Ground), it focused on the years 1931–43, from the Seventeenth Zionist Congress and the start of the Mapai-revisionist battle for hegemony over the Zionist movement until well into the Holocaust. A substantial part of the book deals with the persecution of European Jewry in the 1930s and its extermination in the 1940s.
In his introduction, Teveth remarks on the title’s aptness given the deteriorating situation of Europe’s Jews. Since January 1934 and his pronouncement that Hitler’s government posed a grave danger to the very existence of European Jewry, Ben-Gurion had been aware that time was running out for the Zionist movement. “Ben-Gurion’s increasing sense that the ground was on fire became a decisive factor in his policy,” Teveth wrote. The author’s assertion in the closing chapter that “in disaster lies strength,” remains a bone of contention to this day. Teveth explained:

Thus, as early as October 1941, the pre-Holocaust perception of the dimensions of extermination was, in Ben-Gurion’s eyes, a source of strength and momentum, and a powerful catalyst for the realization of Zionism. He had certainly not desired [the Holocaust], but as it was not within his power to prevent it, he wished at least to wrest from it such advantages as would enable him to solve the Jewish problem once and for all.

In the polemics surrounding Ben-Gurion’s attitude toward the harrowing situation, the charge was made that this statement embodies the Zionist leadership’s cynical, instrumental approach to the Holocaust—withstanding Teveth’s intention to praise rather than condemn.

In the mid-1990s, Teveth devoted an entire book to the subject, and two other scholars—Dina Porat and myself—wrote about it. Tuvia Friling also published a number of essays on Ben-Gurion and the Holocaust, as well as a book based on his doctoral thesis.

The wide-ranging research created a solid foundation for the controversy that followed and, indeed, was essential to its development. The polemic was further stoked by the publication of The Seventh Million: The Israelis and the Holocaust by the journalist and historian Tom Segev in 1991. Based on the studies produced during the previous years, a combination of factors made it a sensational success and a source of considerable controversy.

First, it is the comprehensive work on the attitude of Israelis toward the Holocaust. Earlier essays and books had examined various facets of the subject; this was the first and only work to consider it as a whole from the Yishuv’s attitude to the “yekkes” (immigrants from Central Europe in the 1930s) to Israel’s major “Holocaust trials” (the Kastner and Eichmann trials in the 1950s and early 1960s) and the shaping of Israel’s collective memory in the 1980s.
Second, Tom Segev is a senior, well-known journalist, he was the editor of the weekly *Koteret Rashit* (Headline), and has a weekly column in *Haaretz*. The book is written in a clear, flowing, engrossing, and provocative style, and the author’s extensive media connections helped assure it widespread attention.

Third, it was translated into a number of major European languages (English, French, and German among them), becoming, so to speak, Israeli historiography’s “visiting card” on the subject in the international arena.

And, fourth, its tone—pointed, scathing, and emphatic—angered and even enraged the community of Israeli historians. The ensuing friction between Segev and several senior historians, such as Yehuda Bauer, whetted the public’s interest in the controversy and the book alike. Tuvia Friling’s censure, for example, of both the author and the work, concluded with a warning about the book’s inherent dangers: it could well become the spearhead in the battle against Zionism, Friling claimed, for it essentially mounted “a campaign to dehumanize and delegitimize Zionism.”

It would be no exaggeration to say that, until the mid-1980s the subject was almost virgin ground, whereas today it is a well-researched field, covering numerous related topics. Only a few academic papers, all of them master’s theses, were written in the 1970s: a study on the operations of the delegation of the Jewish Agency in Istanbul by Dalia Ofer, Arie Morgenstern’s examination of the United Rescue Committee, and Hava Eshkoli’s inquiry into the Yishuv leadership’s attempts to save European Jewry.

Eshkoli’s study was the basis for her doctoral thesis, written in the 1980s and illustrative of that decade’s dissertations: they were the harbingers of a spring that bloomed some years later. At the end of the 1970s and the start of the 1980s, it was possible to charge the academic and political establishments with a “conspiracy of silence”; they appeared to be interested in sweeping provocative questions and grave accusations under the carpet. By the end of the 1980s, however, this was no longer true.

What caused the upsurge in this field of study? Dina Porat addressed the main reasons in an essay published in 1990. Underlying all else, as Porat saw it, was a changing of the guard. The new generation of historians “born during or after the [Second World] War” were “unfettered by the dual burden that had weighed heavily on previous research into the subject”; the “sense of responsibility, memory and helplessness, and constant self-justification of those who had lived in Palestine at the time of
the Holocaust; and the “fervor of party ideology that had characterized the Yishuv and early statehood.” The new generation of historians, according to Porat, had managed to “separate their scientific research from their political leanings.” Another cause closely bound up with the question of generations was the trial of Adolf Eichmann. At the time of the trial, the oldest among the new generation had been at a decisive stage in the consolidation of adult identity, and the proceedings had exerted a powerful influence on them. In Porat’s words: “Most of them acknowledge that the Eichmann trial, held here when they were completing high school or beginning their military service—i.e., the onset of adulthood and the formation of their convictions—is what had lent the whole subject of the Holocaust its initial push and pull.”

This trend was further reinforced by the opening of the archives. The 1980s allowed access to documentation previously inaccessible such as, for example, the minutes of the Jewish Agency Executive—the Yishuv government—at the Central Zionist Archives. Yet another reason lay in the changing currents of historical research that focused on the history of Zionism and the Yishuv. The 1960s had seen the emergence of a scholarly-academic current in Yishuv historiography. A number of doctoral dissertations were approved, such as Yehuda Bauer’s in 1963, and “academia’s ingress into the history of Zionism diversified research methods and sources and established a new apparatus and praxis. It strengthened the connection with social science disciplines . . . and international (chiefly western) trends . . . then prevalent in the development of historical research.” Impressive strides were made in research after the Six Day War and in the 1970s: “In this period, a variety of sources became available to researchers, filling in gaps in the ideological, diplomatic and internal-political picture.” One prominent and significant development in this connection was the foray of researchers into “two important topics that had been ‘taboo,’ so to speak, in the 1950s and 1960s: Zionism’s attitude toward the plight of European Jewry on the eve of, during, and after the Holocaust and its relations with the Arab world.”

Previously, the question of the Yishuv’s attitude toward the Holocaust had been dealt with in one of two ways. Either it had been utterly ignored—Yehuda Bauer’s first book devoted only one paragraph to it—or the research adopted the national, heroic arguments of Zionist propaganda, as illustrated in the lecture delivered by historian Yehuda Slutzki at Yad VaShem’s first international conference during Passover of 1968. Slutzki, the editor of Sefer Toldot HaHaganah (The History of the Ha-
ganah, 1968), presented the official positions of the Zionist establishment devoid of all critical perspective. Thus, for example, he noted unequivocally that had a Jewish State been in existence, even only in part of Palestine, when World War II broke out, the position of the Jewish People during the war would have been completely different. The Haganah would immediately have become the Israel Defense Forces, and the instrument by which many tens of thousands of young Jews from all over the world would have been mobilized to fight the Nazis under a Jewish banner. The Jewish refugees would have benefited from the Law of Return and would have found sanctuary in Israel, and even abroad—as citizens of a sovereign state. It is possible that the Nazis, too, would have changed the tempo of extermination.

In other words, the course of the Holocaust would have been significantly changed. In the same lecture, Slutzki referred to the Yishuv parachutists dropped behind the lines in German-occupied Europe. The value of the action, he said, had been more symbolic than real; the parachutists had largely saved Jewish honor “in the flame of their self-sacrifice, which momentarily lit up the darkness of those days.” Since then, a substantial number of essays have described the episode of the parachutists in more complex terms.

The time factor in Israeli historical research has also played a part in the growing attention accorded the subject. In the 1960s and 1970s, Israeli history concentrated primarily on the period before World War II, from the early immigration waves (the first and second Aliyot) up to the Fifth Aliya and the Arab Revolt of 1936–39. This is borne out by the essays featured on a major podium of Zionist research: Studies in the History of the Zionist Movement and the Jewish Hatziyonut Yishuv in the Land of Israel, an annual publication put out by the Chaim Weizmann Centre at Tel Aviv University. The first volume appeared in 1970, followed, over the decade, by five more (the sixth came out in 1981). The entire collection comprised some fifty essays, very few of which dealt with the 1940s. The first three volumes had no article on this decade, the fourth had two (out of nine), the fifth had one (out of eight), and the sixth had two (out of seven). None of them, however, discussed the Yishuv attitude toward the Holocaust.

A different picture emerged during the 1980s. Nine volumes appeared, the majority of the essays dealing with the 1940s and 1950s. In volume 13, published in 1988, seven out of thirteen articles dealt with these two decades. In volume 14, published in 1989, the trend was even more pronounced, with twelve out of thirteen entries describing events...
of the 1940s and 1950s. The research into the Yishuv's attitude toward the Holocaust thus did not derive from extraneous impulses, such as ideology or politics, but was intrinsic to the focus of Israeli historical research on Zionism and the Land of Israel. A succession of studies on Holocaust-related topics dealt with the attitude toward survivors and their place in Zionist policy and the mass immigration to Israel between 1948 and 1953.

Thus far, we have attempted to present some of the main disputes on the subject. It is now time to ask: what is their common denominator? A central thread connects them to a common base. All the claims and arguments of the Zionist historians derive from a single basic contention—as do all the claims and arguments of the New Historians. The difference lies in the nature of the arguments: the Zionists maintain that the Yishuv's attitude to European Jewry was dialectical whereas the New Historians see it as one-dimensional. This is the root of the controversy.

According to the Zionist historians, the Yishuv and Zionist movement leadership saw displaced Jews and Jewish refugees through a dual prism: as both a means and an end. This affected their view of the chief components of the issue. For example, rescue operations were an end—to save lives—but also a means, part of the Zionist mission to strengthen the Yishuv and establish Jewish sovereignty.

The attitude toward building up the country was itself dialectical. The mission, as the Zionists saw it, was an end in itself. One more settlement, one more dunam of land, one more cowshed were important, even hallowed, goals, but they were also tools—for the sake of preparing a home and haven for world Jewry, particularly for the refugees from persecution in Europe. This dialectical approach was the most deep-set feature of their Weltanschauung.

The single basic contention of the New Historians, on the other hand, is that the approach of the Yishuv and the Zionist leadership was single-minded, that they regarded themselves as the supreme goal and their attitude toward European Jewry was purely instrumental—they were a tool or means to realize and reinforce the Yishuv and Zionist aims. The priorities were clear: the Yishuv and Zionist aims were at the top, and European Jewry was lower down. It is a hierarchical view, devoid of dialectics.

This principle gives rise to another problem, which may be defined as “the perception of the other.” According to the New Historians, the Yishuv and its leadership viewed European Jewry—survivors, displaced persons, and “illegal” and new immigrants—as the other, as strangers. To
a large extent, this perception holds true for Sephardi Jews as well. There is a clear line between us and them. We were on one side, they were on the other, and the attitude toward them was pointed and inflexible, as the attitude to the other is meant to be.

According to the Zionist historians, however, the Yishuv’s and Zionist movement’s perception of European Jewry was more complex, more ambivalent: Europe’s Jews were seen as both the other and our own, a duality aptly captured by the title of Hanna Yablonka’s first book Ahim Zarim (Stranger Brothers). A faint, elusive, and hazy line separated us from them, much as in a love-hate relationship.

I have had occasion to address the issue. I have argued that, while the Yishuv saw the Holocaust as the ultimate proof of diaspora passivity, indeed, of diaspora shame—and, thus as the supreme vindication of the sad triumph of Zionism’s basic premise—on the other hand, and at the same time, another, different aspect stood out: the Yishuv’s sense of duty toward diaspora Jewry. The Yishuv felt a supreme sense of responsibility not only for the Jews being slaughtered in Europe but for world Jewry as a whole. This sense of responsibility stemmed from an ingrained feeling that the Yishuv was the “best” of the Jewish people, the vanguard, regardless of its size and power. The feeling was assumed, a given, and had nothing to do with reality. It was expressed by Avraham Tarshish, a member of Kibbutz ‘Ein Harod and leader of the United Kibbutz Movement, in January 1943, when the enormity of the killing was coming to light.

If ever there was a meaning to the rescue of the nation by Zionism, it concerns the Yishuv’s obligation today to the half million Jews living in Eretz-Israel who, by great devotion, were saved from persecution and death. If we do not fulfill the tasks before us, it is doubtful whether it was worthwhile for generations of Jews to have . . . established this Yishuv. Because this is not a Yishuv of choice, but it is chosen, if only because of the tasks laid upon it.

Zionist historians thus saw the attitude of the Yishuv toward European Jewry as complex: it was arrogant, but also genuinely concerned; it was patronizing, but it shared a sense of solidarity. It was egocentric, almost childishly so, but with no trace of cynicism. For the New Historians, in contrast, cynicism is a key standard by which to judge Yishuv conduct. They use cynicism as strident evidence of a callous, if not in-
humane, attitude toward people who had been through the worst hell in the annals of mankind.

A chief feature of the New Historians’ methodology is the frequent—and largely ahistorical—use of direct quotations from Zionist and Yishuv leaders to prove the latter’s cynical, instrumental approach to European Jewry. Two such examples come from speeches by David Ben-Gurion and Yizhak Gruenbaum, the latter the head of the United Rescue Committee. The first, supposedly illustrative of this “cynical cruelty,” is from Ben-Gurion’s speech to the Mapai Central Committee shortly after Kristallnacht and the publication of the Woodhead Commission report (well before the Holocaust had begun): “Were I to know that all German Jewish children could be rescued by transferring them to England, and only half by transfer to Palestine, I would opt for the latter because our concern is not only the personal interest of these children but the historic interest of the Jewish people.”

The second example, taken from Gruenbaum’s remarks before the Inner Zionist Executive in early 1943, when the destruction of European Jewry was coming to light, is meant to demonstrate the real set of priorities of the Yishuv and the Zionist movement.

A mood has begun to take hold of the Land of Israel, which, I believe, is most dangerous to Zionism, to redemption, to our efforts at redemption, to our war. I don’t wish to offend anyone, but I can’t understand how this sort of thing, something that has never happened before, could happen in the Land of Israel: it never happened overseas—how was it possible that in the Land of Israel, at a public meeting, I should have been the object of [such] catcalls [as]: “You have no money, take Keren HaYesod’s funds. Take the money from the bank; after all, there’s money there, Keren HaYesod has money.” . . . I have been asked: “[Should we use] Keren HaYesod’s money . . . for the rescue of Jews in Diaspora countries?” I said “no,” and I say “no” again. . . . I think it must be spelled out here: Zionism comes first.

The difference between the perceptions of the Old and New Historians can be seen in the varying treatments of David Ben-Gurion’s stance during the Holocaust and of the Yishuv’s attitude toward those who came “from there”—the survivors and “illegal” immigrants. The stance of the New Historians is represented by Idith Zertal’s book on
survivors immigrating to Israel. As reported in *HaAretz*, she meant the book to demonstrate

how the Holocaust, and particularly the Holocaust survivors, even before the establishment of the state, were regarded as assets for purposes of its establishment. How they—they, who were not free to choose their own path—were conscripted by Zionism, how they were “used” . . . how, beyond proclamations and rhetoric, they were turned into tools, portable objects.

Zertal’s main charge is that Zionism saw the survivors, including illegal immigrants, as instruments in the Zionist struggle. In this context, she asserted: “Zionism took the tragic events of the Holocaust and turned them into the main weapon of Land-of-Israel Zionism in the struggle for political sovereignty.” Her comments on the illegal immigrants ship, the *Exodus*, illustrate this assertion.

The journey of the *Exodus* was not aimed at actually bringing Jewish refugees to the shores of the land of Israel. It was aimed at breaking the British blockade by an operational, political demonstration, the refugee ship serving as the battering ram on the battle front of the campaign. Asked about it, the refugees said that they had not chosen this course to begin with but had been conscripted by Zionism into the war for Eretz-Israel without being asked.

The picture Zertal painted is clear, unequivocal, and free of all doubt: we, the Yishuv, Zionism, were the end while they were the means; we were the subjects, they the objects.

The most radical expression of this approach is not an academic work but a poem composed by a noted scholar of Hebrew literature, Binyamin Harshavsky. In the mid-1980s, under the pseudonym of Gabi Daniel, he published a poem that caused a sensation. Provocatively entitled “Peter the Great,” the poem likened the czar’s attitude toward his army of serfs to that of Ben-Gurion’s toward the Holocaust survivors. Radical and extreme as it may be, the poem faithfully reflects the mindset that views survivors as anonymous pawns on the chessboard of Zionist policy. In this regard, Anita Shapira wrote that the poem expresses two principles: first, the “claims of dehumanization and instrumental use of the survivors”; and, second, the image of the survivors. In the poem, she
said, the “survivors are passive, their voice is not heard, and they have no will of their own.”

An entirely different picture was portrayed by Hagit Lavsky, a mainstream Zionist historian, in an article published in the early 1990s. Lavsky maintained that some researchers in the 1970s had already concluded that it was inaccurate to charge Yishuv leaders with sweepingly and simplistically relating to survivors as objects. She cited two books published at the time, by Tsemach Tsameriion and Yehuda Bauer. These two authors, she said,

had found the survivor population to have been an active, diverse community, and had even advanced the hypothesis that cohesive forces from within this population had functioned to channel their activity along the Zionist path. This came to the fore in the Zionist spirit that dominated both journalism and the educational and cultural networks in the DP [displaced persons] camps, as well as in the efforts of survivors to reach the Land of Israel.

Studies relating to the image of refugees and survivors, such as those produced by Aviva Halamish and Ze’ev Mankowitz, reflected the same trend. Halamish, in her book on the Exodus, makes the point that the ship’s saga changed the image of the illegal immigrants in Yishuv eyes. At first, “they were seen as fugitives from the sword, on whose behalf one had to rush to the rescue.” In no time at all, however, they had been transformed into “almost the sole standardbearers of the ‘close struggle.’” This episode, added the author, “improved the image of the ‘illegal’ immigrants, and the Yishuv was swept up in a collective catharsis of admiration for them.” They were thus transformed from a passive into an active, even heroic, element in the national saga.

In time, the heroic role played by the illegal immigrants faded in Israel’s collective memory. The explanation for this, according to Halamish, is that “the ‘illegals’ had been assigned a passive role—if not to say as downright ‘extras’—in the internal Yishuv struggle, which dictated not only the actions of the period but also the writing of its history.”

In this context, paradoxically, one can discern a “meeting of extremes” between official Zionist historiography and its challengers. Equally paradoxical is the stand taken by critical Zionist historiography against both the official and the New Historiography in its claim that the illegals were a decisive component of the Exodus episode. The illegals,
critical Zionist historiography maintains, shouldered the lion’s share of this epopoeia, even more so than “our boys”—the members of the Palmah, the native sons of the Land of Israel.

In an essay describing the survivors, Ze’ev Mankowitz argues that their leadership sprouted from within, from the refugee population itself.54 They were Zionists, and they defined their main goal as promoting ‘Aliya (immigration to the Land of Israel) and establishing a Jewish state. The Zionist impulse, he stresses, stemmed from the survivor leadership, not from the Jewish Yishuv’s emissaries. The author examined the motives of the survivor leadership in trying to concentrate the refugees in a defined area—the American Zone in southern Germany—soon after the end of the war.

Already in June 1945, the local Zionist groupings that sprung up after liberation began to work towards a more comprehensive, regional organization. Equally noteworthy is the political thinking which underpinned this organization. These survivors understood that the Zionist movement had lost its human hinterland in the Holocaust and that their primary task was to keep the Saved Remnant together in the hope that the majority would avoid the uncertainties of dispersion and, when the time came, would be able to make their way to Palestine. What we have here, in embryonic form, is the idea of concentrating She’erit Hapeleita in one area.55

Mankowitz ignores neither Zionism’s manipulative aspect nor the crucial role that the Zionist leadership assigned to the DPs in the political struggle. In his eyes, however, the DPs were neither a tool nor a passive entity but active agents seeking to shape their own destiny.

The dispute over Ben-Gurion’s attitude toward the Holocaust brings us back to the central issue of instrumentalism. Tom Segev,56 for example, related to the cognitive and ideological aspects of Ben-Gurion’s behavior during the Holocaust rather than the pragmatic. After all, it was obvious that the Yishuv could not save millions of Jews; the failing of the Yishuv leaders, including Ben-Gurion, lay elsewhere—in their “great emotional withdrawal from the catastrophe [befalling] European Jewry.” Segev quoted a paragraph from Ben-Gurion’s letter to Yehoshua Kastner, Israel’s brother (“My activities at the time centered on rallying Jewry to press for the establishment of a Jewish state”)57 and claimed that this was “a key point.” Segev continued: “After the war Ben-Gurion’s greatest
fear was that the Holocaust survivors might not want to come to the Land of Israel; he did not fear for their fate—after all, they had been saved; he feared that there might not be sufficient manpower to establish the state.”

This position can also be found in the work of S. B. Beit-Zvi.58 His was one of the first works to deal critically with the attitude of the Zionist leadership toward the Holocaust. Many of the New Historians consider Beit-Zvi a trailblazer on the subject, as can be seen in this eulogy written after his death in 1994.

Beit-Zvi dared to give his thoughts free rein, into reaches that few of his generation had even dared to dream of. His readiness to face the truth enabled him to arrive at penetrating conclusions, boldly, even though they went against the current. . . . [T]he importance [of the thesis] . . . advanced in his book . . . is only now becoming clear to a new generation of historians.59

Beit-Zvi wrote in his book that during the Holocaust Ben-Gurion had given preference to the interests of Zionism and ignored the rescue of Europe’s Jews. He cited numerous examples. Beit-Zvi claimed that Ben-Gurion didn’t know what was happening in Europe because he didn’t want to know. Writing ironically, he said: “Truly, Ben-Gurion didn’t know. He knew even less than other people. He didn’t know because he wasn’t interested in ‘details.’”60

He also claimed that in Ben-Gurion’s world the Holocaust was a marginal, even trivial matter. He described a press conference called by Ben-Gurion in October 1942 after a lengthy absence from the country. The conference lasted for more than an hour with Ben-Gurion holding forth on many topics: “Anti-Semitism in America, the Biltmore Program, a Jewish army, Hadassah [the Zionist Women’s Organization], the Magnes group,” which advocated a binational state, and so on. There was only one topic he did not mention. This is how Beit-Zvi put it: “On the Holocaust—not a word. Nothing was said, nothing was asked; the subject was not on the agenda.”61 Farther on, the author noted that this was not an isolated incident. Ben-Gurion made a large number of speeches at the time; in all of them, he ignored the subject.

These conclusions led the author to deliver a categorical diagnosis: the only Holocaust issue that interested Ben-Gurion was that of the survivors. The one question he asked was “whether enough Jews would survive to bring Zionism to fruition.”62 In his world, this was the overriding
Making Israel

issue because it was closely intertwined with the struggle to establish Jewish sovereignty in Palestine; it was the one significant issue. He was thus not concerned with rescue per se, but only in the context of the Zionist political struggle; that is, he related to the survivors and the chances of rescue solely through Zionist-colored glasses.

Tuvia Friling, a leading scholar on Ben-Gurion’s attitude toward the Holocaust, presented a completely contrary view. His 1986 article, written largely to refute Beit-Zvi’s claims, explored “the stereotype” of Ben-Gurion’s conduct with regard to the Holocaust. This stereotype consisted of three elements.

The first element was the charge of “aloofness” or “detachment.” Friling thought that this charge was inconsistent with two pieces of evidence that he brought to bear. One was the fact that “since appeals of this sort [concerning rescue] were addressed to Ben-Gurion, we must conclude that he was both aware of and tactically involved in the rescue activities.” The other, connected to the first, was that “appeals of this kind, concerning rescue efforts, came to Ben-Gurion from the whole political spectrum—Bader of (the Left) HaShomer HaTza’ir, and from the religious and the secular right in the Yishuv.” These facts, Friling concluded, show that Ben-Gurion, the key figure in all spheres of the Yishuv, was also the key figure in rescue matters, which purportedly were far from his mind and heart.

The second element Friling addressed was “lack of knowledge” and, stemming from this charge, the claim of his “not wanting to know.” To counter this notion, the author cited Ben-Gurion’s speech before the Mapai Central Committee in February 1943 following a detailed report by Zvi Yehieli, one of the heads of the illegal immigration operations. According to Friling, Ben-Gurion elaborated on the Yishuv’s rescue efforts and the work of the Yishuv Delegation in Istanbul and Geneva. Ben-Gurion’s speech, Friling argued, showed both claims to be unfounded.

Friling also rebutted Beit-Zvi’s main argument, namely, that Ben-Gurion put the Zionist endeavor ahead of saving Jewish lives. In late November 1942, Ben-Gurion addressed the then topical issue of attempts to rescue Jewish children from the Balkans, saying that they were to be rescued and sent anywhere that would have them. Further evidence in this vein was provided by his stand on the Teheran children. Ben-Gurion did everything he could to reach a compromise with the religious parties, including the anti-Zionist ultra-Orthodox, regarding the education of these children and, in Friling’s view, these efforts “reflect his position on the question of rescue and its place on the Yishuv
agenda, undermining the assumption that Ben-Gurion pitted Zionism against rescue attempts.”

What are the main conclusions of this analysis? First, there seems to be a covert alliance between the positions of the New Historians and the official stand of the Yishuv establishment. Each viewed the survivors as passive, though for different reasons. The Yishuv’s position derived from its image of diaspora Jewry. Diaspora Jews, including survivors, were seen as passive and submissive; it was the task of the Yishuv to do all it could to help them, their fellow Jews. This perspective stemmed from the psychological makeup of the local Jews, and, though it may have been arrogant and patronizing, it was free of ill will. The position of the New Historians, on the other hand, is that the behavior of the Yishuv and its leaders toward survivors was mean and unfeeling. The Yishuv saw its own approach in the most positive light—after all, it was helping survivors who were unable to help themselves. The New Historians saw the Yishuv as exploiting submissive survivors in order to advance its own interests, which it believed to be their interests as well. Thus, although their outlooks are very different, their basic perceptions of survivors as passive are similar.

Second, there is another implicit alliance between the New Historians, most of whom consider themselves part of the radical Left, and the indicters of the Zionist establishment on the radical Right, including even the anti-Zionist, ultra-Orthodox religious camp. In the 1950s, particularly at the time of the Kastner trial, central figures from the Right, including members of the Herut Party, accused the state’s leaders, who hailed from Mapai (and who, during the Holocaust, had dominated the Jewish Agency), of having ignored the rescue of European Jewry. In particular, they accused Ben-Gurion and Moshe Shertok (Sharett), the head of the Jewish Agency’s Political Department, of having torpedoed the Brand Mission. The gist of the charges against them was that they had given priority to marginal, even vested, interests such as collaborating with the British authorities or looking out for their own (Mapai, the Histadrut trade union organization, and the kibbutz movement). The critics also charged the state’s leaders and other establishment figures with carefully maintaining a “conspiracy of silence,” with harboring “dark secrets” ostensibly connected to the actions of the Yishuv leadership during that period, and with an attempt to purvey a falsified version of events in order to gloss over their reprehensible behavior.

In this context, Shmuel Tamir, the attorney for the defense in the Kastner trial, wrote that Shertok had tried in every way possible to refute
the charges against the Yishuv leadership, that he had used every occasion to advance his own version of events, and that he had taken great care to appear only where he would not lay himself open to legal repercussions. Accordingly, he had refrained from appearing as a witness in the two major trials that devoted extensive discussions to the Holocaust-related failings of the Zionist leadership—the Kastner and Eichmann trials.\footnote{74}

Elsewhere in his book,\footnote{75} Tamir cited speeches by Ben-Gurion and Shertok from 1942, claiming that “the subject of European Jewry’s extermination and rescue does not come up in them.” To a large extent, Tamir’s observations made their way into Beit-Zvi’s book (he wrote briefly, though identically, on the matter) and from there to the seething controversy on the topic that erupted in the 1990s.

The curious nexus between the radical Right’s criticism of the Yishuv leadership, voiced in the 1950s, and the current historians’ criticism is indicative of the meeting of extremes noted earlier in this essay.

One possible explanation for this curious kinship—hardly a holy alliance—between the anti-Zionist, ultra-Orthodox,\footnote{76} the post-Zionists, and the New Historians is not so much a common “love of Mordechai” as a common “hatred of Haman,” a shared loathing for the Zionist establishment headed by Mapai and symbolized by David Ben-Gurion.

The importance of the controversy over Yishuv attitudes toward the Holocaust is, to my mind, twofold. First, it furnishes tools with which to understand the attitude of Israeli society toward the Holocaust and its survivors. Second, it sheds light on the connection between that attitude and our own hopes and aspirations and, more particularly, our fears and traumas.

\section*{Notes}


5. Yona Hadari, “‘Od kos ‘al ha-ir ha-bo’eret” [Another Glass of Water over the Burning City], HaAretz Supplement, 3 October 1986.

6. Ibid.


10. Ibid., 6.

11. Ibid. This is the title of the last chapter, 423–50.

12. Ibid., 441.


14. For a detailed list of these articles, see Porat and Weitz, Star of David, 442. See also Friling, Arrow; and Tuvia Friling, “David Ben-Gurion ve-Shoat Yehudei Europa, 1939–1945” [David Ben-Gurion and the Holocaust of European Jewry, 1939–1945], [David Ben-Gurion and the Holocaust of European Jewry, 1939–1945], PhD diss., HU, 1990.


17. Ibid., 367.


21. Ibid., 123.

22. Ibid., 122.


26. Ibid., 79.

27. Bauer, Diplomacy, 278; on this, see Gelber, “Studies.”


29. Ibid., 415.


33. These included, for example, Roni Stauber, “Ha-vikuah ha-politi ‘al mishpat Kastner ‘al-pi ha-hitmat ha-miflagtit” [The Controversy in the Political Press over the Kastner Trial], HaTziyonut, no. 13: 219–46.


35. In the 1980s HaTziyonut was the major academic journal focusing on the
Dialectical versus Unequivocal

history of the State of Israel. In 1991, the Ben-Gurion Research Centre began to put out the annual *Iyunim Bi-Tkumat Yisrael* [Studies in Zionism, the Yishuv, and the State of Israel]. Both are important journals.


39. He was addressing the United Kibbutz Movement Council, 1 January 1943, Ramat Ha-Kovesh, KMA, section 5, container 7, file 1.

40. The commission was appointed by the British cabinet to pave the way for MacDonald’s anti-Zionist white paper (17 May 1939).

41. Meeting of the Mapai Central Committee, 7 December 1938, Labor Party Archive 23/38.

42. Meeting of the Zionist Smaller Actions Committee (18 January 1943), CZA S25/295.

43. Idith Zertal, From Catastrophe to Power: The Holocaust Survivors and the Emergence of Israel (Berkeley, 1998).


45. Ibid.

46. Harshavsky used a variety of pseudonyms, sometimes writing under the name H. Binyamin, sometimes as Benjamin Harshav.


48. Shapiro, “Historiographya,” 34.

49. Hagit Lavsky, “‘She’erit hapleita’: Mi-obyekt le-subyekt—megamot ba-mehkar” [The Surviving Remnant: From Object to Subject—New Directions in Historical Research], *YZ* 6 (1990): 25–44.

50. Tsemach Tsamerion, Ha-’Itonut shel She’erit ha-Pleita be-Germania ke-Bitui le-Ve’ayoteha [The Press of Jewish Holocaust Survivors in Germany as an Expression of Their Problems] (Tel Aviv, 1970); Yehuda Bauer, Flight and Rescue (New York, 1970).


52. Aviva Halamish, Exodus: Ha-Sipur ha-Amiti [Exodus: The Real Story] (Tel Aviv, 1990), 247. The “close struggle” (ha-maavak ha-tzamud) referred to limited opposition to the British (1945–47), and continued illegal immigration and settlement. It was the term used by Yishuv and Haganah moderates in contrast to the more activist wing, which wanted an unmitigated “continuous struggle” (maavak ratzuf), including more militant means.


55. Ibid., 357–58. See also Ze’ev Mankowitz, *Life between Memory and Hope: The Survivors of the Holocaust in Occupied Germany* (Cambridge, 2002).


61. Ibid., 103.

62. Ibid., 133.


64. Ibid., 201–2.

65. Ibid., 215.

66. Ibid. Manahem Bader was his movement’s delegate to the Yishuv Delegation in Istanbul.

67. Ibid., 216–17. Yehieli was a member of Ha-Kibbutz Ha-Meuhad and a senior participant in the Mossad for Illegal Immigration.

68. Ibid., 211–12.


72. Sharett was the prime minister of Israel at the time of the trial (1954–55).


74. Shmuel Tamir, *Ben ha-Aretz* [Son of This Land] (Tel Aviv, 2002).

75. Ibid., 1125–26.