Israel's academic community in recent years has been riven by sharp polemics between self-styled critical sociologists and those they refer to as establishment sociologists, with the controversy reverberating among students of Israeli society abroad. A similar debate has been taking place among historians, but here the distinction has been between New and Old Historians. In the early stages, it was possible not to take the sociologists’ debate too seriously. It could be attributed to intergenerational rivalry within the academic community or a passing fad imported from abroad, primarily from the United States. Today it can no longer be ignored. Its very existence and substance threaten the foundations of Israeli social science and historiography. The dominance of one side or another is likely to have a far-reaching impact on teaching and research in Israeli departments of sociology, anthropology, and political science.

The debate is being conducted on several levels, which may be variously described depending on the viewpoint of the advocate. For example, the discussion might be defined as revolving around the “scientificity” of the social sciences. In this case, the question is less whether the field’s “science” can be consolidated than whether such intellectual effort is even worthwhile given that it is inevitably doomed to failure. From another perspective, the crux of the matter is the ideological identity of establishment sociology or the Old Historiography. In this case, the debate is between scholars who consider establishment academia to be tainted by the virus of Zionism and those who believe a Zionist identity is irrelevant to their research.

In a different formulation, the debate takes place on two interrelated levels that differ analytically. One is essentially methodological and theoretical; the other is based on substance and content—that is, the interpretation of the historical events and the political, economic, social, and cultural tendencies of the past century. The invocation of multiple
theoretical paradigms, all seeking to interpret the same events differently, is in itself praiseworthy; there is much to be gained from the introduction of complementary or rival models that can redress one or another’s shortcomings. But the controversy in recent years has not promoted this desirable state of affairs. Rather (at least some of) the paradigms of critical sociology have tended to totally invalidate the paradigms of establishment sociology on ideological grounds. Ironically, the same detractors regard ideological tendentiousness as intrinsic to contemporary scientific thought. Clearly, this approach undermines the basis for any constructive discussion among the exponents of the different paradigms. Such a situation, it may be said without exaggeration, could cause the social sciences to regress by decades—back to the beginning of the twentieth century if not earlier.

The bulk of what follows addresses the dispute within the sociological-anthropological and political science communities, though the argument among historians is implicit. A comprehensive treatment of historiographical issues would demand a systematic analysis of the methodology, terminology, and semantics of historians, which, as is well known, differ significantly from those of social scientists. Such an analysis is beyond the scope of this essay. In addition, this essay is limited almost exclusively to the Yishuv period (the prestate Jewish community in Palestine, 1882–1948). Although the polemic extends beyond this time frame, it began within the context of the Yishuv. Again, discussion of the statehood period would warrant a separate study.

Yet another limitation stems from the fact that self-professed critical (or, to a lesser degree, establishment) sociologists do not constitute a homogeneous group. Thus, the assessment of one critical scholar on a given issue does not necessarily hold true for another. But, again, a separate discussion of each would greatly exceed the limits of this essay and be too detailed. I have thus attempted to find a golden mean by relating chiefly to the common denominator of critical sociologists.

The Parameters of Sociological and Historical Study of Israeli Society

The main and most vigorous criticism leveled against establishment sociologists and historians is, of course, that they are steeped in Zionism, the implication being that they are one-sided, that their interpretation of events is misleading and distorted, and that they idealize what they
consider suitable and ignore the unpleasant. More specifically, it is argued (by at least some in the critical school) that establishment sociology and historiography function within a “Jewish bubble”—as regards both the Yishuv in the Land of Israel and the diaspora. Establishment scholars allegedly ignore the Jewish–Arab conflict in general, and Palestinian society in particular, as well as the interrelations between Jewish and Palestinian societies. From the establishment viewpoint—so argues the critical school—the borders of the collective and the parameters of research are confined exclusively to that selfsame Jewish bubble.¹

In the eyes of critical scholars, the use of explicitly Jewish–Israeli terminology regarding the Zionist movement and the Yishuv supplies further evidence of the Zionism of establishment sociology and historiography. Critical scholars take particular exception to such terms as the Land of Israel, Aliya, and the meora’ot (literally, “events,” a term commonly used to describe the Arab riots and revolt of the 1920s and 1930s); some even object to the use of Holocaust (Shoah). All these, in their view, are not neutral or positivist terms but pertain to the collective memory of the Jewish people. Moreover, they see even the periodization used by the establishment school as nearly exclusively Jewish–Zionist (e.g., the First Aliya, Second Aliya, pre-Holocaust, post-Holocaust, etc.). According to the critical group, this type of periodization is seriously flawed since it makes it difficult to identify turning points in the historiography of the two peoples. As a result (by critical lights), establishment scholars erroneously stress continuity in the transition from Yishuv to state or overemphasize the changes that took place in the wake of the Six Day War.²

If the primary obstacles to bridging the differences between critical and establishment scholars were merely a matter of terminology and periodization, it would be relatively easy to surmount them. One might, for example, use the term immigration rather than aliya, provided that immigration to Israel could be classified as a special case more or less faithful to the concept of aliya.³ Alternatively, criteria could be set for immigration archetypes ranging from the instrumental to the ideological.

Finding a substitute for the term Eretz-Israel is more difficult. Its very use forms the backbone of the Zionist narrative, just as the term Palestine lies at the heart of the Palestinian narrative. The phrase, “the Holy Land,” while accepted by the three monotheistic faiths, is not the most felicitous substitute because of its religious connotations; nor, moreover, do the three religions agree on the degree of sanctity conferred on the land.

The term Holocaust does seem to have a linguistic counterpart in
genocide. But Holocaust (or Shoah) has become a familiar concept in the world lexicon, particularly in European-American culture. It therefore seems utterly absurd that, of all people, Israeli historians and social scientists should be asked to eliminate it from their vocabulary in favor of a foreign term that can never express the uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust.

Periodization (and its related terminology) would appear to be a subject for which the different schools might possibly find a common denominator. It is no marginal matter, particularly among historians. Not infrequently, periodization reflects the central thesis of research. The periodization of the history of royal dynasties or priests or presidents or diplomatic history, for example, is not commensurable with that of military or socioeconomic history. In our case, too, there is logic and justification for weaning oneself from a periodization based exclusively on aliyyot (plural of aliya [wave of immigration to Land of Israel]). One must begin with the assumption that the turning points are not identical or parallel in every sphere. Thus, the periodization of the socioeconomic history of the Yishuv is, to a certain extent, different from that of the Jewish-Arab conflict or of diplomatic events. Nevertheless, the various events and turning points undoubtedly have points of intersection.

But all these are secondary issues. The other claims, about the Zionism of Israeli society, require a far more thorough discussion of the parameters involved in the historiography of the Yishuv in the past 100 to 150 years. What I set out in the following pages reflects my personal opinion; nevertheless, it seems to follow quite closely the train of thought of quite a few people within the sociological community.

What, then, are the broad parameters for a discussion of the history of the Yishuv and Israeli society that could provide a working framework for historians, sociologists, political scientists, students of international relations, economists, and others? The parameters presented here are based on the assumption that four factors, albeit in different degrees, influenced both the Yishuv and the Palestinian Arab population, whether directly or indirectly. I will first define and briefly describe these four and then discuss two of them more extensively.

1. Diaspora Factors and Conditions Impelling Aliya from the End of the Nineteenth Century On. Among other things, this topic includes the composition of the aliyyot and the demographic, social, and cultural structure and attributes of the manpower. The discussion, one must bear in mind, concerns an ingathering, a coming together of immigrants, who, by self-definition, had for centuries lived in exile, and who, whether because
of ideological impulses, economic and political pressures, or physical threat, sought to rebuild their political and cultural center in a territory that they regarded as their historic homeland. As a settlement movement, as we shall see, this pattern distinguished it from other settlement (colonialist) movements. Its uniqueness, however, need not cause us to reject out of hand any serious comparative discussion of worldwide colonial phenomena alongside Zionism as a settlement movement.

2. Confrontation with the Arab World. The second factor that shaped the Yishuv and Israeli society, and certainly also the image of Palestinian society, was and is the confrontation with the Arab world. The consequences of the ongoing conflict cannot be measured only in terms of victory and defeat or numbers of casualties or the making and breaking of economic resources; it must also be appraised in terms of the ethos and myths spawned and expressed in literature and the arts and of the intellectual and philosophical approaches to the advantages and disadvantages of the use of violence in ethnic-national group relations.

3. Development under the Mandatory Government. A third factor is the role played by the mandatory authorities, as the representatives of the government of Great Britain, in creating the infrastructure (limited as it may have been) for the development of the Palestinian Arab community, on the one hand, and the Jewish community, on the other, and the interrelationship between the two.

4. Periods of Transition. A fourth important factor is the changing position of the Jewish community before 1948, and thereafter, of the state, in the array of global power from Ottoman times to the present.

While there may quite naturally be disagreement over the relative weight of each of these factors in various periods, it seems difficult to deny their importance. This approach reflects neither a Zionist nor an anti-Zionist ideology. Nevertheless, scholars who do not subscribe to the postmodern view about the absolute relativity of different narratives are more likely to achieve a balanced evaluation of the cumulative effect of the four factors on the history of the Yishuv and Israeli society. There is certainly no room here for absolute evaluations, particularly when it comes to short-term processes.

The large number of factors involved indicates intersecting influences on the Yishuv and the Palestinian–Arab population. To put it more graphically, one might say that the two communities lived not in a single, sealed circle but in a number of concentric circles, not all of which were shared by both. The rules of the game characterizing activity in each circle varied during different periods and for different sec-
tors of the population, and, moreover, the possibility of movement from one circle to another was limited. All of these factors affected the definition of the “boundaries of the collective,” which were far more complex than various researchers have attempted to depict them. Thus, for example, nearly all of the organized Yishuv lived almost exclusively within the innermost circle—the Jewish bubble. The national institutions (the Jewish Agency, Jewish National Fund, etc.), the ideological movements, and the political parties provided a significant portion of the services (education, culture, health, employment, housing, etc.). One left the inner circle only for certain British Mandate government services: the courts, police, taxation and postal services, specific health resources, and (to a far lesser extent) employment. These services were shared with the Arab population.

The Yishuv’s political leadership, of course, maintained ongoing working relations with the mandatory government, which was headed by the high commissioner. Contact with the Arab population took place primarily in the labor and employment market, as well as in the economic exchange market (the purchase of agricultural produce and land). These interrelationships and exchanges progressively diminished over the years, whether due to political and security pressures or to the desire of a large part of the Jewish population to sever itself from the limited labor market it shared with the Arab population. All of this, however, was primarily true of the “organized Yishuv.” Those not included in this category, such as the ultra-Orthodox (haredi) Yishuv and some of the oriental Jews, evidently enjoyed far more extensive contact with the mandatory government and the Arab population. Their relationship with the national institutions varied from total alienation, as in the case of the haredim, to unorganized, sporadic interaction, as in the case of the oriental communities.

The various components of the Jewish population all maintained contact with the Jewish diaspora. The most intensive contacts—though totally different in nature—were, on the one hand, those of the ultra-Orthodox community and, on the other, those of the political movements, the backbone of the organized Yishuv. The haredi connections were effected via kollelim (communities of religious scholars), which constituted the key socioeconomic units of the Ashkenazi community, whereas the political movements and parties of the organized Yishuv had strong links with the institutions of the Zionist movement, as well as with other parties and movements, predominately in Eastern Europe.

This structure, described here rather schematically, shaped the
parameters of the particular, collective identity of the various sectors composing the Jewish community. Members of the organized Yishuv considered themselves first and foremost citizens of the political system dominated by Knesset Yisrael (the elected assembly of Yishuv Jews) and the Zionist movement. Formally, they were also citizens of the mandatory state. And this citizenship of the Mandate had practical implications such as receipt of services. Jews who did not belong to the organized Yishuv saw themselves primarily as citizens of their particular ethnic communities; to them, the mandatory framework was evidently more significant, and the sense of citizenship in the sector dominated by the national institutions, more curbed, intermittent, and elusive. This reservation does not apply to the ultra-Orthodox (or "Old" Ashkenazi Yishuv), who automatically rejected any contact with the institutions of the Yishuv and the Zionist movement.

The Palestinian Arab population lived even more exclusively within its own inner circle. In terms of the composition of its secondary units, this circle differed markedly from the inner Jewish one since, instead of modern political parties with ideological substance, it consisted of ascribed units based on extended families (hamulot), villages, and so on. To a great extent, the pseudo-political organizations overlapped with these particularistic frameworks. Palestinian contacts with other circles occurred in the job market, but these were one-directional since in practice Jews did not work in the Arab labor market. Arab contacts with the mandatory government were more intense, at least among the urban sectors, because for various reasons they did not create a strong autonomous center of their own. Hence, they had need of a wider range of government services. In this respect, their mandatory citizenship was broader, though no deeper if we define depth of citizenship as the degree of loyalty to the ruling government. There was thus substantial similarity between the Jewish and Arab populations in this regard, neither of which, to understate the case, demonstrated much loyalty to the mandatory government. As for the Arab population’s internal loyalty toward its own political elite, the issue was more complex than among the Jewish population. The basic allegiance of the Palestinians was above all to the family groups and village frameworks in which they lived. Even identification with a nonelected, nondemocratic national elite largely reflected this root loyalty.

The political elite within the Jewish sector was chosen by democratic process and enjoyed steadily growing allegiance, even if not from the entire Jewish population. Some of the Jews (the ultra-Orthodox) did...
not join Knesset Yisrael. Others (Sephardim, farmers) sometimes sat on the fence. While still others may not have actually left Knesset Yisrael, they did not accept the authority of the Yishuv’s national institutions or the Zionist movement’s leadership (e.g., the so-called separatists at the time, organizations such as IZL and LHI).

Thus the 1939 White Paper essentially depicts mandatory Palestine as a state without a nation within which there were two nations without a state. In other words, mandatory Palestine was unlike the ideal nation-state in nearly every possible respect. First of all, it was governed by the direct rule of a foreign power without local representation. Second, it was a binational unit in which one of the constituent communities—the Jewish—maintained a system of semiautonomous, legally recognized institutions. Third, both communities had connections with national-ethnic, religious, and linguistic units beyond their own demarcation lines. Each of these deviations from the model of an integral nation-state was problematic in terms of the identity and definition of the boundaries of the collective or citizenship. Palestinian nationality was, in the language of the Peel Commission, “a legal formula devoid of moral meaning.” The true loyalty of both Jews and Arabs was, as mentioned earlier, to their respective communal collectives. In the case of the Yishuv, there was the added problem of the nature of diaspora Jewry’s involvement in the building of a national home legally rooted in the Mandatory Charter of the League of Nations. In the Arab community, the problem of identity was perceived in terms of kawmiya as opposed to watania (a pan-Arab understanding of nationality versus the particularist nationhood of various distinct Arab groups). In the case of Palestinian Arabs, the kawmiya was Arab and the watania was Palestinian. These components of Arab identity were variously emphasized by different groups.

In view of this, it was not hard not to see why the questions of the boundaries of the collective, or what I would prefer to describe as the boundaries of citizenship, was highly complex. Scholars seeking to shift the boundaries by adding or removing a sector cannot ignore this complexity. This schematic picture of course applies only to the Yishuv period. After 1948, the definition of the boundaries of citizenship changed, but this topic is beyond the chronological limits of this essay.

The involvement of diaspora Jewry in the building of the Yishuv and the story of the aliya to the country is at the heart of what critical sociologists call the Zionist narrative. This term, it must be said, is always uttered as a sweeping generalization, oblivious of its manifold hues and shades. Several points thus should be clarified about this narrative, which
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has been so condemned and distorted by critical scholars. Zionism, as Amos Oz once said, was only a generic name for a wide variety of forms, positions, outlooks, worldviews, and understandings of Jewish history in the past and looking to the future. In other words, from the very beginning the ideological framework was quite unclear in several respects.

Different ideological streams adhered to different definitions of Jewishness, social justice, and democracy. The vagueness surrounding Judaism pertains to the characteristics of Jewish identity. Is or was the definition of Jewish nationhood secular or religious—traditional or is or was there perhaps a difference between the definition of Jewish nationality in the diaspora—which is or was essentially religious—and that of Jewish nationality in the Yishuv in the Land of Israel and therefore in the State of Israel? This vagueness was also manifested in the Zionist concept of “negating the golah” (literally, “exile,” i.e., everywhere outside of the Land of Israel). Did the Jewish people’s autoemancipation require an end to Jewish exile or was the Land of Israel in the future to serve exclusively as a center of inspiration for a dispersed Jewish nation? No less vague was the concept of social justice, one of the explicit pillars of the nascent Jewish society in the Land of Israel. Did it apply only to the basic freedoms accepted by liberal ideological streams or also to ideas of equality and cooperation advocated by socialist ideological streams? Finally, as regards democracy, did this refer only to formal institutions or also to general, democratic civic rights such as freedom of expression and organization and equality before the law?

Potentially, if not actually, certain contradictions were inherent in the components of the Zionist ideological structure. The most striking was the inconsistency between particularistic Jewish values, reflected in the longing for a national state, and universal humanist values. This became clear as soon as it emerged that Zionism was not about “a land without a people for a people without a land” but rather about the creation of a new society in an ancient, Arab-populated land. The tradition of Jewish particularism is connected with the problem of Jewish separatism, which made the Jews a community apart within a state. The realization of Jewish autonomy, on the other hand, led to the creation of a state like any other, not all of whose inhabitants were Jews. Would its non-Jewish residents be considered equal citizens in every respect, including the right under law to alter the arrangements that reflected the Jewish character of the state?

Yet another of Zionism’s internal contradictions involved the idea of a mission versus the idea of normalization. While Zionism’s ideolog-
ical framework called for the building of a unique society, “a light unto the nations,” it strove also to remold the Jewish people into a nation like all others. Should the Yishuv have given (indeed, should Israel today give) preference to the gradual building of a society of quality to be realized by degrees and based on selective aliya? Or did Jewish and/or Judaism’s redemption require mass aliya, even if this impaired the social fabric of Jewish society in the Land of Israel?

The vagueness, contradictions, and disagreements regarding the relationship between means and ends paved the way for changing definitions of the boundaries of Zionist consensus. There were, for instance, sharp differences of opinion concerning the encounter with the Arab national movement and the Palestinian population, which posed ideological and political dilemmas for the Zionist movement and the Yishuv. The response to these dilemmas reflected both fundamental positions and operative, strategic, or practical considerations.15

To some extent, the issues emanated from deeply rooted beliefs in Jewish tradition, namely, about Jews being a “chosen people” and “a people that dwells alone.” But they also reflected ideological differences between two approaches to nationalism, a confrontation that left its mark on the history of the twentieth century: an understanding of nationalism that recognizes the universal right to self-determination of all peoples as against a nationalism that emphasizes an ethnocentric national egoism.16

The third controversy relates to the second: is the legitimization of Jewish nationalism, and hence its relationship with the Land of Israel, religious or secular? Prior to the state’s establishment, this was the central focus of the polemic between the religious and secular branches of Zionism. Following the state’s establishment, the focus shifted more to the question of whether the State of Israel was to be imbued with the religious significance of “the start of redemption” or was it a secular entity requiring no transcendental legitimization. In the latter case, the theological debate on this subject was conducted mainly between religious Zionism and the non-Zionist ultra-Orthodox (haredi) population, the haredim sharing the views of the secular camp, though for different reasons.

From this it follows that any talk about the Zionist narrative, as the one and only, is shallow, simplistic, and inconsistent with the facts. Second, one must bear in mind that the majority of these narratives originated in the Jewish diaspora or crystallized in the Yishuv, which, among its other qualities, was both a new and old society, as well as an immigrant society, as we shall see.
The Impact of the Aliyot on Yishuv Society

The Yishuv was a new society in terms of both population and institutions. But it was not a tabula rasa; it had social and cultural institutions that continued to influence the behavioral patterns and value attitudes of various population groups. What made Yishuv (and Israeli) society unique was that these traditions were not simply an outgrowth of the evolving society but, in part at least, had been imported from the lands of emigration. This forces us to take a serious look at the claim of a Jewish civilization. What distinguished the Yishuv as a society of immigrants is that it concerned a migration movement from a scattered diaspora to an evolving national center. This simultaneous existence of a center and a diaspora was not the result of migration from the center to the diaspora but rather the reverse. The relationship between the Land of Israel and the diaspora had various aspects to it—immigration, importation of wealth, mutual values, and political commitment.

The heritage of Jewish civilization, which assumed different colorations in different diaspora communities, the Yishuv, and the State of Israel, largely explains some of the social divisions that characterize Israel’s society today. I refer particularly to three rifts: religious-secular; ethnic-class; and ideological, which, in part at least, has always been connected to the struggle for a solution to the Jewish-Arab conflict. These cleavages have impeded social cohesion in both the past and the present and, moreover, have created a society under excessive stress “due to intersecting challenges and pressures, and unclear definitions of boundaries.”

There is only partial truth to the contention that the very existence of these cleavages, particularly the ideological, endowed the political center in the Yishuv and the state with great power. Its limitation lies in the implicit assumption that the greater the divisiveness the more power accrues to the political center. Formulated thus, the axiom is clearly unfounded. Any discussion of the issue must define the potential breaking point of the center’s holding power vis-à-vis the centrifugal force of ideological and other splits. Nor does the argument bear any relation to the historical circumstances and the political and ideological profile of the ruling elite, which was confronted by deep fissures and a sharply divided society. Moreover, in terms of success and talent, obviously not every elite is equally able to deal with this sort of situation.

The implications of all this for the functioning of both Yishuv and Israeli society, particularly as regards the political and socioeconomic systems, and an understanding of national security, have been studied ex-
tensively. But it has not been studied, one might mention, by most of the critical sociologists, who have dealt very little with the subject. Insofar as they have done so, their interpretations of these processes—apart from some rather trite and tired truths—indicate an incorrect reading of the events, whether deliberate or otherwise. Their main concern, as we shall see, was with the impact of the Jewish-Arab conflict on Jewish society and its interrelations with the Arab population.

The Jewish-Arab Conflict and Its Influence on Yishuv Society

There is some truth to the claim that a number of establishment sociologists failed to incorporate the Arab population in their paradigms. The critical school, by contrast, made the conflict the backbone of its paradigm. Be that as it may, the question remains—to what degree is the conflict relevant in explaining the birth and growth of Yishuv (and Israeli) society since the late nineteenth century? In other words, what is the relative weight of this factor vis-à-vis other factors, and what is its marginal value as an explanation? I obviously consider these questions relevant or I would not pose them. In fact, Dan Horowitz and I begin our book with the sentence “Palestine is a state without a nation within which two nations without a state struggle.” This is the point of departure for our analysis. There is thus no basis for the accusation that we have ignored the subject.

As proof of the conflict’s supposedly far-reaching impact on Yishuv society since its inception, critical sociologists posit a colonial situation since Ottoman times or, to be more exact, a specific type of colonial situation since European colonialism was clearly not all of a piece. According to this argument, the colonial situation found expression both in the nature of the markets (land, manpower, and wealth) and in the construction of various institutional frameworks, including economic bodies (e.g., Keren Kayemeth le-Yisrael [the Jewish National Fund] and Keren HaYesod [the Foundation Fund]) and security structures (e.g., the Haganah) aimed at consolidating the colonial situation.

The use of the term *colonialism* is, of course, no accident. There is an explicit intent to engage in ethical condemnation, as if to say that the Zionist movement and the State of Israel were born in sin. Nevertheless, any attempt to compare Jewish settlement in the Land of Israel, or any other phenomenon of Yishuv history, with so-called similar phenomena
is praiseworthy. The comparative study of institutions and phenomena is one of the cornerstones of sociological research. It is precisely such comparison that shows that even if, in the structural respect, several “colonial symptoms” did manifest themselves during the period under discussion, they never developed into an actual colonial situation. Two principal reasons were responsible for this. First, in general, the motivations behind aliya/immigration to the country were distinct from the impulses behind any other settlement movement. Second, the socioeconomic and ideological policy, particularly that of the labor movement, warded off colonial symptoms.

The perspectives and reasons presented by critical sociologists to support their definition of the Jewish settlement movement as colonialist are not consistent. The most extreme critics—those who adhere to a pri-or ideological positions—are more reluctant to acknowledge the specific nature of the settlement movement in Israel, even though they, too, cannot overlook several of its unique characteristics. Others appear to be more reserved in their conclusions, while still others, as noted earlier, to one degree or another reject the very comparison to any kind of colonialism.

The entire conceptualization of Zionist colonialism by critical sociologists is marred by a number of weak points beyond the implicit irony in their method of analysis and deduction, which is explicitly functionalist and positivist in character. This approach may be unavoidable since it both was, and likely will remain, one of the high roads of historical and sociological research. Their main weakness, however, is that they virtually ignore the fact that since the First Aliya Jewish settlement constituted the most comprehensive expression of the Jewish people’s modern national movement. This struggle, like those of other ethnic-national groups, aimed to create a political entity, and this entity was to rise in a territory defined by all segments of the Jewish people as their historical territory.

One substantial difference between the Zionist and other national movements was that the creation of a national state required the population’s migration from one territory to another. This is a unique case, unmatched by any other settlement movement. The creation of a national state also implied a “return to history,” that is, an end to the passive role played by Jews in regional and global politics and their assumption of an active, influential role. Several other national liberation movements, in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, may also have been marked by a return to history, though less forcefully and extensively since the time they
spent “outside of history” was not as protracted and the consequences were less far-reaching. At the beginning of the period in question, the Palestinian Arabs, too, were outside of history; it was the very encounter with Jewish settlement that restored them to the historical realm.

The need to deal with the “Arab problem” gave rise to a variety of suggestions and solutions. Some of these, indeed, may have been of a colonial character, such as the expedients adopted by the moshavot. These features could well have become the dominant structure of Jewish settlement except that the labor movement, which gradually became the predominant force, opted for a different path—first in the ideological realm, rejecting the colonial approach, and thereafter also in the political sphere. It chose to cut itself off almost totally from the Arab sector and build a wholly autonomous system, an economic, political, and cultural structure that would not be dependent on the Arab population and would not exploit it.

The only significant external frame of reference for the Zionist colonizers was the Jewish diaspora. This holds true even though the champions of a just social and political order were influenced also by instrumental considerations (such as economic hardship due to failure to compete with the Arabs in the sector of the labor market common to both populations—planting and construction). It is also true that at a rather crucial stage the Yishuv was helped by the British government, which lent it legal sanction to build its institutions and, at least during the period of the Third Aliya, also provided employment. Without this, the Third Aliya might have suffered even greater attrition than did the fourth—assuming that there would have been a fourth had the third failed. British assistance contributed to the construction of a central political, socioeconomic, and cultural framework that facilitated the establishment of Jewish autonomy in the Land of Israel. By these (not inconsiderable) means, various hallmarks of a colonial-like structure were neutralized.

The Yishuv’s choice of an autonomous course was a strategic decision of the highest order since in principle it had several courses open to it. Some of these remained theoretical until 1967, at which time they all moved into the realm of the actual. The various options may be formulated thus: the first was a policy of “X on Y,” that is, complete control of the Arab population while denying it political rights. This option was not realistic in the Yishuv period, although certain groups on the extreme political Right did dream of it. Another theoretical option was a policy of “X instead of Y,” that is, expulsion of the Arabs. Some such limited process did take place during the War of Independence; there are,
in fact, numerous versions regarding the number of people expelled and the existence or otherwise of an emergency plan to implement expulsion. Yet another option was a policy of “X together with Y,” that is, the creation of a binational state. This option, as is known, found support on the eve of the War of Independence primarily from the Marxist HaShomer HaTza’ir Party. The final option was a policy of “X alongside Y,” the separation of the two populations and the division of the country into two distinct political entities. There was talk of this possibility in 1937: the idea was to transfer both the Jewish and Arab populations to their own states to allow for the establishment of two relatively homogeneous nation-states. This last option, which was explicitly anti-colonialist, was the one always favored by the central stream in the labor movement. Yet we are asked to believe that it was the labor movement, as the standard-bearer of settlement, that was, so to speak, the spearhead of Zionist colonialism.

The idea of X alongside Y was nourished by an ideology that sought to build not only a democratic and egalitarian society but also a framework that would “reverse the occupational pyramid” of the Jewish people. In the new pyramid, Jews were to occupy all rungs of the employment ladder, particularly those involving physical labor, and thereby be restored to “productivity.” To attain this goal, it was necessary to build an autonomous socioeconomic structure alongside that of the Arab population to allow for a controlled exchange of goods, wealth, and manpower between the two distinct economic-political systems without either side unduly exploiting the other. The strategy of the Labor movement entailed creating the infrastructure for this sort of symmetry. Accordingly, notwithstanding certain similarities between Jewish settlement and diverse forms of colonialism, the parallels were purely structural and did not affect the unique character of the Zionist movement one way or another. This, more or less, was the picture until 1967. In 1967, there was a radical change in outlook. But, again, that discussion is beyond the scope of this essay.

Another serious flaw in the argument put forth by critical sociologists and political scientists as to the colonialist character of Zionist settlement is the great emphasis they place on the competition in the land and labor markets. They misunderstand the real extent of the competition between Jews and Arabs in the labor market. This subject has been dealt with by economic historians, and I will take a brief look at their main findings. During the Yishuv period, Jewish-Arab friction in the labor market revolved mostly around unskilled and semiskilled physical
labor and mostly in the spheres of agriculture (plantations), construction, public works, and agricultural marketing. In these market sectors, the friction progressively decreased along with the number of Jews engaged in these activities, both in absolute terms and in direct proportion to the growth of the number of Jews engaged in the professions, white-collar jobs, services, and trade. In the latter sectors, there was effectively no competition between Jews and Arabs mainly because the great majority of the Arab labor force was composed of peasants (fellahin) and blue-collar workers (in agriculture and construction). The turning point in the Yishuv’s internal division of occupations evidently occurred in the 1930s with the arrival of the Fifth Aliya.

Mandatory Palestine’s divided economic market did not emanate solely from the slogan “Hebrew labor,” which sought to instate Jews in the place of Arabs working for Jewish employers. Over the years, the role of the structural differences between Jewish and Arab labor became increasingly pronounced, greatly curbing the extent, if not the intensity, of the friction between the two groups. Jewish–Arab labor rivalry was further mitigated by the fact that the overriding majority of Arab laborers, particularly in agriculture, had an economic base in their villages and relied on employment in the Jewish sector only to supplement this livelihood and raise their standard of living. In addition, political and security events in the latter 1930s (the period of the Arab Revolt) drastically reduced contact between Jews and Arabs, even in that sector of the labor market in which they vied with one another: plantations and construction. This curtailment, one may recall, was due, first, to the general strike called by the Arab Higher Committee and, second, to the increasingly dangerous security situation.

The level of friction dropped even more upon the outbreak of World War II and especially from 1941 on, when the mandatory economy as a whole began to prosper from British military commissions and both national sectors enjoyed full employment.

Thus, while the labor market was divided along national lines, any resemblance between it and the types of markets that characterized colonial societies is weak and coincidental. In any event, the concept of a split market in the mandatory period requires serious revision. The ineluctable conclusion is that even in the economic realm, where interaction between the two populations was at its most extensive, the divided market lost its importance over the years as a factor in the structure of the Jewish economy; that is, the economic connections between the two national sectors gradually became insignificant for Jewish economic
development—so much so that the thesis of Jewish settlement having been patterned after a form of European colonialism cannot be sustained. The question of the split market economy under military administration in the 1950s and 1960s, and military rule in the West Bank after 1967, is a separate issue that must be left for a separate essay.

To minimize the significance of economic competition between Jews and Arabs in the formation of Yishuv society is not to say that the Yishuv was unaffected by the existence of two ethnic-national groups that slid into protracted, violent conflict. On the contrary. To this subject, however, critical sociologists have nothing new to add. Two examples will suffice to illustrate their excessive and totally unnecessary zeal. One concerns the realm of ideas, culture, and education, the other the question of security. Regarding the first, in recent years, two comprehensive works have been published by Yosef Gorny and Anita Shapira, respectively, neither of whom are considered New Historians. Both provide extensive evidence, albeit from different viewpoints, of the Jewish population’s preoccupation with the conflict and the unflagging attempts made to seek political and military solutions. More importantly, they address the effect of the conflict on the major transition from a defensive to an offensive ethos.

As for the question of security, it, too, was explicitly dealt with prior to the rise of critical sociology. The ongoing conflict, particularly at its height during the Arab Revolt of 1936–39, contributed, directly or otherwise, to the strengthening of the Jewish political center. The armed conflict greatly boosted the ability of each sovereign or semisovereign community to enlist two types of key resources: martial forces (the Haganah) and financial resources in the form of taxation (kofer haYishuv). The combination of an offensive ethos and a military arm certainly enhanced the modernization of the Yishuv as it prepared for the struggle against the Arab population and the Arab states. It also helped build the social and political structure of both the Yishuv before 1948 and the state once it became sovereign. This is the banal truth that was eagerly seized on by some critical sociologists, including Uri Ben-Eliyzer, to prove that Israeli society was already militaristic prior to 1948 and only became more so upon attaining statehood.

Insofar as it concerns the Palmah strike force, the claim is false ab initio. Even though its commanders championed an “offensive ethic” in all that pertained to the resolution of the Jewish-Arab conflict, the Palmah was not in the slightest marked by militarism in the true sense of the word—that is, a lifestyle and ideology that cultivate power, hierarchy, and symbols of death and heroism on the battlefield. These qual-
ities were far more prevalent among radical right-wing groups in Eretz-Israel such as the revisionist movement. To attribute these traits to the Palmah of all groups is to misunderstand them. Ben-Eliezer’s profound failure to correctly assess the Palmah mind-set is perhaps the most extreme example thus far of the failings, bordering on intellectual anarchy, of an a priori approach in the social sciences.

**Where Is Critical or Reductionist Sociology Liable to Lead Us? By Way of a Summary**

In this essay, I have attempted to respond to some of the charges leveled in recent years by professed critical sociologists and political scientists against so-called establishment sociologists. The designations attached by critical scholars to themselves and others are symptomatic of an unremitting attempt to discredit professional colleagues. The debate, as noted, is being conducted on two major planes (with various offshoots), the theoretical-methodological and the thematic-empirical.

From an examination of the writings of the critical sociologists, we find that, despite the pretensions of at least some, not only do they fail to propose an alternative sociological theory, whether on the level of meta- or middle-range theory, but they hardly address the issue at all and certainly not systematically. They relate to various theoretical paradigms from the viewpoint of the philosophy of methodology. This may be seen in the repeated attacks on positivist–functionalist methodology, primarily on its ability to conduct impartial, objective research divorced from ideology or a specific worldview. Ironically, at least some of the critical scholars present functional, systemic explanations that are not particularly sophisticated. In practice, they commit the very sin of which they accuse establishment scholars. Moreover, establishment scholars never did, nor do they today, accept the critical school’s crude interpretation of functionalism, having long since acknowledged updated interpretations consistent with the theoretical paradigms developed since the 1950s.

The attack on the methodological approaches of establishment figures is meant to convey an unambiguous message, namely, that one cannot achieve objectivity in the social sciences. Nor, the argument continues, is objectivity even desirable since, on the one hand, any writing is completely subservient to the scholar’s personal biography and beliefs and, on the other hand, social science should be practiced by engaged scholars committed to a certain idea. True, not all members of the critical
school swear by this model, but this is the “hegemonic message,” to bor-
row their language. It is a public admission aimed essentially at denounc-
ing establishment scholars as responsible for the introduction of engaged
Zionist scholarship into Israel’s academic arena.

The sin of establishment scholars is twofold: they both refuse to
admit their guilt and they serve a false idea/narrative—the Zionist idea.
The great merit of the critical school, as its adherents see it, lies in their
telling the truth and attacking the Zionist narrative. This essay has at-
ttempted to refute these charges and to point to the great danger inherent
in such talk for the very existence of research and teaching of these sub-
jects at Israeli universities.

Establishment sociology has never pretended to absolute confidence
or omnipotence in all that pertains to explaining social or other tenden-
cies and processes in Israel. The approach, whether written or spoken,
was always fairly hesitant, in contrast to the fashion of absolutism in place
today. If anyone epitomizes a supposed omniscience, it is the critical
scholars. I am afraid, however, that the ultimate result will be a consid-
erable impotence as regards social research in Israeli academia. I say this
not because I suspect establishment scholars of fearing either criticism or
alternative paradigms, or of misunderstanding the inherent limitations of
objective analysis, but because of the potentially dangerous consequences
of ruthless attempts to delegitimize rivals.

Everyone understands the need for continual deconstruction and
ongoing criticism of various paradigms. Moreover, from time to time
new variables must be incorporated into basic paradigms or new weight
given to old variables. But there is no reason to do so by force or to
make this a goal in its own right. Thus, for example, no one disputes the
fact that all researchers will have to adjust their paradigms for the tran-
sition period from the Zionist to the post-Zionist era should such a tran-
sition take place.

Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that the post-Zionist era will be
marked by the de-Judaization of the State of Israel—that is, the building
of a secular-democratic society based on the national equality of all its
citizens—as several critical researchers seem to hope. The classical Zion-
ist situation (i.e., Jewish communities in distress comprising potential re-
erves of immigrants) may, for example, disappear, but it could be accom-
panied by a simultaneous surge in the ethnic-nationalist moods in Israel
or an extreme religious-national ethos diametrically opposed to all the
varieties of classical Zionism. Under such circumstances, Israel’s present
position as the center of the Jewish people may rapidly deteriorate.
I have not chosen this example by chance, for the second controversial plane is the Zionism of establishment sociology and historiography and the relative importance of different factors in shaping Yishuv (and Israeli) society. These questions relate to Israel’s common denominator with other societies that were created as a result of immigration and the installation of a colonial regime in their formative years.

We opened our discussion by saying that the debate both within and without the academic community on the methodological and theoretical path of Israeli sociology needs to be taken seriously because of the troubling developments and tendencies that have arisen in the discipline. In part, at least, these are connected with the growth of critical-reductionist sociology. The first is the process of excessive subdivision and specialization in Israel’s relatively small sociological and political science community. Today researchers deal with a wide range of subjects such as the sociology of the family, the sociology of religion, the sociology of musical culture, sociological aspects of forms of mass communication, the sociology of organizations, the sociology of labor, and the sociology of radical ideological groups. These divisions are characteristic of all social science research and study centers throughout the world. But they are felt more strongly here because of the smallness of Israel’s academic community. Overspecialization is one of the greatest stumbling blocks in the formation and grounding of a metatheory or overall paradigm. Under conditions of fragmentation, it is easy for each researcher or small group of researchers to adopt a private paradigm, albeit one that is generally supported by similar, narrow paradigms of colleagues abroad—and there is nothing wrong with this. Such division, however, prevents the formation of a critical mass of researchers who, by means of their joint efforts in a given field of research, could become a sociological school in every sense of the word.

A second, even more troubling, development, closely connected to the emergence of critical sociology, is the flight from certain subjects that in the past were the bread and butter of Israeli sociology. Thus, for example, very few members of academic faculties today deal with such topics as the absorption of Russian immigrants, the sociology of parties and political culture, or the study of the elite and social history. The tendency toward microsociology has had an adverse effect on the research and teaching of the macrosociology of Israeli society, particularly on the need to trace the latent and overt connections between phenomena in various institutional spheres. This has been the dominant pattern, although there are a number of exceptions.38
Postmodernism’s relativist, reflexive approach attracts researchers more to such areas as social psychology, collective memory, symbolic anthropology, and the like. All of these are important fields of study and research, and they certainly do not require anyone’s stamp of approval. Nevertheless, the very tendency to detach research and teaching from the key questions in Israeli society and politics is undesirable and likely to bring sociology faculties to the point of crisis within a very short period. The reasons for this are twofold. First, sociologists are apt to become more and more cut off as researchers (though not as citizens) from the dramatic events shaping Israeli society today, ending up as a marginal group unable to contribute to an understanding of the historical processes and trends unfolding before their eyes. Second, while the present generation of students may show an interest in somewhat more piquant and esoteric subjects, it would be a mistake to assume that this will always be the case. Students interested in the broader topics of sociology and political science will seek inspiration in other departments. Israeli sociology’s severance from “weightier” or broader concerns has left these topics open for other disciplines, which have already spread into its classical realms. Striking examples are to be found in geography, economics, and political science. This might have been a positive development had the central participants remained sociologists.

Moreover, the contempt shown for the desire to achieve a reasonable objectivity, and the attempt to lump together all social scientists and historians under monolithic banners—Zionism, anti-Zionism or non-Zionism—and to label each as modernist or antimodernist, destroys all possibility of professional discourse.

By rights, the various streams of social scientists and historians should not set themselves exaggerated or utopian goals. It is enough to assure maximal autonomy of the academic framework, to strive to uncover the truth by means of various paradigms, and to draw unbiased conclusions. The alternative is to become embroiled in exhausting pseudo-ideological rivalries. Furthermore, there is the danger that, at one stage or another, the argument will be joined by external political-ideological elements interested in compromising the intellectual independence of academe. Signs of these dangerous trends can already be detected.

I would like to conclude with a brief remark on the subject of Zionist narrative, the pet topic of critical-reductionist sociologists. Establishment sociologists, they say, are captive to the Zionist dream spun by the founding fathers. There may indeed be researchers captive to this dream, but there are also researchers captive to dreams alien to Israeli so-
society. Which is preferable? In any event, it is far better that researchers be aware of the need to analyze the gap between dream and reality. I am not at all sure that a comparative study of such gaps would reveal this one—on the Yishuv through the War of Independence—to be the greatest gap in modern history.

NOTES

3. One might perhaps designate this phenomenon ideological migration.
5. The cutoff date is arbitrary and is connected here with the periodization.
6. In this context, one should note in particular my friend, colleague, and collaborator on many papers, the late Dan Horowitz.
10. Ibid., 11.
13. Ibid., 35. The partial authority of the Jewish Agency was rooted in clause 4 of the Palestine Mandatory Charter.
14. The phrase was uttered by Israel Zangwill and cited in A. Elon, Ha-Yisre’elim: Meyasdim u-Vanim (Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, 1972), 149–50; English: The Israelis: Founders and Sons (London 1972), 154.
15. Y. Gorny, Ha-She’ela ha-‘Aravit ve-ha-Be’aya ha-Yehudit [The Arab Question and the Jewish Problem] (Tel Aviv, 1985).
18. For an extensive discussion of these rifts, see D. Horowitz and M. Lissak, Metzukot be-Utopia: Yisrael Hevra be-Omes Yeter [Trouble in Utopia: The Overburdened Polity of Israel] (Tel Aviv, 1992), chap. 3.
19. Ibid., 28–29.
21. The critical sociologists frequently address this charge to, for example, S. N. Eisenstadt, most of whose analyses deal with the Jewish sector.
23. On the importance that we have attributed to this factor in principle, see ibid., chap. 2. Moreover, (Old) Historians have written extensive works on issues concerning Jewish-Arab relations in mandatory Palestine. See, for example, Gorny, Arab Question; and Anita Shapira, Land and Power: The Zionist Resort to Force, 1881–1948 (Oxford, 1992).
34. Shapira, *Land and Power*.
35. Ibid.
36. See the extensive discussion on this issue in Horowitz and Lissak, *Origins*, chap. 7.
38. One of the exceptions is Michael Shalev’s attempt to connect social and economic processes. See his *Labour and the Political Economy in Israel* (Oxford, 1992).
39. This is after the title of Nurit Gertz’s book, *Shevuya be-Haloma: Mithosim ba-Tarbut ha-Yisre’elit* [Captive of a Dream: National Myths in Israeli Culture] (Tel Aviv, 1995).