Notes

CHAPTER I


3. Many of these studies are referred to in the chapters on Reagan and Yeltsin.


8. Polsby and Wildavsky, Presidential Elections, 43.


12. Riker’s theory of heresthetic is criticized by Gerry Mackie, “The Coherence of Democracy,” unpublished manuscript, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 2001, on the grounds that many vote cycles identified by Riker, when more carefully examined, were not cycles at all. We agree, however, with Ian McLean in “William H. Riker and the Invention of Heresthetic(s),” *British Journal of Political Science* 32 (2002): 535–58, that Mackie is mistaken to emphasize cycles as essential to heresthetic. McLean demonstrates numerous examples of heresthesical maneuvers without requiring cycles. Maneuver, not preference cycles, is the essence of heresthetic.


20. See references in note 14 for a sampling of studies that use the concept of heresthetic to explain important political phenomena.


22. During the campaign Reagan offered his thoughts about visiting the North American Aerospace Defense Command, which monitored missile activity but could not stop incoming missiles. In an interview with Robert Scheer, he said: “I think the thing that struck me was the irony that here, with this great technology of ours, we can do all of this yet we cannot stop any of the weapons that are coming at us. I don’t think there’s been a time in history when there wasn’t a defense against some kind of thrust, even back in the old-fashioned days when we had coast artillery that would stop invading ships if they came.” Robert Scheer, *With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush, and Nuclear War* (New York: Random House, 1982), 232–33.

28. In the reframed issue environment that linked Russian autonomy to economic reform, Gorbachev might also have been able to sustain support from the nomenklatura, but to do so he would first have had to accept the principle that these two issues really were one. As we explain later, there were compelling political impediments to his doing so.

CHAPTER 2

3. Bartels was referring to events that will be reviewed in this chapter: Senator Eugene McCarthy’s near-victory in the New Hampshire primaries, President Johnson’s surprise announcement that he would not compete for his party’s presidential nomination, and the assassinations of Senator Robert Kennedy and Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., all of which occurred in the span of a few months. Larry M. Bartels, *Presidential Primaries and the Dynamics of Public Choice* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 19.
5. A key participant in and analyst of southern politics in the 1960s explains the origins of the strategy that was associated with Senator Goldwater’s presidential campaign: “It is fitting that the term ‘southern strategy’ should have been coined in the Goldwater campaign of 1964 because that campaign planted the seed for a radical new direction in national politics, leading to a conversion of Democratic Dixie into a Republican heartland for presidential elections. For almost a century the Old South had been taken for granted by the Democrats and ignored by the Republicans. . . . Finally in 1964, the Republican Party nominated a presidential candidate who stood more with the South than the rest of the country.” Harry S. Dent, *The Prodigal South Returns to Power* (New York: John Wiley, 1978), 6–7. Dent ran a southern operation for Goldwater during the 1964 presidential contest; encouraged Senator Strom Thurmond, whom he had worked for since the mid-1950s, to switch to the Republican Party in that year; and began running southern operations for Nixon and was elected Republican


17. These figures were presented by Nelson Rockefeller throughout the Republican contest for the presidential nomination. See, for instance, his statement at a rally in San Francisco on July 8, 1968. Nelson A. Rockefeller Collection, Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, New York (NAR), Record Group 15, Series 33, Box 62, Folder 2443. For other figures, see the data on party affiliation and orientation reported by American National Election Studies. According to it, in 1968, 55 percent of the respondents were either Democrat or leaning toward the party; 33 percent were Republican or leaning toward the party; and 11 percent were independent. See http://www.electionstudies.org/nesguide/toptable/tab2a_2.htm, consulted April 24, 2007.

18. Goldwater’s successful 1968 bid to reenter the U.S. Senate after he had withdrawn to campaign for the presidency in 1964 assured him of continued involvement in Republican politics for years to come.

19. For a careful review of the activities of the Greenville Group and the role of the South in choosing the Republican Party’s presidential nominee in 1968, see Dent, *Prodigal South Returns*.

20. Kirkpatrick Sale found that “Southern Republicans of all stripes were given at least limited help in establishing new and serious statewide organizations for the first time, and party machinery was established to continue tapping the new financial wells that the 1964 campaign had uncovered.” Sale, *Power Shift*, 115.


23. Dirksen had opposed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 on the ground that defending the right of minorities to be served in any establishment intruded on the rights of property owners. He then voted for the measure, stating that it represented an idea whose time had come, and his leadership was instrumental in the Senate’s affirmative decision. For a review of some of these issues see Byron C. Hulsey, *Everett Dirksen and His Presidents: How a Senate Giant Shaped American Politics* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 175, 194–96.


25. Goldwater said: “I want to express my heartfelt thanks and gratitude to Dick Nixon who worked harder than any one person for the ticket this year. Dick, I will never forget it! I know that you did it in the interests of the Republican Party and not for any selfish reasons. But if there ever comes a time I can turn those into selfish reasons, I am going to do all I can to see that it comes about.” Quoted in Kolkey, *The New Right*, 278. On March 7, 1968, Goldwater said: “I have stated on numerous occasions since 1965 that in my opinion the Republican

26. Chester, Hodgson, and Page, *An American Melodrama*, 185. Nixon’s campaign activities were so extensive that shortly before the election President Johnson called the former vice president “a chronic campaigner.” See Gould, 1968, 28.

27. In 1965, Ford replaced Charles Halleck, a more conservative congressman, as House minority leader.


33. The potential for the Wallace vote to throw the presidential decision into the House of Representatives was so strong that Governor John Chafee (R-RI) proposed a deal between Democrats and Republicans to designate as president the candidate who received a plurality of votes. The proposal was rejected at the National Governors’ Conference held in Cincinnati, Ohio, prior to the Republican National Convention of 1968. See “Governors Shun Two-Party Deal to Stop Wallace,” *Cincinnati Enquirer*, July 24, 1968, 1.


37. The Republican favorite sons in 1968 were Governor Walter J. Hickel of Alaska, Governor Winthrop Rockefeller of Arkansas, Governor George Romney of Michigan, Senator Frank Carlson of Kansas, Senator Hiram L. Fong of Hawaii, Senator Clifford P. Case of New Jersey, New York Mayor John V. Lindsay, and Governor James A. Rhodes of Ohio. Prior to the convention, Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina, Senator Howard Baker of Tennessee, and Senator John Tower of Texas shed their favorite-son status in order to endorse Nixon. Governor Ronald Reagan relinquished his designation as favorite son of the California delegation when he announced his presidential candidacy on August 5, 1968.

38. NAR, Record Group 15, Series 33, Box 62, Folder 2443.

39. This strategy was widely attributed to Nelson Rockefeller at the time. For instance, in a memo for the file dated August 23, 1967, Nixon reviewed a phone conversation he had with Goldwater about the upcoming presidential race: “I
had a talk with Barry Goldwater. . . . He feels that Rockefeller is quietly backing Romney, thinking that Romney will fall on his face and the Romney votes will shift to Rockefeller.” Lyndon B. Johnson Library and Museum, Austin, Texas, Office Files of W. Marvin Watson, Box 23.


41. This was a reference to Romney’s lack of support for Goldwater’s candidacy in 1964. “Barry Denounces Romney; but He Likes Nixon in ’68,” *Free Press-Chicago Tribune* wire, August 29, 1966. This wire, as well as a set of testy exchanges between Romney and Goldwater, including a Romney letter to Goldwater that became public, are found in George Romney Papers, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor (GRP), Romney Associates, Box 45, Folder Goldwater, Barry.

42. Bachelder’s campaign document is found in GRP, Romney Associates, Box 47, Folder Issues: General.

43. The day after the midterm election, Romney disavowed that he would immediately begin preparing to seek the Republican presidential nomination but also left open the possibility of such a move. His intentions became much clearer two months later when Romney Associates, a pre-presidential-campaign organization, opened offices in Lansing, Michigan, near his office at the State Capitol. See Walter Rugaber, “Romney Edges toward Race for ’68 Nomination,” *New York Times*, November 10, 1966, 28; and Paul Hofmann, “A Romney Group Opens ’68 Office,” *New York Times*, January 20, 1967, 21.

44. Romney made this statement in his February 18, 1967, speech in Anchorage, Alaska. GRP, Gubernatorial, Box 262, Folder Lincoln Day Banquet. Copies of speeches and interviews he gave on his tour in February are found in this box.


46. GRP, Romney, Box V-8, Folder April 1967.


48. The letter was dated April 10, 1967. GRP, Romney Associates, Box 44.

49. GRP, Romney Associates, Box 49, Folder Memoranda (9).

50. This was Nixon’s assessment of Romney as reported by Richard Whalen in *Catch the Falling Flag*, 11.

52. GRP, Romney Associates, Box 51, Folder Polls.

53. See Romney’s “Statement on Conclusion of Urban Tour,” September 30, 1967, GRP, Box 265.


56. GRP, Box 265.


58. See the November 9, 1967, memo by Henry A. Berliner, Jr., on the stationery of the Romney for President Committee. GRP, Romney Associates, Box 49, Folder General—Romney for President Committee.

59. Romney’s address at Dartmouth College in Hanover, New Hampshire, on October 30, 1967, is found in GRP, Box 265.


64. English, Divided They Stand, 81.


66. See Tom Reed, diary notes about Reagan’s 1968 campaign, 5. The document is found in Reed’s private papers in Healdsburg, California.

67. Reed, diary, 7.

68. Reed, diary, 8.


70. See page 8 of the speech, which is found in RRGP, Box P17, Press Unit—Speeches.

71. Reed, diary, 10.

72. Reed, diary, 11.

73. Reed, diary, 12. For Reagan’s speech in South Carolina, as well as his speech to the Republican State Central Committee in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, on September 30, 1967, see RRGP, Box P17, Press Unit—Speeches.

74. Reed, diary, 13.


78. On August 25, 1967, a group of aides and supporters reported to the governor that Phil Battaglia, his executive assistant (chief of staff in modern parlance), was recruiting homosexuals in the governor’s inner office. Three days later, Battaglia resigned. On October 31, columnist Drew Pearson broke the story. On November 10, despite the fact that the New York Times verified that Nofziger had told reporters that some members of the governor’s staff had been dismissed for immoral behavior, Reagan stated publicly that there were no homosexuals serving in top positions in his administration. This story is recounted in Lou Cannon, Governor Reagan: His Rise to Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2003), 238–53. See also Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson, “Scandal in Sacramento,” New York Post, October 31, 1967, 46; and George H. Smith, Who Is Ronald Reagan? (New York: Pyramid Books, 1968), 13–23. According to Theodore White, the scandal took the wind out of the sails of the Reagan presidential drive. “Shocked, Reagan purged his immediate staff, then withdrew to the circle of only his oldest friends, making trusted personal lawyer, William French Smith, an amateur in politics, master of all his political enterprises and surrogate for all decisions. The plans of Reed and White were put on ice. From this blow, the Reagan campaign never recovered.” Making of the President, 40–41. For a similar analysis, see David S. Broder, “Reagan Banks Prairie Fire,” Washington Post Times Herald, January 14, 1968, B1, B3. Others hold that the homosexual scandal did not divert Regan’s attention away from his campaign, but the governor’s concern about undertaking a presidential bid early in his governorship dampened his enthusiasm for the effort. See White and Gill, Why Reagan Won; and William A. Rusher, The Rise of the Right (New York: William Morrow, 1984), 206.

79. This story is recounted in Reed, diary.


81. English, Divided They Stand, 79.

82. White, Making of the President, 59.

83. Goldwater dictated this letter to Charles F. Conrad on December 26, 1966. It is found in GRP, Romney Associates, Box 45, Folder Goldwater, Barry.

84. For a review of these events, see White, Making of the President, 60; and Whalen, Catch the Falling Flag, 57.

85. According to Harry S. Dent, chairman of the Republican Party in South Carolina in the mid-1960s, he “sold a ‘southern strategy’ to citizen Nixon in 1966 while he was campaigning for congressional candidates in Columbia, South Carolina.” Dent, Prodigal South Returns, 6.

86. Following his defeat to Edmund Brown in the gubernatorial race in California in 1962, Nixon moved to New York and joined a prestigious law firm as a
senior partner. Although he enjoyed his new life on the East Coast and the new political network he developed, Nixon was never fully accepted by the eastern Establishment.


88. Sale, *Power Shift*, 6. When Nixon became president, Dent was appointed special counsel to the president, serving as a liaison between Nixon and Republican organizations throughout the country. Dent was also Nixon’s adviser on the South. During the 1968 campaign, Dent was the Republican state chairman for South Carolina. He participated in Nixon’s southern strategy during the 1968 campaign, but Howard “Bo” Callaway of Georgia ran the former vice president’s operation in the South.


91. Nixon, RN, 298.

92. Quoted in Whalen, *Catch the Falling Flag*, 83.


94. Nixon had reflected on and explained his unusual decision to travel abroad and take a six-month hiatus from politics as the Republican contest for the presidency was gaining momentum in 1967. See Richard Nixon, *In the Arena: A Memoir of Victory, Defeat, and Renewal* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), 197.


99. Barely two days after Romney withdrew, Rockefeller came close to declaring his candidacy in a press conference: “I am not going to create dissension within the Republican Party by contending for the nomination, but I’m ready and willing to serve the American people if called.” The governor in effect entered the field with this statement, even though it would be two more months before he


102. Whalen, *Catch the Falling Flag*, 97.

103. Quoted in Whalen, *Catch the Falling Flag*, 82.


106. Whalen, *Catch the Falling Flag*, 83.


109. The draft of the speech is reproduced in Whalen, *Catch the Falling Flag*, appendix.


111. The transcript of Rockefeller’s announcement is found in NAR, Record Group 18, Series 33, Box 59, Folder 2322.

112. Reed, diary, 14.


116. The speech is found in “April 25, 1968. Bridges to Human Dignity. RN’s copy,” RNLB, Speech Files, Box 94, Folder 27. Nixon would not expend considerable time and energy courting the black vote once he became the Republican Party’s presidential nominee. According to Lewis L. Gould, “When asked to appear [during the general election] in black districts, he declined. ‘I am not going to campaign for the black vote at the risk of alienating the suburban vote.’ His attitude toward black voters was stark. ‘If I am President, I am not going to owe anything to the black community.’” Gould, 1968, 139–40.

117. Whalen, *Catch the Falling Flag*, 149.

118. This statement is found in RRGP, Box P8, Press Unit—Press Releases, Box P8.

119. A copy of the speech can be found in the RRGP, Box P17, Press Unit—Speeches.

120. The quotes in this paragraph are found in Tom Wicker, “Reagan on the Move,” *New York Times*, April 28, 1968, E19. In addition to speaking in Boise, Idaho, Reagan gave a stump speech in Boulder, Colorado, on April 27, 1968. His speeches in both states are found in RRGP, Box P17, Press Unit—Speeches.


122. Rockefeller discusses his campaign strategy in his June 19 speech in Cleveland, Ohio; his June 26 speech in New Haven, Connecticut; and his July 2
speech in Boise, Idaho. See NAR, Record Group 15, Series 33, Box 61, Folder 2397; Record Group 15, Series 33, Box 61, Folder 2413; and Record Group 15, Series 33, Box 62, Folder 2434.


124. One undated and unsigned confidential document was obviously written before Romney’s withdrawal: “For the time being, the contest is openly between Romney and Nixon. It seems that Nixon will win that contest. My analysis is that the more support Nixon gains, the better it is for Rockefeller because all the ground gained by Nixon reduces the power of the Goldwater-Reagan conservatives who enter the convention fight with a tough, unyielding but manageable minority. . . . Romney’s experience has dramatically shown the fatal danger that exists for anyone aspiring to national leadership in changing one’s position purely for political reasons.” NAR, Record Group 15, Series 35.3, Box 19, Ann Whitman Series, Folder 241.

125. Rockefeller presented these figures on July 31 in a speech at his New York headquarters. See NAR, Record Group 15, Series 33, Box 63, Folder 2493.


127. NAR, Record Group 18, Series 33, Box 59, Folder 2321.

128. See R. W. Apple, Jr., “Rockefeller Sees Reagan in South,” *New York Times*, May 21, 1968, 1, 28. Rockefeller’s speeches in Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina are found in NAR, Record Group 18, Series 33, Box 59, Folder 2338; Record Group 18, Series 33, Box 60, Folder 2344; and Record Group 18, Series 33, Box 60, Folders 2346 and 2348.


130. Reed, diary, 15.

131. RRGP, Box P24, Governor’s Daily Schedules, 1968 (5–1–68 to 7–30–68) Press Unit.


134. These speeches are reviewed in Reed, diary, 15–16. See also Sam Jacobs, “GOP Lands: Rocky, Reagan Tour Florida,” *Miami Herald*, May 21, 1968, 1A, 19A; and James M. Naughton, “JFK’s ‘Missile Gap’ Now Exists—Reagan,” *Plain Dealer* (Cleveland), May 23, 1968, 1, 5. Copies of Reagan’s speeches in Miami and Cleveland can be found in RRGP, Box P17, Press Unit—Speeches.

135. Reed, diary, 16.


137. The document is found in RNLB, Speech Files, Box 94, Folder 31.

138. Excerpts from Nixon’s speech are found in RNLB, Speech File 1968 (Jan. 27–May 26), Box 94, Folder 34.

139. The radio address is found in RNLB, Speech File 1968 (Jan. 27–May 26), Box 94, Folder 37. See also Donald Janson, “Nixon Discerns a New Coalition,” *New York Times*, May 17, 1968, 25.
140. For Nixon’s statement of May 16, 1968, see RNLB, Speech File 1968 (Jan. 27–May 26), Box 94, Folder 36.

141. Dent, Prodigal South Returns, 80–81.

142. Dent, Prodigal South Returns, 82.

143. Nixon, RN, 305.


145. Thurmond wrote: “For our future peace and security, our ABM defenses should be expanded . . . [T]he United States must now proceed with development of a reliable anti-satellite system for use in conjunction with the ABM.” Strom Thurmond, The Faith We Have Not Kept (San Diego: Viewpoint Books, 1968), 72, 73.

146. Nixon, RN, 305. “Nixon on the Issues” was a campaign circular that presented the former vice president’s views on policy issues. It is in the Richard Nixon Book Collection at the Nixon Library and Birthplace Foundation, Yorba Linda, California.


148. In a June 6, 1968, letter to a resident of Georgia, Thurmond wrote: “I had a talk with Richard Nixon in Atlanta. . . . I was very much pleased with his position on matters and the statements he made. I realize that he will not favor every position that we take, but on balance he seems to be far the superior candidate to any of the Democrats that have been mentioned. I feel that as time has gone by he has seasoned a great deal and will stand for principles in which you and I believe.” See Letter, June 6, 1968, from Strom Thurmond to Hugh G. Grant, Folder Political Affairs 2 (Elections) January 30—December 11, 1968, Box 26 Subject Correspondence 1968. Strom Thurmond Collection, Clemson University.

the House. At this point with the Johnson Administration in such trouble at home and abroad it is necessary to have a public discussion of all potential Republican candidates.” Ford Congressional Papers, Box A68, Folder 21, Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan (GRF).

152. Kramer and Roberts, I Never Wanted, 326.
153. NAR, Record Group 4, Series 6, Box 1, Folder 5.
154. Whalen, Catch the Falling Flag, 174–75.
155. Whalen, Catch the Falling Flag, 175.
156. Whalen, Catch the Falling Flag, 177–78.
157. Whalen, Catch the Falling Flag, 182.
158. See pages 13–14 of Nixon’s press conference, found in RNLB, Speech File 1968 (May 27–Aug. 8), Box 95, Folder 15, Press Conference.
159. The quotes in this paragraph are found in Whalen, Catch the Falling Flag, 189–91.
160. The text of the Vietnam statement that Nixon submitted to the Platform Committee of the Republican National Convention is found in RNLB, Speech Files, Box 95, Folder 19.
165. Richardson, A Nation Divided, 255. Rockefeller explicitly reached out to black voters in a speech in Baltimore on July 12. In the speech, he mentioned his familiar themes regarding social policy that would cure urban ills such as poor schools and unemployment. See NAR, Record Group 15, Series 33, Box 62, Folder 2455.
166. NAR, Record Group 15, Series 33, Box 61, Folder 2420.
167. The full text of Rockefeller’s Vietnam plan is found in NAR, Record Group 7, Series G, Box 2, Folder 12.
168. For instance, at a press conference in Cincinnati, Ohio, on July 23, 1968,

169. The point here is not that the Democratic presidential contenders were insulated from Wallace; indeed, Wallace came out of the Democratic Party. In the 1968 election, however, he was competing with Republicans for some of the same voters. Lou Cannon has concisely explained the problem: “Polls taken in 1967 and 1968 showed that any Republican nominee would defeat President Johnson (and later Hubert Humphrey) in most southern states in a two-way race. With Wallace in the mix as a third-party candidate, however, Republicans trailed Democrats in some states and Wallace in others.” Cannon, Governor Reagan, 264.


172. These speeches are found in RRGP, Box P17, Folder RR GP Press Unit and Folder 1966–75 Press Unit—Speeches.


174. This review of Reagan’s activities on behalf of minority communities is based on the analysis found in Cannon, Governor Reagan, 263.

175. Cannon, Governor Reagan, 264.


181. For instance, see his speech in Amarillo, Texas, on July 19 and in Charlottesville, Virginia, on July 20. RRGP, Box P17, Folder RR GP Press Unit. See also Peter Boisseau, “Reagan Says Democrats Weighing Superstates,” Richmond Times-Dispatch, July 21, 1968, A1, A13.

182. Reagan’s statement in Amarillo is found in James E. Jacobson, “Not Active Candidate, Reagan Still Insists,” Birmingham News, July 21, 1968, 1, 6, 8. His speech in Little Rock is found in RRGP Box P17, Folder RR GP Press Unit.


186. RRGP, Box P17, Press Unit, Folder Speeches—Gov Ronald Reagan [5/21/68 thru 7/31/68].
187. Reed, diary, 17.
188. GRP, Gubernatorial, Box 362, Folder GOP Convention Nominating Speech.
194. The telegram is quoted in Dent, Prodigal South Returns, 87.
198. Reed discusses the issue of Reagan’s running mate in his diary, 17.
201. White and Gill, Why Reagan Won, 103.
204. The front-page article was written by Don Oberdorfer. See also Robert Eells and Bartell Nyberg, Lonely Walk: The Life of Senator Mark Hatfield (Chappaqua, NY: Christian Herald Books, 1979), 59–60.
205. NAR, Record Group 15, Series 33, Box 63, Folder 2502.
206. Quoted in Whalen, Catch the Falling Flag, 177–78. See also Tom Reed’s April 29, 2007, e-mail correspondence to Kiron Skinner. This correspondence is found in Skinner’s private files at Carnegie Mellon University and the Hoover Institute.
207. Another view about the vice presidential selection was that Nixon chose Agnew because he “could take orders.” See Robert E. Hartley, Charles H. Percy: A Political Perspective (New York: Rand McNally, 1975), 96.
208. For the text of Agnew’s statement, see Baltimore Sun, April 12, 1968, C7.
CHAPTER 3

1. Bill Boyarsky, “Reagan Isn’t Sure If Car Was Speeding,” Los Angeles Times, December 30, 1974, 3; Lee Fremstad, “Newspaper Column, Talks Are Reagan’s Next Career,” Sacramento Bee, December 30, 1974, B1; Peter Han- 

7. For examples of Reagan’s ideas on the economy see his discussion of Proposition 13, the June 1978 ballot initiative approved by California voters. Skinner, Anderson, and Anderson, In His Own Hand, 258–62. The quotes in this paragraph are from pages 274 and 255. Proposition 13 was a property-tax-cutting measure.
10. Skinner, Anderson, and Anderson, A Life in Letters, contains more than 1,000 letters Reagan wrote by hand during 72 years of his life. The authors collected a database of more than 5,000 letters drawn from private collections, President Reagan’s private papers, and public archives throughout the United States. Writing responses to those who heard his radio commentary and disliked it was one of the ways in which Reagan communicated with people about both his radio program and his philosophy. In the spring of 1977, Reagan wrote a lengthy response to a critic who believed his radio station should discontinue broadcasting Reagan’s commentaries. At the end of the letter he encouraged his critic to “listen at least for the next few weeks because I’m doing a broadcast about our great generosity. Another about the difference between ourselves and Russia as to what we give medals for, and three broadcasts about the government of Chile.” Page 271. For another response to a critique of his radio commentary see his March 1, 1978, letter found on pages 276–77.


14. Reagan’s political activities are reviewed extensively in a later section of this chapter.


30. Prior to the official announcement of Wallace’s candidacy, Melvin Laird, former secretary of defense and one of Ford’s longtime political associates, stated that the governor’s candidacy would be a boost for the president because Wallace would receive the votes of the conservatives in the Democratic primaries who would otherwise oppose Ford in the Republican primaries. See Christopher Lydon, “Laird Expects Challenge to Rockefeller,” *New York Times*, May 14, 1975, 10. In his retrospective analysis of Republican politics from the 1960s to the 1980s, Harry Dent includes Wallace in his analysis of Ford’s loss but places the blame squarely on Reagan: “When Reagan became a candidate, George Wallace was abandoned by the John Birch Society. This, more than the 1972 wound, caused the demise of Wallace and the consequent loss to Carter in the big southern primary stakes between the two southern Democratic hopefuls, Wallace and Carter.” *Prodigal South Returns*, 55–56.


32. See William F. Buckley, Jr., “Say It Isn’t So, Mr. President,” *New York Times Magazine*, August 1, 1971, 36.

33. In a May 21, 1971, letter to Robert Docksai, the chairman of YAF, Reagan denounced the movement to have him seek the presidency in 1972: “The move you’ve announced can only divide and destroy our chance to go forward. I am pledged to support the president and have told him I’ll lead a California delegation to the convention in his behalf.” See Skinner, Anderson, and Anderson, *A Life in Letters*, 174.
42. These remarks were not part of Reagan’s GOP speech in Atlanta, but were typical of those he made during the Watergate crisis. The remarks are quoted in Cannon, Reagan (1982), 198.
47. The statement by Peter Schrag is from his book Paradise Lost: California’s Experience, America’s Future (New York: New Press, 1998), which Lou Cannon cites in Governor Reagan, 381. The Cannon quote above is found on the same page.
51. See for example the August 10, 1974, telegram from Mr. and Mrs. Jack Christian and President Ford’s August 30 response in GRF, White House Central Files, Box 20, Folder PL/Reagan, Ronald 8/9/74–8/31/74. Ford’s response was a form letter, perhaps written as such due to the high volume of critical letters the president received about his choice of Rockefeller as vice president.
52. Skinner, Anderson, and Anderson, Reagan’s Path to Victory, xiv.
53. These statistics and assessments are found in Lou Cannon, Governor Reagan, 394. William Rusher reported different figures for identification with the Republican Party than Teeter did. Rusher reported that 23 percent of Americans described themselves as Republican. See New Majority Party, xvi.
55. Rusher, New Majority Party, 36, 37.
56. See two books by Phillips: The Emerging Republican Majority, and Medi-

57. Phillips, Mediocrity, 2, 3, and 8.

58. See, for example, The Ripon Society and Clifford W. Brown, Jr., Jaws of Victory (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974).


63. GRF, Richard Cheney Files, Box 18, Folder President Ford Committee—Establishment. See also http://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/exhibits/campaign/planning.htm, consulted April 24, 2007.


65. GRF, Presidential Handwriting File, Box 71, Folder 7/1/75 (Jerry Jones to Don Rumsfeld). See also http://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/exhibits/campaign/jones1.htm, consulted April 24, 2007.


67. GRF, Richard Cheney Files, Box 16, Folder Goldwater, Barry.


71. Witcover, Marathon, 394.

72. PH Box 5, Folder (Research) Sears, John.


76. White and Gill, Why Reagan Won, 166.


Criticism behind Ford Talk,” Washington Post, August 20, 1975. For Reagan’s July 21, 1975, newspaper column on Ford and Solzhenitsyn see Deaver and Hannaford Collection, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford, California (DH), Box 61.


82. Broder, “Détente Criticism.”

83. The speech is found in Ronald Reagan Subject Collection, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford, California (RRSC), Box 1, Folder RR Speeches 1975–76. See also Neil Mehler, “Reagan: Cut Spending $82.4 Billion,” Chicago Tribune, September 27, 1975, 3.

84. Reagan’s September 24, 1975, speech is found in DH, Box 9, Folder Ronald Reagan Press Releases and Speeches, 1973–75.


88. Both speeches are found in RRSC, Box 1, Folder RR Speeches 1975–76.


91. GRF, Foster Chanock Files, Box 4, Folder Research re Ronald Reagan.


95. Greene, Presidency of Ford, 164.

98. Excerpts from Reagan’s March 31, 1976, televised speech are found in CFR, Box 101.
99. GRF, Foster Chanock Files, Box 3, Folder Polls—Sindlinger.
100. GRF, Foster Chanock Files, Box 3, Folder Polls—Sindlinger.
104. Hannaford, The Reagans, 130.
105. The Morality and Foreign Policy statement in the 1976 Republican platform is found in http://www.ford.utexas.edu/LIBRARY/document/platform/platform.htm. Reagan’s convention speech was reproduced as a pamphlet titled “Will They Say We Kept Them Free?” RRSC, Box 1, Folder RR Remarks—1976 Convention (1-Staff; 2-Convention).
106. Hannaford, The Reagans, 137.
109. Copley News syndicated Reagan’s newspaper column in 1975 and distributed it once a week.
111. Hannaford, The Reagans, 137.
116. For instance, see Reagan’s July 9, 1979, radio commentary titled “Nigeria.” In it, he asks: “Are we choosing paths that are politically expedient and morally questionable? Are we in truth losing our virtue?” Skinner, Anderson, and Anderson, In His Own Hand, 17.

CHAPTER 4

1. See Wirthlin, “Reagan for President Campaign Plan,” June 29, 1980. Skinner obtained this document from Wirthlin before he donated his private papers to the Hoover Institution Archives. The campaign document should now be available to the public in the Richard B. Wirthlin Papers at the Hoover Archives.
7. JCL, Staff Secretary Files, Box 1, Folder Caddell, Patrick 12/76–1/77.
10. The statements by Baker and Dole are found in Bill Peterson, “Behind Front-Runners Plod the ‘Other Republicans,’” Washington Post, December 18, 1979, A2.
and Folder RR Speeches—1979. Delivered before the American Conservative Union Banquet in Washington, DC, Reagan’s February 6, 1977, speech has the same theme as his January 15 speech and is found in CFR, Box 104, Folder Speeches 1977, and in Baltizer, A Time for Choosing, 183–201. The quote from Reagan’s June 8, 1977, speech is found in “Reagan Calls for ‘New Majority’ Party,” Daily-Record (York, PA), June 10, 1977, 12.

23. See the following Reagan speeches: June 9, 1977, before the Foreign Policy Association in New York; March 17, 1978, before the Conservative Political Action Conference in Washington, DC; April 10, 1978, before the Bonds for Israel Dinner; January 12, 1979, Pepperdine University, Malibu, California; December 13, 1979, St. Petersburg, Florida; and March 17, 1980, Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. See also the foreign and defense policy sections of Skinner, Anderson, and Anderson, In His Own Hand, 21–218, and the two Cold War chapters in A Life in Letters, 372–431. The speeches listed here are found in CFR, Box 104, Folder 1–5 and Folder 1–6; RRSC, Box 3, Folder RR Speeches—1977, Folder RR Speeches 1978, Folder Speeches 1979; CFR, Box 107, Folder 4–3 and Peter Hannaford Collection, Box 5, Folder Reagan—March, 1980, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford, California.

24. For a few radio commentaries in which the Kemp-Roth bill is discussed see Skinner, Anderson, and Anderson, In His Own Hand, 279–80; Skinner, Anderson, and Anderson, Reagan’s Path to Victory, 382.

25. RRSC, Box 3, Folder RR Speeches 1978.


32. For a major statement of Reagan’s assessment of Soviet expansionism, including its control of Eastern Europe, see his June 9, 1977, speech before the Foreign Policy Association in New York. CFR, Box 104, Folder 1–4; and RRSC, Box 3, Folder RR Speeches 1977.


34. RRSC, Box 3, Folder RR Speeches 1978.

35. Skinner, Anderson, and Anderson, In His Own Hand, 442.


37. DH, Box 3, Folder Ronald Reagan Collection, Ronald Reagan—General Memos and Allen.
38. The interviewing dates for this survey were April 26–27, 1980. *Gallup Poll, 1980*, 103.


40. CFR, Box 104.


47. Pat Caddell’s campaign strategy document is reviewed in the next chapter.


51. DH, Box 9, Folder 9–9.


60. For a history of the Panama Canal negotiations see William J. Jorden, *Panama Odyssey* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984).


63. The transcript of Reagan’s May 1, 1977, interview on *Meet the Press* is found in DH, Box 13, Folder 13–2, Correspondence 1977–1980; the August 11, 1977, press release is found in DH, Box 9, Folder Ronald Reagan Press Releases 1977–79 and RSC, Box 3, Folder RR Speeches 1977; the September 8, 1977, Senate testimony is found in Peter Hannaford Collection, Box 5, Folder Reagan Speeches 1977, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford, California; the October 4 newspaper column is in CFR, Box 105, Folder 2–4 Reagan Column 1977; and excerpts from Reagan’s October 20 speech are in RRSC, Box 3, Folder RR Speeches 1977. For radio commentaries on the Panama Canal treaties see Skinner, Anderson, and Anderson, *In His Own Hand*, 198–212.

64. The declassified document in which this quote is found is reprinted in Odd Arne Westad, ed., *The Fall of Détente: Soviet-American Relations during the Carter Years* (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1997), 267.


75. JCL, Carter, Rafshoon, Box 24, Folder Campaign Themes Memorandum.
76. JCL, Carter, Jordan, Box 34, Folder Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, SALT 1978 and Box 80, Folder Themes.


83. Moore, The Campaign for President, 121.


**CHAPTER 5**

2. Wirthlin, “Reagan for President Campaign Plan.”
3. Caddell’s campaign plan is found in JCL, Carter, Chief of Staff Jordan, Box 77, Folder Campaign Strategy—Caddell, Patrick General Election.
5. The July 5, 1979, memo from Brad to John [Anderson] is titled “Initial Proposals for General Strategy (July–March),” John Anderson Campaign Collection, Box 27, Folder 1.2, New Hampshire Political Library, Concord.
6. The quote is from a June 4, 1979, memo to John [Anderson] from Brad titled “Random thoughts.” John Anderson Campaign Collection, Box 27, Folder 1.2, New Hampshire Political Library, Concord.
9. This review of David Garth’s strategy is based on Bisnow, *Dark Horse*, 208–49 and 301.
17. JCL, Carter, Chief of Staff Jordan, Box 77, Folder Carter-Mondale Presidential Campaign General. In a July 16, 1979, memo to President Carter, Hamilton Jordan wrote: “Pat [Caddell] had yelled ‘wolf’ so many times that I discounted his harsh analysis of our situation as well as his unconventional approach to our problems. However, after exposure to his work and time for reflection, there is no question that Pat’s original concept was sound and that many of his suggestions were and are valid.” Carter, Jordan, Box 34, Folder Image Analysis & Changes, 7/16/79.
25. Peter Hannaford Collection, Box 7–2, Folder Reagan for President Committee File, 1980, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford, California.
38. Ambassador Hank Cooper, e-mail to coauthor (Kiron Skinner), March 5, 2007. NSDD 13, Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy, is partially declassified and is found in Records Declassified and Released by the National Security Council Box 1, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, California.
41. Richard V. Allen, e-mail to coauthor (Kiron Skinner), January 5, 2007. This correspondence is found in Skinner’s private files.
44. Skinner, Anderson, and Anderson, *In His Own Hand*, 480, 481.
47. Skinner, Anderson, and Anderson, *In His Own Hand*, 484.
52. On January 28, 1980, President Carter delivered his budget to the U.S. Congress, and on March 14, he introduced his anti-inflation package.
60. Boskin writes, “By 1980, discontent with the policies of the previous two decades and the disappointing economic performance of the 1970s led a growing number of economists, businessmen, and politicians to support different economic policies than those in favor since 1960. These changing attitudes were not limited to a narrow ideological band, but were embraced by a broad group of
people drawn from various political and economic persuasions. President Reagan’s economic program, which represented a significant departure from previous policies, reflected this new outlook and differed only in degree and packaging from what was rapidly becoming a consensus among economists. Although Reaganomics was oversold ideologically and politically, it was simply something of an exaggerated expression of mainstream economic thinking at the time. It was not an aberration.” *Reagan and the Economy*, 11.

61. Reagan won the 1980 presidential election, of course, and he certainly did not abandon his revolutionary campaign proposals once in the White House. On February 18, 1981, four weeks after his inauguration, he proposed an economic program to Congress under the title “America’s New Beginning: A Program for Economic Recovery.” Considerable debate ensued, and in August 1981 Reagan signed into law a compromise version, the Economic Recovery Act of 1981. This legislation was consistent with the proposals Reagan had laid out in his September 9, 1980, speech in Chicago and throughout his presidential campaign: income tax rates were to be cut by 25 percent, with a 5 percent cut in October 1981; a 10 percent cut in July 1982, and a 10 percent cut in July 1983. The top income tax rate would be reduced from 70 percent to 50 percent, tax rates would be indexed to soften the impact of inflation, and the exemption for estates and gifts would be increased. Lee Edwards, *The Essential Ronald Reagan: A Portrait in Courage, Justice, and Wisdom* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), 93; and John W. Sloan, *The Reagan Effect: Economics and Presidential Leadership* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999), 145–46. *Newsweek* described ERTA as the “second New Deal potentially as profound in its import as the first was a half century ago.” Peter Goldman with Thomas M. DeFrank, Eleanor Clift, John J. Lindsay, Gloria Borger, and Howard Fineman, “RWR’s Own New Deal,” *Newsweek*, March 2, 1981, 22. Following the enactment of ERTA, the United States experienced 60 months of uninterrupted economic growth, the longest period of economic growth since the U.S. government began recording such statistics in 1854.

62. According to national newspapers, the Anderson/Lucey program was unveiled on August 30, 1980. Anderson and Lucey, however, signed an August 29 letter in which they outlined their national program. Their program was attached to the letter. See Brown and Walker, *A Campaign of Ideas*, 7–11.


68. JCL, Carter, Chief of Staff Jordan, Box 77, Folder Campaign Strategy—Caddell, Patrick.

69. Patrick Caddell’s document is found in JCL, Carter, Chief of Staff Jordan, Box 77, Folder Campaign Strategy—Caddell, Patrick General Election. See page 33 of the campaign document. See page 87 of Wirthlin’s “Reagan for President Campaign Plan.”


73. Bisnow, Dark Horse, 304–5.


104. Jordan, Crisis, 368.
106. Statistics are from the Gallup Poll unless otherwise noted.
112. Greg D. Adams explains that “only for the last few years have Democrats been the more pro-choice party, although the changes producing this result have been clearly underway for a much longer period. . . . Republicans were more pro-choice than Democrats up until the late 1980s. . . . Among those who recalled voting for president in 1968, most pro-lifers voted Democrat for Humphrey (by a five-point margin), while most pro-choicers voted Republican for Nixon (by an 11-point margin).” “Abortion: Evidence of an Issue Evolution,” American Journal of Political Science 41 (1997): 731, 732.
113. Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Change and Continuity, 135.

CHAPTER 6

1. For alternative explanations of the USSR’s collapse, see, among others, Mark Beissinger, Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Valerie Bunce, Subversive Institutions: The Design and the Destruction of Socialism and the State (Cambridge:

2. For the analysis of the impact of Soviet institutional constraints, see Roeder, *Red Sunset*.


4. Gorbachev’s close adviser Vadim Medvedev points out that perestroika started de facto only in 1987. See Vadim Medvedev, *V komande Gorbacheva, Vzgliad iznutri* (Moscow: Bylina, 1994), 42. The most prominent example of Gorbachev’s strong reformist rhetoric prior to 1985 was his speech at a party conference in December 1984. See Breslauer, *Gorbachev and Yeltsin*, 49.


6. On the significance of Gorbachev’s proposals, see Medvedev, *V komande Gorbacheva*, 44.


9. In addition to Ligachev, the conservative coalition in the Politburo included Solomentsev, Chebrikov, and Iazov. See Mikhail Gorbachev, *Zhizn’ i Reformy* (Moscow: Novosti, 1995), 1:378.


York: Random House, 1992), 86.


17. Vladimir Solovyov and Elena Klepikova, Boris Yeltsin. Politicheskie Metamorfozy (Moscow: Vagrius, 1992), 44.


22. Aleksandr Yakovlev, Sumerki (Moscow: Materik, 2003), 405.

23. During Yeltsin’s speech at the plenum, Yakovlev wrote to Medvedev: “It turns out there is someone more radical than us, and that is good.” See Medvedev, V komande Gorbacheva, 46.


31. From Poltoranin’s interview with Corriere della Sera, May 12, 1988, as quoted in Aron, Yeltsin, 199.

32. Yeltsin refers to the September 10, 1987, Politburo meeting in his letter to Gorbachev and cites it as an example of “systematic persecution” on the part of Ligachev; this account is confirmed in Aleksandr Yakovlev, Gor’kaya Chasha: Bol’shevizm i Reformatsiya v Rossii (Yaroslavl’: Verkhne-Volzhskoe knizhnoe izd-vo, 1994), 216.

33. Yeltsin, Against the Grain, 178.

34. According to his adviser, Gorbachev was notably irritated after discussing the resignation letter with Yeltsin. In Gorbachev’s view, Yeltsin was just looking for scapegoats after failing in Moscow. See V. Boldin, Krushenie P’edestala. Shrikhti k Portretu M. S. Gorbacheva (Moscow: Respublika, 1995), 327.

35. Yeltsin, Against the Grain, 11. Yeltsin’s interpretation of his appeal and Gorbachev’s response were corroborated by Gorbachev at the October 1987 CC Plenum.

Notes to Pages 218–29

8. Yeltsin, Against the Grain, 147.
25. Morrison, Boris Yeltsin, 143; Geoffrey Hosking notes Yeltsin’s ambiguous use of the words independence (nezavisimost’) and sovereignty (suverenitet), which he used interchangeably. See Geoffrey Hosking, Rulers and Victims: The Russians in the Soviet Union (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006), 383. Yeltsin’s reference to independence was largely rhetorical, while substantively he demanded expansion of Russia’s rights and powers within the weakened Soviet Union.
30. “Na leninskih printsipah—k novomu kachestvu mezhnatsional’nyh
35. Walker, Dissolution, 78.
36. For more on the nationalistic-Communist alliance in the election of 1990, see Brudny, Reinventing Russia; and Smith, The New Russians.
45. See Brudny, Reinventing Russia, 20.
49. Gorchakov and Zhuravliov, Gorbachev-Yeltsin, 196.
51. “The popularity ranking of Mikhail Gorbachev prepared by the All-Union center for the study of the public opinion under supervision of Professor Yurii Levada,” in Gorchakov and Zhuravliov, Gorbachev-Yeltsin, 281.
56. Medvedev, V komande Gorbacheva, 137.
58. “Yeltsin Interviewed on CPSU, Gorbachev,” in FBIS-SOV-90-142, July 23,
59. Ibid.
61. Ibid.
63. A. Olbik, “Boris El’tsin: V Rossiiu vsio esho mozhno verit’,” Komsomol-
skaia Pravda, August 8, 1990, 1–2.
64. Simes, After the Collapse, 59.
71. Yeltsin’s Address at the Fourth Congress of the USSR People’s Deputies, December 19, 1990, in Gorchakov and Zhuravliov, Gorbachev-Yeltsin, 287–89.
72. Gorchakov and Zhuravliov, Gorbachev-Yeltsin, 281.
75. As quoted in Solovyov and Klepikova, Boris Yeltsin, 221.
77. “Yeltsin Addresses Democratic Russia Bloc,” 68.
81. Solovyov and Klepikova, Boris Yeltsin, 232.
85. A. Grachev, Gorbachev (Moscow: Vagrius, 2001), 245.
87. Walker, Dissolution, 117.


CHAPTER 8

1. See Bueno de Mesquita et al., *Logic of Political Survival*, especially chapter 7.