Introduction
What’s Race Got to Do With It?
Postwar German History in Context

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In June 2006, just prior to the start of the World Cup in Germany, the New York Times ran a front-page story on a “surge in racist mood” among Germans attending soccer events and anxious officials’ efforts to discourage public displays of racism before a global audience. The article led with the recent experience of Nigerian forward Adebowale Ogungbure, who, after playing a match in the eastern German city of Halle, was “spat upon, jeered with racial remarks, and mocked with monkey noises” as he tried to exit the field. “In rebuke, he placed two fingers under his nose to simulate a Hitler mustache and thrust his arm in a Nazi salute.”

Although the press report suggested the contrary, the racist behavior directed at Ogungbure was hardly resurgent or unique. Spitting, slurs, and offensive stereotypes have a long tradition in the German—and broader Euro-American—racist repertoire. Ogungbure’s wordless gesture, moreover, gave the lie to racism as a worrisome product of the New Europe or even the new Germany. Rather, his mimicry efficiently suggested continuity with a longer legacy of racist brutality reaching back to the Third Reich. In effect, his response to the antiblack bigotry of German soccer fans was accusatory and genealogically precise: it screamed “Nazi!” and labeled their actions recidivist holdovers from a fanatical fascist past. Ironically, since his Hitler mustache was accompanied by the raised arm of a Nazi salute—a gesture banned in Germany—Ogungbure was briefly investigated by German authorities. His tormenters, it appears, melted into the crowd and evaded legal action.

The incident on this German playing field, of course, was far from
unique. Distasteful taunting and outright racist insults are part and parcel of soccer culture in Europe. The problem has been acknowledged in the sport since at least 1993, when Great Britain established “Kick It Out,” an organization to fight racism in football throughout the country. In 1999, Football Against Racism in Europe was founded as a European forum to combat racism in all aspects of the sport. But the impending World Cup generated more attention than usual to “friendly” matches leading up to the tournament and exposed the routine and continuing abuse heaped on black players in pro stadiums across the Continent. These events prompted Thierry Henry, at the time a professional player for the London club Arsenal and key member of the French national team, to initiate a highly publicized campaign urging fans to reject racism in football with the help of his corporate sponsor Nike. FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football) recognized the issue as urgent enough to make “No to racism” an official slogan of the 2006 World Cup. Given the public hand-wringing by German politicians and FIFA officials, Germany’s ability to avoid major incidents of outright racism during the monthlong event was a cause for celebration. The achievement served to confirm that the nation had indeed overcome its previous racist tendencies. Ironically, this self-congratulatory posture came at a moment when Islamic xenophobia and, to a lesser degree, antisemitism have gained increasing currency in Europe.

Acknowledging the prevalence of racism in European soccer and the more recent emergence of a racialized discourse around Muslim immigrants on the Continent as a whole, we would also like to suggest that the Ogungbure incident and its aftermath are particularly emblematic for Germany in the ways they invoke and transgress postwar taboos surrounding “race” and the term’s association with the Third Reich. If the “surge” of racist behavior in public was portrayed as Germany’s shameful secret, it was also linked to the post–Cold War challenges confronting the unified German state. Contemporary German racism, in other words, is routinely described as perpetrated by hooligans inhabiting a specific geography—namely, the provinces of the former East Germany.2 It is characterized as a recidivist impulse from the German margins: the persistent psychological and behavioral residue of economic stagnation, unemployment, and a population insufficiently socialized in democratic forms. Despite its often neofascist fashioning, contemporary German racism has been interpreted as the ugly legacy of the repressive state politics of socialism and the uncomfortable adjustment to capitalist democracy: somehow not-yet modern, not-yet Western, not-yet democratic or socially progressive. Centered
in disaffected, unemployed white male youth, it is perceived by and large as a product of the social malaise and political immaturity of the still economically stunted East.\(^3\)

Ogungbure’s angry gestures too denounced racism as recidivist. In contrast to journalists and social scientists, the soccer player suggested contemporary racism’s origins in, and affinities with, Nazism. His charge was one of historical continuity rather than rupture. But due to the Federal Republic’s successful postwar conversion to a stable democracy, now over a half-century old, this struck some observers as immoderate, offensive, and indeed technically illegal. Ogungbure, unlike his attackers, felt compelled to apologize: “I regret what I did . . . I should have walked away. I’m a professional, but I’m a human too. They don’t spit on dogs. Why should they spit on me? I felt like a nobody.”\(^4\) Some sixty years after the demise of the Third Reich, even in the face of dehumanizing racism, it was somehow inappropriate and historically inaccurate to trace racist infractions back to the days of Hitler and thereby suggest continuities of racial ideology and practice between the Nazi era and the democratic Federal Republic.\(^5\) After all, Germans—whether civilians or scholars—no longer even speak the language of “race.” The term *Rasse* has virtually disappeared from the German lexicon and public discourse since 1945 despite the persistence of social ideologies and behaviors that look an awful lot like racism.

Racism, theorists agree, has “no single characteristic form”; although a product of modernity, its specific manifestations and targets vary across space and time.\(^6\) After World War II, historians of Europe and the United States began to bifurcate the study of racism and antisemitism, in effect treating these as two distinct social, psychological, and historical phenomena. This scholarly response echoed a broader post-Holocaust trend to disaggregate the historical treatment and experience of Jews from that of other racialized populations, particularly those of color, as decolonization and the American civil rights movement were gaining force. This approach, moreover, has altered contemporary understandings of “racism,” a term that was coined and gained currency in the 1920s and 1930s and explicitly included anti-Jewish discrimination in its original definition. The postwar distinction between racism and antisemitism was accompanied by a new social conception of Jews, at least in scholarly and public venues: instead of constituting a “race” they came to be understood (and came to understand themselves) as an “ethnicity.” As this example makes evident, notions of race and ethnicity are fluid, contingent, and unstable. Here, we want to insist on the analytic value of exploring processes of racialization
both comparatively (across groups) and historically (across the 1945 divide).  

First, though, it seems important to offer some rudimentary observations regarding our use of the terms race and ethnicity. Ethnicity connotes a sense of peoplehood based upon shared customs, language, and (sometimes) religion. It derives from a “belief in common descent” and therefore tends to be self-ascribed and embraced as a positive collective identity. Race, on the other hand, implies a “harder” or “deeper” sense of difference from some specified or unspecified norm. Unlike ethnicity, which evokes (although doesn’t necessarily enact) an unhierarchical social landscape of coexisting diversity, racial ascription is at least implicitly hierarchical and therefore initially imposed from without. Race, like ethnicity, is an ideology that achieves political, social, and psychological expression via institutions, structures of thinking, social policy, and social practice. It thereby profoundly affects the racialized subject’s life. Race doesn’t exist in nature; rather, groups become racialized when their difference is registered and invested with heightened negative social meaning. Race differs from ethnicity, then, in the perceived intensity, character, and implications of its difference. As historian George Frederickson put it, race “is what happens when ethnicity is deemed essential or indelible,” innate, hereditary, trans-generational, unchangeable, ineradicable, and most of all unassimilable. While frequently justified by a fetishistic focus on skin color or other phenotypical traits perceived as markers of political, social, physical, intellectual, or moral inferiority, “race”—in the eyes of the contemporary beholder—need not be embodied or biologized in ways characteristic of the “old racisms” prior to 1945. Rather, racialized thinking can be found in institutional patterns, policies, social practices, and behaviors that target, stigmatize, treat as unequal, exclude, or adversely affect individuals on the basis of their perceived ethnoracial membership, “even if conscious belief that they are inferior or unworthy is absent.”

The Ogungbure case, of course, is only one of countless examples of “race” and racialized thinking that have surfaced in contemporary Germany—from the so-called Muslim test developed by the Baden-Württemberg naturalization office and that same state’s ban of the headscarf, to the recent judgments handed down for an attack on eight Indian men in the eastern town of Mügeln, and even to the now prevalent public anxiety over the clash between Judeo-Christian and Muslim civilizations. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that “race” is a veritable moving target in current German public discourse. For precisely this reason, we do not aspire to
provide an on-the-spot, comprehensive analysis of “race” in the present conjuncture. Rather, we seek to counter the long-dominant and unspoken assumption that the problem of “race” disappeared at the level of public discourse and policy-making with the defeat of the Third Reich. This assumption has made it more difficult to perceive the racialized response that underlies much of the contemporary debate in Germany around immigrants and asylum seekers, Turks, Jews, and other native minorities. Our goal, then, is to trace the thread of continuity across the 1945 divide and sort through key analytical categories in order to help better understand the current discourse and the ways it is implicated with “race.” In the pages that follow, we ask a number of basic, yet crucial questions: How and when did “race” become taboo in Germany? Why has it disappeared as a significant category for understanding German society since 1945? And perhaps most important, what are the social and epistemic consequences of this determined retreat from “race”?

Race and Rupture: Interrogating the Stunde Null

Over the last two decades, historians of Germany have systematically deconstructed the myth of “zero hour,” arguing for the numerous ways in which 1945 did not and could not represent an absolute rupture from all that came before. We now take for granted that West Germany did not emerge sui generis from the ruins of war and occupation, that its society, politics, and culture can only be fully understood as part of the longer continuum of German history. This perspective, for example, has made it possible to grasp the multiple meanings of 1945. The armistice of 8 May, on the one hand, terminated the war in Europe and spelled the collapse of the Third Reich. The subsequent occupation period (1945–49) resulted in the establishment of two German states and helped usher the new Federal Republic into the Western alliance. Ordinary Germans, on the other hand, did not perceive an end to the war so much with the signing of the armistice, but rather with the introduction of the new currency and impending division of their nation. And many experienced 1945 as the moment when one repressive regime (Hitler’s dictatorship) was replaced by another (Allied occupation). Yet in terms of the all-important question of race, assumptions of a Stunde null remain largely unchallenged. The Third Reich, scholars agree, was a hyperracialized society. Virtually every aspect of life was determined
by Nazi race thinking; at its most extreme, the state made decisions about the fate of its citizens—and during the war, its European subjects—based on racial categories and distinctions. At the same time, most historians have operated on the unspoken assumption that the problem of race disappeared after the Nazi defeat, reflexively accepting that the postwar taboo against the term *Rasse* also meant the question of how to define and deal with difference was no longer central. This book, by contrast, wants to insist that the same challenges to the zero hour thesis leveled in other areas of historical analysis also apply to the issues of race and difference.

As a first step, our intervention seeks to demonstrate that the question of race remained at the very center of social policy and collective imagination during the occupation years, as the western Allies worked to democratize Germany, and during the Bonn Republic. Our goal is to begin to trace the development of race and ethnicity debates after the collapse of the Third Reich’s racial state, exploring how and in what forms these issues resurfaced and were reconstituted in the post-1945 period, even as explicit public discussion of “race” gradually subsided and Germans became habituated to democratic forms and practices. Our primary focus is the Federal Republic of Germany—“West Germany” prior to unification in 1990—for both practical and analytical purposes. Because of its status as the German successor state, its historiography at the moment is somewhat deeper and richer than that of the now defunct German Democratic Republic. This same status, moreover, convinces us that it is urgent to explore the historical dynamics and mythologies that have produced and sustained its democratic polity and culture. Nonetheless, our introduction is intended as a clarion call for comparative and contextualized approaches to the study of the postwar period, and we indicate in what follows our desiderata for the reconceptualization of contemporary German and European history, both West and East.

While this introduction sketches out a rather ambitious program of historiographical reorientation, the following three chapters present synthetic summaries of some of the innovative arguments of our recent research on Black Germans, Jews, and immigrant Turks after 1945. The aim of our collaboration is to highlight, in abbreviated form, and bring into dialogue with each other some of the historical work that has already been done to explore processes of racialization and democratization in postwar Germany. In doing so, we hope to demonstrate the new perspectives opened up by such a focus.

Chapter 1, by Heide Fehrenbach, traces the postwar “devolution” of
the Nazi racial state. It follows the shifting language and taxonomy of race across the 1945 divide within Germany, investigating the impact of international impulses—especially segregationist U.S. military policies and liberalizing American social science—on postwar reformulations of racial policy and practice in West German society. Discussions regarding postwar occupation children of color, Fehrenbach argues, were crucial in reconstituting notions of race in West Germany, shifting the terms of postwar debate about race away from Jewishness and toward a black-white binary.

Chapter 2, by Atina Grossmann, examines how Jews became Ausländer in postwar West Germany. Focusing on East European Jewish Holocaust survivors who resided in the displaced persons (DP) camps of occupied Germany, it considers the ways in which victims of the Third Reich were quickly cast as parasitic “foreigners,” who threatened to siphon off precious resources. Germans insistently remembered their own victimization and refused to recognize their new/old prejudices and resentments as antisemitism, in part because notions of difference were recast in the language of resources and “rights.”

Chapter 3, by Rita Chin, shifts temporal frames to consider Turkish guest workers during the early 1980s, a moment when public debates began to acknowledge that two million foreigners and their families now constituted immigrants in the Federal Republic. It examines conservative and progressive ideas about Ausländer and integration. While German conservatives tended to see migrant culture as timeless, essential, and fixed, their liberal counterparts generally insisted on the mutability of migrant culture. Yet both patterns of thought and discourse came to emphasize incommensurable differences between Turkish and German cultures and ultimately treated integration as a one-way process. Through these case studies, it is possible to glimpse the outlines of postwar West Germany’s efforts to both redefine and deal with difference across three distinct minority groups. But this is just a start. Our hope is that the picture will become more detailed and nuanced through the work of other scholars.

The final two chapters in this volume are, like this introduction, more interpretive in character and offer reappraisals of significant developments in postwar German and European history. Chapter 4, by Rita Chin and Heide Fehrenbach, revisits some milestone moments in the history of the Federal Republic from 1945 through the early 1990s in order to trace the interconnections (sometimes explicit, but mostly implicit) between the shifting ways Germans understood democracy—as secured by economic recov-
ery, achieved through a condemnation of fascism and capitalism, earned through historical commemoration—and their conceptions of difference. The essay also explores unification and its aftermath—including the specific analytical terms that German social scientists and the media deployed to test the democratic stability of the expanded Federal Republic and that minority intellectuals used to illuminate unified Germany’s unacknowledged ethnonational self-conception.

Finally, chapter 5, by Geoff Eley, broadens the geographical lens, arguing that other Western European countries also absorbed the lessons of the German Holocaust and shied away from the language of race in the decades after 1945. Some, like France, appealed to a longer tradition of republican universalism that emerged from the Enlightenment and French Revolution, even as they repeatedly reinscribed racial difference in their social and political conceptions of colonials and postcolonials across the past two centuries. Eley then turns to Britain to explore in more detail how “race” as a central category of analysis emerged only fitfully from the neo-Marxist thinking of mostly minority intellectuals like Stuart Hall and Paul Gilroy, whose theorizing gained international influence by the 1980s and beyond. In tracing the analytical turn toward “race” over the past couple of decades, Eley trains a critical eye on discussions of European culture and commonality as well as the recent embrace of anti-Islamicism in efforts to consolidate European identity.

It is important to be clear that this book by no means represents the first attempt to address the continuities of racism and xenophobia in German history. Minority writers, intellectuals, and scholars have been commenting on the processes and effects of racialization in contemporary German society since the mid-1970s. As early as 1973, Aras Ören published poems that highlighted the ways in which assumptions of essential ethnic difference prevented German and Turkish workers from recognizing their shared oppression within the capitalist system of production. May Ayim and Katharina Oguntoye wrote *Farbe bekennen* in 1988 with the explicit purpose of exposing “the social underpinnings of racism” and demonstrating that the invisibility of Afro-Germans was a “consequence of the suppression of German history.” In the months after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Zafer Şenocak pointed to the racializing effects of the Federal Republic’s citizenship law, which continued to treat German descent as the crucial criterion for citizenship. This residue of genealogical thinking, he observed, meant that ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe with only distant family ties to Germany and little ability to speak the language were
considered German, while second- or third-generation Turks who knew German better than Turkish remained perpetual foreigners.\textsuperscript{15}

Despite their trenchant critiques, these authors have generally gone unrecognized by most German historians. Part of the problem is that their writing has been categorized as “foreigner literature.” This designation marked their texts as primarily of interest to literary scholars. It also relegated their work to “migration” or “minority” studies, fields often perceived as marginal to the main currents of modern German history. These important early efforts to engage the question of race and to insist on the continued relevance of racial assumptions in the Federal Republic have thus failed to register as integral to our understanding of German society, politics, and culture in the postwar period.

For the future, a thorough unpacking of the zero hour thesis in terms of race and difference would involve further interventions in the broader field of modern German history that can only be gestured at here. First and foremost, this task would require considering continuities across the 1945 divide. It is worth pointing out that a significant, authoritative historical literature has emerged that investigates continuities in racialized thinking and social policy from the Imperial period, including colonialism, through the Weimar Republic into the Third Reich.\textsuperscript{16} The question of continuity has been taken up by looking backward from the 1930s to earlier decades and across prior political regimes. In recent years, historians have exhibited a great deal of interest in tracing the evolution of German racism and its mobilization by the German state through the last days of the Nazi regime. A primary concern is to test the radicalism of National Socialist policies toward German and European minorities, which emerged from a longer historical commitment to racial hierarchies and eugenic practices, and culminated in state-mandated sterilization, medical experimentation, and mass murder. But the question of continuity also needs to be posed for the period after 1945. While the most egregious racialized violence of the Nazi regime ceased with defeat, Claudia Koonz has suggested that other, more localized and everyday practices were not rooted out so easily. What, in other words, happened to the everyday racism that was also very much a part of German social life, social policy, and the social imaginary during the Third Reich?\textsuperscript{17}

Pioneering work has begun on this question, but its central insights and critical approach have yet to be integrated into synthetic accounts of modern German history. Thus far, studies that have raised the issue of race after 1945 have primarily focused on postwar German interactions with,
and responses to, American culture and American military occupation. In her study of the reconstruction of national identity and gender norms in the two postwar German states, Uta Poiger explores the social and cultural threats that the import and youthful consumption of “black” American music like jazz and rock ‘n’ roll represented to both East and West German authorities. In detailing the convergences and divergences of this Cold War dialogue about the meaning of American cultural forms for “German-ness,” Poiger exposes continuities in eugenic language and racist stereotype across 1945 in both German states and thereby highlights the racialized content of social and cultural reconstruction. Maria Höhn, on the other hand, considers ground-level social interactions between German civilians and American soldiers in western Germany. She pays special attention to interracial (black-white) sexual fraternization, including the hostile reception it provoked among Germans and Americans alike, and ultimately shows how American practices of race were transferred to German garrison towns in the form of racially segregated bars and entertainment venues. Heide Fehrenbach examines transnational debates regarding the “mixed-race” children of postwar fraternization between black troops and white German women from the end of the war through about 1960, suggesting that responses to the children were central to the ideological transition from National Socialist to democratic approaches to race and, moreover, that these early years helped shape contemporary German racial understanding. Her essay in this volume compares the racial typologies of the Nazi period with those that emerged under U.S. occupation, while Atina Grossmann’s piece, like her recent book, highlights the everyday ways in which antisemitic prejudices (re)surfaced during the interregnum. More recently, the emergent body of work around guest workers in West Germany has also begun to consider the issue of race. Analyzing national public debates about foreign labor recruits, Rita Chin argues that the figure of the guest worker effectively marked imported workers as temporary sojourners who were completely separate from German society. Her essay shows how West Germans applied racialized notions of cultural difference to guest workers (and especially Turks) once the presence of labor migrants was officially acknowledged as permanent. As a whole, this scholarship on the postwar period represents an important start, but the line of investigation needs to be extended.

Taking seriously the issue of continuity would also open up new avenues of inquiry across the entire span of modern German history. If the racial ideologies of the National Socialist regime are no longer perceived
as an absolute break with what came before and after, then it becomes possible and even necessary to think about racial or ethnic “difference” as an ongoing, constitutive question in the nation’s development. One of the primary tasks of consolidating the nation-state, after all, was defining the legal and ideological parameters of membership in order to differentiate insiders from outsiders. In this respect, nineteenth-century antisemitism, anti-Slavism, and antiblack racism served a function similar to that of late-twentieth-century xenophobia. Each form of prejudice became a kind of weapon in the effort to assert a uniquely German identity; each singled out a specific group of people as antithetical and antagonistic to the German social body in an attempt to create ethnic homogeneity. Germany’s protracted struggle to achieve national unification—with the debates over a greater or lesser Germany—made the need to clearly demarcate “others” especially urgent. And defeat in both world wars, along with more recent reunification, produced moments of crisis that required (re)constructing national identity and hence clarifying belonging. Our point is not to claim that these engagements with “difference” were exactly the same or that they produced equivalent historical effects. We simply want to suggest that they ought to be explored in relation to one another rather than treated as isolated, discrete episodes.

A Jewish-Turkish comparison, for example, yields several potentially illuminating insights. In terms of the status of religion, Christian anti-Judaism offers a counterpoint to the Islamization of Turkish immigrants after 1945. In medieval and early modern Europe, religion served as the primary marker of absolute difference: Jews were viewed as religiously misguided and even the source of deicide. The perception of religious alterity dictated the way Jews were treated in German Christian lands. Even when they were tolerated, the population understood them as separate from and inferior to the rest of society. This status was most visible in terms of the restrictions placed on Jews’ free movement, trades, and clothing. Their social and economic standing as well as their physical security were highly precarious and ultimately dependent on the goodwill of the rulers in whose territory they resided. With the recognition of Turkish permanent residence in postwar Germany, religion has resurfaced as a crucial explanation for incompatibility. In this case, the problem is not so much a clash of doctrinal interpretations or theological understandings that set one community off from another, but rather a sense that Islamic religious practices cannot be accommodated within a Western liberal democracy. For many Germans, the Turkish custom of female head-covering is the ul-
timate sign of Islam’s deeply patriarchal nature and tendency to oppress women. These aspects of the religion are deemed antithetical to the liberal principle of equality. Islam, in this view, represents a major challenge and threat to postwar Germany’s hard-won democracy.

Another point of comparison is the question of integration or assimilation. For Jews in German lands, the issue emerged as a matter of serious public debate once emancipation became a real possibility. To the extent that the Enlightenment principle of individual equality paved the way for Jewish equality of rights over the course of the nineteenth century, it also led to the expectation that Jews would “merge with the rest of the citizens” and forgo “a nation of their own, completely isolated by religious customs, ways of thinking and acting.” One unanticipated consequence of Jewish emancipation, then, was an expectation of assimilation that was ultimately hard to distinguish from the eradication of Judaism pure and simple. Similarly, a main tension around Turkish immigrants in contemporary Germany has been the putative failure of integration. For many Germans on both the right and the left, the integration of Turks requires relinquishing cultural particularities and pathologies that they associate with Islam, such as the wearing of headscarves or the perpetuation of gender inequality (through arranged marriages, domestic violence, and “honor killings”). Islam, these Germans fear, encourages Turks to live in a Parallelgesellschaft with its own rules, values, and institutions that isolate them from mainstream society. The existence of enclaves in major German cities where Turkish is the primary language, worship takes place in mosques, businesses are predominantly Turkish-owned, and seemingly backward customs and behaviors predominate often serves as proof of the Turkish community’s unwillingness or inability to integrate.

By juxtaposing the push for assimilation or integration at two very different historical moments, we begin to see Christianity as a constitutive but sometimes unnamed element of German cultural identity. Jewish emancipation often came with the expectation of conversion, while the Islam of Turkish migrants has been understood as clashing with a secular state even as that state still maintains special privileges for Judeo-Christian institutions. At the same time, German anxiety over the failure to eradicate difference grows out of a distinct set of concerns in each case. Anti-Semitism, which first emerged as a term in German public debate during the late nineteenth century, specifically condemned Jews for causing and benefiting from the massive upheavals of global capitalism, industrialization, urbanization, and modernization. On this score, the discourse
around Turks presents an interesting contrast: Islam has often been blamed for encouraging backwardness and illiberal behavior among its Turkish-German adherents, a scenario that is perceived as especially dangerous because it reintroduces retrograde values into German society.

This comparison between Jews and Turks, moreover, productively foregrounds the complicated calculus that exists between cultural and biological conceptions of difference. After the murderous genocide of European Jewry committed in the name of racial purity, it became commonplace among Western democracies to reject the language of race. The 1950 United Nations statement on race, in fact, unequivocally denounced the validity of the concept as a scientific category and made biological notions of race unacceptable in a post-Holocaust world. The 1949 constitutions of both postwar German states declared civic equality under the law and prohibited racial discrimination. One effect of this trend was the repudiation of biology and the growing preponderance of culture as an explanation for fundamental differences between peoples. Such explanations insisted that it was unnatural for different national groups to live together not so much because one was superior to the other but rather because each belonged to a different culture. In the early 1980s, for example, Christian Democrats condemned the far Right’s claim that Turks and other guest workers threatened the genetic purity of the Federal Republic as obviously racist. But they went on to advocate restrictions on continued family reunion, arguing that the strength of Turkish culture prevented successful integration and thus imperiled the German way of life. Rejecting immigration and ethnic diversity, in this view, was not racist, but an honest acknowledgment of unbridgeable difference.

In the last twenty years, scholars of Europe have criticized the postwar shift from biology to culture, noting the ways that cultural explanations of incommensurable difference escaped the tainted label of racism. Some of the most insightful work characterized this shift as the emergence of a “new racism,” in which using the language of culture made racist assumptions of essential difference seem reasonable and respectable. But these scholarly efforts to expose the racialist thinking lurking beneath cultural arguments against immigration and ethnic diversity (a project we enthusiastically endorse) have also produced unintended consequences. Culture often appears as an entirely novel mode for rationalizing the claim of absolute boundaries between peoples and nations.

What a broader temporal frame and comparative approach make visible are the ways in which culture and biology are routinely interwoven. In-
deed, both the Jewish question and the guest worker question demonstrate that culturally based notions of difference have always existed alongside their biological counterparts. Within the framework of Christian anti-Judaism and antisemitism, Jews’ religious beliefs and customs proved their fundamental distinction from Germans, even as those cultural traits were often understood as inherited. The Nazis conversely employed bloodlines to mark Jews as Other, while simultaneously pointing to Jewish cultural peculiarities to justify this exclusion. In a similar vein, West German conservatives expressed anxieties about Turkish cultural difference by emphasizing Islamic faith and condemning what they perceived as Islamic-inspired forms of behavior. But they also retained a harder notion of immutability, insisting that Turkish culture was too strong to allow for successful integration no matter how long Turks and Germans lived together. In each case, neither the biological nor the cultural is fully absent from racialized conceptions of difference.

This broader approach also helps us to see that race, ethnicity, and nation are not so much discrete entities or things in themselves but rather modes of perception or ways of making sense of the world. In this formulation, the salient question is not whether antisemitism and anti-Turkish xenophobia really count as racism? Or what differentiates regular old prejudice from dangerous racism? But rather how does race thinking get operationalized? When and why do people interpret social experience in racial or ethnic terms? What about a particular historical moment leads people to invoke race or ethnicity as an explanation for social relations, social resentments, or even social violence? Our intention here is not to offer definitive analyses of antisemitism or anti-Turkish xenophobia, or to explicate the relationship between them once and for all, but to draw attention to the kinds of questions opened up by making race as a way of understanding the social world an ongoing and central narrative within modern German history.

At this point, it also seems necessary to ask what is to be gained and what is to be lost with an approach that insists on seeing “race” as a salient category, and racialization as a continuing practice, within German history. There is unease, especially among Europeans, with what seems to be the imposition of an American model—race—on a radically different European history, society, and set of values. To be sure, the concept of Rasse has been closely associated with the disciplines of anthropology and eugenics, traditionally involved a fixation on Jews and Slavs, and was generally treated as an ontological category. Thus, for many Germans born after
World War II, the idea of using the word is tantamount to validating the assumptions, beliefs, and false science on which it had been based. Yet what is consistent between “race” and “Rasse” is the insistence on looking for differences between people. In this respect, we are trying to open up a whole field of “race” and race thinking, a broader framework that would allow these two concepts to be seen as comparable but also never fully stable. Maxim Silverman has observed for a French society that has similarly rejected the word *race* that “the banishment of the term is no guarantee of the banishment of the practice.”

Our intention is certainly not to lend credence to the social category of “race” as a biological or ontological reality or to suggest that we accept such a view but rather to use the term as a critical concept that enables us to perceive processes of racialization, the ways German society has been and remains structured according to ideas about fundamental (and often hierarchical) differences among groups of peoples. It is important to be clear about the precise moments when racialized thinking became operational: when, how, and why specific sectors of the population are identified and targeted as constituting “groups” imbued with significant and meaningful differences from the majority population. When, how, why, and by whom is “groupness” mobilized, to borrow Rogers Brubaker’s terminology, and to what political, social, and cultural effect?

Fehrenbach demonstrates quite clearly that in the first postwar decades the American model of race did, in fact, have a major influence on West German parameters for thinking about and formulating social policy on Afro-German occupation children. At the same time, Chin suggests that racialized notions of difference only became necessary for understanding guest workers once the Federal Republic began to acknowledge these migrants as permanent members of society. Such examples vividly illustrate the necessity of opening our eyes to the historically contingent processes of racialization and ethnicization. Indeed, we cannot grasp the full range of social experience in postwar West Germany without this critical perspective.

**Racial Ideologies in Transnational Perspective**

Racial ideologies, although typically investigated and conceptualized in national terms, are fundamentally international and transnational in reference. This extends from specifically national regimes of belonging such as
citizenship and immigration policy, which are grounded in conceptions of “us” and “other” and articulate the legal basis for inclusion in and exclusion from the nation, through social policy, to popular notions and cultural expressions of difference. In this, Germany was like other modern European nations of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, founded upon the language of ethnic self-determination and rights. What differed in the German case were the historical, geographical, and therefore the ideological particulars. German unification and nation building in the late nineteenth century resulted from a half decade of wars (against the Danes, the Hapsburg Austrians, and the French), which were orchestrated to forge a polity, citizenry, and, ultimately, a loyalty to the new German nation and its Protestant Prussian Kaiser among a diverse collection of central Europeans divided not only by region and religion but also by language and ethnic identification. The German nation that resulted was hardly a homogeneous ideal, but a more heterogeneous mix that included minority religions (Catholicism and Judaism) and ascribed ethnicities (Poles, Czechs, Danes, French, Sorbs, Sinti, and Roma). The quest to foster national loyalty and German identity involved explicit attempts by the state and its academic establishment to delineate the social and cultural differences between Germans and their Others, both domestic and foreign. This encompassed strategies as diverse as Bismarck’s Kulturkampf (1873–79), which targeted Poles and Catholics; imperial expansion in overseas colonies prior to 1918 and in Europe proper through 1945; a nationality law (1913) based upon patriarchal descent and an ethnicized notion of Deutschtum; and the cultivation of social knowledges of race—such as colonial anthropology, Ostforschung, eugenics, and other racial sciences—that legitimated state initiatives ranging from conquest, colonization, nationalization, and deportation to adoption, abortion, Aryanization, sterilization, euthanasia, enslavement, mass expulsions, and eventually genocide. German national identity emerged and evolved according to a protracted politics of difference that established German subjectivity and superiority by delineating these from their historically, geographically, and politically relevant Others. By the early twentieth century, Germanness was defined in opposition to a number of racially defined categories of perceived aliens residing in Germany, its colonies, and its borderlands, namely, Jews, Slavs, Blacks, and “Gypsies.”

Because this process was “enmeshed” with the quest for “national identity and cohesion,” we call it a nationalizing politics of difference. This nationalizing politics of difference was responsive to more than merely the accidents of geography and localized international pressures,
whether actual or perceived. It also developed in ongoing dialogue with a larger international marketplace of ideas and interactions. In this sense, German racial ideologies—though articulated through national laws, policies, and practices—have been shaped by a transnational dynamic.\(^3^4\) Beginning in the nineteenth century, this involved, among other things, the professional interactions of biologists, anthropologists, and ethnographers within a growing international academic circuit of conferences, research institutes, and journals that resulted in the circulation of social knowledges of race, now unhinged from the national context within which they had been articulated, for selective borrowing or transplantation elsewhere.\(^3^5\) Racial ideologies were also shaped by a range of interactions between normative Germans and perceived racial aliens in the workplace, neighborhood, street, shop, school, military, and even the home (in the case of domestic servants) in Germany proper, in Germany’s colonial territories in Africa, Asia, and Europe, and during Germans’ travels abroad.

A third crucial transnational network for the cultivation of social knowledge and cultural representations of race was the expanding global market. This unleashed a historically unprecedented increase in transnational migrant labor and the mass circulation of commercial media and products—such as movies, music, magazines, fashion, and cosmetics—that disseminated potent images and narratives of race.\(^3^6\) Racial aesthetics and ideology are an integral expression of modernity, implicated in its political, social, cultural, and economic forms. Mobilized through processes of nationalization, racial aesthetics and ideologies have been perpetuated by an increasingly mobile and global capitalist economy.\(^3^7\) The German politics of race must be situated in this larger international nexus.

The argument for investigating the politics of race as an ongoing, constitutive feature of modern Germany—and modern nations more generally—does not discount the dynamics of change. The years after 1945 in Germany are a case in point. With military defeat in May 1945, the wartime geography of race imposed upon Europe by the Nazi regime was thrust back into Germany, in particular into the western zones occupied by the British and the Americans. Defeated Germans witnessed the influx of their former racialized enemies in the form of Jewish, Slavic, and Soviet DPs, who were liberated from slave labor and the death camps or, a bit later, had fled westward in the face of pogroms in early postwar Poland.\(^3^8\) Simultaneously, Germans were subordinated to the multiethnic militaries of the British, French, Soviet, and U.S. victors. In terms of political authority and social demographics, May 1945 represented an abrupt rupture
for Germans. The resident population within their occupied borders increased and became ethnically diverse. Due to military occupation, moreover, Germans had lost their formalized political and social superiority. They no longer exercised authority at home or abroad. Their hierarchical social and racial order had become disordered. But exactly how interactions with foreign Allied superiors, protected DP survivors, and refugees—and contact with victors’ own racial attitudes and ideologies—affect ed postwar Germans’ notions of racial and national identity and their expectations concerning the content and social consequences of democratization is still insufficiently understood.

Nonetheless, it is clear that the altered international context and transnational interactions within occupied Germany produced a dramatic impact. Military occupation, combined with postwar Germans’ observation of antiblack racism in the U.S. army and often violent reaction to the civil rights movement, a growing market for African American rock ‘n’ roll, jazz, and rhythm and blues, and the political destabilization caused by decolonization created a new lens through which Germans began to interpret “race.” As Germany abruptly receded as a global political and military power, the significant sites of race appeared to move elsewhere. In the decades after World War II, Germans on both sides of the Cold War border increasingly internationalized—and Westernized—the race problem.

By the turn of the 1950s, German commentators identified racist policy and behavior—and therefore preoccupations with “race” as a social category—primarily with the United States and, secondarily, with their Western European neighbors engaged in the painful process of decolonization. This was likely a function of several developments, all of which were connected to the drastically changed geopolitical situation after World War II and the emerging bipolar world. First was the adoption, in Germany, of an American model of race, based upon skin color and a black-white binary, and a corresponding disarticulation of antisemitism from racism. Second, the Federal Republic experienced a demographic decline, as a result of the Holocaust and avid emigration, of Jews and other minorities who were German citizens rather than German residents. Third, the emergence of the Cold War and proliferation of socialist states under Soviet patronage produced a new type of politicking that eagerly advertised the discrepancies between the lofty promises and the prejudiced practices of American capitalist democracy at home and abroad. At the same time, European socialist states actively supported the liberation move-
ments of colonials against their Western European masters and concurrently shielded their own domestic social ills from scrutiny.\textsuperscript{40} The rise of American international influence, combined with the social earthquake of the U.S. civil rights movement and a decline in Western European countries’ ability to maintain their imperial power abroad, refocused the international battleground of “race” away from Germany. This development was likely further propelled by the New Left radicalism of the student movement, which was grounded in a critique of the oppressive social effects of global capitalism in general and American power in particular.\textsuperscript{41}

To sum up, it might be useful to make a couple of observations. Definitions of race/Rasse are not historically stable and were in a period of tremendous flux in the post-1945 period in both Europe and the United States. The ideologies of “race” and “Rasse,” though associated with distinctive national-cultural traditions, did not evolve in splendid isolation but through intense mutual interaction, particularly after World War II. By the 1960s, Germans and their historians came to recognize “race” only in moments of overt racial violence and increasingly around problems of color—such as the eras of Nazi domination, decolonization, or the U.S. civil rights movement. As a result, the study of questions of race has been cordoned off to periods of high social drama or destruction. This has led to a neglect of the more subtle yet nonetheless significant ways that notions of difference have structured a more stable, democratic German society, economy, and culture since 1945.

The tendency of post-1945 Germans to internationalize the problem of race and uncouple it from the contemporary German context has extended to the historical scholarship of the postwar period, as we have noted. We want to insist that a nationalizing politics of race persisted after 1945, if in an altered form. Processes of racialization did not end with the demise of Germany’s global political and military power. In fact, one could argue just the opposite: that in times of military defeat, foreign occupation, and perceived social and moral disorder, the impetus for a politics of national redefinition and reconstitution intensified. As the following essays make clear, racialized notions of both German cohesiveness and unassimilable difference persisted and informed this process in significant and insufficiently acknowledged ways. After all, Germany was divided into two Cold War states, each of which faced the task of national reconstruction via political, social, and ideological redefinition. How they defined themselves and their Others was key to this process. What lessons were
learned? What models were employed? And although racial discrimination was outlawed in both states, did they envision societies built upon racial tolerance or integration? Did they, in practice, pursue both—or either?

Race and Democracy Reconsidered

What emerges from this transnational perspective, especially for the post-1945 period, is a more complex understanding of the relationship between race and democracy. As the U.S. case demonstrates most vividly, commitments to racial hierarchies and democracy were not incompatible. While American leaders in Germany preached democratization and sought to lay its foundation through denazification and reeducation, this mission was carried out initially by a segregated U.S. Army. Despite the American military’s best efforts to downplay the racist practices of its own organization, the lesson that white supremacy and racial inequality could coexist with democracy came through loud and clear to occupied Germans. During the initial efforts to mete out justice, moreover, American officials insisted on identifying Nazi victims on the basis of nationality and refused to recognize Jews as a special group that cut across national lines. This classification system had the effect of obscuring the deeply racialized distinctions that animated Nazi decisions about who should live or die.

Yet by 1949, as Grossmann points out, key American diplomats such as U.S. high commissioner John McCloy insisted that the West German stance toward its remaining Jewish population would serve as a measure of the country’s democratization. American leaders further suggested that commitment to the Western alliance compelled West Germans to acknowledge German responsibility for the Holocaust. Acceptance into the family of Western democracies thus implicitly required a clear rejection of the Nazi racial project. In practice, this meant that the categories of race tainted by the Nazi legacy became taboo, and the language of race was largely purged from West German public discourse. At the same time, there was no uniform or consistent policy against racism; West German attitudes toward race shifted multiple times in this period of flux and upheaval. Different strands of racism were treated differently: whereas it was possible to accommodate the racialist binary of black/white in thinking about Afro-German “Mischlinge,” it simultaneously became impossible to invoke *Rasse* in relation to the Jewish remnant in the Federal Republic and, more generally, as a social category in public discussion.
This complicated relationship between race and democracy is worth emphasizing. After all, one of the arguments in favor of German exceptionalism was its purportedly overly rigorous racism. There seems to be some residual acceptance of this thesis, since scholars have often operated on the assumption that West Germany was “cured” of this problem with the advent of democracy. Or, in the case of East Germany, was blocked from expressing racist values and behaviors publicly by the repressive state structures of socialism—at least while these were in place. The lack of historical attention to postwar processes of racialization evinces an unquestioning acceptance of the mythology of Western democracy, which suggests that democracy actually enacts—and doesn’t just represent itself as aspiring to—political and social equality. In the case of West Germany, taking the discourse of democratization at face value has made it difficult to grasp the ways in which assumptions of difference continue to shape social policy, social practices, and cultural representation.

While scholars have noted how German law has drawn exclusive boundaries around citizenship and national belonging to exclude migrant laborers, they have addressed this pattern in terms of economic and labor needs or immigration law. There has generally been very little scholarly discussion casting the issue in terms of racialized conceptions of nation, of a longer history of racial exclusion. Yet democracy and race were intertwined in West Germany in at least two respects. One of the key foundations for establishing democracy in the Federal Republic was building a strong and stable economy. This goal was a priority for Western forces and German leaders alike because of the ways that economic volatility had undermined the Weimar Republic. As relations among the Allied powers shifted with the emergence of the Cold War, moreover, economic prosperity became a key component of the American and British efforts to preclude communist takeover and encourage democracy in their occupation zones. With its unexpectedly quick economic recovery, however, the Federal Republic required more manpower than the native population could provide, if it was also to fulfill the conservative social agenda of returning German women to the home. To address the shortage of acceptable workers, the government embarked in 1955 on an eighteen-year period of foreign labor recruitment from many southern Mediterranean countries, including Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Muslim Turkey. Ultimately, the decision to fuel the economic miracle with guest workers meant that the process of forging West German democracy necessarily involved a renewed engagement with difference.
But the successful building of German democracy also required another, very specific relationship to race: repudiation of Nazi racism and remembrance of German complicity in that racial project. By the time West Germany became an official state, federal leaders such as Konrad Adenauer understood that acceptance as a full partner in the Western democratic alliance demanded public admission of Germany’s responsibility for the Holocaust. For the 1968 generation a decade and a half later, it was their parents’ stubborn silence about the details of the Nazi period that proved the thorough corruption of West German democracy. True democracy, according to many of these young people, was grounded in and could only be achieved by serious Vergangenheitsbewältigung.

This leftist generational critique helped solidify the deep connection between—indeed, the inseparability of—the West German democratic achievement and rejection of the racist past (along with an embrace of its more positive variant, Holocaust remembrance). Indeed, one of the reasons Chancellor Helmut Kohl provoked such an outcry during the 1985 Bitburg affair was the implicit suggestion that four decades of democratic commitment had bought West Germany the right to abandon its self-consciously circumspect posture of remorse for the past. His invitation to U.S. president Ronald Reagan to lay a wreath at the Bitburg military cemetery in spite of the presence of SS graves was roundly condemned—in large part because it seemed to assert that Vergangenheitsbewältigung no longer need be at the center of German democracy. The fact that a proper attitude toward the Nazi past has remained a cornerstone of German democracy was starkly illustrated in the recent response to the Hitler salute mimed by Nigerian soccer player Adebowale Ogunbure. Local authorities condemned his illegal gesture as improper and antithetical to a democratic German society, more concerned with the legality of his act than the fact that Ogunbure was responding to undisguised acts of racism.

This incident makes clear that the democratic impulse to eliminate all trace of Nazi racism has not rooted out racist action or racialized understandings of difference from German democratic society. The same is true for the habitual commemorations of the Holocaust since the 1980s. The postwar German inclination to define a new, democratic national identity in terms of “collective guilt” and a “community of fate” reinscribed an ethnically exclusive notion of belonging. Only those who could claim a genealogical connection to the perpetrators fit within this conception of German identity. Somewhat ironically, then, the very effort to embrace democracy by atoning for the Nazi past inadvertently became a tool for re-
constituting a homogeneous German nation. The preoccupation with Holocaust remembrance prevented Germans from seeing other, more immediate forms of race thinking and racism that persist in their democracy.

**From Postfascist to Post–Cold War and Beyond**

What work does focus on “race” as a category do? We want to suggest that it would both provide a better understanding of German history and contemporary social problems and allow comparisons between the German experience and that of other European (and non-European) countries. An international perspective allows us to place the German case in dialogue with other national debates about race and difference—not only Britain, France, and other European countries that have struggled with diversity after World War II but also the United States, Canada, and Australia.

Attention to the category of race and the processes of racialization also offers an opportunity to reframe the postwar period and substantially rethink its defining narratives. Since the 1950s, West Germans constructed for themselves and posterity the perception of having produced a “raceless” polity and society through the ready adoption of democratic forms and values. Although racist behaviors and racialized social and economic policies persisted after 1945, they were rarely recognized as such. To be sure, historians have noted “episodes” of antisemitism and xenophobia since 1945, but these have been understood as periodic phenomena marginal to the broader trajectories of the Federal Republic’s history, which tends to be narrated through a more positive focus on democratization, reconstruction, prosperity, Atlanticism, and European integration.

Given this perspective, it is perhaps not surprising that with the end of the Cold War, the demise of the East German socialist state, and the advent of German unification in 1990, incidents of racist and xenophobic slurs and violence—like those directed at soccer player Adebowale Ogungbure—were attributed to the racist proclivities of former East Germans. In this scenario, a progressive West German society now had to contend with its prejudiced East German counterpart. Since 1990, then, racism and xenophobia have been interpreted more often than not as an irascible inheritance of a now defunct East German socialist organization and political ideology. As such, they mark a persistent “difference” from the West German democratic ethos. It is noteworthy that this analysis continues to marginalize the place of racism in German society, if in a somewhat dif-
ferent way than before 1990. Rather than locate racism in the actions of a handful of hateful extremists, as had been done since the 1950s in West Germany, it is now located in the German East where western (German) democratic culture has not yet “taken.” (After all, if there is an argument for “continuity” in postwar German history it is evident in scholarship connecting the Nazi dictatorship with the “second dictatorship” of the Socialist Unity Party, or SED.) Such conceptual framing of the post–Cold War order seemingly derives from, and perpetuates, a celebratory narrative of the stability, strength, and success of West German capitalist democracy. It once again discourages a critical self-examination among (West) Germans when it comes to issues of native racial ideology and practice. In fact, one might say that unification allowed citizens and scholars of the Federal Republic to persist in ignoring issues of continuity across 1945 by off-loading concerns about racism to collective hand-wringing over the residual effects of socialism’s corrosive impact on social behaviors and values. The lack of a more generalized attention to “race” in the contemporary Federal Republic may well be a function, in part, of Western triumphalism following the Cold War.

This is not to argue that the German Democratic Republic and East German society should be exempt from critical scrutiny. It is worth considering why questions of “race” are not frequently posed in relation to East German history—or even postwar Eastern European history more generally. In the case of East Germany, this too may be a legacy of Cold War politics. After all, the Socialist Unity Party (SED) by the late 1940s increasingly refused to speak the language of “race” in public in relation to its own society. Instead, they engaged in an ideological strategy of projecting “race” and its social ills onto the contemporary capitalist West and its contemptible Nazi predecessor. However, despite official SED denunciations of Western and especially American racism and racist practices, the politics of difference persisted after 1945 in East Germany as well: whether in early postwar reactions to perceived racialized rape by Soviet soldiers and debates about who should cover the costs and care of unwanted “Russenkinder” of Soviet paternity or in later instances of antisemitism in purges of the East German socialist leadership. By the 1970s, the SED participated in the official recruitment of “contract workers” from Poland, Vietnam, Cuba, Angola, and Mozambique, who were segregated into workers’ housing and deliberately isolated from the daily lives of their German counterparts, but who nonetheless fueled East Germany’s minor eco-
conomic miracle. We need to know more precisely how and to what political and social effect the GDR mobilized a socialist discourse and practice of difference.

Yet even this cursory glance yields intriguing analytical possibilities. It is worth noting, for example, that like capitalist West Germany, socialist East Germany too sought to cultivate postwar prosperity through the use of migrant foreign labor and policies favoring their social isolation rather than integration. Boldly put, one could argue that both Cold War Germanys ultimately structured **ethnicized economies** to meet labor needs and supply their national populations with acceptable levels of consumer goods. Yet the fact, and historical effect, of these ethnically articulated economic policies—and the ethnically segmented economies they produced—has not registered in burgeoning social and cultural histories of consumption and consumerism in the German and European context.

Rather than inform the broader historiography and historiographical debates of the postwar period, discussions of foreign labor are mostly consigned to the narrower purview of minority, labor, and to a lesser extent, economic history.

The German experience, and its Cold War framing, may be instructive when considering Europe as a whole. After all, the impulse for racial reconstruction was hardly a uniquely German enterprise after 1945. An important legacy of Nazi military aggression, beyond the ideological division of Europe into two Cold War camps, was its demographic and ethnic reordering. One way of thinking about this is to pose a provocative question: How would we write the postwar history of the Nazi racial empire in Europe? How would we investigate the aftermath of racial and eugenic ideologies, policies, and practices that achieved such radical and murderous expression under the Nazi regime and its aggressive war of conquest? The consequences of the Nazi imperializing project in Europe are only beginning to be explored by historians, and more attention needs to be devoted to the war's aftermath as a constitutive period of contemporary Germany and Europe. Some historical attention has been devoted to the postwar experiences of individual groups of persecuted minorities across Europe, including Jews, Sinti, and Roma. Here again, employing "race" as an analytical framework (focusing on what Brubaker has called "processes of racialization, ethnicization, and nationalization") seems especially productive.

After all, during World War II, European countries experienced historically unprecedented forced population transfers and losses, and wartime displacements created a demographic revolution across much of
Europe, but particularly in the East. By war’s end, Europeans as a whole engaged in the project of reordering national societies. With the explicit agreement of Western democratic nations like the United States and Britain, mass expulsions of ethnic Germans occurred from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, Poland, and the Baltic states. In addition, Hungarians were deported from Czechoslovakia; Slovaks were deported from Hungary; Ukrainians and Belorussians were deported from Poland to the Soviet Union; Poles were deported from the Soviet Union to Poland. Violent postwar pogroms drove Jews out of Poland and the Soviet Ukraine and into occupied Germany. Within the Soviet Union, the Red Army and Secret Police undertook rigorous ethnic cleansing against national groups in the west and southwest, and consigned thousands of other ethnicities to prison camps and slave labor.

This was not primarily the result of postwar chaos. Rather, the victorious Allied governments of World War II agreed in principle that ethnic mixing had historically caused conflict in Europe. The “orderly migration” of minorities to their national homes was expected to secure peace and European stability. As Winston Churchill put it, “there will be no mixture of populations to cause endless trouble . . . A clean sweep will be made.” Following on the heels of Nazi Germany’s demographic revolution in Central and Eastern Europe, early postwar efforts succeeded in producing ethnically homogeneous nations. The success of this process of ethnic homogenization was assured by Soviet might and may have aided the establishment of Communist rule throughout Eastern and Central Europe. The aim, according to historian Mark Kramer, was to “reshape the ethnic contours of the region psychologically as well as physically.”

So far, these forced population transfers in Central and Eastern Europe after World War II have been analyzed by specialists as examples of “ethnic cleansing” and an international strategy with two distinct agendas: first, to ensure political stability in a historically volatile region, and second, to facilitate Soviet control and the installation of communist governments throughout the region. However, this heavy-handed attempt to defuse the national-ethnic demands of minorities within nations through forcible expulsion paradoxically reinforced a commitment to ethnic nationalism demographically, and perhaps politically and psychologically. By suggesting that “mixture” was politically dangerous and destabilizing, the postwar political strategy of ethnic cleansing contributed to the cultivation of a culture of purity.

Certainly the rigorous attempts by numerous nations to homogenize
their populations beg the question of not whether, but in what specific ways, the broader European project of postwar reconstruction was racialized. How did prewar racial ideologies and wartime Nazi racial policies affect postwar national reconstructions?65 On the intimate social scale of the family, for example, it would be instructive to follow the postwar legal disposition and geographical dispersion of war children, numbering in the hundreds of thousands, whose final placement sometimes took a good half decade and the negotiation of multiple national legal codes to determine. This amorphous category of children encompassed the illegitimate children fathered by German troops in the conquered and occupied territories of wartime Europe; the predominantly Czech and Polish children kidnapped, “Aryanized,” and adopted by German families in Nazi-dominated Europe; children of various nationalities and ethnicities, including Jewish, who miraculously survived being targeted for deportation, slave labor, or death; and the postwar occupation children of Allied paternity born to European women of various nationalities. The international debates and national politics concerning the “proper placement” of such children are only beginning to be explored by historians. Yet these negotiations constitute a rich trove of evidence and assumptions regarding emerging postwar notions of national and ethnic belonging in European societies. As such, they may suggest the legacy of Nazi violence and racial hierarchies for postfascist social ideologies throughout continental Europe.66

What would happen to our understanding of postwar European history, and our conceptualization of “Europe” more generally, if we attended to the moments when “race”—in the form of racialized language, policy, social behaviors, and valuative distinctions—gets engaged? How would we periodize the social politics of race in Europe? Would attention to such an alternative chronology alter the historical narratives of postwar European reconstruction? The historical narratives of Cold War politics? Of capitalist and socialist economies? And most particularly, of democracy and the processes of democratization, whether postwar or post–Cold War? We think so. Focusing on processes of ethnicization and racialization may be a useful way to begin to synthesize what have been relatively discrete historical narratives regarding population displacements, ethnic cleansing, decolonization and postcolonial adjustments, immigration, and labor migration.

Until now, histories of social integration and social disarticulation have continued to be structured in accordance with the political geography of the Cold War. There has been one narrative model for Western Europe,
typically keyed to the challenges of postgenocidal Jewish-Gentile relations, postcolonial immigration, labor migration, and a growing multicultural population. And another, possibly more contentious narrative for Eastern Europe, which has debated the socially stabilizing effects of socialist regimes, the socially destabilizing effects of their demise, and whether or why Eastern Europe since 1990 has been more prone than its Western neighbors to pursue contemporary politics of ethnic, rather than civic, nationalism. The terms of such debates suggest that a rigorous rethinking of ideological biases may be in order. After all, the conceptual dichotomy of “civic” versus “ethnic” nationalism, in which the former describes the rational postwar West while the latter damns the fractious post–Cold War East, better serves purposes of moralizing than historical analysis. Attending to the historical processes of racialization and ethnicization across postwar Europe would level the ideological playing field between East and West. Indeed, it may prove productive in breaking the stranglehold of Cold War conceptualizations and yield unpredictable answers to recent questions regarding the historical, political, social, and cultural coherence of “Europe” itself. At the very least it would allow us to begin to sketch a more expansive European history that not only includes Western (and select areas of Central) Europe but can accommodate the Baltic states to Bulgaria and beyond (to Turkey). A focus on the postwar politics of difference would provide one useful comparative framework for investigating social formations, social classifications, social practices, social understandings, and social representations across the European continent as a whole.

To cite a contemporary example: Germany is not unique in struggling with a more visible Muslim presence, whether in the assessments of mainstream politicians, experts, and media coverage or in the perceived and actual social, political, and religious practices and prescriptions of European Muslims. Isn’t the challenge at the moment how to describe, interpret, represent, and evaluate difference? What, for example, does this difference mean for definitions of Europe in a legal, social, political, and cultural sense? To what extent are these conceptions historically unique? To what extent are they implicated in a longer history of racialization and ethnicization intended to protect, preserve, or produce specific notions of national or regional identity in opposition to groups judged to be different from, inassimilable in, or destructive of those visions? Would we learn something by considering the current situation in a broader conceptual frame that would allow us to compare contemporary assessments of “the Muslim problem” with diverse European articulations of “the Jewish
problem” over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries? Whether such comparisons would ultimately emphasize points of overlap or divergence is something we won’t conjecture here. Our simple point is that such an approach would at least provide a historical context in which to make sense of the contemporary situation. Such a historical perspective would permit us to read current concerns in relation to longer ideological and cultural formations and strategies—whether national, European, or transatlantic in scope—regarding difference.

After 1945, the politics of difference remained a constituent part of the modern nation, both in Germany and indeed throughout Europe. Rather than be consigned to the marginalized subdisciplines of minority or (im)migration studies, questions of race and difference should be mainstreamed in historical inquiry and recognized as central to the larger political, social, and cultural articulation of national and European identities, institutions, economies, and societies. Only then can we assess the historical limits, fluidity, and possibilities of defining and diversifying both Germany and Europe.